In Re Iw Ca26
Filed 7/22/25 In re I.W. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re I.W., a Person Coming Under 2d Crim. No. B341282
the Juvenile Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. IJ0265B)
(Los Angeles County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
I.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
I.W. appeals an order of the juvenile court declaring him a
ward pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and
ordering him home on probation. This appeal concerns his claim
that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence
of a firearm found during his street encounter with Los Angeles
police officers. We reject his argument and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 5, 2024, the prosecutor filed a petition alleging
that I.W. concealed an unregistered firearm on his person. (Pen.
Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(2).) I.W. denied the allegation and filed a
motion to suppress evidence of the firearm asserting that the
search was warrantless and lacked reasonable cause. On
September 25, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing and
received the testimony of Los Angeles Police Officer Kevin
Santizo as well as the body camera videos of the encounter and
arrest. The court then denied the motion. Following the hearing,
the court sustained the allegation of the wardship petition,
declared the allegation to be a felony and I.W. to be a ward of the
court, and ordered I.W. home on probation.
This evidence was presented at the hearing:
In the late afternoon of July 7, 2024, Gang Enforcement
Police Officers Santizo and Farias were patrolling 102nd Street
in Los Angeles. They stopped their marked patrol vehicle at 1317
West 102nd Street, a location known for people to congregate,
loiter, and drink. In the past, the area had experienced
shootings.
Four boys stood in that location, including I.W. Santizo
spoke with them (“chit-chatting”) while Farias canvassed the
area. Farias then spoke with them while Santizo looked into a
truck bed in a nearby front yard. Farias asked the group,
“Anything on you, bro?” and “Let me see.” The four boys pulled
up their shirts and exposed their bellies and waistbands. Farias
then asked I.W.: “Anything in your backpack, bro?” I.W.
responded, “No.” Farias then asked, “No pistol?” I.W. opened his
backpack.
During the interaction, the boys were laughing, texting,
joking with the officers, and standing wherever they chose. I.W.
and the others were free to leave. None of the boys were
2
detained, restrained, or handcuffed. Their paths were not
blocked by the patrol car or the officers.
Within approximately one minute, Santizo then saw what
appeared to be the butt of a firearm inside I.W.’s waistband and
between his legs. Santizo was familiar with firearms based upon
his police officer training and experience. He pat-searched the
object and it felt like a firearm. Santizo then ordered I.W. to turn
around and place his hands behind his back. Farias handcuffed
I.W. and Santizo, concerned for officer safety, seized the firearm.
The officers arrested I.W. and the other boys left. The officers did
not pat down the other boys.
The firearm was in working order. It had a live round in
the chamber and five rounds in the magazine.
I.W. appeals and contends that the juvenile court erred by
denying the suppression motion because the encounter was an
unconstitutional detention and not consensual.
DISCUSSION
I.W. argues that the police officers did not have reasonable
suspicion necessary to detain him prior to discovery of the
firearm. He relies upon United States v. Jones (4th Cir. 2012)
678 F.3d 293, 301-303 (following defendant into private driveway,
blocking his exit, and requesting him to lift his shirt together is a
show of authority).
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or
implied, if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Flores
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043; In re T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
893, 904.) We exercise our independent judgment in determining
whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was
reasonable pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. (Ibid.) In so
3
doing, we do not consider each fact in isolation, but the totality of
the circumstances. (Flores, at p. 1043.)
Police contacts with individuals fall into three broad
categories: 1) consensual encounters that result in no restraint of
liberty; 2) detentions, which are seizures of the individual that
are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and 3) formal
arrests. (In re T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 903.) Unlike
consensual encounters, a detention is a seizure for which a
reasonable suspicion is required. (Ibid.) A reasonable suspicion
requires a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped was engaged in criminal activity.
(People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 981.)
A person is seized by the police when the officer by means
of physical force or a show of authority restrains the person’s
freedom of movement through intentional means. (Brendlin v.
California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254 [168 L.Ed.2d 132, 138]; In re
T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 903.) In distinguishing a
detention from a consensual encounter, a court must consider all
the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine
whether the police conduct would have informed a reasonable
person that he was not free to leave or decline the officer’s
requests. (People v. Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th 968, 974 [“An
officer may approach a person in a public place and ask if the
person is willing to answer questions. If the person voluntarily
answers, those responses, and the officer’s observations, are
admissible in a criminal prosecution”]; T.F.-G. at p. 903.)
The key distinction between a consensual encounter and a
detention is that a consensual encounter requires no justification
but detentions do. (In re L.G. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 818, 821.)
If an officer’s show of authority restrains a person’s liberty, then
4
that officer has seized that person and must justify the detention.
(Ibid.) We consider the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether police actions have turned a consensual encounter into a
detention. (People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 241; L.G.,
at p. 821.) Relevant circumstances include presence of multiple
police officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, use of a siren or
overhead lights, physically touching the person, use of a patrol
car to block movement or a commanding tone of voice.
(Tacardon, at pp. 241-242.)
The juvenile court did not err by denying the suppression
motion. The totality of circumstances shows that the encounter
between the police officer and the four boys was consensual. The
officers did not block the sidewalk or the driveway near where
the boys were standing. (People v. Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th
235, 247 [no detention where defendant’s vehicle was not blocked
from driving away].) The officers also did not draw weapons,
issue commands, approach rapidly, or surround the boys. The
boys were texting and joking with the officers. Contacting the
boys and asking questions in a public place does not constitute
coercive police conduct that would lead a reasonable person to
believe that he or she was not free to leave. (People v. Flores,
supra, 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043.)
During the consensual encounter, Santizo noticed – in plain
view – what appeared to be the outline of a firearm in I.W.’s
pants. (Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 634
[search of contraband in plain view not unconstitutional].) At
that point, Santizo had reasonable cause to pat down and detain
I.W. for reasons of officer safety and the safety of others nearby.
(People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 131 [bulge in pocket
resembling shape of gun justifies pat-down search].)
5
I.W. asserts that his race is a factor in determining
whether he felt free to leave the encounter. He points out that
being a Black teenager is not a sufficient reason to detain. The
Fourth Amendment test is an objective one, however, that does
not change based upon racial or other classifications.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
6
J. Christopher Smith, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.