State V Cook
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
SEANTAIN LEROY COOK, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 24-0329, 1 CA-CR 24-0330 (Consolidated)
FILED 07-24-2025
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2021-001928-001, CR2021-001949-001
The Honorable Laura Johnson Giaquinto, Judge
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Jana Zinman
Counsel for Appellee
Seantain Leroy Cook, Buckeye
Appellant
STATE v. COOK
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey
joined.
P E R K I N S, Judge:
¶1 Seantain Leroy Cook appeals his aggravated driving under
the influence (“DUI”) convictions and sentences. We affirm his convictions
but vacate his sentences and remand for resentencing because the court
improperly imposed a greater-than-presumptive sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Cook was arrested in Tempe for driving under the influence
in January and March 2021. The City of Mesa first charged Cook with
misdemeanor DUIs in municipal court but dismissed those charges without
prejudice. Then, the State separately charged him in superior court for each
of the January and March arrests with class 4 felony DUIs, aggravated for
driving with a suspended license—(“the January case”) and (“the March
case”).
¶3 Cook moved to waive his right to counsel and represent
himself in both cases. In February 2022, the court granted his motions and
assigned him appointed counsel to an advisory role. Cook filed several
motions to dismiss for violations of his right to a speedy trial under Rule 8
of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the court denied.
¶4 On the eve of the trials, Cook opted to revoke his pro per
status, and appointed counsel represented him in both jury trials. In each
trial, the State presented evidence showing that Cook’s driver license was
suspended at the time of his arrests, that he was personally served with
notice of the suspension before his arrests, and that his blood alcohol
content was .213 after the January arrest and .134 after the March arrest.
Cook unsuccessfully moved for acquittal under Rule 20 in both trials and
both juries found him guilty.
¶5 The court held a joint sentencing hearing on both convictions,
at which the State introduced evidence of Cook’s four prior felony
convictions from between 1999 and 2007. Based on those prior convictions,
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Decision of the Court
the court sentenced him as a category three repetitive offender, see A.R.S. §
13-703(C), (J), and imposed 12-year concurrent sentences—two years more
than the presumptive term. Cook appealed the convictions and sentences,
and we have jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona
Constitution, A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).
DISCUSSION
¶6 On appeal, Cook challenges (1) his trial counsel’s conduct,
(2) the denial of his motions to dismiss for speedy trial violations, (3) the
court’s “failure to inquire into” his motions to waive counsel, (4) the
sufficiency of the evidence, and (5) the use of his prior convictions to
enhance and aggravate his sentence. We address each in turn.
I. Trial counsel’s conduct
¶7 Cook argues it was a conflict of interest for his appointed trial
counsel to receive a salary, claiming that counsel “deliberately abandoned
plausible alternative defense strategies that [might] have resulted in . . .
dismissal with prejudice” to avoid losing “pecuniary gain.” But a public
defender merely receiving a salary, as required by law, does not create a
conflict of interest. A.R.S. § 11–582(B) (“[P]ublic defender[s] shall receive [a]
salary.”).
II. Speedy trial violations
¶8 Cook argues the court abused its discretion by denying his
motions to dismiss for violations of his speedy trial rights.
¶9 Defendants imprisoned in Arizona must be tried within 90
days after requesting a final disposition. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.3(b)(3). If the
court finds a violation of this rule, it “must dismiss the prosecution with or
without prejudice.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.6. A Rule 8 violation only warrants
reversal on appeal if the defendant shows the violation harmed his defense
or deprived him of a fair trial. State v. Hunter, 227 Ariz. 542, 544, ¶ 10 (App.
2011). “We review a trial court’s Rule 8 rulings for abuse of discretion.” Id.
at 543, ¶ 4.
¶10 Cook argues the court violated Rule 8.3(b) by trying him more
than 90 days after he requested final disposition in municipal court. He
contends he was prejudiced by the delay because it allowed the State to
refile the charges as felonies in superior court. But no Rule 8.3(b) violation
could arise from the municipal court charges because those charges were
dismissed without prejudice—at that point, there was no longer a pending
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STATE v. COOK
Decision of the Court
case against Cook in municipal court that could be brought to trial. Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 8.3(b)(3) (“The defendant must be brought to trial on the charge no
later than 90 days after sending a request for final disposition.” (emphasis
added)).
¶11 Cook also argues there were Rule 8.3(b) violations because he
requested a final disposition of the superior court charges more than 90
days before trial. It is true that the January and March cases went to trial in
April 2022—more than 90 days after Cook’s October 2021 requests for final
disposition. But several months must be excluded from that time
computation because the delays were “caused by or on behalf of the
defendant.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.4(a)(1). The court continued the trial twice:
the first at Cook’s request, and the second to give Cook time to prepare for
trial after he began representing himself. Both continuances were caused by
or on behalf of Cook. In any event, Cook has articulated no prejudice that
resulted from the delays in trying the superior court charges. His only
claimed prejudice—that the municipal court misdemeanors were refiled as
felonies in superior court—occurred before any delay in trying the superior
court charges. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Cook’s motions to dismiss the charges.
III. Delay in ruling on Cook’s motions to waive counsel
¶12 Cook filed motions to waive his right to counsel and to
represent himself in October 2021, December 2021, and January 2022. The
court granted his request in February 2022, but Cook argues that while his
motions were pending before the court, his appointed counsel
“unreasonabl[y] delay[ed] in the assertion of [his] . . . rights demonstrating
a lack of due diligence.” Cook thus reasons that the court’s failure to rule
on his motions to waive counsel until February 2022 prejudiced him.
Because this is functionally an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we
will not address it on appeal. State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2002)
(“[I]neffective assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32
proceedings. Any such claims improvidently raised in a direct appeal . . .
will not be addressed by appellate courts regardless of merit.”).
IV. Sufficiency of the evidence
¶13 Cook argues the court erred by denying his Rule 20 motions
for acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support either
conviction.
¶14 Defendants are entitled to acquittal “if there is no substantial
evidence to support a conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a). “Substantial
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Decision of the Court
evidence . . . is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate
and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 16 (2011) (cleaned up).
We “review de novo the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction . . .
resolv[ing] any conflicts in the evidence against the defendant and
view[ing] all facts in the light most favorable to supporting the verdict.”
State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014).
¶15 To convict a defendant of aggravated DUI under section 28-
1383(A)(1), the State must prove the defendant drove under the influence
when “the defendant knew or should have known his or her license was
suspended, canceled, [or] revoked.” State v. Gomez, 246 Ariz. 237, 239, ¶ 10
(App. 2019). Cook does not contest that he drove under the influence,
instead arguing the evidence did not support that he knew or should have
known his license was suspended. In the January case, officers testified they
found documentation in Cook’s vehicle showing he had a suspended
license. In the March case, Cook testified that he was twice informed that
his license was suspended. In both cases, an officer testified that he served
Cook with a license suspension notice in November 2020, months before
either DUI. Because substantial evidence supports that Cook knew or
should have known his license was suspended during both DUIs, the court
did not err by denying Cook’s Rule 20 motions for acquittal.
¶16 We affirm Cook’s convictions.
V. Sentence enhancement and aggravation
¶17 Cook argues the court improperly used his prior convictions
to enhance and aggravate his sentences. “We review de novo sentencing
issues that involve statutory interpretation.” State v. Urquidez, 213 Ariz. 50,
53, ¶ 11 (App. 2006). Because Cook did not object to the sentence in superior
court, we review for fundamental error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135,
140, ¶ 12 (2018). “An illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error.” State
v. Cox, 201 Ariz. 464, 468, ¶ 13 (App. 2002).
¶18 “When the State seeks to use a prior conviction as a sentence
enhancer . . . the State must first prove the existence of the prior conviction.”
State v. McCann, 200 Ariz. 27, 31, ¶ 15 (2001). “At that time, the presumption
of regularity attaches . . . [but] [i]f the defendant presents some credible
evidence to overcome the presumption, the State must fulfill its duty to
establish that the prior conviction was constitutionally obtained.” Id. Here,
the State adequately proved the existence of the prior convictions using
Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) pen packs. See State v. Solis,
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236 Ariz. 242, 248, ¶ 21 (App. 2014) (ADOC pen packs—the master records
for each prisoner—are sufficient to prove prior convictions). And Cook did
not object.
¶19 For the first time on appeal, Cook argues the prior convictions
were invalid because they were obtained in violation of his rights to
counsel, self-representation, and due process. By failing to raise that
challenge below, he has lost the opportunity to present credible evidence to
overcome the prior convictions’ presumption of validity for sentence
enhancement. State v. Anderson, 160 Ariz. 412, 415 (1989). As a result, he
cannot challenge the constitutional validity of those prior convictions on
direct appeal. Rather “the proper procedure is . . . post-conviction relief
under Rule 32.” Id. We will next determine whether the court properly
enhanced and aggravated the sentences using the valid prior convictions.
A. Sentence enhancement
¶20 “[A] person shall be sentenced as a category three repetitive
offender if the person . . . has two or more historical prior felony
convictions.” A.R.S. § 13-703(C). A “historical prior felony conviction”
includes any prior felony conviction that “[m]andated a term of
imprisonment.” A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(a)(i). The sentencing evidence showed
that Cook’s four prior felony convictions had mandatory terms of
imprisonment. Because the court properly found Cook had “two or more
historical prior felony convictions,” it did not err by sentencing him as a
category three repetitive offender. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C).
B. Sentence aggravation
¶21 The State concedes that the court erred by imposing greater-
than-presumptive sentences and requests that we vacate the sentences and
remand for resentencing. For the following reasons, we agree and grant its
request.
¶22 The court may not impose a sentence greater than the
presumptive term unless an aggravating circumstance exists. See A.R.S. §
13-701(C); see also State v. Johnson, 210 Ariz. 438, 441, ¶ 10 (App. 2006) (“[T]he
maximum punishment authorized by a jury verdict alone, without a
finding of additional facts, is the presumptive term.”). Prior convictions
may constitute an aggravating circumstance if “[t]he defendant was
previously convicted of a felony within the ten years immediately
preceding the date of the offense.” A.R.S. § 13-701(C), (D)(11).
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STATE v. COOK
Decision of the Court
¶23 Here, the jury did not find any aggravating circumstances.
And none of Cook’s prior convictions (between 1999 and 2007) occurred
within the ten years immediately preceding the dates of current offenses—
both of which occurred in 2021. Thus, the superior court could only impose
10-year presumptive prison sentences. By imposing 12-year sentences
without the necessary findings, the court committed fundamental error.
CONCLUSION
¶24 We affirm Cook’s convictions but vacate his sentences and
remand for resentencing.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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