Feedback

Quadir Quiroz V State Of Indiana

                                                                        FILED
                                                                    Jul 23 2025, 9:35 am

                                                                        CLERK
                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                         and Tax Court




                                             IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                          Quadir Quiroz,
                                         Appellant-Defendant,

                                                     v.

                                          State of Indiana,
                                           Appellee-Plaintiff.


                                             July 23, 2025

                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           24A-CR-2649

                                           Appeal from the
                                      St. Joseph Superior Court

                                          The Honorable
                                       David Francisco, Judge

                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                         71D02-2308-MR-15




Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025                     Page 1 of 14
                                      Opinion by Senior Judge Najam
                                     Judges Bailey and Scheele concur.



      Najam, Senior Judge.


      Statement of the Case
[1]   Quadir Quiroz appeals from his conviction of murder and raises the following

      issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion by declaring a

      witness unavailable under Evidence Rule 804(a)(3) and 804(b)(5). We conclude

      that there is no abuse of discretion and, therefore, affirm.


      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On the evening of October 13, 2021, Ashanti Hines drove a vehicle in which

      Camyla Walton, Michael Cole, and her sister Kahlayia were passengers to

      Michael’s aunt’s house on Yukon Street in Elkhart. After they arrived, they sat

      in the car for a few minutes. As they waited, around six shots were fired at the

      vehicle, everyone in the car ducked for cover, and then the shots stopped.

      Kahlayia called the police, who had also received a notification from
                      1
      ShotSpotter of possible gunshots in the area. A neighbor saw a silver sedan

      speeding down the alley immediately after he heard the gunshots.




      1
       ShotSpotter is a device that monitors for gunshots and dispatches officers to the area where gunshots are
      detected. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 59-60.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025                                Page 2 of 14
[3]   Detective Brett Airy responded to the ShotSpotter notification and observed

      that Ashanti had sustained a gunshot wound to the right side of her head and

      was slumped over in the driver’s seat. She died from those injuries.

      Responding officers combed the scene and recovered fired bullet casings located

      around the home.


[4]   That same day, Quiroz was at a home on Cleveland Avenue in South Bend.

      He left the home in a Chevy Malibu, and when he returned later, he told a

      resident that he had been involved in a shootout. At around 2:00 a.m. on

      October 14, police officers pursued a silver Chevy Malibu. Officers ultimately

      found the vehicle parked at a home on Cleveland Avenue. Officers recovered

      Facebook messages from Quiroz in which he stated that he took the vehicle on

      a high-speed chase.


[5]   Meanwhile, law enforcement officers with the South Bend Police Department

      Strategic Focus Unit conducted surveillance of the home on Cleveland Avenue

      for matters unrelated to the homicide. They observed Quiroz at the home,

      standing on the front porch and holding a firearm. Officers were aware that he

      had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. By the time officers surrounded the

      home, Quiroz had returned indoors. The officers instructed the occupants to

      come outside. Four people immediately complied, including Tavian Logan.


[6]   When Quiroz eventually came outside, he had insulation in his hair and on his

      shirt. Officers obtained a warrant to search the home and discovered the access

      point to the attic was broken. They found a Glock firearm in a pile of clothes


      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025      Page 3 of 14
      below the access point. A firearm examiner determined that some of the fired

      casings found around the Yukon Street home were fired from the Glock. There

      was “very strong support” for the inclusion of Quiroz’s DNA on the Glock and

      magazine. Tr. Vol. III, p. 131.


[7]   Detective Airy interviewed Tavian Logan, who was also known as Brazo, and

      videotaped the interview. In his interview, Logan told Detective Airy that

      Quiroz had killed Ashanti. He knew that Quiroz had used a silver vehicle to

      take his girlfriend to a place on Yukon Street the night Ashanti died. Quiroz’s

      plan was to shoot someone named Michael. Logan heard Quiroz and another

      person argue about which of them killed Ashanti. Logan believed it was

      Quiroz who had killed her because he wanted to sell his gun. And Quiroz’s

      girlfriend told Logan’s girlfriend that Quiroz had shot someone. The State

      charged Quiroz with Ashanti’s murder.


[8]   The trial court admonished Quiroz’s girlfriend, Natilie Haynes, not to have any

      communications with any potential witnesses in the case, including Quiroz.

      While incarcerated awaiting trial, Quiroz was placed in a cell with Prince

      Herron. Logan was incarcerated in the same pod as Deonte Lofton, who was

      also known as Chop. Quiroz used Herron’s inmate identification to text others.

      The nicknames were used in the text messages.


[9]   Lofton contacted Haynes from the jail. Lofton asked Haynes if she knew

      someone named Brazo and if Brazo was supposed to be testifying against

      Quiroz. Haynes replied that she did and that he was a rat, meaning an


      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025       Page 4 of 14
       informant. Lofton instructed Haynes to seek clarification from Quiroz about

       whether he should beat up Logan. Quiroz responded to Haynes that he wanted

       Lofton to beat Logan up because he was going to testify against him. Ex. Vol.

       V, p. 220 (State’s Ex. 402); Tr. Vol. II, p. 122. Haynes relayed the message to

       Lofton.


[10]   A few minutes later, another person in the prison texted Haynes to let her know

       that Logan was going to testify against Quiroz. Next, Haynes copied a text

       message from Lofton to the effect that Logan had escaped from him and that he

       could not beat him up and sent that copied message to Quiroz.


[11]   Jail surveillance video showed Logan entering the dayroom area of his pod, and

       Lofton showing a message on his phone to Logan. A detective testified that it

       appeared that “Lofton was getting a little amped up[.]” Tr. Vol. III, p. 49.

       Logan immediately used the jail intercom system and asked to be locked down.

       Logan told jail staff that there were people in the jail who “wanted to jump on

       him” and that he needed to be “moved somewhere else” because he was in fear.

       Id. at 49-50.


[12]   The next day, the State presented the trial court with allegations of efforts by

       Quiroz, or others acting on his behalf, to contact witnesses and to threaten them

       not to testify. Logan refused to come to court and told Detective Airy that if he

       testified he would be killed upon returning to prison. Tr. Vol. II, p.116. During

       a video conference call, the trial court ordered Logan to appear and informed

       him he would be held in contempt if he refused. When the trial court asked


       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025         Page 5 of 14
       Logan if he was going to appear, he relented, acknowledging he had no other

       choice.


[13]   Logan appeared at a “forfeiture by wrongdoing hearing” held outside the jury’s

       presence. Id. at 96. When questioned, Logan asserted his Fifth Amendment

       privilege. After the State granted him use immunity, he denied knowing

       Quiroz, responded that he would not give truthful answers to questions about

       Ashanti’s murder, and said he had lied during his prior statement to police.


[14]   When questioned by the court, Logan responded that he would answer the

       State’s questions. After the State asked if he knew Quiroz, Logan answered

       that he did and that Quiroz was his brother. And Logan replied that he did not

       remember if he was there at the Cleveland Street house on the night of

       Ashanti’s murder. He further testified that he did not remember: (1) who was

       with him; (2) the day of the murder; (3) Quiroz talking about a shootout; (4)

       who was at the house when the police served the warrant; (5) who his girlfriend

       was; or (6) seeing Quiroz or another person with a firearm.


[15]   The State asked the court to find Logan unavailable as a witness. The court

       took the matter under advisement and ordered Logan to be returned to the jail.


[16]   That night, Logan made two phone calls in which he recounted testifying to a

       lack of memory at the hearing and questioned how the State was aware of the




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025        Page 6 of 14
                                 2
       content of chirps, or text messages from prison. The trial court determined

       that Logan was unavailable as a witness and that his unavailability was caused

       by Quiroz, thus forfeiting his right to confrontation of the hearsay statements.

       The trial court admitted Logan’s videotaped interview with police into evidence

       over Quiroz’s objection. And a jury found Quiroz guilty as charged.


       Discussion and Decision
[17]   Quiroz appeals and asks us to find that the court erred by determining that

       Logan was unavailable as a witness and that error harmed his substantial rights.

       We begin our analysis by acknowledging our well-settled standard of review.

       “A trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence, and

       we review the trial court’s evidentiary decisions only for an abuse of that

       discretion.” Taylor v. State, 223 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “A trial

       court abuses its discretion when its evidentiary decision is clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, and we will

       reverse only when the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Id.


[18]   The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

       Constitution provides in pertinent part that “in all criminal prosecutions, the

       accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

       This right allows the admission of an absent witness’s out of court statement

       only if the witness is unavailable, and the defendant has had a chance to cross




       2
           Chirps are “electronic communications from the jail[.]” Tr. Vol. II, p. 108.


       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025                  Page 7 of 14
       examine the witness. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). An

       exception to the right, however, exists when the defendant’s “own wrongdoing

       caused the declarant to be unavailable to testify at trial.” Scott v. State, 139

       N.E.3d 1148, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; see also Crawford, 541 U.S.

       at 62. This exception, known as the “forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine,” is

       designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process, and when a defendant

       attempts to undermine that process by procuring or coercing silence from

       witnesses, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation may be forfeited. Davis

       v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).


[19]   For a defendant to have forfeited his confrontation rights by wrongdoing, “the

       defendant must have had in mind the particular purpose of making the witness

       unavailable.” Scott, 139 N.E.3d at 1154. The State bears the burden of showing

       by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant forfeited his right to

       confrontation under this theory. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833. We consider evidence

       from the forfeiture hearing and the trial to independently assess whether the

       State met its burden. See Scott, 139 N.E.3d at 1154. Thus, the first step of our

       analysis is to determine whether the trial court correctly found that Logan was

       unavailable as a witness. And the next, related step is to determine whether

       Logan’s unavailability was the result of Quiroz’s actions or those acting on his

       behalf.


[20]   Logan’s statements to Detective Airy during the taped interview are hearsay

       statements. Unless the Rules of Evidence allow for the admission of his

       videotaped statement based on the unavailability of his testimony at trial, there

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025           Page 8 of 14
       could be a Confrontation Clause violation. Therefore, we turn to whether

       Logan’s statement was admissible under the Rules of Evidence.


[21]   “‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while

       testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth

       of the matter asserted.” Evidence Rule 801(c). Evidence Rule 804(a)(3)’s

       hearsay exception allows the admission of statements when the declarant is

       unavailable as a witness. “A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a

       witness if the declarant . . . testifies to not remembering the subject matter[.]”

       Id.


[22]   Quiroz asserts that Logan “actually testified in open court[,]” Appellant’s Br.

       p. 11, which implies that Logan was available as a witness. But the fact that

       Logan appeared at a separate hearing and answered some questions does not

       mean that he was available as a witness at trial. Logan’s testimony was given at

       a forfeiture hearing conducted for the trial court to determine his availability as

       a witness. Case law and the Rules of Evidence speak in terms of unavailability

       of the witness, but in every case the question presented is not whether the

       witness is physically present or capable of being located but whether the

       witness’s testimony is available. Physical presence is but one factor among

       several to be considered by the trial court in determining whether the witness’s

       testimony is unavailable for purposes of the Rule.


[23]   Quiroz contends that there are no state court cases “addressing how much

       memory a witness must lack” to be unavailable under Rule 803(a)(3), “nor are


       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025           Page 9 of 14
       there prior decisions directly addressing whether the witness must genuinely

       lack memory as opposed to merely feigning it.” Appellant’s Br. 12. He offers
                                                                                    3
       several cases under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3) he contends support his

       position that the State did not meet its burden of establishing by a

       preponderance of the evidence that Logan was unavailable as a witness. We

       see it differently.


[24]   Logan indicated that he would not testify at the forfeiture hearing or the trial.

       The trial court then informed Logan that he could be held in contempt of court

       should he refuse to testify at the hearing. At the forfeiture hearing, Logan

       stated he would answer questions but then asserted his Fifth Amendment rights.

       The State responded by granting him use immunity. He then denied knowing

       Quiroz, responded that he would not give truthful answers to questions about

       Ashanti’s murder, and said he had lied during his prior statement to police.

       Next, Logan responded that he would answer the State’s questions. After the

       State asked if he knew Quiroz, Logan answered that he did and that Quiroz

       was his brother. And Logan replied that he did not remember if he was there at

       the Cleveland Street house on the night of Ashanti’s murder. He further

       testified that he did not remember: (1) who was with him; (2) the day of the

       murder; (3) Quiroz talking about a shootout; (4) who was at the house when the




       3
           The language of Federal Rule 804(a)(3) is identical to the language of Indiana Evidence Rule 803(a)(3).


       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025                                 Page 10 of 14
       police served the warrant; (5) who his girlfriend was; or (6) seeing Quiroz or

       another person with a firearm.


[25]   Logan remembered neither the general subject matter nor the details of

       Ashanti’s murder, that is, he professed to have no memory of the events to

       which his hearsay statements related. Cf. N. Mississippi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jones,

       792 F.2d 1330, 1336 (5th Cir. 1986) (witness was not unavailable because he

       remembered the general subject matter but not the details of his out-of-court

       testimony). Thus, Logan’s testimony was unavailable because he professed not

       to remember the “material portion of the subject matter” of his videotaped

       interview. See McDonnell v. United States, 742 F.2d 1143, 1155 (8th Circ. 1973);

       see also U.S. v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1977) (witness is unavailable

       when he refers to “a lack of memory of the subject matter of the [hearsay]

       statement.”); U.S v. Hughes, 411 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1969) (prior testimony of

       witness allowed in second trial because witness was schizophrenic and

       “claimed lapse of memory”). Thus, a witness is not available if he will not or

       cannot testify about the material portion of the subject matter of his out-of-court

       statement.


[26]   The federal cases cited by Quiroz do not help his claim. As in every case, the

       trial court may take into account the credibility of the witness and, here,

       whether the witness has a bona fide lapse of memory or is motivated or

       compelled to profess a lapse of memory because he has been threatened or is

       otherwise afraid to testify. Those are some of several factors to be considered

       by the court when determining whether a witness’s testimony is unavailable

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025         Page 11 of 14
       under Evidence Rule 804(a)(3). And the numerous scenarios which may bring

       about the unavailability of the witness’s testimony are exactly why that

       determination is reviewable for an abuse of discretion. There is no bright line

       rule to quantify a sufficient lack of memory or whether a professed lack of

       memory is bona fide.


[27]   Having determined that Logan was an unavailable witness, Evidence Rule

       804(b)(5) provides another exception to the hearsay rule, which applies here.

       The Rule provides for the admissibility of:


               A statement offered against a party that has engaged in or
               encouraged wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure
               the unavailability of the declarant as a witness for the purpose of
               preventing the declarant from attending or testifying.


       The Rule incorporates the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.


[28]   The trial court held a video conference with Logan, who was incarcerated.

       Logan told the court that he would not testify against Quiroz. Logan agreed to

       testify during the hearing only after the trial court informed Logan he would be

       held in contempt of court if he did not testify. Once at the hearing, Logan

       asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. The State then offered Logan use

       immunity. Next, Logan testified that he did not know Quiroz and that he

       would not truthfully answer the State’s questions. And he said his prior

       statement to Detective Airy was untruthful.




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025         Page 12 of 14
[29]   After questions from the court, Logan stated he would answer truthfully. He

       denied all of the material portions of his prior statement to Detective Airy. He

       did not remember if he was present at the Cleveland Street house on the night

       of Ashanti’s murder. And, as we have noted, he further testified that he did not

       remember some six material portions of his videotaped interview.


[30]   Detective Airy testified about his review of chirps that came from Quiroz’s

       cellmate’s number, Lofton’s number, and Haynes’ telephone number about

       plans to beat up Logan because he was scheduled to testify against Quiroz.

       And video from the prison depicted Lofton showing Logan something on his

       phone while getting “amped up.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 49. Logan immediately

       thereafter asked to be placed in lockdown in his cell. Here, the State clearly

       established that Logan did not remember or professed not to remember the

       material portion of the subject matter of his statement and that Logan’s silence

       was brought about by Quiroz’s actions or by others acting on his behalf.


[31]   The State has met its burden. There is an adequate factual basis in the record to

       support the trial court’s conclusion that Quiroz procured the unavailability of

       Logan as a witness for the purpose of preventing him from testifying. Thus, we

       find no abuse of discretion in the admission of Logan’s recorded statements to

       Detective Airy.




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025       Page 13 of 14
       Conclusion
[32]   We affirm the trial court’s determination that Logan’s testimony was

       unavailable and that his testimony’s unavailability was brought about by

       Quiroz and/or others acting on his behalf.


[33]   Affirmed.


       Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.


       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       A. Robert Masters
       Nemeth, Feeney, Masters & Campiti, P.C.
       South Bend, Indiana


       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana
       Alexandria N. Sons
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-2649 | July 23, 2025      Page 14 of 14