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Martens V Reinly

           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                              
           EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN                              
                 SOUTHERN DIVISION                                   


Chance Martens,                                                           

          Plaintiff,                                          Case No. 25-cv-11565 
                                   Hon. Nancy G. Edmunds             
v.                                                                        
Reinig, et al.,                                                           

          Defendants.                                                
                                                             /       

     OPINION AND ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL                          

This is a pro se prisoner civil rights case.  Michigan state prisoner Chance 
Martens is incarcerated at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, 
Michigan.  He asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Plaintiff also filed a motion 
to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which the Court has granted.  
(ECF No. 2, 5.)  Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is authorized 
to screen the case and dismiss it in its entirety or in part at any time if it determines 
the action is: (i) frivolous or malicious or (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).                           
In his complaint, Martens asserts that corrections officers used excessive force 
when he was tased on January 19, 2024, and failed to provide medical care in the 
aftermath.  He alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  For the 
reasons discussed, the Court dismisses Martens’ Fourteenth Amendment claim.   
                  I.  Standards of Review                            
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” 
as well as “a demand for the relief sought.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3).  The purpose 
of this rule is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2)).  The notice pleading standard requires more than the bare assertion of legal 
conclusions or “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”  

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  “A pleading that offers ‘labels and 
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
do.’”  Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  “Nor does a complaint suffice if it 

tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. at 1949 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).                                       
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was 
deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or 

laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting 
under color of state law.  Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978).  A 
pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally.  Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520-21 (1972).                                                       
                     II.  Complaint                                  
Martens names five corrections officers as defendants: Reinly, Stembock, 

Buley-Neumas, Garcia, and John Doe.  The events giving rise to his complaint stem 
from a January 19, 2024, incident at the St. Louis Correctional Facility.  Martens 
claims that he was given conflicting instructions from defendants regarding where 

he was supposed to be.  (ECF No. 1, PageID.9.)  The defendant officers interpreted 
Martens’ actions as noncompliance.  (Id.)  In the process of trying to handcuff 
Martens, Defendant Stembock tased Martens multiple times in his spine.  (Id.)  
Defendants then dragged Martens to segregation while he screamed out in pain and 

ignored his requests for medical attention.  (Id. at PageID.13.)  He claims he now 
has chronic back and neck pain, insomnia, and mental and emotional distress.  (Id. 
at PageID.13-14.)                                                         

                     III.  Discussion                                
Martens claims that Defendants’ use of excessive force and their deliberate 
indifference to his medical needs violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.                                                               

States  are  obligated  under  the  Constitution  to  provide  medical  care  to 
incarcerated people.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976).  The source 
of the right depends on whether the inmate is a convicted prisoner or pretrial 

detainee.  The Eighth Amendment is the source of protection for convicted prisoners; 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees. See Helphenstine v. Lewis 
Cnty., 60 F.4th 305, 315 (6th Cir. 2023); see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 

390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (explaining that the Eighth 
Amendment  forbids  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  through  acts  of  deliberate 
indifference whereas the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides 

corresponding  protection  to  a  pretrial  detainee).    At  the  time  of  the  alleged 
constitutional  violations,  Martens  was—and  remains—a  convicted  prisoner.  
Accordingly,  the  Eighth  Amendment  provides  the  applicable  standard,  and  the 
Fourteenth Amendment claim will be dismissed.                             

                     IV. Conclusion                                  
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails to state 
a claim for which relief may be granted and is DISMISSED.                 

IT IS SO ORDERED.                                                    

                                      /s/ Nancy G. Edmunds           
                         NANCY G. EDMUNDS                            
                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE                
DATED: July 22, 2025                                                      

               CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE                                
    Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on     
        July 22, 2025, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.           
                   /s/ Marlena Williams                              
                      Case Manager