Aceves V Central Management Services
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ISRAEL ACEVES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 24-cv-3022
)
CENTRAL MANAGEMENT )
SERVICES, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Illinois Department of Central
Management Services’ (“CMS”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim and Memorandum of Law in Support (d/e 18).
Because Plaintiff does not contest his claims’ deficiencies raised by
Defendant, Defendant’s Motion (d/e 18) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Complaint (d/e 1) is DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 5, 2024, Plaintiff Aceves filed a Complaint with
this Court alleging that Defendant CMS discriminated against him
based on his national origin and race in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and based on his race in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981. See d/e 1, p. 2. Plaintiff further alleged that
Defendant discriminated against him starting on or about
December 6, 2023, by failing to promote him and by retaliating
against him for whistleblowing. Id. at pp. 2-3. Plaintiff, who is
proceeding pro se, filed the requisite filing fee on February 27, 2024
before repeatedly attempting to serve Defendant. See d/e 2, 3, 8,
and 10.
On November 8, 2024, Defendant’s counsel filed both a Notice
of Appearance of Attorney (d/e 11) and a Motion to Dismiss &
Memorandum of Law in Support (d/e 12) for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and
insufficient service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(5). On November 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
Response (d/e 14) to Defendant’s Motion (d/e 12).
On January 10, 2025, this Court filed a text order directing
Plaintiff “to file with this Court by January 24, 2025 the charge he
filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Right to
Sue Notice he received from the Illinois Department of Human
Rights relating to this claim.” See January 10, 2025 Text Order. On
January 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed “[t]he Right to Sue letter issued by
the Illinois Department of Human Rights” “in response to the
Court's request for further information in the above-referenced
case.” d/e 15, p. 1.
On January 23, 2025, this Court issued an Order and Opinion
(d/e 16) denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 12) for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2) and insufficient service of process pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5).
On February 5, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim and Memorandum of Law in Support (d/e
18). On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Response (d/e 21).
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter
because Plaintiff’s claims arise under Title VII and § 1981, which
are federal statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (AThe district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States@). Venue is
proper because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Central District of Illinois.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
III. FACTS
The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint (d/e 1)
and are accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Bible v.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff applied for a promotion on or about November 2023.
See d/e 1, p. 4. On or about December 6, 2023, Plaintiff had a
meeting with Katrina McCarver, who served as Senior Public Service
Administrator at CMS. Id., see also d/e 15, p. 4. During the
meeting, McCarver stated that Plaintiff was the most qualified and
senior employee. See d/e 1, p. 4. However, McCarver decided to
bypass Plaintiff for consideration for the position of Human
Resources Specialist, saying that Plaintiff was not a good fit. Id.
Plaintiff was already part of the relevant team on a different unit. Id.
In approximately mid-December 2023, Plaintiff blew the
whistle by raising concerns to the Illinois Office of Executive
Inspector General about alleged wrongdoings within CMS. Id. at pp.
4, 6. Plaintiff was then retaliated against and suspended for 15
days. Id.
Plaintiff claims that he filed a charge before the Illinois
Department of Human Rights (IDHR) relating to his claims and
received a Right to Sue Notice on January 23, 2024. See d/e 1, pp.
2-3. Plaintiff’s Complaint requests that this Court direct Defendant
to promote him, “hold the parties involved accountable,” and
“remove employee discipline from employee file.” Id. at pp. 4-5.
Plaintiff’s Response requests that this Court direct Defendant to
“correct[] the job title to ‘Human Resources Specialist,’” “issue[] an
order of non-retaliation,” and “award[] back pay as calculated and
such other relief as just.” d/e 21, p. 3.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See d/e 18, p.
1. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the
complaint’s sufficiency. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d
454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). A complaint must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief” that puts the defendant on notice of the allegations. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), see also Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.
2002).
The court accepts all well-pleaded facts alleged and draws all
possible inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6)
can be based on documents that are critical to the complaint and
referred to in the complaint. Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743,
745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
V. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff Did Not Exhaust His Administrative Remedies
as Required Before Bringing His Title VII Claim.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant CMS
discriminated against him based on his national origin and race in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See d/e 1, p. 2.
“Before bringing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first exhaust
his administrative remedies by filing charges with the [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)] and receiving a
right to sue letter.” Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004
(7th Cir. 2019). “After doing so, a plaintiff filing suit in federal court
may bring only those claims that were included in [his] EEOC
charge, or that are like or reasonably related to the allegations of
the charge and growing out of such allegations.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
In response to this Court’s directive, Plaintiff submitted a
Right to Sue Notice bearing Charge No. 21B-2020-01126. See d/e
15, p. 2; d/e 21, p. 21. The same charge number, 21B-2020-01126,
appears on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint. See d/e 1, p. 1; d/e 21,
p. 10.
Defendant first argues in its Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff
did not “exhaust administrative remedies by filing charges with the
EEOC and receiving a right to sue letter as to the claims in the
complaint” as required for Plaintiff to pursue his claims in federal
court. d/e 18, p. 5. Defendant provides documentation, and
Plaintiff does not dispute, that EEOC Charge No. 21B-2020-01126
corresponds to IDHR Charge of Discrimination 2020SF2063, which
Plaintiff filed on April 15, 2020 alleging that CMS discriminated
against him by suspending him and failing to promote him in June
2019 due to his national origin and ancestry. See id. at pp. 5-6; see
also d/e 18-1, pp. 7-9.
Conversely, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant
discriminated against him in 2023—not during any other year. See
d/e 1, pp. 2-4. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title VII claim does not “bring
only those claims that were included in [his provided] EEOC charge
[No. 21B-2020-01126], or that are like or reasonably related to the
allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.”
Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1004.
Furthermore, Plaintiff provides no documentation indicating
that he filed any additional EEOC charges after EEOC Charge No.
21B-2020-01126 alleging that Defendant discriminated against him
in 2019. Plaintiff does not allege that he “first exhaust[ed] his
administrative remedies by filing charges with the EEOC and
receiving a right to sue letter” pertaining to Plaintiff’s allegations
that Defendant discriminated against him in 2023. Chaidez, 937
F.3d at 1004. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 18) is
GRANTED as to the Title VII claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 1).
B. Plaintiff’s § 1981 Claim, Interpreted as a § 1983 Claim,
is Barred by Sovereign Immunity.
Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges that Defendant CMS
discriminated against him based on his race in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981. See d/e 1, p. 2. Plaintiff admits that Defendant is an
agency of the State of Illinois. Id. at pp. 9-10.
The Seventh Circuit has held that “42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not
create a private right of action against state actors,” such that
“§ 1983 remains the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981
committed by state actors.” Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook
County, Ill., 752 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2014). Therefore, this
Court interprets Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim as a § 1983 claim.
Defendant argues in its Motion to Dismiss that, “[e]ven if
Plaintiff had brought his § 1981 claim against CMS pursuant to
§ 1983, this claim still fails because CMS is not a ‘person’ subject to
suit under § 1983.” d/e 18, p. 6.
Section 1983 claims must comply with the Eleventh
Amendment, which typically bars a state’s citizens from suing their
own state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). However,
individuals may nonetheless sue a state if: 1) the suit is “against
state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing
violations of federal law…under the Ex parte Young doctrine,” 2)
“Congress has abrogated the state's immunity from suit through an
unequivocal expression of its intent to do so and pursuant to a valid
exercise of its power,” or 3) the defendant state “has properly waived
its sovereign immunity and consented to suit in federal court.” MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Com. Comm'n, 183 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir.
1999) (internal citations omitted).
In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
(1989), the Supreme Court held that neither “a State” nor
“governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for
Eleventh Amendment purposes” are considered “a person within the
meaning of § 1983.” Id. at 64, 70 (internal citations omitted). In
other words, “a state agency is the state for purposes of the
[E]leventh [A]mendment.” Kroll v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 934
F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
Since Plaintiff admits that Defendant is an agency of the State
of Illinois, see d/e 1, pp. 9-10, the Eleventh Amendment would
typically bar his suit. Additionally, none of the three exceptions
outlined above apply to Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff does not name any
“state officials” as defendants nor does he “seek[] prospective
equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law” under the first
exception, as Plaintiff names only Defendant CMS and alleges only
events that occurred in 2023. MCI, 183 F.3d at 563.
Nor is there any indication that “Congress has abrogated the
state's immunity from suit through an unequivocal expression of its
intent to do so and pursuant to a valid exercise of its power” to
satisfy the second exception. Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court
found in Will that “[t]he language of § 1983 falls far short of
satisfying the ordinary rule of statutory construction that if
Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between
the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention
to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989).
Finally, there is no indication that the State of Illinois “has
properly waived its sovereign immunity and consented to suit in
federal court” in this case. MCI, 183 F.3d at 563; see also Graham
v. Illinois, No. 07 C 7078, 2009 WL 1543821, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 3,
2009) (“Section 1983 claims against Illinois, the State Agency
Defendants [including Defendant CMS], and the Individual
Defendants named in their official capacity could also be dismissed
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”). Therefore, Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss (d/e 18) is GRANTED as to the § 1981 claim in
Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 1) because, even interpreted as a § 1983
claim, it is barred by sovereign immunity.
C. The Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claims if
Brought Under Federal Law, or, Alternatively,
Relinquishes Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Retaliation
Claims if Brought Under State Law.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him
starting on or about December 6, 2023 by retaliating against him
for whistleblowing. See d/e 1, pp. 2-3. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that he blew the whistle in approximately mid-December 2023 by
raising concerns to the Illinois Office of Executive Inspector General
about alleged wrongdoings within CMS. Id. at pp. 4, 6. Plaintiff was
then retaliated against and suspended for 15 days. Id.
Plaintiff does not specify under what statute he brings these
retaliation claims. If Plaintiff brought the retaliation claims under
Title VII or § 1983, then the claims have already been dismissed for
the reasons outlined previously.
If Plaintiff brought these retaliation claims under Illinois state
law, the district court under the supplemental jurisdiction statute
“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over state-law
claims if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The district court has
broad discretion in making this decision. RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP
Prods. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2012) (“When
federal claims drop out of the case, leaving only state-law claims,
the district court has broad discretion to decide whether to keep the
case or relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims.”). Furthermore, there is a “presumption” that courts will
relinquish jurisdiction over supplemental state-law claims when the
federal claims drop out of the case. Id. at 479.
Here, the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction”—Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1983 claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Therefore, if Plaintiff brought the retaliation
claims under an unspecified Illinois state law, this Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those supplemental state-
law claims because the federal claims have been dismissed.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 18)
is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 1) is DISMISSED with
prejudice and this case is CLOSED.
ENTERED: July 22, 2025
FOR THE COURT:
/s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE