Ss V Moore County
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
S.S. by and through her guardian
Rumina Slazas, J.S. by and through
his guardian Rumina Slazas, and
RUMINA SLAZAS,
Plaintiffs,
v. 1:24cv658
MOORE COUNTY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This case is before the court on Defendant’s motion to
dismiss. (Doc. 29.) The motion was heard in open court on
June 12, 2025, and the court granted it in part, denied it in
part, and reserved ruling on Plaintiffs’ claim under Olmstead
v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), as to which the
court permitted supplemental briefing by the parties. (Doc.
47.)
The parties have submitted their supplemental briefing.
(Docs. 48, 49.) Having considered the arguments, the court is
not persuaded that Defendant Moore County has demonstrated
that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a plausible Olmstead
claim. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Olmstead claim will be denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a
pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is
meant to “test[] the sufficiency of a complaint” and not to
“resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a
claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of
N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To survive
such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (citations omitted), and all reasonable inferences
must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Ibarra v.
United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). To survive
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff
must “allege facts to satisfy the elements of a cause of
action” created by the statute. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't
of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015); accord Woods v.
City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017). But a
plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585.
Here, Plaintiffs proceed under Title II of the American
with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, which “can
be combined for analytical purposes because the analysis is
substantially the same.” Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla,
910 F.3d 739, 750 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Seremeth v. Bd. of City. Comm'rs Frederick
Cnty., 673 F.3d 333, 336 n.1 (4th Cir. 2012)). To bring a
claim under either statute, a plaintiff must establish: “(1)
they have a disability; (2) they are otherwise qualified to
receive the benefits of a public service, program, or
activity; and (3) they were denied the benefits of such
service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated
against, on the basis of their disability.” Id. (quoting
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 503 (4th
Cir. 2016)).
Moore County does not challenge the first two elements.
(See generally Doc. 49.) It is the third element - whether
Plaintiffs were “denied the benefits of such service, program,
or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis
of [his or her] disability,” that is at issue. Lamone, 813
F.3d at 503.
To make out a claim, “a plaintiff must show that she was
excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, a
program or service offered by a public entity, or subjected to
discrimination by that entity.” Constantine v. Rectors &
Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir.
2005) (emphasis removed). Title II of the ADA and § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act protect individuals with disabilities
from “unjustified institutional isolation,” Pashby v. Delia,
709 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (abrogated on other grounds
by Stinnie v. Holcomb, 37 F.4th 977 (4th Cir. 2022))
(quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600), requiring that services
be provided in integrated, community-based settings where
appropriate, Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607 (plurality op.). Under
Olmstead, the “proscription of discrimination” contained in
Title II of the ADA requires placement of persons with mental
disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions
when “[(1)] the State's treatment professionals determine that
such placement is appropriate, [(2)] the affected persons do
not oppose such treatment, and [(3)] the placement can be
reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources
available to the State and the needs of others with mental
disabilities.” 527 U.S. at 587, 607. The “unjustified
institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form
of discrimination.” Id. at 600.
Here, Moore County challenges Olmstead’s third prong.
(Doc. 30 at 20.) The county contends that Plaintiffs must
allege not only that viable placement options were available
in the community but must identify a specific option and
allege that such an option was willing to accept the
placements. (Doc. 49 at 1 (contending that Plaintiffs have
failed to allege that “a viable placement existed in the
community where the Plaintiff Children could have been
accommodated”) (emphasis removed); id. at 4-6 (citing Z.S. v.
Durham Cnty, No. 1:21CV663, 2022 WL 673649, at * 3 (M.D.N.C.
Mar. 7, 2022)).) Plaintiffs contend, however, that the
complaint makes out a plausible claim.
The complaint alleges that both minors, S.S. and J.S.,
could reasonably be accommodated in the community. (Doc. 1
¶¶ 57, 106.) As to S.S., Plaintiffs allege she had been in a
“temporary placement at the home of one of her teachers” and
had been approved for an emergency slot for the Innovations
Waiver to permit her to live “in a home-like environment”;
that her former special education teacher and husband were
“approved” for her placement; that she was approved for
potential placement in a group home as well; but that rather
than pursue such options, Moore County elected to place her
unnecessarily in a psychiatric facility and directed a
provider (Sandhills) not to continue to look for a placement
for her. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 65, 77, 78, 81, 82, 84-85.) Plaintiffs
also allege that Sandhills advised Moore County that it would
search for an Alternative Family Living placement for S.S.,
which care staff at UNC Health (where S.S. was placed) also
supported, but that Moore County refused to consider it. (Id.
¶¶ 86-89.) Plaintiffs allege that Moore County had “an array
of non-institutional services that were available and were
able to meet Plaintiff children’s needs.” (Id. ¶ 116) They
claim that the services provided to S.S. in the institutional
setting were “also available in the community in a non-
institutional setting.” (Id. ¶ 117.)
Plaintiffs allege that the services J.S. received in his
institutional setting were “also available in the community in
a non-institutional setting.” (Id. ¶ 118.) Plaintiffs charge
that Moore County “had been told by Sandhills of other,
community-based placement options for J.S.[,] but that [Moore
County] maintained his placement in an [institution].” (Id.
¶ 121.) Plaintiffs conclude that the county exercised
“consistent placement of Plaintiff children in an institution
when home and community-based placements and services were
available, especially after Ms. Slazas fully recovered from
cancer and requested return of Plaintiff children to her
custody and home.” (Id. ¶ 155.)
Though these allegations are far from robust, the court
finds that Moore County has not demonstrated that they fail to
make out a plausible claim, assuming (without deciding) that
Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that such options were
available. Though the County makes a credible argument that
identifying a specific, available option would discourage
unmerited litigation, it has not provided any case law that
clearly sets out such a requirement at this early pleading
stage. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Olmstead
claim will be denied.
For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Moore County’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Olmstead claim (Doc. 29) is DENIED.
/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
July 23, 2025