State V Ebenezer Byrd State V Jerry J Spraulding State V Gregory A

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

State v. Ebenezer Byrd (A-3/4/5-24) (089469)

Argued February 3, 2025 -- Decided July 24, 2025

NORIEGA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers whether a trial judge took appropriate steps
in response to serious mid-trial allegations of juror misconduct. The claims included
that the juror conducted outside research, discussed the case with third parties,
texted one of the defendants, and expressed an intent to find the defendants guilty.

The State charged defendants Ebenezer Byrd, Jerry J. Spraulding, and
Gregory A. Jean-Baptiste in connection with a 2009 murder. During voir dire of the
jury, the trial judge asked a series of open-ended questions, one of which inquired
into the “type of work” the jurors did. Juror No. 8 answered that she was “an
operating room nurse at a medical center.” She did not state the name of the center.
Defendants’ trial began in January 2019.

In February 2019, Byrd’s defense counsel’s secretary emailed the trial judge’s
secretary about a call received by the Office of the Public Defender indicating that a
juror “has been googling and texting [Byrd] and all of his friends.” After calling the
Office to gather more information, the judge’s secretary sent the following email to
the judge’s court clerk: “[Employee S.] at the PD’s office took the call. The woman
identified herself as ‘Miss Wurty(?)’ but said she doesn’t want to be involved any
further. She claims she has a friend who works at Monmouth Medical Center with
[A.B.] (I believe she is juror 15). She said [A.B.] has been googling the case,
showing articles to and talking about it with other people, and has already decided
she is going to find them all guilty and going to ‘burn their asses.’”

The judge informed counsel that he intended to call the named juror up to
question her. After deducing that the allegations pertained to Juror No. 8, the judge
called her to sidebar and questioned her in the presence of defense counsel. He
asked where she works (Monmouth Medical Center); whether, “in terms of any
posting or newspaper articles, is there anything outside of what’s been in this
courtroom that you have been in contact with?” (no); and general questions about
whether her responses to the questions asked during voir dire had changed, including
her ability to listen to the evidence and “render a fair and impartial verdict” (no).
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Defense counsel objected to the line of questioning and requested additional
relief. Ultimately, the judge declined to inquire further. Defense counsel renewed
their objections once the court excused the jury for the day, asking the judge to
excuse Juror No. 8 for cause. The judge denied the request. The trial continued, and
the jury convicted defendants on all counts.

On appeal, Byrd’s counsel moved for a limited remand to reconstruct the record
regarding Juror No. 8’s alleged misconduct. The Appellate Division ordered a
remand hearing. On remand, the trial judge described what prompted the inquiry
into Juror No. 8, marking his notes and a series of emails between court staff as an
exhibit for purposes of the remand hearing. Following the limited remand,
defendants appealed their convictions and sentences on several grounds. The
Appellate Division affirmed, holding, as relevant here, that the trial judge’s response
to allegations of Juror No. 8’s misconduct did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
The Court granted certification limited to the adequacy of the court’s response to the
allegations of misconduct by Juror No. 8. 258 N.J. 456 (2024); 258 N.J. 457 (2024);
258 N.J. 477 (2024).
HELD: The trial judge’s inquiry into the allegations in this case was inadequate.
When allegations of juror misconduct arise during trial, the court must assess their
plausibility. Once the court is satisfied that the allegations are sufficiently plausible
to require questioning, the court is obligated to conduct a specific and probing
examination of the juror to determine whether misconduct occurred. Here, the trial
judge determined the allegations required an inquiry of the juror but then failed to
ask questions that directly addressed the allegations.

1. The constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury includes the expectation that
the jury will decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial, without
influence of extraneous matters. When the trial court becomes aware of allegations
of juror misconduct, bias, or external influence, it must determine, first, whether the
allegations are sufficiently plausible to warrant further inquiry. If so, then the court
must assess whether any affected jurors are capable of fulfilling their duty to judge
the facts in an impartial and unbiased manner, based strictly on the evidence
presented in court. See State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551 (2001). Trial courts must pose
searching questions to uncover the specific nature of the extraneous information and
safeguard the jury’s impartiality. That inquiry should capture whether the juror --
intentionally or inadvertently -- shared any of the information with fellow jurors.
Based on the juror’s responses, the court must then determine whether individual
voir dire of the rest of the jury is necessary to ensure continued impartiality. Any
such determination should be placed on the record to facilitate appellate review.
Still, the decision to voir dire additional jurors remains within the sound discretion
of the trial judge, and no per se rule governs that determination. (pp. 17-20)

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2. Here, the trial judge’s initial assessment of the allegations caused the court
sufficient concern to take action by questioning Juror No. 8. The fact that the caller
accurately identified Juror No. 8 as an employee of the Monmouth Medical Center --
information not available to the parties or counsel at that point in the trial -- and
provided her name and phone number and was therefore not “anonymous,” supports
the trial court’s implicit determination that action was needed. By way of guidance,
the Court notes that courts should make such findings on the record. (pp. 20-21)

3. As explained in R.D., once the trial court determines that voir dire is necessary
based on the nature of the alleged outside influence, it must engage in a scrupulous
investigation into the situation, with deliberate questions designed to uncover
potential prejudice in order to preserve the overall fairness of the proceedings. See
169 N.J. at 560-63. Here, the trial court failed to meet that standard both by
questioning Juror No. 8 at sidebar in the presence of the jury and by failing to
conduct a sufficient inquiry into the allegation that a seated juror was exposed to or
engaged in prejudicial extraneous conduct. When a trial court conducts an inquiry
into potential jury misconduct by voir dire of a single juror, it must do so in open
court and outside the presence of the remaining jurors. This procedure serves two
essential purposes. First, it ensures transparency and allows both parties to
participate meaningfully, thereby preserving the defendant’s right to due process.
Second, and equally important, it protects the integrity of the jury as a deliberative
body by minimizing the risk that other jurors will be influenced -- consciously or
unconsciously -- by either the allegations or the inquiry itself. (pp. 21-24)

4. In regard to the scope of questioning, the court’s questioning fell short of the
standard set forth in R.D., 169 N.J. at 560, 563. The Court reviews the questioning
and notes that no question addressed whether Juror No. 8 had conducted internet
research and that, more broadly, the court’s inquiry centered on whether Juror No. 8
had received outside information but did not explore whether she had sought it out,
discussed the case with others, or engaged in any conduct that might suggest a lack
of impartiality. Further, for the court’s final question, the proper inquiry is not
whether the juror believes herself to be impartial, but whether the trial court can
satisfy itself as to the integrity of the proceedings by an objective determination of
impartiality based on the juror’s answers to probing, fact-specific questions. The
court’s reliance on Juror No. 8’s prior voir dire responses as a substitute for a fresh,
probing examination of impartiality was inadequate under the circumstances. The
Court does not prescribe a rigid script for trial courts. But questions in this context
must be tailored to the specific allegations, clear in scope, and designed to provide
jurors with an opportunity to disclose any breach of their obligation. Here, the trial
court’s inquiry into Juror No. 8’s alleged misconduct was insufficiently tailored to
the allegations against the juror, failed to probe into the heart of the allegations, and
was therefore inadequate. (pp. 24-27)

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5. The trial court’s incomplete inquiry also left unresolved the second step of the
process described in -R.D.:
- - a determination whether Juror No. 8 improperly
influenced or shared prejudicial information with her fellow jurors. (p. 28)

6. The Court has previously held that, in extraordinary circumstances, post-trial
juror questioning may be warranted. The Court finds that such protection is
necessary here and so remands the matter for an evidentiary hearing, including
individual voir dire of the juror who allegedly engaged in misconduct, to determine
whether juror taint occurred and, if so, whether further steps, including a new trial,
are necessary. (pp. 28-29)

REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE NORIEGA’s
opinion.

4
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-3/4/5 September Term 2024
089469

State of New Jersey,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Ebenezer Byrd, a/k/a
Ebernezer Byrd,
E.B. Byrd,
Ebenezer Bird,
Donali Byrd, and
Danall Johnson,

Defendant-Appellant.

State of New Jersey,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Jerry J. Spraulding,
a/k/a Gerry Spraulding,
Jerry Spraulding,
Gerald J. Spraulding,
Jerry Batter,
Michael Harris,
Mark Love, and
Gerald Spaulding,

Defendant-Appellant.

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State of New Jersey,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Gregory A.
Jean-Baptiste, a/k/a
Gregory Jean Baptist,
Gregory Baptite,
and Gu Jean,

Defendant-Appellant.

On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.

Argued Decided
February 3, 2025 July 24, 2025

Stephen W. Kirsch, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant Ebenezer Byrd (Jennifer N. Sellitti,
Public Defender, attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch, on the
briefs).

Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant Gregory A. Jean-Baptiste (Jennifer N.
Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Andrew R. Burroughs,
on the briefs).

Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant Jerry J. Spraulding
(Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Margaret
McLane, of counsel and on the briefs).

Melinda A. Harrigan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth
County Prosecutor, attorney; Melinda A. Harrigan, of
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counsel and on the briefs, and Monica do Outeiro,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).

David M. Galemba, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey
(Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; David
M. Galemba, of counsel and on the brief).

Jonathan Romberg submitted a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae Seton Hall University School of Law Center for
Social Justice (Seton Hall University School of Law
Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jonathan Romberg,
of counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE NORIEGA delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal requires us to decide whether a trial judge took appropriate

steps in response to serious mid-trial allegations of juror misconduct. The

claims included that the juror conducted outside research, discussed the case

with third parties, texted one of the defendants, and expressed an intent to find

the defendants guilty.

We hold that the trial judge’s inquiry into those allegations was

inadequate. When allegations of juror misconduct arise during trial, the court

must assess their plausibility. Once the court is satisfied that the allegations

are sufficiently plausible to require questioning, the court is obligated to

conduct a specific and probing examination of the juror to determine whether

misconduct occurred. Here, the trial judge determined the allegations required

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an inquiry of the juror but then failed to ask questions that directly addressed

the allegations. Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment,

and remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the

allegations of juror misconduct.

The State charged defendants Ebenezer Byrd, Jerry J. Spraulding, and

Gregory A. Jean-Baptiste in connection with the 2009 murder of Jonelle

Melton, a Red Bank Middle School teacher. According to the State,

defendants mistakenly entered the victim’s apartment instead of the apartment

of their intended target, where they planned to commit a burglary. The

encounter led to the victim’s brutal beating and fatal shooting. The

prosecution charged the defendants with multiple offenses, including first-

degree felony murder, first-degree armed robbery, second-degree conspiracy to

commit armed burglary, second-degree burglary, and weapons-related charges.

The prosecution also charged Byrd and Jean-Baptiste with first-degree witness

tampering charges, while Byrd faced an additional count of third-degree

witness tampering.

Jury selection for defendants’ joint trial began on January 8, 2019. On

January 15, 2019, the trial judge asked the jurors a series of open-ended

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questions, one of which inquired into the “type of work” the jurors did. Juror

No. 8 answered that she was “an operating room nurse at a medical center.”

She did not state where that medical center was located or the name of the

center. A review of the transcript from jury selection reveals that Juror No. 8

never mentioned that she worked at the Monmouth Medical Center, a fact that

we discuss further below. 1 The jury information sheet submitted to the parties

included an entry for Juror No. 8 with her name, occupation, and town of

residence. Her occupation was listed as “administrator.”

Defendants’ trial began on January 17, 2019. On February 19, 2019,

Byrd’s defense counsel’s secretary emailed the trial judge’s secretary, writing:

I received a call from the Public Defender’s Office a
few minutes ago. They received a call from an
unidentified woman who told them she had information
on one of the jurors. She knows the juror’s name but
did not disclose it and said she would call back.
Apparently, this woman has been googling and texting
[Byrd] and all of his friends. [Employee S.] from the
PD’s office is the one to speak to as she received the
call.

1
The only written indication concerning a connection between Monmouth
Medical Center and Juror No. 8 was provided to this Court after oral argument
by the State, in the form of its internal juror note sheet, which had a
handwritten notation stating, “Nurse - Mon - Med.” It is unclear when, during
the trial or thereafter, this notation was made. As addressed below, the only
time Juror No. 8 stated her place of work on the record was during the side bar
conversation with the trial judge that is the subject of this appeal.

5
The judge’s secretary called the Office of the Public Defender to gather more

information. The secretary then sent the following email to the judge’s court

clerk:

[Employee S.] at the PD’s office took the call. The
woman identified herself as “Miss Wurty(?)” 2 but said
she doesn’t want to be involved any further. She claims
she has a friend who works at Monmouth Medical
Center with [A.B.] 3 (I believe she is juror 15). She said
[A.B.] has been googling the case, showing articles to
and talking about it with other people, and has already
decided she is going to find them all guilty and going
to “burn their asses.”

The judge learned about the allegations and informed counsel that he

intended to call the named juror up to “question her, see whether or not the

answers to any of her initial jury questions have changed, and . . . to find out

where she works.” The judge and defense counsel deduced the allegations

pertained to Juror No. 8, not Juror No. 15. Defense counsel for Byrd requested

that the judge find out where the juror lived, voir dire the juror in his

chambers, and voir dire the entire jury no matter what the juror said. Counsel

for Spraulding asked the judge to inquire about some of the specific

allegations, especially the claim “that she talked to other jurors.” The judge

2
The transcript of the remand hearing spells the caller’s name as “Ms.
Worthy.” We use this spelling going forward.
3
The caller used the juror’s full name. We use fictitious initials to preserve
the juror’s confidentiality.
6
replied: “I will ask whether or not she did, but the fine line that I want to try

to stay on is I don’t want anything specific to any of your individual clients.”

The judge called Juror No. 8 to sidebar and questioned her in the

presence of defense counsel as follows:

[JUDGE]: At the beginning of this process we asked
you a series of questions and those questions were
designed to find out whether or not you could be fair
and impartial. Is there anything that has happened
throughout the course of this trial that would affect your
answers to those questions?

[JUROR No. 8]: No.

[JUDGE]: Ma’am, where do you work?

[JUROR No. 8]: At Monmouth Medical.

[JUDGE]: Where do you live?

[JUROR No. 8]: In Red Bank.

[JUDGE]: Okay. And in terms of any posting or
newspaper articles, is there anything outside of what’s
been in this courtroom that you have been in contact
with?

[JUROR No. 8]: No.

[JUDGE]: So is there anything that would change any
of your other answers to those questions that we asked
during voir dire?

[JUROR No. 8]: No.

[JUDGE]: And you believe that you can listen to the
evidence in this case, and as I have asked you certainly
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throughout the voir dire process, listen to the evidence,
apply the law as I give it to you at the end of the case
and render a fair and impartial verdict?

[JUROR No. 8]: I can.

[JUDGE]: Okay.

[JUROR No. 8]: Why do you ask?

[JUDGE]: Because that’s my job.

[JUROR No. 8]: Okay.

[JUDGE]: I ask the questions. You don’t. What I want
you to do is I want you to take your seat. This is a
discussion, a private discussion, up at sidebar, the same
as we did for jury selection.

[JUROR No. 8]: Okay.

[JUDGE]: I did that for a reason. I don’t want you to
discuss anything that we have talked about up here as
we move forward. Okay?

[JUROR No. 8]: Okay.

[JUDGE]: You may be seated. Thank you.

The judge then spoke with defense counsel, who all objected to the line

of questioning and requested additional relief. Counsel for Byrd objected

because the court did not inquire whether Juror No. 8 had discussed the matter

at work. The judge responded to the objection by stating:

[JUDGE]: I specifically asked her whether or not she
had any outside information, anything outside of this
courtroom. She said no, and I think the record should
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reflect that clearly she was puzzled why she would even
be up here answering these questions. In this Judge’s
opinion, she seemed very sincere and she seemed very
straightforward with her answers. So in terms of
further inquiry, I’m satisfied at this point.

Counsel for Spraulding asked that the judge dismiss Juror No. 8, arguing that her

being singled out was itself cause for dismissal. And counsel for Jean-Baptiste

asked that she be questioned further and specifically about whether she had spoken

to anyone at work. Ultimately, the judge declined to inquire further:

[JUDGE]: Okay. I’m satisfied at this point with the
inquiry that I have made. My concern is to make sure
that we have a fair and impartial trial with fair and
impartial jurors. I specifically asked her whether or not
she has come into contact with any outside information.
Her answer was no. And, as I indicated, she was about
as candid and as straightforward as she could be; and
while I do hear you, [counsel for Spraulding], but with
regard to your concerns, I specifically told her not to
discuss anything that we discussed here at sidebar, so
I’m satisfied at this point that we can move forward.
This was an outside concern that was given originally
to the Public Defender’s Office, then brought to our
attention. The person, as I understand the information
to the Public Defender’s Office, originally had
indicated it was a different juror and then changed to
Juror No. 8 and the information as I understood it had
originally started out that this juror was texting
Ebenezer Byrd and her friends and clearly -- and his
friends and clearly that couldn’t happen because Mr.
Byrd has been in custody for quite some time at this
point without access to computers or texting or
Facebook or any of those other things, so I’m satisfied
at this point we can proceed.

9
Defense counsel renewed their objections once the court excused the

jury for the day, asking the judge to excuse Juror No. 8 for cause. The State

objected to defense counsel’s request. The judge responded to defense counsel

that he had been watching the jurors during trial and that “they certainly

seem[ed] intent” and “focused.” He emphasized that Juror No. 8’s demeanor

“was very candid” and “straightforward when she answered the questions.”

He explained that if Juror No. 8 was exhibiting any distress, it was because

speaking with a Superior Court judge is stressful
enough, so to the extent there was stress beyond that, I
did not notice that or pick up on that. So having said
that, I’m comfortable at this point, we have explored
the issue. I was satisfied with her answers about her
ability to be fair and impartial, and that the answer that
she gave us throughout the course of what was a lengthy
voir dire to select these jurors for this case had
indicated that her answers have not changed. So with
that, I’m satisfied at this point and I will deny that
request.

The trial continued, and the jury convicted defendants on all counts.

Defendants were ultimately sentenced to life in prison. The court also

sentenced Byrd to two consecutive twenty-year terms for two counts of first-

degree witness tampering and a consecutive five-year term for third-degree

witness tampering and Jean-Baptiste to a consecutive twenty-year term for

first-degree witness tampering.

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B.

On appeal, Byrd’s counsel moved for a limited remand to reconstruct the

record regarding Juror No. 8’s alleged misconduct. The Appellate Division

ordered a remand hearing to confirm the nature of the allegations against Juror

No. 8. 4 On remand, the trial judge described what prompted the inquiry into

Juror No. 8, marking his notes and a series of emails between court staff as an

exhibit for purposes of the remand hearing. He explained:

So clearly . . . there [was] some outside Googling and
. . . an allegation that there was a pre-determination by
one of the [jurors] . . . [and] that was the nature of the
inquiry and the reason why the Court proceeded the
way the Court did.

Clearly, I did not want to taint the rest of the jury with
regards to something that may certainly have been all
fabricated. We may never know who Ms. Worthy is.
She was never part of this trial, never listed, as I
understand it, on any of the witness lists, that name is
foreign to me, had not heard it prior to haven’t heard it
hence. And with that, I chose the course that I chose to
question . . . only the individual juror.

....

[W]hether . . . she should have been called into my
chambers . . . throughout the course of my career I have
never done and certainly did not want to start it with
this case.

4
The appellate court also ordered the judge to confirm whether the allegations
involved a claim of racial bias; the judge dispelled that concern on remand.
11
....

[J]uror number 8 was clear and unequivocal. She
seemed . . . puzzled as to why she was there . . . [and]
made it clear to this Court that she could be fair and
impartial, and that she could listen to the testimony and
apply the law as I gave it to her at the end of the case.

....

The allegation simply was that she had been texting and
talking about the case, and I was satisfied based on her
candid response to my questions that that had not
happened.

Following the limited remand, defendants appealed their convictions and

sentences on several grounds, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Relevant

to this appeal, the Appellate Division held that the trial judge’s response to the

allegations of Juror No. 8’s misconduct did not constitute an abuse of

discretion.

The Appellate Division relied on State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551 (2001), and

State v. Loftin, 191 N.J. 172 (2007), in reaching its conclusion, reasoning that

“the judge confirmed Juror No. 8 was able to ‘listen to the evidence,’ ‘apply

the law’ as instructed[,] . . . and ‘render a fair and impartial verdict.’” The

appellate court determined that the judge objectively evaluated the juror’s

impartiality instead of relying on the juror’s own subjective evaluation and

was “understandably skeptical about the allegations” based on their source and
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contents. For example, the court noted, the caller originally claimed that a

juror was texting Byrd, which the trial judge reasoned “couldn’t happen

because Mr. Byrd ha[d] been in custody for quite some time.” Relying on out-

of-state case law as well, the Appellate Division suggested that “less credible

allegations of juror misconduct necessitate a less extensive inquiry.” (citing

United States v. Zimny, 846 F.3d 458, 470 (1st Cir. 2017); State v. Brown, 668

A.2d 1288, 1305 (Conn. 1995)).

Here, the Appellate Division highlighted that the allegations did not

identify the caller or the juror’s co-workers; the allegations of misconduct

were “seemingly conflicting” as to whether Juror No. 8 was aligned with or

against the defendants; the trial involved witness tampering charges; and the

only accurate information conveyed was the juror’s name and place of work --

which could be gleaned by the public during voir dire. The Appellate Division

therefore concluded that the judge properly exercised his discretion by

“weighing the relevant factors” and choosing not to “delve further into non-

credible allegations.”

We granted certification, limited to the question of whether the trial

court’s response to allegations of misconduct by Juror No. 8 was adequate.

258 N.J. 456 (2024); 258 N.J. 457 (2024); 258 N.J. 477 (2024). We then

granted motions to appear as amici curiae from the Seton Hall University

13
School of Law Center for Social Justice (CSJ) and the Attorney General of

New Jersey.

II.

Defendants ask us to reverse and remand for a new trial. They contend

that the judge failed to voir dire Juror No. 8 specifically and thoroughly, as

required under New Jersey case law. Spraulding and Byrd argue that if an

allegation of juror taint has the capacity to prejudice the defense, then the

judge must conduct a specific, probing voir dire of the juror and jury; failure to

do so requires reversal. Spraulding contends the allegations here were facially

plausible, and the judge therefore was required to administer a thorough voir

dire. He compares the judge’s specific questions in ----
R.D. to the “vague” and

“close-ended” questions asked here. Byrd adds that the judge’s “vague” and

“cursory” questioning did not address “the most serious” allegation: Juror No.

8’s predetermination of the case.

All three defendants contend that the judge erred by failing to voir dire

the other jurors to determine whether any alleged misconduct had affected the

rest of the jury. Byrd and Jean-Baptiste argue that the voir dire in this case

should not have been done at sidebar in the full view of the entire jury, an

issue that Spraulding raised for the first time at oral argument and now joins.

They also suggest the voir dire should have been conducted in camera.

14
The CSJ asks us to reverse and remand for a new trial, arguing that the

trial judge failed to conduct the required probing and thorough inquiry into the

specific allegations about Juror No. 8. The CSJ adds that a trial judge must

conduct a detailed and specific inquiry to determine any potential capacity to

affect the jury’s verdict when the court learns of a realistic possibility that a

juror may have been exposed to evidence outside the courtroom or may have

prejudged guilt.

The State asks us to affirm the Appellate Division. It argues that the

trial judge’s questioning was adequate because the allegation of juror taint was

not, on its face, independently accurate. The allegations, the State says, were

based on triple hearsay and contained information that could be gleaned from

anyone in the courtroom during jury selection. The State argues that the trial

judge’s questions sufficiently covered the allegations, that Juror No. 8’s

answers were clear and unequivocal that she was not in contact with any

outside information and that she could be fair and impartial, and that asking

Juror No. 8 or the other jurors about the specific allegations would promote

prejudice rather than prevent it.

The State also argues that pursuant to ----
R.D., there was no need for the

court to expand its inquiry to other jurors in the case because the judge found

that Juror No. 8 was not tainted. It challenges defendants’ assertions of

15
wholesale jury taint, emphasizing that the jury never complained about Juror

No. 8, deliberated for two days, and played back three hundred pages of trial

transcript.

The Attorney General asks us to affirm, contending that the trial judge

properly exercised his discretion because the juror credibly confirmed she

could be fair and impartial and the phone tip lacked indicia of reliability. The

Attorney General emphasizes that it is within a judge’s discretion to determine

the level of inquiry necessary based on case-specific circumstances and also

cautions that requiring judges to confront jurors with excessive questioning,

regardless of the veracity of the allegation, will have adverse consequences.

III.

This Court reviews a trial court’s determination of juror influence or

misconduct for abuse of discretion. R.D., 169 N.J. at 559-60. A reviewing

court gives deference to the trial judge’s factual findings regarding jurors,

“which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the

witnesses and to have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot

enjoy.” State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 495 (2007) (quoting State v.

Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).

16
B.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the

right to trial by an impartial jury. That right includes the expectation that the

jury will decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial, without

influence of extraneous matters. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-

63 (1966); State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 60 (1983); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45,

75 (1988); R.D., 169 N.J. at 559.

The trial judge bears the primary responsibility for safeguarding that

constitutional guarantee. That duty includes evaluating prejudicial

occurrences as well as their impact when they arise. See Smith v. Phillips, 455

U.S. 209, 217 (1982). To that end, trial judges must “‘take all appropriate

measures to ensure the fair and proper administration of a criminal trial,’

including ‘preserv[ing] the jury’s impartiality throughout the trial process.’”

State v. Tyler, 176 N.J. 171, 181 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting

Williams, 93 N.J. at 62). Trial judges must “protect both the jurors and their

deliberations from illegitimate influences that threaten to taint the verdict.”

R.D., 169 N.J. at 557 (quoting Bey, 112 N.J. at 75).

When an outside influence threatens the fairness of the trial, the court

has an independent obligation to respond swiftly and decisively. See id. at

17
557-58; Bey, 112 N.J. at 83-84; Williams, 93 N.J. at 63. The test for

determining when action is appropriate “is not whether the irregular matter

actually influenced the result but whether it had the capacity of doing so.”

Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61 (1951).

When the trial court becomes aware of allegations of juror misconduct,

bias, or external influence, it must determine, first, whether the allegations are

sufficiently plausible to warrant further inquiry. If so, then the court must

assess whether any affected jurors “are capable of fulfilling their duty to judge

the facts in an impartial and unbiased manner, based strictly on the evidence

presented in court.” R.D., 169 N.J. at 558 (quoting Bey, 112 N.J. at 87); see

United States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2004) (establishing that

the court must first determine whether an allegation of juror misconduct is

“colorable,” and then, if so, “conduct a further investigation to discern the

extent of the jury taint and the possible prejudice” (first citing United States v.

Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st Cir. 1990); and then citing United States v.

Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1998))).

In R.D., this Court emphasized that “the trial court is in the best position

to determine whether the jury has been tainted.” 169 N.J. at 559. When

considering possible juror taint, trial courts are to evaluate several factors,

including the seriousness of the extraneous information in relation to the issues

18
at trial; the demeanor and credibility of any juror exposed to the information;

and the potential impact on the fairness of the proceedings. Ibid. The court

does so by first “interrogat[ing] the juror, in the presence of counsel, to

determine if there is a taint,” and second, if the judge discerns taint, “the

inquiry must expand to determine whether any other jurors have been tainted

thereby.” Ibid. After surveying the jury, “[t]he trial court must then determine

whether the trial may proceed after excusing the tainted juror or jurors, or

whether a mistrial is necessary.” Ibid.

As we have explained, “[t]he procedure of questioning an impaneled

jury when [extraneous information] threatens the fairness and integrity of a

defendant’s trial should not be invoked begrudgingly.” Bey, 112 N.J. at 89.

The purpose of the process is to uncover potential prejudice to constitutional

rights -- and to do so at a time when corrective measures are still available,

before ordering a new trial is the only remedy. Ibid.

Trial courts must pose “searching” and “probing questions” to uncover

the specific nature of the extraneous information and safeguard the jury’s

impartiality. R.D., 169 N.J. at 560, 563. That inquiry should capture whether

the juror -- intentionally or inadvertently -- shared any of the information with

fellow jurors. Id. at 560. Based on the juror’s responses, the trial court must

then determine whether individual voir dire of the rest of the jury is necessary

19
to ensure continued impartiality. Ibid. Any such determination should be

placed on the record to facilitate appellate review under the abuse of discretion

standard. Id. at 560-61. Still, the decision to voir dire additional jurors

remains within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and no per se rule

governs that determination. Id. at 561.

IV.

Applying those principles here, we first address the judge’s decision to

voir dire the allegedly tainted juror. We next consider whether the court’s

investigation under the two-part test set forth in R.D. was sufficient as to Juror

No. 8 and as to the remaining jurors. Finally, we determine the appropriate

remedy.

We begin by highlighting that the trial judge’s initial assessment of the

allegations caused the court sufficient concern to take action. The trial judge

did not make an explicit finding about the plausibility of the allegations in this

case. Nevertheless, we can infer from the court’s decision to question the juror

-- in support of which the court explained that “there [was an allegation of]

some outside Googling and . . . an allegation that there was a pre-

determination by one of the [jurors]” -- that the court found the alleged

misconduct sufficiently plausible to warrant inquiry.

20
We do not question that decision. Indeed, the caller accurately identified

Juror No. 8 as an employee of the Monmouth Medical Center -- information

that was apparently not available to the parties or counsel at that point in the

trial. That detail lent credibility to the allegation and supported the court’s

determination to proceed with an inquiry.

The Attorney General appears to challenge the trial court’s

determination that action was warranted by repeatedly describing the caller as

“anonymous” and the information provided as lacking indicia of reliability.

We note, however, that the caller provided her name and phone number, which

was at least initially available to the Office of the Public Defender. Although

no further investigation into the caller’s identity was conducted by any party,

the record does not support the use of the term “anonymous” under these

circumstances. In short, we find no reason to question the trial court’s implicit

determination that action was needed in this case. By way of guidance, we note

that courts should make such findings, on the record, as an initial step in

considering allegations of juror misconduct.

We turn, therefore, to the adequacy of the court’s voir dire.

R.D., once the trial court determines that voir dire is
As we explained in ----

necessary based on the nature of the alleged outside influence, it must engage

21
in a scrupulous investigation into the situation, with deliberate questions

designed to uncover potential prejudice in order to preserve the overall

fairness of the proceedings. See 169 N.J. at 560-63. Here, we find that the

trial court failed to meet that standard both by questioning Juror No. 8 at

sidebar in the presence of the jury and by failing to conduct a sufficient

inquiry into the allegation that a seated juror was exposed to or engaged in

prejudicial extraneous conduct.

R.D.’s mandate to “interrogate the juror, in the presence of counsel,” is

not a mere procedural formality, but is instead rooted in the need for fairness

and for a clear record of the inquiry and its scope. Id. at 558. The presence of

counsel allows for appropriate follow-up questions and objections, and

prevents later claims of incomplete or biased examination.

When a trial court conducts an inquiry into potential jury misconduct by

voir dire of a single juror, it must do so in open court and outside the presence

of the remaining jurors. This procedure serves two essential purposes. First, it

ensures transparency and allows both parties to participate meaningfully,

thereby preserving the defendant’s right to due process. Second, and equally

important, it protects the integrity of the jury as a deliberative body by

22
minimizing the risk that other jurors will be influenced -- consciously or

unconsciously -- by either the allegations or the inquiry itself.

Equally, the exclusion of other jurors’ presence during the inquiry serves

to contain possible taint. If other jurors remain in the courtroom while one is

being questioned about possible misconduct or bias, the inquiry itself may

inject improper considerations into the deliberations. This is the harm that

courts are seeking to avoid. Voir dire conducted outside the presence of the

full panel minimizes such a risk and protects the remaining jurors from

exposure to potentially prejudicial information. See Bey, 112 N.J. at 89-90

(noting that voir dire of individual jurors is a prophylactic measure designed to

preserve the impartiality of the jury and protect the integrity of the verdict).

This practice aligns with the broader principle that when a juror’s

impartiality is called into question, the process for evaluating that claim must

be both thorough and shielded from further risk of contamination. 5

5
The trial judge remarked during the remand hearing that despite defense
counsel’s request to do so, he had never brought a juror into chambers for an
in-camera discussion throughout his entire career. But an in-camera
discussion is not the alternative contemplated by case law to an interrogation
at sidebar while the remainder of the jury was present. Rather, the juror at
issue should have been questioned individually in open court, with counsel
present, and outside the presence of the remaining jurors. That limited and
routine step is consistent with long-standing practice and serves to preserve the
impartiality of the jury and the integrity of the trial process. See R.D., 169
N.J. at 560-61; Bey, 112 N.J. at 89-90.
23
Conducting the inquiry in open court -- with only the questioned juror, the

judge, and counsel present -- ensures both transparency and containment.

In regard to the scope of questioning, we reiterate that the trial court is

obligated to conduct a probing and independent inquiry once there is a

plausible suggestion of juror taint. -------
See R.D., 169 N.J. at 560, 563. Here, the

court’s questioning fell short of that standard.

The allegation itself suggested alarming conduct by a juror: a call

reporting that a sitting juror had prejudged the case, spoken to co-workers

about the details, “Googled” the case, texted one of the defendants, and stated

to co-workers that she intended to “burn their asses.”

It is undisputed that the information regarding Juror No. 8 arrived

through multiple intermediaries before reaching the trial judge, and that certain

details -- such as whether the juror was able to text an in-custody defendant --

were conflicting or unclear. Nonetheless, the trial judge found the allegations

plausible enough to warrant questioning the juror at sidebar. Once the judge

committed to conducting an inquiry, any speculation regarding perceived

discrepancies could not justify a cursory examination.

The trial judge’s questioning fell short in several key respects. Among

the allegations presented was that Juror No. 8 had been “Googling” the case.

24
During the sidebar inquiry, the court asked: “And in terms of any posting or

newspaper articles, is there anything outside of what’s been in this courtroom

that you have been in contact with?” That question, by its phrasing, narrowly

focused on exposure to passive media sources -- “posting[s] or newspaper

articles” -- and failed to ask the more direct and necessary question: whether

the juror herself had actively conducted any internet research about the case.

More broadly, the court’s inquiry centered on whether Juror No. 8 had

received outside information, but did not explore whether she had sought it

out, discussed the case with others, or engaged in any conduct that might

suggest a lack of impartiality.

The court’s last question also failed to address the core allegation of pre-

determination. The court asked: “And you believe that you can listen to the

evidence in this case, and as I have asked you certainly throughout the voir

dire process, listen to the evidence, apply the law as I give it to you at the end

of the case and render a fair and impartial verdict?” While this question

reaffirms the juror’s understanding of her duty to remain impartial, it does not

reach the critical issue of whether the juror engaged in conduct inconsistent

with that duty. The proper inquiry is not whether the juror believes herself to

be impartial, but whether the trial court can satisfy itself as to the integrity of

the proceedings by an objective determination of impartiality based on the

25
juror’s answers to probing, fact-specific questions. See State v. Scherzer, 301

N.J. Super. 363, 487-88 (App. Div. 1997).

The court’s reliance on Juror No. 8’s prior voir dire responses as a

substitute for a fresh, probing examination of impartiality was inadequate

under the circumstances. Similarly, referencing general instructions given to

the venire at the outset of trial, without context or connection to the specific

allegation, does not meaningfully test whether the juror remained impartial

after being exposed to potentially prejudicial information. Vague references to

general voir dire instructions will rarely suffice in uncovering prejudicial

conduct when juror taint is alleged.

To be clear, we do not prescribe a rigid script for trial courts; indeed,

this opinion is not a road map for what may or may not be asked. But

questions in this context must be tailored to the specific allegations, clear in

scope, and designed to provide jurors with an opportunity to disclose any

breach of their obligation. Here, the trial court was not required to accuse the

juror of misconduct to adequately investigate the allegation. The court could

have asked straightforward, neutral questions that were both non-prejudicial

and responsive to the concerns raised. For example: “Have you talked about

this case at work?” “Have you expressed an opinion about the case to others?”

“Have you spoken to anyone at Monmouth Medical Center about it?” Such

26
questions are tethered to the court’s own jury instructions and would have

provided an opportunity for the juror to disclose information material to her

impartiality.

Fundamentally, trial judges retain broad discretion in determining

whether allegations of juror misconduct are sufficiently plausible to warrant

inquiry, in shaping the scope of that inquiry, and in evaluating the credibility

of the responses given. However, once the court finds the allegations

sufficiently plausible to question the juror, that discretion to ask is not

discharged by conducting a superficial or incomplete examination. At that

point, the court must undertake a focused and probing inquiry.

This is not an onerous burden. As this Court has previously explained,

voir dire of potentially tainted jurors is a minimal and prophylactic procedure

-- particularly when conducted mid-trial, before deliberations begin or a

verdict is rendered. -
Bey,
- - 112 N.J. at 89-90. This is why courts maintain

alternate jurors: to preserve the integrity of the process when a seated juror’s

impartiality is in doubt.

For these reasons, we hold that the trial court’s inquiry into Juror No. 8’s

alleged misconduct was insufficiently tailored to the allegations against the

juror, failed to probe into the heart of the allegations, and was therefore

inadequate.

27
C.

The trial court’s incomplete inquiry also left unresolved the second step

of the process described in R.D.: a determination whether Juror No. 8

improperly influenced or shared prejudicial information with her fellow jurors.

That uncertainty strikes at the heart of the defendants’ constitutional right to

an impartial jury. As this Court has emphasized, the question is not whether

outside influence did affect the verdict, but whether it had the capacity to do

so. R.D., 169 N.J. at 559. Because the trial court failed to engage in a

thorough investigation once plausible allegations arose, the integrity of the

deliberative process cannot be assured on this record.

This Court has previously held that, in extraordinary circumstances,

post-trial juror questioning may be warranted, “only upon a strong showing

that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct.” State v. Koedatich,

112 N.J. 225, 288 (1988) (quoting State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250 (1966)).

That remedy, though rare, is recognized to protect the integrity of the

deliberative process while preserving confidence in the finality of jury

verdicts. State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 154 (1998).

We find that such protection is necessary here, and we therefore remand

the matter for an evidentiary hearing, including individual voir dire of the juror

28
who allegedly engaged in misconduct, to determine whether juror taint

occurred and, if so, whether further steps, including a new trial, are necessary.

The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the trial judge’s

questioning is reversed. We remand for further proceedings in the trial court

consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-
LOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE
NORIEGA’s opinion.