Crenshaw V Yost
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Mariah Crenshaw, Case No. 1:25cv00787
Plaintiff,
-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dave Yost, AND ORDER
Defendant.
Pro se plaintiff Mariah Crenshaw filed this action against Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney
General, concerning a judgment entered against her by the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals.
(Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff objects to the Ohio Appellate Court’s order declaring her to be a vexatious
litigant. Plaintiff appears to claim that the local appellate rule relied upon by the state court of
appeals is in conflict with Ohio’s vexatious litigator statute and is unconstitutional. She seeks
declaratory relief stating that the statute lacks “Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment language to
protect litigants from the appellate court rule” and the local appellate rule is unconstitutional. (Id.
at 29).
Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). The Court
grants Plaintiff’s application.
I. Background
Plaintiff’s complaint contains very few facts and is comprised almost entirely of legal
arguments and one exhibit. The exhibit reveals that Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas regarding the content of social media posts that Plaintiff alleges were
defamatory, caused her emotional distress, and constituted telephone harassment. Plaintiff
appealed a judgment against her to the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals. On appeal, the
Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment and, pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code § 2323.52 and the Appellate Court’s Local Appellate Rule 23, declared Plaintiff to be a
vexatious litigator. (See Doc. No. 1-1). The Appellate Court barred Plaintiff from filing new
appeals or continuing with current appeals pro se without first obtaining leave of court. And the
Appellate Court further prohibited Plaintiff from filing any appeal or original action pro se without
paying the filing fee. (Id. at 14-15).
On February 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed an action in the Northern District of Ohio against three
Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals judges: Eileen A. Gallagher, Frank D. Celebrezze, and Sean
C. Gallagher. See Crenshaw v. Gallagher, et al., No. 1:25CV218 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2025).
Plaintiff claimed the judges erred in finding that she meets the criteria of a vexatious litigator under
Ohio Revised Code § 2323. She also claimed the judges denied her due process and equal
protection and committed the torts of negligence, slander, libel, false light, malfeasance in public
office, and abuse of power. (Id.; Doc. No. 4 at 2). On March 25, 2025, the Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s action, finding the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the judges are immune from suit. (Id.; Doc. No. 4 at 5-6).
Undeterred, Plaintiff now files this action, objecting once again to the Appellate Court’s
vexatious litigant order entered against her in the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals. This time,
however, Plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court does not have the authority to sua sponte declare
litigants vexatious without a court of common pleas judgment entry, pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code§ 2323, and the Ohio Local Appellate Rule deprives litigants of their Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process. (Doc. No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff asks this Court to “review the totality
of the cases [with] which Plaintiff was involved and the district court’s rulings to determine if the
constitutionality of the vexatious litigator statute was and is being properly applied.” (Id. at 2-3).
And she states that the absence of a court of common pleas final determination of vexatious
litigation in compliance with the Ohio statute “should void any appellate declaration of vexatious
conduct by the courts of appeals.” (Id.).
II. Standard of Review
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.
Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594,
30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The Court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action
under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks
an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d
338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99
F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised
on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise
the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed
factual allegations but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id.
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).
III. Law and Analysis
A. Rooker-Feldman
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing his or her case in state court is barred
from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States
District Court based on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her federal
rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2012). United States District Courts do not
have jurisdiction to review state court decisions even if the request to reverse the state court
judgment is based on an allegation that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,292 (2005). Federal appellate review of state court
judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme Court. See Dist. of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where a party losing his or her case in state
court initiates an action in federal district court complaining of injury caused by a state court
judgment itself and seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99; In re
Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the
Court must look to the “source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.”
McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir.2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299. If the
source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state court judgment itself, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars the federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other source of injury, such
as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id.; see Lawrence v.
Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368-69 (6th Cir. 2008). In conducting this inquiry, the Court also considers
the plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray, 424 Fed. App’x. 537, 2011 WL 2149547, at *1
(6th Cir. 2011).
Here, as in the previous case filed in this district, the source of Plaintiff’s injury is the
Appellate Court vexatious litigator judgment. Indeed, Plaintiff states that she has been injured by
the Appellate Court’s judgment, and she attaches a copy of the Appellate Court order to the
complaint. (See Doc. No. 1 at 23; Doc. No. 1-1). Plaintiff alleges that the judges erred in following
the Local Appellate Rule and sua sponte declaring her to be a vexatious litigator, rather than
following the requirements of the Ohio statute governing vexatious litigators. And she asks this
Court to review and reject that state appellate court judgment, “void[ing] any appellate declaration
of vexatious conduct by the courts of appeals.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3). To the extent Plaintiff is asking
this Court to declare the state appellate judges were wrong and to overturn the Appellate Court’s
order, the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant that relief pursuant to Rooker-Feldman.
B. Res Judicata
Even if the Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to
relitigate the matter in another court in the hope of obtaining a different result, this Court cannot
grant that relief.
The term “res judicata” literally means “a matter [already] judged.” Res Judicata,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The doctrine of res judicata bars duplicative
litigation based on the same event or events. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.
Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.
Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979). When one court has already resolved the merits of a case, another
court will not revisit them. Id. The doctrine of res judicata therefore precludes a party from
bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or from raising a new defense to defeat the prior
judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir.
1990). The doctrine bars relitigation of every issue actually brought before the Court and every
issue or defense that should have been raised in the previous action. Id. Furthermore, res judicata
bars Plaintiff from relitigating in federal court claims and issues that were previously decided by
a state court. Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 570 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff asks this Court to make a determination on the Appellate Court’s vexatious
litigator order. Plaintiff has already litigated this issue in federal court. A decision on an issue by
one federal court bars Plaintiff from filing another case in federal court to relitigate the same issue.
Additionally, this Court must give full faith and credit to the state court judgment declaring her to
be a vexatious litigator. See Anderson v. Corrigan, No. 1:23 CV 2262, 2023 WL 8190129, 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209972, *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 2023) (citing Bragg, 570 F.3d at 776).
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
No. 2), denies Plaintiff’s motion for electronic filing privileges (Doc. No. 3), and dismisses the
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
Date: July 23, 2025 U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE