Crawford 823909 V Porter
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
DILONTE D. CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-745
v. Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
GIZELLE PORTER,
Defendant.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the Court is required
to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must
read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which
he complains occurred there. Plaintiff sues ICF Correctional Officer Gizelle Porter in her official
capacity. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
Plaintiff alleges that on May 19, 2025, during first shift, his cell door was opened so that
Plaintiff could go take a shower. (Id., PageID.3.) On the way to the showers, Plaintiff realized he
had the wrong shower shoes. (Id.) Plaintiff asked Defendant Porter if he could go back to his cell
to get the right shoes; Defendant Porter said “yes.” (Id.)
After Plaintiff swapped his shoes, he was walking back to the showers when Defendant
Porter approached him and said “to take it in.” (Id.) Plaintiff “asked for what.” (Id.) Defendant
Porter responded “because I f***ing said so,” and went on to say other things that Plaintiff was
unable to make out. (Id. (asterisks added).) After Plaintiff gathered his personal belongings, he
started walking back to the stairs and told Defendant Porter “I’m not your kid. Don’t disrespect
me.” (Id.) Defendant Porter replied, “I know why [you are] in here. You need to worry about
f***ing [those] little kids.” (Id. (asterisks added).) Plaintiff stopped, turned around, and asked
Defendant Porter what she said. (Id.) Defendant Porter “repeated what she said and called
[Plaintiff] a child molester.” (Id.)
Based upon the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Eighth
Amendment claims against Defendant Porter. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of
Defendant Porter being “relieved of her duties as a correctional officer,” as well as damages. (Id.,
PageID.4.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp.
of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal
rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A. Official Capacity
As set forth above, Plaintiff has sued Defendant Porter in her official capacity only.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is
equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir.
1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in
the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24
F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented
to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986).
Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued
under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing
Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771.
Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as well as injunctive relief in the form of
Defendant Porter being “relieved of her duties as a correctional officer.” (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983
for money damages. See, e.g., Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617. Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary
damages against Defendant Porter in her official capacity, and any such claim will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an
official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an exception to
sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). The
United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under Ex parte Young for prospective
injunctive relief should not be treated as an action against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 167 n.14 (1985). Instead, the doctrine is based on the fiction that unconstitutional acts cannot
have been authorized by the state and therefore cannot be considered done under the state’s
authority. Id.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “Ex parte Young can only be used to
avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law
and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581
(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that
the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95 (1983) (addressing injunctive relief); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127
(2007) (addressing declaratory relief).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint concerns a discrete incident that occurred on May 19, 2025.
Plaintiff does not set forth any facts suggesting that Defendant Porter is engaged in an ongoing
violation of law. For that reason alone, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is not properly
characterized as prospective. And, regardless, courts have found that they do not have the authority
to order that correctional officials be terminated from their employment. See, e.g., Williams v.
Maynard, No. 23-cv-1320, 2023 WL 3674332, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2023) (collecting
cases); Pagonis v. Raines, No. 4:17-cv-01, 2018 WL 9240919, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2018)
(“‘Federal courts are not prison managers’ and injunctive relief in the form of an order to terminate
a prison official’s employment is not available in a § 1983 action.” (citations omitted)), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 17-cv-00001, 2018 WL 9240916 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2018). Thus,
the Court has no authority to grant Plaintiff the injunctive relief he seeks in the form of having
Defendant Porter’s employment terminated.
For all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant
Porter in her official capacity upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official
capacity claim against Defendant Porter will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Because
Plaintiff has only sued Defendant Porter in her official capacity, his entire complaint is subject to
dismissal for the reasons set forth above. Nevertheless, the Court will consider the merits of
Plaintiff’s claim below.
B. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The
Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148
F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations
of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison
confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant
experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations
are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he
faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying
deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference
standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling,
509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the
subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.” Id. at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act
with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of
recklessly disregarding that risk.” Id. at 836.
Here, the Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert an Eighth Amendment verbal
harassment claim against Defendant Porter premised upon Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant
Porter disrespected him. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) As set forth supra, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Porter called him a child molester. (Id.) While the Court does not condone the use of
such language, and while such language is certainly unprofessional, verbal harassment of an
inmate by prison officials does not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. Ivey, 832 F.2d at 955. Additionally, verbal harassment does not rise to the level of
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. See id.; see
Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that harassment and verbal abuse
do not constitute the type of infliction of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits). Thus, any
Eighth Amendment claim premised upon Defendant Porter’s alleged verbal harassment of Plaintiff
will be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s complaint can also be construed to assert an Eighth Amendment failure to
protect claim against Defendant Porter based upon Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Porter
called him a child molester. Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety
grounded in the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Thus, prison staff are obliged “to
take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson, 468 U.S.
at 526–27. In particular, because officials have “stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of
self-protection[,]” “officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Id. at 833. To establish a violation of this right, Plaintiff must show that Defendant
Porter was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s risk of injury. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449,
1453 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880–81 (6th Cir. 1988).
Labeling an inmate as Defendant Porter allegedly did may constitute deliberate
indifference to an inmate’s safety. See, e.g., Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 699 n.2 (6th Cir.
2001) (acknowledging that being labeled a snitch could make the inmate a target for prison
attacks); Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Odom v.
McKenzie, No. 12-cv-79, 2012 WL 6214367, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2012) (citations omitted).
“It does not matter whether the risk is caused by the actions of prison officials or may come at the
hands of other inmates. If an inmate is believed to be a ‘snitch’ by other inmates, he or she faces a
substantial risk of assault by other inmates.” Spotts v. Hock, Civ. No. 10-353, 2011 WL 676942,
at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 16, 2011) (citation omitted). However, in at least one published opinion,
the Sixth Circuit has held that to state a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment in such a context, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered physical harm as a
result of being labeled as such. See Thompson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 25 F. App’x 357, 359 (6th
Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s dismissal where plaintiff’s claim that he was endangered by
being labeled a snitch was unsupported by any allegation of harm); Yaklich, 148 F.3d at 600–01
(concluding that plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim based upon inmate threats
where he alleged no physical injury); White v. Trayser, No. 10-cv-11397, 2011 WL 1135552, at
*6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2011) (holding that plaintiff failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim
where he alleged that defendant endangered his life by thanking him for information about illegal
contraband in the presence of other inmates but failed to allege that he suffered any physical
injury); Catanzaro v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 08-11173, 2009 WL 4250027, at *12 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 19, 2009) (“[A]n Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim must be grounded in an
actual physical injury.”).
That said, a prisoner ordinarily does not need to prove that he has been the victim of an
actual attack to bring a personal safety claim; instead, he must at least establish that he reasonably
fears such an attack. Thompson v. County of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242–43 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that plaintiff has the minimal burden of “showing a sufficient inferential connection” between the
alleged violation and inmate violence to “justify a reasonable fear for personal safety”); see also
Gresham v. Walczak, No. 1:20-cv-310, 2020 WL 7872192, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2021)
(holding that an officer’s accusation that a prisoner was a snitch, coupled with a threat of physical
harm from a prisoner, was sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim).
Here, however, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that would permit the Court to infer that
Defendant Porter called Plaintiff a child molester in the presence of other inmates. Likewise,
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts suggesting that after being called a child molester by Defendant
Porter, Plaintiff began to experience threats of harm from other inmates. While Plaintiff need not
prove that he has been the victim of an actual attack, nothing in the complaint permits the Court to
infer that Plaintiff reasonably fears such an attack. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Thompson, 29
F.3d at 242–43. Plaintiff’s allegations are simply too conclusory for the Court to conclude that he
has set forth a plausible Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Porter.
Accordingly, any such claim will also be dismissed.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the
Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge
v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would
not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605
appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: July 22, 2025 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE