Payne V Geer
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
CHRISTOPHER M. PAYNE,
Plaintiff, 8:23CV427
vs.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
KEAGAN GEER, in his individual capacity;
and DEMETRIA HERMAN, in her individual
capacity;
Defendants.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery, Filing No. 35, and
Defendant Demetria Herman’s Motion for a Discovery Conference. Filing No. 43. For the
reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery is granted in part, denied
in part with prejudice, and denied in part without prejudice. Herman’s Motion for a
Discovery Conference is denied without prejudice. The Court also lifts the stay of the
dispositive motions deadline, see Filing No. 50, and sets October 6, 2025 as the deadline
to file dispositive motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his pro se complaint against Defendants Keagan Geer and Demetria
Herman on September 29, 2023. Filing No. 1. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
Filing No. 6. Upon an initial review of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and
1915A, the Court1 issued an order dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims except for his
malicious prosecution claim against Defendants in their individual capacities. Filing No.
10.
The basis for Plaintiff’s remaining claims relates to events occurring on or about
March 30, 2022 when Plaintiff, an inmate at Tecumseh State Correctional Institution
(“TSCI”) was transferred to the Omaha Correctional Center (“OCC”). Upon arrival at OCC,
Plaintiff’s belongings were searched and inventoried by OCC staff who discovered
1 The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Senior United States District Judge.
several photographic prints depicting seminude and nude subjects which OCC staff
believed were minor children (the “Photos”). The NSP was contacted, and Defendant
Geer was assigned to investigate the Photos.
Plaintiff was questioned by Geer and another investigator about the Photos.
Plaintiff alleges that, during this questioning, he was advised the Photos were not illegal,
a crime had not been committed, and the focus of the questioning related to how the
material, which was considered contraband, entered the prison. Plaintiff alleges he told
investigators he removed the Photos from a book he obtained from the prison library.
Plaintiff alleges that, sometime after this interview, Geer contacted Defendant
Herman who instructed and assisted Geer with the drafting of a probable cause affidavit
for Plaintiff’s arrest (the “Affidavit”) for possessing sexually explicit material visually
depicting sexually explicit conduct in violation of Nebraska law. The Affidavit allegedly
focused on the apparent age and nudity of the subjects in the Photos. Plaintiff was
subsequently arrested. Plaintiff alleges that, on October 17, 2022, the charges against
Plaintiff were dismissed upon the conclusion of a preliminary hearing at which Geer
presented testimony. Plaintiff subsequently sued Geer and Herman for malicious
prosecution.
ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Compel (Filing No. 35).
Plaintiff’s motion to compel relates to Interrogatories and Requests for Production
served upon Defendant Herman on or about February 16, 2025. See Filing No. 28.
Herman responded to this discovery on or about March 31, 2025. See Filing No. 32. More
specifically, Plaintiff takes issue with: (1) Herman’s objections to his definitions in the
Interrogatories; (2) Herman’s objections to Interrogatories 1, 3, and 5; and (3) Herman’s
objections to all three of Plaintiff’s Requests for Production.
First, this Court’s local rules explicitly prohibit definitions without the Court’s leave.
NECivR. 33.1(b) (“A party may not separately define words used in an interrogatory
without the court’s leave.”). Plaintiff did not have leave of Court to use definitions.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to compel on this issue. The Court now
turns to Plaintiff’s individual requests.
A. Interrogatory No. 1.
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: In the Declaration at paragraph 17 You state: “The
photos Plaintiff describes in his Complaint are not the sexually explicit visual
depictions of children that I attempted to prosecute Plaintiff for having.” Please
state with specificity:
a. A detailed and complete description of the Prints;
b. Which element(s) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-813.01 that you believe(d) the
Prints violated and why; and,
c. In what ways the Prints differ from the Alleged Prints.
Filing No. 36 at 6.
Herman objected to this interrogatory as ambiguous, calling for information outside
the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 and protected by the attorney work
product doctrine. In her brief, Herman asserts she has already answered this interrogatory
to the best of her recollection in paragraph 17 of a declaration she previously filed in this
case in support of an unrelated motion. See Filing No. 24-1 at 3–4 ¶ 17.
Upon review of the interrogatory and objections, as well as the positions in the
parties’ briefing, the Court overrules Herman’s objections to Interrogatory 1(a) and 1(c).2
Herman shall answer, to the best of her recollection, Interrogatory 1(a) and 1(c), even if
her response is already delineated in her declaration. The photographs in the underlying
lawsuit are relevant to Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim.3 Neither interrogatory is
2 Plaintiff capitalized “Prints” and “Alleged Prints” in Interrogatory 1(a) and 1(c). Plaintiff asserts he defined
these terms in the definitions section of his interrogatories. Filing No. 37 at 2. The definitions are not in
evidence and, as noted above, Plaintiff did not have leave of Court to define words in his interrogatories
pursuant to the local rules. However, even without the definitions to define “Prints” and “Alleged Prints,”
Interrogatory 1(a) and 1(c) are not ambiguous.
3 “[T]o establish a case of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show: (1) the commencement or
prosecution of the proceeding against him; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant; (3) its bona fide
termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such a proceeding; (5)
the presence of malice therein; (6) damage, conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff.” Lynch v.
Omaha World-Herald Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 896, 899–900 (D. Neb 2004) (first citing Johnson v. First
seeking work product, and both fall within the scope of discovery delineated by Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) and 33.
The undersigned agrees, however, that Interrogatory 1(b) is ambiguous as written.
It is unclear what Plaintiff means when he requests Herman state with specificity “[w]hich
element(s) of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-813.01 that [she] believe(d) the Prints violated and
why.” Section 28-813.01 is a comprehensive statute delineating different criminal
charges, affirmative defenses, and possible penalties. Accordingly, the Court sustains
Herman’s ambiguity objection. Herman is not ordered to answer Interrogatory 1(b).
Plaintiff’s motion to compel Herman to answer Interrogatory No. 1 is granted in part
and denied in part. Herman shall answer Interrogatory 1(a) and 1(c), as set forth herein.
Herman is not ordered to answer Interrogatory 1(b).
B. Interrogatory No. 3.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please state with specificity the exact number of cases
that you participated in while engaged as a lawyer, prior to April 5, 2022, that
involved the possession, distribution, and/or manufacture of visual depictions,
whether photographic or videographic, involving children/minors.
Filing No. 36 at 6.
Herman objected to this interrogatory as overly broad, vague, overly burdensome,
and unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence because it requested
information regarding Herman’s entire career prior to April 5, 2022. Plaintiff argues this
interrogatory is relevant to the “malice” element of the pending claim and further states
he would be amenable to an estimate of the number of cases referenced above, rather
than the exact number.
For purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, to establish malice, the proceeding
must have been brought for a purpose that is wrongful or willful without reasonable or
probable cause. Lynch, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (first citing Miles v. Walker, 66 Neb. 728,
92 N.W. 1014, 1016 (1902); and then citing Tucker v. Cannon, 32 Neb. 444, 49 N.W. 435
National Bank and Trust Co., 207 Neb. 521, 300 N.W.2d 10, 14 (1980); and then citing Holmes v.
Crossroads Joint Venture, 262 Neb. 98, 629 N.W.2d 511, 526 (2001)).
(1891)). The Eighth Circuit has described the showing of malice as requiring a plaintiff to
show that defendants “had an illegitimate motive or acted in flagrant disregard so that a
motive can be inferred.” Id. (citing Cassady v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 167 F.3d 1215 (8th
Cir. 1999) (applying Missouri law)).
The undersigned agrees that Herman’s experience in this area of criminal law is
relevant. However, Herman need not provide this information with “specificity” as Plaintiff
is no longer requesting this information and, given the information before the Court, this
may not be proportional to the needs of the case. Herman can provide her best estimate
to respond to this interrogatory and is ordered to do so.
Plaintiff’s motion to compel Herman to answer Interrogatory No. 3 is granted in part
and denied in part. Herman shall answer Interrogatory No. 3 as limited herein.
C. Interrogatory No. 5.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: In the Declaration at paragraph 16 you state: “Where
no overt sexual act (i.i. [sic] penetration or masturbation) is involved. [sic] Nebraska
state law requires the State to prove the sexual motivation of the possessor for
each charges [sic] image of CSAM.” Please state with specificity exactly which
authority/authorities require the State to prove the sexual motivations of the
possessor (as opposed to the sexual motivation of the producer) of CSAM.
Filing No. 36 at 7.
Herman objected to this interrogatory as calling for information outside the scope
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 and protected by the attorney work product doctrine.
Herman argues answering this interrogatory is improper as it would require her to provide
a recitation of the law and, as such, is outside of the scope of discovery.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(a)(2) provides that “[a]n interrogatory is not
objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or
the application of law to fact.” Plaintiff argues this interrogatory is asking for the application
of law to fact and, as such, falls within the scope of Rule 33. Herman disagrees.
The Court sustains Herman’s attorney work product objection. Interrogatory No. 5
is not seeking the application of law to fact. Instead, it requests Herman provide legal
authority to support the contention that the State must “prove the sexual motivations of
the possessor” for certain criminal charges. In other words, Plaintiff is seeking Herman’s
attorney’s legal arguments in support of this position. Cf. Promotional Mktg. Insights, Inc.
v. Affiliated Comput. Servs., Inc., No. 11-2795, 2012 WL 13028115, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept.
19, 2012) (sustaining attorney work product objection and denying motion to compel
because interrogatory requesting all legal bases in support of a certain contention was
not seeking a permissible mix of application of law to facts but was rather seeking legal
arguments of counsel in support of a legal position). Plaintiff’s motion to compel Herman
to answer Interrogatory No. 5 is denied.
D. Requests for Production No. 1, 2, and 3.
The undersigned now turns to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production. First, Herman
responded to all three requests on the basis that she has nothing responsive to the
requests in her possession. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a)(1) limits the scope of
requests for production to “items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or
control.” Plaintiff concedes Herman may not be able to access responsive documents
because she is no longer employed by the Douglas County Attorney’s Office. He argues,
however, that Herman’s attorney is employed by the Douglas County Attorney’s Office
and, thus, the requested documents are within Herman’s possession.
Herman is not required to respond to Plaintiff’s requests to the extent responsive
items are not in her possession, custody, or control. Plaintiff is mistaken in his belief that
Herman has control over every item responsive to his discovery requests simply because
her attorney is employed by the Douglas County Attorney’s Office. For instance, neither
Herman nor her attorney can access Plaintiff’s sealed criminal court file maintained by
the County Court of Douglas County, Nebraska. Filing No. 44 at 1 ¶ 4; Filing No. 46 at 1
¶ 3. The Court cannot order Herman to produce what she does not have.
Plaintiff is correct, however, that “possession, custody, or control” is broader than
physical possession. Herman cannot answer these requests based upon items in her own
individual possession. “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 requires a party to produce not
only those documents within its possession or physical custody, but also responsive
documents that are within the party’s ‘control.’” Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Allen
Interchange LLC, No. 22-CV-1681, 2024 WL 3617141, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2024)
(citing Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 635 (D. Minn. 2000)). “‘Control’
is defined broadly as . . . ‘the legal right, authority, or ability to obtain upon demand
documents in the possession of another.’” Id. (quoting Prokosch, 193 F.R.D. at 636). “The
party to whom the discovery is directed thus need not have legal ownership or actual
physical possession, but rather a ‘practical ability’ to obtain the documents, to be required
to produce them.” Id.
Herman has the practical ability to obtain, and thus, control over any item Herman’s
attorney gathers from third parties on her behalf. “Because a client has the right, and the
ready ability, to obtain copies of documents gathered or created by its attorneys pursuant
to their representation of that client, such documents are clearly within the client’s control.”
Gowan v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 309 F.R.D. 503, 509–10 (D.S.D. Sept. 11, 2015) (quoting
Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey
Circus, 233 F.R.D. 209, 212 (D.D.C. 2006)).
In this case, discovery gathered from third parties includes documents gathered
from the Douglas County Attorney’s Office on Herman’s behalf. It is possible Herman’s
attorney can gather discovery from Douglas County without using formal discovery
devices. The Court is not ordering Herman’s attorney to affirmatively search for items
responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests in the possession of the Douglas County
Attorney’s Office. However, any items Herman’s attorney gathers in the course of
representing Herman in this lawsuit, including materials informally gathered from the
Douglas County Attorney’s Office, are in Herman’s control and, therefore, potentially
discoverable. To put it more simply, Herman’s attorney is not required to gather discovery
for Plaintiff. If, however, Herman’s attorney gathers discovery (such as police reports, the
case file from the criminal prosecution, etc.) for Herman, Herman is required to disclose
that discovery to Plaintiff when asked (in a formal discovery request subject to appropriate
objections).
Accordingly, Herman is ordered to either (1) supplement her responses to items in
her possession, custody, or control, subject to the Court’s rulings on Herman’s objections
below, and/or (2) create a privilege log.4 The undersigned now turns to Plaintiff’s
individual requests.
Requests No. 1 and 2:
REQUEST NO. 1: Any and all reports, records, or other documents and items that
you relied on in the investigation and prosecution of myself as described and
alleged in the Complaint.
REQUEST NO. 2: Any and all text messages, emails, memos, voice messages, or
other communications – whether handwritten, digital, typewritten, or produced by
any other means – that relate to Myself, including but not limited to those by and
between you and Keagan Geer, you and NDCS Personnel, you and any employee
of NSP, and you and any other person. In regard to voice message [sic] that are
audio recordings and not transcribed into writing, may be produced in digital format
by emailing the digital recording in digital format to: chrispay79@gmail.com.
Filing No. 36 at 10.
Herman objected to both requests as requesting privileged attorney work product
and advised that no non-privileged documentation was within Herman’s possession.
Herman additionally objected to Request No. 2 on the basis that it is vague and
ambiguous.
First, Herman’s vague and ambiguous objections to Request No. 2 are overruled.
This request unambiguously seeks any communications related to Plaintiff, specifies
certain formats for the communications, and specifies potential individuals involved in the
communications.
Second, Herman objected to Requests No. 1 and 2 as requesting attorney work
product. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(A) provides that:
4 For instance, it is possible Herman is arguing she has responsive discovery in her possession, custody,
or control that she believes she cannot disclose pursuant to the Nebraska Security, Privacy, and
Dissemination of Criminal History Information Act. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3501, et. seq. Herman does not
delineate what, if anything, she is refusing to disclose on this basis. If Herman is withholding responsive
discovery on the grounds that this Act prohibits its dissemination to Plaintiff, she is ordered to delineate
what she is withholding in a privilege log. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(5).
Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered
if:
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare
its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial
equivalent by other means.
Additionally, “[i]f the court orders discovery of those materials, it must protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s
attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b)(3)(B).
Items protected by the work product doctrine may be responsive to Requests No.
1 and 2, but it is unlikely every item responsive to these requests is work product. The
work product doctrine only applies to documents and tangible items “prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. 26(b)(3)(A). Accordingly, the Court cannot rule at this point on Herman’s work
product objections because it is unclear what, if anything, Herman has that is responsive
to these requests.
Herman is ordered to re-evaluate whether she has anything responsive to these
requests within her possession, custody, or control consistent with the Court’s guidance
above and supplement her response accordingly. If she does not have anything
responsive, she is ordered to supplement her response to clarify. If she is withholding any
responsive items on the basis of the work product doctrine, she is ordered to create a
privilege log consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5).
Plaintiff may renew his motion upon the receipt of a privilege log indicating Herman
is withholding responsive items as attorney work product. Neither party is permitted to
resort to motions practice until after the parties have attempted to meet and confer again
to resolve the dispute without Court intervention pursuant to NECivR. 7.1(j). If motions
practice is required, the parties are encouraged to brief whether items prepared in
anticipation of the criminal prosecution underlying a civil malicious prosecution action are
protected by the work product doctrine in the civil action.
Finally, Plaintiff is reminded that the Court cannot compel Herman to produce what
is not in her possession, custody, or control. Since Herman’s current position is that there
is nothing in her possession responsive to these requests, the Court will summarily deny
a renewed motion to compel a response to these requests if there is no evidence that
Herman has anything responsive in her possession, custody or control, as discussed
herein.
Plaintiff’s motion to compel Herman to produce items in response to Requests No.
1 and 2 is granted in part and denied in part without prejudice. Herman shall supplement
her responses and/or provide a privilege log as set forth herein.
Request No. 3:
The undersigned now turns to Plaintiff’s Request No. 3.
REQUEST NO. 3: Any and all photographs, copies of photographs, and/or digital
images pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of myself as described and
alleged in the Complaint. Digital images shall be produced by printing the same
and noting thereon or therewith in separate document that a digital copy thereof
exists.
Filing No. 36 at 11.
Herman objected to this request insofar as it requested documentation that cannot
be legally transferred to Plaintiff. Herman then responded by advising she was not in
possession of such items.
Once again, Herman is ordered to re-evaluate whether she has anything
responsive to this request within her possession, custody, or control consistent with the
Court’s guidance above. If she does not have anything responsive, she is ordered to
supplement her response to clarify. The Court cannot order Herman to produce what she
does not have. It will summarily deny a renewed motion to compel a response to this
request if there is no evidence that Herman has anything responsive in her possession,
custody or control.
Herman also objected to this request on the basis that Plaintiff is requesting
materials she cannot legally transfer to Plaintiff. It is unclear whether Herman is asserting
she cannot provide the photos to Plaintiff because the requested material is illicit and
transferring it to Plaintiff is illegal or because Plaintiff is incarcerated and the facility’s
policies prohibit him from possessing this type of material. Either way, the Court provides
the following guidance to the parties.
The material Plaintiff is requesting is highly probative to his malicious prosecution
claim. Accordingly, if items responsive to this request come into or are in Herman’s
possession, custody, or control (as set forth above), she is ordered to disclose a log to
Plaintiff describing the responsive material consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5). The parties are then ordered to meet and confer to attempt to resolve the dispute
without Court intervention. In doing so, the parties are ordered to contact the facility where
Plaintiff is incarcerated to determine the best way to transfer and/or allow Plaintiff to view
these photos without violating any internal procedures. For instance, the parties might
agree to designate a documents custodian within the facility to hold the materials for
Plaintiff and coordinate with the facility to provide Plaintiff supervised access to the
materials at set times to prepare his case. The parties may resort to formal motions
practice if the meet and confer is unsuccessful. See NECivR. 7.1(j). If it is Herman’s
position that Plaintiff should not, under any circumstances, be able to view the photos in
any way whatsoever, Herman should provide the Court with additional authority
supporting this position.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel Herman to produce items in response to
Request No. 3 is granted in part and denied in part without prejudice. Herman shall
supplement her response to clarify whether she has responsive discovery in her
possession, custody, or control. If she does have items responsive to this request in her
possession, custody, or control, Herman is ordered to produce a privilege log, and the
parties are ordered to meet and confer as set forth herein prior to engaging in any formal
motions practice.
In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted
in part, denied in part with prejudice, and denied in part without prejudice. The
undersigned now turns to the motion for a discovery conference.
II. Motion for Discovery Conference (Filing No. 43).
Defendant Herman seeks a discovery conference to obtain access to the sealed
criminal case forming the basis of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. Filing No. 43.
Plaintiff refuses to execute an affidavit permitting Herman and her counsel to access the
sealed records. See generally Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3523(1)(c).
Herman did not explain what discovery mechanism she believes entitles her to
compel Plaintiff to execute an affidavit to unseal the criminal record. Notably, the written
discovery deadline is closed. Filing No. 29. Herman asked Plaintiff to execute the affidavit
in an informal letter and Plaintiff refused. Filing No. 43 at 2. There is no evidence Herman
requested Plaintiff execute the affidavit through a formal discovery request and Herman
did not provide any authority indicating the Court may compel Plaintiff to execute the
affidavit in the absence of a formal request. Accordingly, the Court denies Herman’s
motion without prejudice. The undersigned is not inclined to hold a discovery dispute
conference when there is nothing on the record before it suggesting Herman is entitled to
the relief she seeks.
However, it appears both parties want access to the sealed criminal record and
would mutually benefit from coming to an agreement. A protective order could alleviate
Plaintiff’s concerns that the criminal record will become public if he signs the affidavit to
release these records. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(c)(1) (a protective order can specify
terms for the disclosure of discovery). The parties may look to the Court’s standard
protective orders, posted on the Court’s website: https://www.ned.uscourts.gov/forms, for
guidance. Accordingly, the parties are ordered to meet and confer a second time on this
issue. If the parties come to an agreement, the parties may file a joint motion for a
stipulated protective order (or any other joint motion, as appropriate).
If the parties cannot come to an agreement after meeting and conferring, the
parties may resort to formal motions practice. If Herman files a motion to compel Plaintiff
to execute the affidavit, she is encouraged to (1) identify the discovery method entitling
her to this relief and (2) provide legal authority indicating the Court may order Plaintiff to
execute this affidavit. If one or both of the parties opt to subpoena the appropriate agency
for the sealed record, the parties may do so, but remain bound by any applicable law,
including the procedures set out in the federal and local rules for third party subpoenas.
All Rule 45 subpoenas shall be served by August 22, 2025.5
III. Dispositive Motion Deadlines.
Both parties requested the Court extend their dispositive motions deadline. Filing
Nos. 45 & 47. This Court previously stayed the dispositive motions deadline pending a
ruling on the motions at hand. Filing No. 50. The Court now lifts the stay and orders that
any dispositive motions be filed on or before October 6, 2025.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery, Filing No. 35, is granted in part, denied
in part with prejudice, and denied in part without prejudice as set forth herein.
a. Defendant Herman is ordered to answer and/or supplement her
responses to Plaintiff’s discovery, as set forth herein, by August 22,
2025. If Herman is withholding any responsive information based upon
privilege, a privilege log shall be produced in conjunction with her
supplemental responses.
b. Any discovery motions permitted by this Order shall be filed on or before
September 5, 2025.
2. Defendant Herman’s Motion for Discovery Conference, Filing No. 43, is denied
without prejudice. The parties are ordered to meet and confer on the issues
raised by this motion, as set forth herein, by August 8, 2025.
3. All Rule 45 subpoenas shall be served by August 22, 2025.
5 The Court’s final progression order, Filing No. 29, did not set a deadline for completing Rule 45
subpoenas. The Court now sets forth such deadline.
4. The stay of the dispositive motions deadline, see Filing No. 50, is lifted. The
deadline for filing motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment (all
dispositive motions) is October 6, 2025.
Dated this 23rd day of July, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Jacqueline M. DeLuca
United States Magistrate Judge