Napier V Super Fireworks
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LONDON DIVISION
TERESA NAPIER, as legal guardian of
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:24-cv-169-KKC
minor child, R.C.,
Plaintiff,
V. OPINION & ORDER
SUPER FIREWORKS and CRAZY
CARL’S FIREWORKS,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * *
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. (DE 11, 15.)
For the following reasons, the motions are denied.
I. Factual Background
Teresa Napier brought this action ag ainst Super Fireworks and Crazy Carl’s
Fireworks (the “Defendants”) on behalf of her minor child for injuries the child sustained
while operating a firework purchased from the Defendants. Napier is a resident of Kentucky
and alleges that the Defendants are business entities that are citizens of Tennessee. The
Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacks (1) subject matter
jurisdiction over this action, and (2) personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.
II. Analysis
a. The Defendants’ first motion to dismiss
The Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss on March 18, 2025. (DE 11.) Napier
subsequently filed an amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
This renders the Defendants’ first motion to dismiss moot. See Kentucky Press Ass'n, Inc. v.
Kentucky, 355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (“Plaintiff's amended complaint
supersedes the original complaint, thus making the motion to dismiss the original complaint
moot.”). As such, the Court will deny the first motion to dismiss (DE 11) as moot.
b. Subject matter jurisdiction
In their second motion to dismiss, the Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this case. Napier alleges that subject-matter jurisdiction exists
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because this is a civil action involving citizens of different states
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (DE 13 at 3.) As the action is currently plead,
complete diversity exists between the parties. That is because Napier is a citizen of Kentucky
and claims that the Defendants are citizens of Tennessee. (DE 13 at 2.)
The Defendants argue that the Court’s analysis must not end there. Rather, the
Defendants contend that the Court must also consider whether the proper parties are
presently before it. They cite DT GRAT JMT, LLC v. Keeney, No. CV 17-101-DLB-CJS, 2017
WL 5194063, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2017) for support. In Keeney, the district court evaluated
whether the “real part[ies] in interest” were before it, pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure
17(a), as a part of its subject matter jurisdiction analysis. Id. at *4. The court found that
parties other than the named plaintiffs were the real parties in interest, determined the
citizenship of the real plaintiffs in interest, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction
when it concluded that those plaintiffs were not diverse from the defendants. Id. at *7.
Here, the Defendants ask the Court to conduct a slightly different inquiry, and this
ultimately makes Kenney distinguishable. In this case, the Defendants ask the Court to find
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the “capacity of Defendants is such that they
cannot be sued.” (DE 15 at 6.) Essentially, the Defendants argue that they lack the capacity
to be sued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b). Circuit precedent, however, dictates
that capacity challenges do not implicate the Court’s jurisdiction. Davis v. Lifetime Cap., Inc.,
560 F. App'x 477, 478 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Brown v. Keller, 274 F.2d 779, 780 (6th Cir.
1960)) (“Generally, capacity is considered an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional issue.”).
Accordingly, the Court reads the Defendants’ capacity challenge as one properly
brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This challenge, however, must yield
until the Court has resolved the Defendants’ other jurisdiction-based objection. In re 2016
Primary Election, 836 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2016) (“courts must decide jurisdictional issues
before merits issues.”).
c. Personal jurisdiction
The Defendants also argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. For
personal jurisdiction to exist over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the
defendant have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). Personal jurisdiction can be
specific or general, depending on the type of minimum contacts in a case. Reynolds v. Int'l
Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1116 (6th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Defendants support their argument that this Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over them by submitting affidavits from an individual named Carson Lakes. In
the affidavits, Lakes asserts that he is the sole proprietor of both Defendants. (DE 22-2, p.
1.) He also states that the Defendants are located only in Tennessee and that their websites
exist only for the purpose of advertising their locations. (DE 15-2, p. 1-2.) Further, Lakes
attests that the Defendants have never supplied or shipped goods in Kentucky, nor have
either transacted business in Kentucky. (DE 22-2, p. 2.)
On their face, Lakes’ affidavits cast doubt on the Defendants’ contacts with Kentucky.
In response, Napier asks the Court to permit jurisdictional discovery so that she may explore
the Defendants’ potential contacts with Kentucky.
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, the Court “may determine the
motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in aid of the motion; or it
may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.” Serras v. First Tenn. Bank
Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989). And “[a]lthough the plaintiff bears the
burden of demonstrating facts that support personal jurisdiction, courts are to assist the
plaintiff by allowing jurisdictional discovery unless the plaintiff’s claim is ‘clearly frivolous.’”
Carr v. DJO Inc., No. 3:12–cv–42, 2012 WL 3257666, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2012) (citing
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003)).
The Court will permit jurisdictional discovery in this case. For one, Napier’s claims
are not “clearly frivolous.” Moreover, irregularities in Lakes’ affidavits give the Court pause
regarding the accuracy of the information included therein. In his affidavits, Lakes asserts
that both Defendants “are not corporations or limited liability corporations registered in the
state of Tennessee or any other state.” (DE 15-2, p. 1 and DE 22-1, p. 1.) Lakes signed the
first affidavit (DE 15-2) on April 21, 2025, and he signed the second affidavit (DE 22-1) on
June 18, 2025. The Court conducted its own research and discovered that defendant Crazy
Carl’s was registered as a corporation, by Lakes, on April 18, 2025. Thus, it was inaccurate
for Lakes to attest that Crazy Carl’s was not incorporated on April 21st or June 18th.
Based on the foregoing, Napier will be granted sixty (60) days from the date of entry
of this Opinion & Order to engage in jurisdictional discovery.
III. Conclusion
Being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is HEREBY ORDERED that
(1) the Defendants’ motion to dismiss (DE 11) is DENIED as moot;
(2) jurisdictional discovery SHALL BE PERMITTED subject to the following conditions:
a. discovery SHALL be limited to jurisdictional issues; and
b. discovery SHALL close at the end of sixty (60) days from the date of entry of
this Opinion & Order; and
(3) the Defendants’ motion to dismiss (DE 15) is DENIED without prejudice, with leave
to refile within twenty-one (21) days after the close of jurisdictional discovery.
This 22>4 day of July, 2025.
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FAREN EF. CALDWELL
We bg fy * UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY