People V Mency Ca24

Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Mency CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B340627

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
v. GA030918-01,
GA032946-01)
JASON MENCY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jason Mency.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________

In 1999, a jury convicted Jason Mency of first degree
murder, among other offenses. The judgment of conviction was
affirmed on appeal. (People v. Mency (Nov. 14, 2002, B135267)
[nonpub. opn.] (Mency I).) In 2019, Mency filed a petition for
resentencing of his conviction pursuant to Penal Code, section
1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 The resentencing court summarily
denied the petition, and on appeal, we reversed and remanded.
(People v. Mency (Sept. 16, 2021, B301966) [nonpub. opn.]
(Mency II).) On remand, the resentencing court issued an order
to show cause, conducted an evidentiary hearing, found that
Mency was ineligible for relief, and denied his petition. Mency
appealed.
His appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) raising no issues,
and Mency filed a supplemental brief. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Trial, Sentencing, and Direct Appeal
“From 1995 to 1997, defendant Jason Mency and
codefendant La Min Johnson engaged in a crime spree in the
Pasadena area. The crimes ranged in seriousness from vehicle
burglary and joyriding to first degree murder.” (Mency I, at p. 2.)
The two “were arrested on January 3, 1997, and charged with
these crimes in an 88-count information with numerous special
allegations.” (Ibid.) “[Mency] gave the police a lengthy
statement in which he admitted involvement in several crimes,
including the murder of [Marsha Lee] Birch.” (Mency II, at p. 5.)
The murder charge was prosecuted under a felony murder
theory predicated on Mency’s involvement in the robbery of Birch

1 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the
Penal Code. In 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered 1172.6
without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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and the burglary of a vehicle parked near her home. (Mency II, at
p. 5.) The jury convicted him of 60 substantive crimes, including
the special circumstance murder of Birch. (Id. at p. 2.) The jury
found true that the murder was committed while Mency was
aiding and abetting the commission of a robbery and a burglary,
and that a principal was armed with a firearm. (Ibid.) Mency
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole plus one year. (Ibid.)
Mency appealed from the judgment of conviction, and we
affirmed. (Mency I, at p. 2.)

B. Mency’s Section 1172.6 Petition
In January 2019, Mency “filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1170.95, claiming entitlement to relief
because he was convicted of first degree murder under a felony-
murder theory or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (Mency II, at p. 8.) In August 2019, the petition was
summarily denied. (Id. at p. 9.)
On appeal, we reversed the order, concluding that the
record of conviction did not establish as a matter of law that he
acted as a major participant with reckless indifference under the
standards established by People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
(Mency II, at p. 15.) We directed the lower court to issue an order
to show cause and proceed consistent with section 1170.95,
subdivision (d). (Id. at pp. 4–5.)
On remand, the resentencing court issued an order to show
cause and set an evidentiary hearing. Counsel was appointed for
Mency, and the parties submitted briefing. Thereafter, defense
counsel served a supplemental brief regarding youthful offenders

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pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) and Senate Bill
Nos. 1437 and 775, which attached a document titled, “White
Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence, A Guide for Judges,
Attorneys, and Policy Makers” (white paper). Mency argued that
“the hallmarks of youth are relevant in determining whether a
youthful defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life,
or conscious disregard to human life.”
At the August 27, 2024 evidentiary hearing, the parties
stipulated to the admission of copies of the trial transcripts,
verdict, jury instructions, and transcripts of Mency’s interviews.
The court took judicial notice of the white paper. Mency attended
by videoconference and waived his right to testify.
After hearing argument, the resentencing court denied the
petition and found Mency was not entitled to relief under section
1172.6. It found that he acted with express malice during the
commission of the murder and was a major participant in the
underlying robbery and burglary who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. The court considered Mency’s age (23
years old) at the time of the crimes but was unpersuaded that his
actions were influenced by peer pressure. Mency appealed from
the order.2
We appointed appellate counsel for Mency, who filed a brief
identifying no issues on appeal and requesting that we follow the
procedures outlined in Delgadillo. In Delgadillo, our Supreme
Court held that when counsel finds no arguable issues in an
appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 resentencing petition,

2 The notice of appeal states that he is appealing from the order
denying his section 1172.6 petition and the “denial of Franklin
hearing.” The record contains no order denying such a hearing, and
Mency’s supplemental brief does not raise any errors on this point.

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“(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that
determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing
on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a
copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and
that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may
dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231–232.) “If the defendant
subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of
Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented
in that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a
supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent
review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (Id. at
p. 232.)
On April 1, 2025, we notified Mency of the filing of this
brief and permitted him to submit a supplemental brief within
30 days stating any grounds for an appeal or arguments he
wished us to consider. Mency timely filed a supplemental brief.3

DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
“In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437), the Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the
felony-murder rule. It also created a path to relief for defendants
who had previously been convicted of murder on a felony-murder
theory but who could not have been convicted under the new law.
Resentencing is available under the new law if the defendant

3 Mency filed a concurrent request for calendar preference. We
deny that motion in the absence of a showing of good cause. He also
filed a second supplemental brief that we do not consider, as it was
untimely.

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neither killed nor intended to kill and was not ‘a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision of [Penal
Code] Section 190.2.’” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
703; § 189, subd. (e)(3); § 1172.6.)
Upon the filing of a facially sufficient resentencing petition
under section 1172.6, the superior court must conduct a prima
facie analysis with briefing to determine the petitioner's
eligibility for relief, and, if the requisite prima facie showing is
made, issue an order to show cause. (People v. Hill (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1065 (Hill); § 1172.6, subd. (c).) At the
evidentiary hearing following issuance of an order to show cause,
the superior court acts as an independent fact finder, and the
prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder following Senate Bill
No. 1437’s amendments. (Id. at pp. 1065–1066; § 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) The resentencing court may consider evidence
previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law. (Id. at p. 1066; § 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)
On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after
an evidentiary hearing, we review the factual findings for
substantial evidence and the court’s application of the law to
those facts de novo. (Hill, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1066.)

B. Analysis
After review of Mency’s supplemental brief, we are unable
to discern any assertion of error that would warrant reversal of
the resentencing court’s order. (See People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12
Cal.5th 367, 410 [it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively

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demonstrate error on appeal].) Mency does not argue that the
resentencing court’s findings were unsupported by substantial
evidence. The arguments that he makes are not identified by
headings, are conclusory, and provide few citations to the record.4
Most do not appear to relate to these resentencing proceedings.
We identify only two arguments that seem to relate to the
evidentiary hearing.
As we understand Mency’s first argument, the prosecutor
made an allegedly improper statement during his argument—
that Mency and Johnson “hop[ped] into a blue stolen vehicle . . . .”
According to Mency, this was a reference to a vehicle that was the
subject of count five of the amended information, which alleged
the misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code, section 10852. Count
five was dismissed, and Mency argues that the prosecutor was
precluded from “attempt[ing] to resurrect” this fact.
Mency did not object to the prosecutor’s argument at the
hearing, and therefore, has forfeited any objection. (See People v.
Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1260.) In any event, he does not
explain how reference to this vehicle affected or related to the
court’s findings, and he does not show he has been prejudiced by
the reference.
Mency’s second argument seems to be that Mency II “stated
and agreed” that he was “not a major participant and did not act
with reckless indifference.” He argues that the prosecution “did

4 We may “disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported
by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which
the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.” (City of
Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287.) Any issues
not discussed in this opinion are deemed forfeited. (Brown v. Garcia
(2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1207.)

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not adhere to” and “circumvent[ed]” this purported conclusion.
Mency misapprehends our prior ruling. The question in Mency II
was whether it was error to summarily deny his section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. In reversing the trial court’s
denial order, we wrote: “Nothing in [Mency’s] record of conviction
establishes as a matter of law that he acted with reckless
indifference as a major participant during the robbery and/or
burglary in accordance with standards established by Banks and
Clark.” (Mency II, at p. 15, italics added.) We held only that
Mency was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 16.) Our
prior decision did not prevent the resentencing court from
finding, after considering the trial record, additional material,
and argument, that Mency was a major participant in the
underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.

DISPOSITION
The resentencing court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.