Pamela Louise Anderson V Sergio Michael Lucci
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PAMELA LOUISE ANDERSON, UNPUBLISHED
July 22, 2025
Plaintiff-Appellee, 2:52 PM
v No. 369351
Antrim Circuit Court
SERGIO MICHAEL LUCCI, LC No. 23-009215-DO
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GARRETT, P.J., and RICK and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this divorce action, defendant appeals as of right the property division ordered in the
trial court’s judgment of divorce; however, defendant is actually challenging the trial court’s grant
of plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), in which plaintiff argued
that: (1) defendant was estopped from seeking any interest in plaintiff’s property on the basis of
an alleged oral postnuptial agreement, and (2) the parties entered into a full and final property
settlement agreement after the divorce proceedings were initiated. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we vacate the trial court’s order of summary disposition and the trial court’s judgment of
divorce, and we remand for further proceedings.
I. FACTS
This case arises from the divorce proceedings—and the resulting property division—
between the parties. The parties got married in 2007. At the time of these proceedings, plaintiff
was 68 years old, and defendant was 65 years old. There were no children born of this marriage.
In 2010, the parties purchased a property in Battle Creek, Michigan, and in 2013, the parties
purchased a property on Torch Lake, in Kewadin, Michigan. The parties generally maintained
separate bank accounts during their marriage, but they shared one joint bank account for expenses
associated with their properties. After defendant’s retirement in 2011, and before plaintiff’s
retirement in 2020, plaintiff earned about $300,000 a year; therefore, plaintiff largely funded the
party’s expenses during that time.
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In April 2023, defendant filed a complaint for divorce in the Barry County Circuit Court,
and on May 1, 2023, the Barry County Court entered an ex parte mutual temporary restraining
order that prohibited the parties from concealing, assigning, selling, destroying, transferring,
mortgaging, or encumbering either parties’ assets. The restraining order also specifically
prohibited the parties from distributing proceeds from the sale of the Battle Creek property, which
was under a purchase agreement at the time of the order, without a written agreement between the
parties. Defendant never served plaintiff with any documents related to the Barry County case,1
including the restraining order. While plaintiff was unaware of the restraining order, defendant
asked her for part of the sale proceeds from the Battle Creek property so that he could purchase a
home in Florida. Plaintiff gave defendant $385,000 from the proceeds and allowed him to take
personal property from the Battle Creek property. Additionally, without plaintiff’s knowledge or
approval, defendant withdrew significant amounts of money from his retirement account and
personal savings accounts, and he obtained a mortgage for his Florida property.
On May 3, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in the Antrim County Circuit
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Court. On July 25, 2023, the parties stipulated to dismiss the Barry County proceedings and
proceed in Antrim County. As the parties proceeded with the divorce, plaintiff alleged that the
parties had an oral postnuptial agreement, in which plaintiff agreed to purchase, maintain, and
furnish the parties’ real properties and be responsible for all taxes, insurance, and utilities, so long
as the properties would remain solely hers. Plaintiff also alleged that the parties entered into a full
and final oral property settlement agreement after the divorce proceedings were initiated, in which
her $385,000 payment to defendant constituted the parties’ full and final divorce settlement.
Plaintiff eventually moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asking the court to
enter a judgment of divorce recognizing the alleged oral agreements between the parties and
dismissing the case. In December 2023, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and entered a
judgment of divorce awarding: (1) the parties their respective bank accounts, vehicles, and debts;
and (2) plaintiff the Torch Lake property, the remaining proceeds from the sale of the Battle Creek
property, and the parties’ joint bank account. Defendant now appeals.
II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel
to the parties’ claims when granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition. We agree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the application of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
King v Munro, 329 Mich App 594, 599; 944 NW2d 198 (2019).
B. ANALYSIS
“Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue in a new action arising between the same
parties or their privies when the earlier proceeding resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue
1
5th Circuit Court, Case No. 2023-0000000263-DO.
2
13th Circuit Court, Case No. 23-009215-DO.
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in question was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding.” Bryan v JPMorgan
Chase Bank, 304 Mich App 708, 715; 848 NW2d 482 (2014) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). A critical factor when applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel is “the determination
of whether the respective litigants were parties or privy to a party to an action in which a valid
judgment has been rendered.” Mecosta Co Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co, 509 Mich
276, 283; 983 NW2d 401 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Generally, application
of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel.” King, 329 Mich App at 599
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, the trial court found that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied because the
Barry County Circuit Court entered an ex parte mutual temporary restraining order, which
defendant violated, before the parties stipulated to dismiss the Barry County proceedings and
continue their divorce proceedings in Antrim County. Even though this case was initiated in Barry
County before proceeding in Antrim County, there is no evidence that: (1) the parties had an
opportunity to litigate these issues in Barry County, or (2) the Barry County proceedings resulted
in a valid and final judgement. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the extent that it applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to the present case. See id.
III. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in
plaintiff’s favor because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of any
alleged oral agreements between the parties. We agree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We “review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.” Bailey
v Antrim Co, 341 Mich App 411, 421; 990 NW2d 372 (2022) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency
of a party’s claim. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665
(2019). “When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by
the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Id. “A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A
genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Trial “courts may not resolve
factual disputes or determine credibility in ruling on a summary disposition motion.” White v
Taylor Distrib Co Inc, 275 Mich App 615, 625; 739 NW2d 132 (2007) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
B. ANALYSIS
In this case, plaintiff alleged that the parties entered into the following oral agreements: (1)
a postnuptial agreement, in which plaintiff agreed to purchase, maintain, and furnish the parties’
real properties and be responsible for all taxes, insurance, and utilities, so long as the properties
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would remain solely hers; and (2) a full and final property settlement agreement, in which her
$385,000 payment to defendant constituted the parties’ full and final divorce settlement.
In support of the alleged postnuptial agreement, plaintiff presented: (1) promissory notes,
with only her signature, for the Battle Creek and the Torch Lake properties; and (2) records
showing defendant’s minimal income during the parties’ marriage, which she argued reflected her
financial support of him. In response, defendant presented deeds and mortgages for the Battle
Creek and Torch Lake properties that contained both parties’ names. Defendant also argued that
he completed maintenance and repairs for the parties’ various properties and made smaller
financial contributions to the parties’ expenses. When viewing this competing evidence in the
light most favorable to defendant, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the parties entered
into the alleged oral postnuptial agreement. See El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. Accordingly, a
genuine issue of material fact existed, and the trial court erred by granting summary disposition on
the matter. See id.
Moreover, in support of the alleged final property settlement agreement, plaintiff drew
attention to the fact that defendant violated the Barry County restraining order by requesting sale
proceeds, purchasing a home in Florida, withdrawing funds from his retirement account and
personal accounts, and taking out a mortgage. In response, defendant presented text messages
from plaintiff that were exchanged after the transfer of the sale proceeds and indicated that the
parties did not consider the $385,000 payment to be the parties’ final divorce settlement. Not only
does this competing evidence create a genuine issue of material fact, see id., but also, plaintiff’s
argument is misplaced. Defendant’s violation of the restraining order does not necessarily indicate
that defendant agreed to accept no other property in the division of marital assets. To the extent
that the trial court attempted to resolve the factual dispute of what defendant was entitled to after
violating the restraining order, the trial court erred. See White, 275 Mich App at 625. Even though
defendant violated the restraining order, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
parties entered into the alleged final settlement agreement; therefore, the trial court erred by
granting summary disposition on the matter. See El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160.
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENTS
Defendant further contends that even assuming, arguendo, that the alleged oral agreements
existed, they would not be enforceable because they are against public policy and contrary to the
statute of frauds. We agree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because postnuptial and other marital agreements are contracts, we review them using
contract principles. Skaates v Kayser, 333 Mich App 61, 71; 959 NW2d 33 (2020). “Accordingly,
we review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of a contract as well as its ruling on legal
questions that affect the contract’s validity.” Id. But, “we review for clear error any factual
findings made by the trial court.” Id. “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when this Court is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Special deference is
afforded to a trial court’s factual findings that are based on witness credibility.” Hodge v Parks,
303 Mich App 552, 555; 844 NW2d 189 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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B. ANALYSIS
“[U]nder Michigan law, a couple that is maintaining a marital relationship may not enter
into an enforceable contract that anticipates and encourages a future separation or divorce.” Wright
v Wright, 279 Mich App 291, 297; 761 NW2d 443 (2008). This Court has addressed the validity
of postnuptial agreements as follows:
[P]ost-nuptial agreements are not invalid per se, because some postnuptial
agreements may be intended to promote harmonious marital relations and keep the
marriage together. In such situations, the public policy objection to postnuptial
contracts . . . does not arise . . . . If a postnuptial agreement seeks to promote
marriage by keeping a husband and wife together, Michigan courts may enforce the
agreement if it is equitable to do so. [Hodge, 303 Mich App at 558-559 (quotation
marks, citations, and alternations omitted).]
“Postnuptial agreements that make it more financially attractive for a party to divorce are viewed
as encouraging divorce and have been invalidated on that basis.” Skaates, 333 Mich App at 76.
Throughout the proceedings in this case, plaintiff argued that the parties had an oral
postnuptial agreement in which plaintiff would financially support the parties and purchase,
maintain, furnish, and be financially responsible for the parties’ properties so long as the properties
would remain solely hers. If true, this agreement would entitle plaintiff to the parties’ real
properties and leave defendant with less than a quarter of the marital estate. Therefore, even if the
parties did enter into this alleged oral postnuptial agreement, it would be invalidated on the basis
that it encouraged divorce by making it financially attractive for plaintiff to divorce defendant.
See Skaates, 333 Mich App at 76; Wright, 279 Mich App at 297.
An additional consideration when addressing postnuptial agreements is Michigan’s statute
of frauds, which provides as follows:
No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding 1
year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any manner relating
thereto, shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared,
unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized by writing. [MCL 566.106.]
Therefore, according to the statute of frauds, the alleged oral agreements in this case, which
concerned the parties’ interests in land, cannot be enforced without a writing. See MCL 566.106.
Plaintiff agrees that the alleged oral agreements were not in writing, but plaintiff argues
that the doctrine of partial performance vitiates the requirements of the statute of frauds to the
parties’ alleged postnuptial agreement and alleged divorce settlement agreement. In Barclae v
Zarb, 300 Mich App 455, 475; 834 NW2d 100 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted), this
Court stated that the doctrine of partial performance can remove an agreement from the statute of
frauds, reasoning as follows:
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If one party to an oral contract, in reliance upon the contract, has performed his
obligation thereunder so that it would be a fraud upon him to allow the other party
to repudiate the contract, by interposing the statute, equity will regard the contract
as removed from the operation of the statute.
But, for the doctrine of partial performance to apply to an agreement, the party seeking to enforce
the agreement must first show that the oral contract exists by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
Clear and convincing evidence is that which “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear,
direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App
611, 625; 617 NW2d 351 (2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alterations in original).
In light of the evidence presented to the trial court in this case, plaintiff failed to establish
the existence of either alleged oral agreement by clear and convincing evidence. See id. Regarding
the alleged postnuptial agreement, defendant provided mortgage statements and deeds to the Battle
Creek and Torch Lake properties that named both parties and showed defendant’s recorded interest
in the properties. Regarding the alleged final settlement agreement, defendant provided text
messages from plaintiff that were exchanged after the transfer of sale proceeds and indicated that
the parties did not consider the $385,000 payment to be the parties’ final divorce settlement.
Because plaintiff has failed to show that either oral contract existed by clear and convincing
evidence, the trial court could not apply the doctrine of partial performance to the alleged
agreements. See Barclae, 300 Mich App at 475.
Accordingly, even if the alleged oral agreements existed, they would not be enforceable
because they are against public policy and contrary to the statute of frauds.
V. CONCLUSION
We vacate the trial court’s order of summary disposition and the trial court’s judgment of
divorce, and we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
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