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Marriage Of Haile Ca11

Filed 7/22/25 Marriage of Haile CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE


 In re the Marriage of EDEN and
 TSEGAI HAILE
 EDEN HAILE,
           Respondent,
                                                                        A171590, A171891, & A171979
 v.
 TSEGAI HAILE,                                                          (Sonoma County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. SFL-090902)
           Appellant.


         In these consolidated appeals, appellant Tsegai Haile challenges three
separate orders entered in the dissolution proceedings initiated by his wife,
respondent Eden Haile.1 Because he raises no reasoned factual or legal
arguments of how the trial court erred, we affirm all three orders.
                                                    I.
                                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                                               BACKGROUND
         Tsegai and Eden were married in January 1996 and have three
children. Eden filed a divorce petition in April 2022. Around a year later, in
April 2023, Tsegai purported to appeal from several orders entered in the
action. In an unpublished opinion, this court concluded that Tsegai had


         1 We refer to the parties by their first names in the interest of clarity.




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mostly appealed from nonappealable orders, and that to the extent one of the
orders was appealable, Tsegai offered no reasoned argument why it should be
reversed. (Haile v. Haile (Oct. 26, 2023, A167562) (Haile I).)
      Litigation continued in the trial court. Among the many things the
parties disputed was their date of separation. Tsegai claimed that the parties
separated in March 2002 (i.e., around 20 years before Eden filed a divorce
petition), when Eden was pregnant with the couple’s third child. Eden, by
contrast, contended the separation date was in April 2022.
      Tsegai’s legal representation has changed several times. He is
currently unrepresented. He challenges the following three orders issued by
the trial court.
             A. Denial of Claim of Exemption.
      In May 2022, the court ordered Tsegai to pay $5,000 in attorney fees
and $500 in other payments. Apparently he did not pay. Tsegai also was
directed to pay Eden money in orders filed in August 2022, December 2022,
and March 2023. Eden ultimately obtained a writ of execution for the
enforcement of a money judgment totaling $8,987.50. In January 2024,
$5,570.24 was withdrawn from Tsegai’s account with Redwood Credit Union
to pay a “Sheriff’s Department levy.”
      Tsegai filed a claim of exemption under title 42 United States Code
section 407(a), which exempts Social Security income from garnishment.
Eden opposed the claim. She contended that Tsegai’s equity was greater
than what he had listed on a financial statement.
      In response to Eden’s opposition to his claim of exemption, Tsegai first
filed a declaration complaining about almost every aspect of the proceedings.
As for his claim of exemption, he characterized Eden’s opposition as
“frivolous” and asserted that he was “not a judgment debtor in this case, I



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won every issue raised legally and factually!” And he provided an estimate
for proposed dental work and a statement regarding his Social Security
benefits. Two days later, Tsegai filed a supplemental declaration. He
characterized the documentation presented by Eden as “illegally gathered”
and “irrelevant,” and claimed that the order supporting the writ of execution
against him was “VOID.”
      At a hearing in February 2024, the court ordered further briefing on
whether a court order that has not been reduced to a judgment can be subject
to a writ of execution. Following briefing, the court concluded that Eden
could enforce the orders against Tsegai as money judgments. But the court
characterized the evidence submitted as “unclear and disjointed,” and it
therefore ordered an evidentiary hearing on the claim of exemption.
      At a hearing on August 9, 2024, Tsegai appeared by Zoom despite
having been ordered to appear in person to provide testimony. The trial court
continued the hearing and ordered Tsegai to be present in court.
      Tsegai did not appear at the continued hearing. A representative from
Tsegai’s credit union was present to authenticate bank statements showing
that the levy on Tsegai’s account was taken from a savings account that did
not contain Social-Security payments, and Eden’s attorney made an offer of
proof that the representative would testify to that effect. The attorney also
provided evidence of the equity Tsegai had in the home held in his name.
      The trial court denied Tsegai’s claim of exemption based on the offer of
proof and the fact there was sufficient equity in Tsegai’s home for him to
satisfy the judgment against him. Tsegai appealed. (No. A171590.)
            B. Award of Attorney Fees.
      Meanwhile, Eden sought $105,000 in attorney fees and costs under
Family Code, section 271. The form request stated that Tsegai retained sole



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access to several financial accounts and that his “behavior ha[d] increased
[her] attorney fees and costs substantially by having to defend [her]self
against frivolous motions and pleadings.” Eden reported she was working
two entry-level jobs (one as a caregiver in a senior home and the other as a
housekeeper for a hospital) to support herself and the Hailes’ youngest
daughter, an adult who “has special circumstances.” She represented that,
given her age and the cost of living, she was “unsure [she would] ever be able
to earn enough to sustain the standard of living [she] enjoyed during the
marriage.”
      Tsegai did not appear at the hearing on the request for attorney fees.
Eden’s attorney provided an offer of proof about the amount of fees Eden
would testify she had incurred. The attorney also provided proof of Tsegai’s
ability to pay the attorney fees. The court ordered that Tsegai pay Eden
$105,000 in attorney fees. Tsegai appealed. (No. A171891.)
              C. Declaration of Tsegai as a Vexatious Litigant.
      Eden also sought to have Tsegai declared a vexatious litigant under
Code of Civil Procedure section 391 et sequitur. She asked that he be
required to furnish security and that the court issue an order preventing him
from filing any further petitions, applications, or motions without first
obtaining leave of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 391.1, subd. (a), 391.7,
subd. (a).)
      Tsegai filed a seven-page declaration in opposition to the request. He
attested that there was “irrefutable documentary evidence” showing that the
trial judge was “a personal enemy of mine.” Tsegai accused the judge, in his
words, of refusing and failing “to follow simple guidelines of a judicial post, on
ongoing and repeated basis. His acts are not judicial acts. These retaliatory
acts are his own, representing his own prejudices, and gaols [sic].” Tsegai



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contended that the judge had denied him his constitutional and civil rights
and that the judge’s orders were “void [and] of no force or effect” since the
judge had “lost subject matter jurisdiction.” And he devoted most of his
declaration to listing all the ways the judge supposedly had “conspired,
supervised, abetted, & aided” wrongful acts against him. The declaration
concluded: “with him [the trial judge] being the litigant on false/fraudulent
basis; with him being the accuser w/o standing, and him being the decision
maker in his kangaroo court, declared me vexatious litigant, grossly
falsifying the facts of the records in the proceedings w/o any supporting
evidence but his words. It’s illegal, null, and void!”
      Tsegai also submitted a two-page memorandum of points and
authorities. He contended that his appeal from the denial of his claim of
exemption automatically stayed the case. Finally, Tsegai submitted
printouts of anonymous reviews that the trial judge had received on a website
for rating judges.
      Following a hearing, the trial court on November 6, 2024, declared
Tsegai to be a vexatious litigant. It granted the request to enter a prefiling
order against Tsegai (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.7, subd. (a)), but it denied the
request that he be required to furnish security in order to continue the
litigation.
      Tsegai filed a notice of appeal on November 18. (No. A171979.) This
court dismissed the appeal as having been taken from a nonappealable order,
then conditionally reinstated it on the condition that he submit the prefiling
order entered against him. The trial court entered a prefiling order on
January 14, 2025, and this court allowed the appeal to proceed after Tsegai
provided the order to this court.
      The court consolidated Tsegai’s three appeals.



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                                       II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Tsegai has submitted a two-part opening brief that does little to
address any of the three orders he challenges in these appeals. He recounts
all the many ways he claims the trial court acted improperly, including in
matters that are not the subject of this appeal. We do our best to summarize
Tsegai’s arguments that touch in some way on the orders from which Tsegai
appealed.
      A. Claim of Exemption (No. A171590)
      Tsegai quotes at length from the trial court’s order that concluded that
outstanding orders against Tsegai could be enforced as money judgments. He
focuses on the portion of the order that characterized Eden’s evidence
presented to that point as “unclear and disjointed,” and apparently asserts
that this conclusion undermines the trial court’s decision to order an
evidentiary hearing.
      Tsegai then claims that he objected to such a hearing as a violation of
his constitutional rights. He purports to cite to a portion of the record where
the trial court asked Tsegai if he was willing to testify under oath, and he
replied, “ ‘There’s no law mandating me. You’ve no jurisdiction to even hear
this case! However in a spirit of cooperation, I’m willing.’ ” The only record
citation that appears around this supposed statement and the testimony that
followed is to a form schedule of assets Tsegai supposedly referred to during
his testimony, but not to any such testimony itself. In other words, it is
unclear on our record whether the testimony Tsegai purports to quote exists.
      As for legal argument, Tsegai cites generally applicable statutes. (E.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 407(a) [exemption of Social Security payments from
garnishment], Code Civ. Proc., § 703.030, subd. (b) [property described as
exempt is not subject to enforcement of money judgment]). But he offers no


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reasoned factual or legal argument why the trial court erred in applying
those statutes.2 The absence of these necessary elements allows us to treat
Tsegai’s issue as waived. (In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708.)
      B. Award of Attorney Fees (No. A171891)
      As we have said, Eden sought attorney fees under Family Code,
section 271. Subdivision (a) of the statute provides in relevant part that “the
court may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which
any conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the
law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost
of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.
An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature
of a sanction. In making an award pursuant to this section, the court shall
take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets,
and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section
that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom
the sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, the
party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not required to
demonstrate any financial need for the award.”
      On appeal, Tsegai refers to the general rule that each party to civil
litigation usually is responsible for their own attorney fees. But he does not



      2 The following is a typical excerpt from Tsegai’s opening brief:

“Admissibility of evidence is fundamental aspect of due process. Evidence not
handled according to proper procedure isn’t admissible. Evidence obtained by
unlawful search/seizure in violation of the 4th amendment to the US const.,
and other violations of constitutional right is inadmissible. Even if funds
other than SSDI were shown, it would have been inadmissible! Records are
obtained by (1) illegal subpoena; (2) before a hearing to quash; (3) personal
appearance of 8/22/24, before hearing to quash it (10/11/24); (4) it’s
perjurious, & (5) irrelevant, because we’re also separated in 2002 (FC 70).”


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cite the relevant Family Code statute, let alone explain why the trial court
misapplied it when awarding Eden attorney fees. He asserts, without specific
citation to the record: “I’m dragged into this! my objection to order of
8/22/24, showed it’s retaliatory. Order 3/19/24, & TR of 8/8/24, admitted my
argument is meritrious [sic], OC’s is frivolous. The $8,947.50 is void from its
inception. RT vol II, shows OC lost. Baseless award of $105,000 while lost, is
also nothing but doubling down on its egregious abuse of power (PC 422.6;
18 USC 241; 242); CCP 916(a); 410,10.” This brief argument is confusing and
wholly inadequate to preserve any objection to the award of attorney fees.
We thus treat Tsegai’s argument as waived.
      C. Prefiling Order (No. A171979)
      As for the issuance of a prefiling order, Tsegai acknowledges on appeal
that the definition of a vexatious litigant includes a person who, “[i]n any
litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious
motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or
engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b)(3).) After the trial
court declared Tsegai a vexatious litigant, it entered an order that prevents
Tsegai from filing any new litigation in propria persona without first
obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where
the litigation is proposed to be filed. (Id., § 391.7, subd. (a).) “A court
exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a vexatious
litigant. [Citation.] We uphold the court’s ruling if it is supported by
substantial evidence. [Citations.] On appeal, we presume the order
declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply findings necessary to
support the judgment.” (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.)




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      Abundant evidence supports the trial court’s order declaring Tsegai a
vexatious litigant. The record is filled with motions filed by Tsegai that
contain irrelevant, frivolous, and repetitive claims, along with ad hominem
attacks on trial judges, Eden, and Eden’s attorney.3 This has had the effect of
dragging out divorce proceedings and has forced Eden to devote time and
resources to responding.
      Tsegai’s opening brief does not meaningfully address the legal or
factual basis for the prefiling order. He characterizes the prefiling order as
“Egregious Retaliation.” After he summarizes the statutory definitions of
a vexatious litigation, he simply asserts: “None of these applies here!”
And he characterizes the order as “outrageous, and nonjudicial.” We reject
these unsupported allegations.
                                       III.
                                  DISPOSITION
      In A171590, the order denying appellant’s claim of exemption is
affirmed.
      In A171891, the order awarding respondent attorney fees is affirmed.
      In A171979, the order declaring Tsegai a vexatious litigant and
imposing a prefiling requirement is affirmed.
      Respondent is awarded her appellate costs, if any, as she did not file a
respondent’s brief.


      3 Tsegai repeats this strategy in this court.  The first two pages of
Tsegai’s brief are filled with frivolous accusations that this court has
“[f]abricated” factors in order to rule against him and is part of a conspiracy
against him. After these appeals became fully briefed, Tsegai filed an
“[u]pdated” list of the supposed evidence he says supports a showing of a
conspiracy. After that request was docketed, he filed yet another request,
this one accusing the court of mischaracterizing his motion on the court’s
docket. We reject his request that two members of the panel be disqualified.


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                                       _________________________
                                       Humes, P.J.




WE CONCUR:




_________________________
Banke, J.




_________________________
Smiley, J.




Haile v. Haile A171979, A171590, A171891



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