Ray V Google Llc
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 23 2025
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT JAMES RAY, No. 23-3987
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-04222-TSH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GOOGLE LLC, d/b/a You Tube,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Thomas S. Hixson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 14, 2025**
Before: HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Robert James Ray (“Ray”) appeals from the district court’s
dismissal of his complaint against Google LLC d/b/a YouTube (“Google”) for
failure to state a claim. We review the dismissal de novo, Parents for Privacy v.
Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper if “the plaintiff’s allegations fail
to set forth a set of facts that, if true, would entitle the complainant to relief.” Id.
Although the court is generally confined to consideration of the allegations in the
pleadings, the court may consider documents that are not physically attached to the
complaint where the authenticity of the documents is not contested, and the
complaint necessarily refers to and relies on them. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068,
1076 (9th Cir. 2005); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir.
2001).
Ray has failed to plausibly allege that Google contracted to pay him $22 per
view of his YouTube videos. To participate in the YouTube Partner Program
(“YPP”), Ray had to accept the terms of three agreements—the YPP terms, the
YouTube terms of service and the AdSense terms of service —none of which contain
such a pay-per-view promise, and one which expressly provides for a different
payment formula. Google cannot breach a promise that does not exist, and the
district court properly held that Ray failed to state a claim for breach of contract.
Scott v. Sec. Title Ins. & Guarantee Co., 9 Cal. 2d 606, 614 (1937) (“Breach of
contract rests upon a failure to perform an enforceable obligation, and if there is no
such obligation there can be no breach.”). The district court also correctly held that
even if there was unequal bargaining power between Ray and Google, the contracts
themselves were not overly harsh or one-sided so as to render the contracts
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unconscionable. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011) (both
procedural and substantive unconscionability required).
The district court dismissed Ray’s complaint with prejudice. We review the
denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125,
1139 (9th Cir. 2015). Ray sought leave to allege a claim of fraudulent inducement.
However, as the district court noted, Ray’s own allegations and the documents he
provided show Google did not misrepresent or omit any material facts, and thus Ray
cannot state a plausible claim for fraudulent inducement. See Dhital v. Nissan N.
Am., Inc., 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 838 (2022). Leave to amend would be futile, see Mo.
Ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017), and the court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Ray leave.
AFFIRMED.
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