United States V Anthony Hargett
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4091
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY HARGETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (4:94-cr-00068-FL-11)
Submitted: June 13, 2025 Decided: July 23, 2025
Before KING, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief
Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Anthony Hargett appeals the 60-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his
supervised release. On appeal, Hargett contends that the revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable considering that he served a long sentence in state custody for the revocation
conduct and that his original crime of conviction would support only a 24-month maximum
revocation sentence if committed today. ∗ We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). “We
affirm a revocation sentence so long as it is within the prescribed statutory range and is not
plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 296 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first “determine whether the sentence is unreasonable at all.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “In making this determination, we follow generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original
sentences, with some necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of
supervised release revocation sentences.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207
(4th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
∗
Hargett had moved in the district court for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of
the First Step Act of 2018, Pub L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, which, if applicable to
revocation proceedings, would allow the district court to retroactively apply the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, when determining an appropriate
sentence upon revocation of Hargett’s supervised release. The district court found that
Hargett was eligible for a reduction to a maximum revocation sentence of 24 months’
imprisonment but declined to grant his motion. Hargett has not challenged on appeal the
district court’s denial of his sentence reduction motion.
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district court adequately explains the sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy
statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for
concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory
maximum. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006).
Our review of the record confirms that Hargett’s revocation sentence is procedurally
and substantively reasonable. The district court correctly identified the policy statement
range and the revised policy statement range under the Fair Sentencing Act, considered the
relevant statutory factors, and adequately explained its determination that a sentence
reduction and any sentence less than 60 months’ imprisonment would not satisfy the
relevant § 3553(a) factors. We conclude Hargett’s revocation sentence is not plainly
unreasonable.
Additionally, a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release is a sanction
on the defendant’s breach of trust, United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (2013), and
is separate from and in addition to any sentence imposed as punishment for the new
criminal conduct, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(f) & cmt. n.4 (2024).
Accordingly, the district court appropriately imposed a sentence within the policy
statement range for Hargett’s violation of the terms of his supervision although he served
a lengthy state sentence for the new criminal conduct.
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We therefore affirm the district court’s revocation judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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