Getzels V The State Bar Of Cal
Filed 7/24/25 (unmodified opn. attached)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MORRIS S. GETZELS, B338089
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV18632
THE STATE BAR OF ORDER MODIFYING
CALIFORNIA,
OPINION AND
DENYING PETITION
Defendant and Respondent.
FOR REHEARING
NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT
THE COURT:*
The court has read and considered the petition for
rehearing filed by appellant Morris S. Getzels on July 11, 2025.
The opinion filed on June 26, 2025, in the above-entitled
matter is ordered MODIFIED as follows:
Footnote 12 on pages 12–13, “Getzels also cites Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (1978) 438 U.S. 234, to argue
his equal protection challenge is subject to strict scrutiny review
because rule 2.30 violates the Contract Clause of the federal
Constitution. Getzels has forfeited this argument. (High Sierra
Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102,
130, fn. 2 [“New arguments may not be raised for the first time in
an appellant’s reply brief”].) Further, his citation to Spannaus is
unpersuasive, as the case did not concern an equal protection
challenge or strict scrutiny review. (See Spannaus, supra, 438
U.S. at pp. 236, 244–245; see also California Grocers Ass’n. v.
City of Long Beach (C.D. Cal. 2021) 521 F.Supp.3d 902, 914.
[“alleged Contract Clause violations committed in the exercise of
a municipality’s police power are subject to analysis under their
own separate framework, which does not automatically assume
that strict scrutiny applies”].)” shall be replaced with “To the
extent Getzels also cites Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus
(1978) 438 U.S. 234, to argue rule 2.30 is invalid because it
violates the Contract Clause of the federal Constitution, he has
forfeited this argument. (High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of
Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 130, fn. 2 [“New arguments
may not be raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply
brief”].) Further, his citation to Spannaus to argue his challenge
is subject to strict scrutiny review is unpersuasive, as the case
did not concern an equal protection challenge or strict scrutiny
review. (See Spannaus, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 236, 244–245; see
also California Grocers Ass’n. v. City of Long Beach (C.D. Cal.
2021) 521 F.Supp.3d 902, 914. [“alleged Contract Clause
violations committed in the exercise of a municipality’s police
power are subject to analysis under their own separate
framework, which does not automatically assume that strict
scrutiny applies”].)”
2
The petition for rehearing in all other aspects is DENIED.
There is no change in the judgment.
*ZUKIN, P. J. MORI, J. J. DAUM. **
** Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.
3
Filed 6/26/25 (unmodified opinion)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MORRIS S. GETZELS, B338089
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV18632)
v.
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jill T. Feeney, Judge. Affirmed.
Steiner & Libo and Leonard Steiner, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of California,
Ellin Davtyan, Kirsten R. Galler, Lisa Jacobs, and Suzanne C.
Grandt, for Defendant and Respondent.
__________________________
Plaintiff Morris S. Getzels, an attorney and licensee of
defendant the State Bar of California (the State Bar), appeals
from a judgment of dismissal following an order sustaining the
State Bar’s demurrer without leave to amend. Getzels challenges
the constitutional validity of State Bar Rule 2.30 (rule 2.30),
subdivisions (B) and (C). Rule 2.30 precludes the State Bar’s
inactive licensees from acting as private arbitrators and
mediators. Getzels argues the rule violates the Equal Protection
Clauses of the federal and California Constitutions by treating
inactive licensees differently from everyone else in “the entire
world.” Getzels contends the rule’s disparate treatment of
inactive licensees is subject to strict scrutiny because the rule
impinges on a fundamental liberty, “freedom of contract.”
Alternatively, he contends there is no rational basis for the rule.
We conclude Getzels’s equal protection challenge is subject
to rational basis review, and a rational basis exists for any
disparate treatment of inactive licensees in rule 2.30. The
judgment of dismissal is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The State Bar
The State Bar is a public corporation established by the
California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 9.) It serves as an
administrative arm of the California Supreme Court for purposes
of attorney regulation and discipline. (In re Attorney Discipline
System (1998) 19 Cal.4th 582, 599–600; see In re Rose (2000) 22
Cal.4th 430, 438 [“The State Bar is a constitutional entity, placed
within the judicial article of the California Constitution, and thus
expressly acknowledged as an integral part of the judicial
function”].) Under the State Bar Act (Stats. 1927, ch. 34, codified
at Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6000, et seq.), the State Bar may
“formulate and declare rules and regulations” necessary for
carrying out its responsibilities. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6025.)
2
Article VI, section 9 of the California Constitution states:
“Every person admitted and licensed to practice law in this State
is and shall be a member of the State Bar except while holding
office as a judge of a court of record.” Members of the State Bar
are its “licensees.” (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6002.) Licensees are
divided into two classes: active and inactive. (Id. at § 6003.)
Different annual license fees are fixed by the State Bar for each,
with the inactive fee being lower. (Id. at §§ 6140, 6141.) All
licensees are active until they request to be or are involuntarily
enrolled as inactive. (Id. at § 6004.)
B. State Bar Rule 2.30
Inactive license status was formerly governed by Article 1,
Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar. It
provided in part: “No member of the State Bar . . . occupying a
position wherein he or she is called upon to give legal advice or
counsel or examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any
act, document or law, shall be enrolled as an inactive member.”
In January 2005, the State Bar proposed amending the
former rule to clarify that licensees acting as private arbitrators
and mediators had to be active licensees. A staff report prepared
for the State Bar board in 2005 (the 2005 Staff Report) explained
that the annual fee paid by active licensees was based “largely on
the cost of administering the State Bar’s regulatory system.” The
report stated that because inactive licensees “ceased to associate
with the practice of law,” they were unlikely to invoke the
regulatory jurisdiction of the State Bar, and this warranted a
discounted annual license fee. Article 1, Section 2 required
inactive licensees to “distance themselves from the practice of law
3
and not burden the State Bar’s regulatory system,” as they no
longer shared in its cost.
The 2005 Staff Report observed that attorneys that serve as
private arbitrators and mediators did not distance themselves
from the legal profession. The parties that hired them called
upon them to do what Article 1, Section 2 prohibited: “‘give legal
advice or counsel’, or ‘examine the law or pass upon the legal
effect of any act, document or law.’” Indeed, private arbitrators
and mediators often advertised their “attorney status” as a
benefit, “emphasizing that legal skills enhance the process.”
Because they engaged in conduct so closely related to the practice
of law, there was a “likelihood of complaints to the State Bar’s
discipline office” or “other demands on the State Bar’s regulatory
jurisdiction.” The report concluded bar members who serve as
arbitrators or mediators should be required to pay the active
membership fee, as they are still engaged in conduct associated
with, as opposed to distanced from, the practice of law.
The State Bar board approved the proposed amendments to
the former rule. The rule was amended to read: “No member of
the State Bar . . . occupying a position wherein he or she is called
upon in any capacity to give legal advice or counsel or examine
the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, document or law
shall be enrolled as an inactive member.” (Italics added to
highlight changes.) Thereafter, former Article 1, Section 2 was
transferred to rule 2.30. Minor edits, such as replacing the word
“member” with “licensee,” were made to the rule in 2007 and
2019.
At the time Getzels filed his complaint in August 2023,
rule 2.30 stated:
4
“(A) Any licensee not under suspension, who does not
engage in any of the activities listed in (B) in California,
may, upon written request, be enrolled as an inactive
licensee. The Secretary may, in any case in which to do
otherwise would work an injustice and subject to any
direction of the board permit retroactive enrollment of
inactive licensees.[ 1]
“(B) No licensee practicing law, or occupying a position in
the employ of or rendering any legal service for an active
licensee, or occupying a position wherein he or she is called
upon in any capacity to give legal advice or counsel or
examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act,
document or law, shall be enrolled as an inactive licensee.
“(C) Notwithstanding (A) and (B) a licensee serving for a
court or any other governmental agency as a referee,
hearing officer, court commissioner, temporary judge,
arbitrator, mediator or in another similar capacity is
eligible for enrollment as an inactive licensee if he or she
does not otherwise engage in any of the activities listed in
(B) or hold himself or herself out as being entitled to
practice law.”
(Fn. omitted.)
The State Bar’s instructions for its Application for Transfer
to Inactive Status state an inactive licensee is precluded from
“engaging in certain activities in California including, but not
limited to, working as a private arbitrator, mediator, referee or
1 The second sentence of subdivision (A) was amended effective
September 2023, as follows: “The State Bar may, in any case in which
to do otherwise would work an injustice, permit retroactive enrollment
of inactive licensees.” No modifications were made to subdivisions (B)
and (C).
5
other dispute resolution provider . . . where the licensee will be
called upon to give legal advice or counsel or examine the law or
pass upon the legal effect of any act, document or law.” 2
C. Getzels’s Complaint
Getzels’s complaint asserted claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief. He sought an order declaring as
unconstitutional, and permanently enjoining the State Bar from
enforcing, rule 2.30, subdivisions (B) and (C).
Getzels alleged he is 72 years old and an active licensee of
the State Bar. He has served as an arbitrator and mediator for
various persons and entities for more than 25 years. He retired
from the practice of law in November 2022 but wishes to continue
serving indefinitely as an arbitrator and mediator in California.
However, he alleged that because of rule 2.30, subdivisions (B)
and (C), he is required to maintain his status as an active
licensee, pay the active annual license fee, and complete the
required number of hours of mandatory minimum continuing
legal education.
2 We previously granted, in part, Getzels’s request for judicial
notice and took judicial notice of the State Bar’s instructions for its
Application for Transfer to Inactive Status. In his opening and reply
brief, respectively, Getzels further requests we take judicial notice of
the amount Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitrators are
paid and that there are thousands of contracts entered into that
require arbitration or mediation of disputes. The requests are denied.
Getzels failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.252. (In
re Marriage of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1075, fn. 2; see also
Lent v. California Coastal Com. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 812, 855 [denial
of request for judicial notice “is particularly appropriate where judicial
notice has been requested in support of a reply brief to which the
opposing party has no opportunity to respond”].)
6
Getzels alleged the operative effect of rule 2.30 is to
preclude inactive licensees from acting as arbitrators and
mediators in California, except as provided in subdivision (C). He
asserted there are no other classifications of persons prohibited
from acting as private arbitrators and mediators. He further
asserted that there is no rational basis for prohibiting inactive
licensees from serving in these capacities, and therefore,
rule 2.30 violates the equal protection rights of inactive licensees
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the California
Constitution.
D. The State Bar’s Demurrer and Trial Court’s Ruling
The State Bar demurred to Getzels’s complaint, arguing his
equal protection claim failed as a matter of law because there
was a legitimate state interest in rule 2.30’s restriction on the
conduct of inactive licensees, who are still within the State Bar’s
jurisdiction and subject to discipline for misconduct. The State
Bar concurrently filed a request for judicial notice of various
documents and reports concerning rule 2.30’s adoption, including
the 2005 Staff Report. Getzels opposed the demurrer and filed
objections to the State Bar’s request for judicial notice, and the
State Bar filed replies to the opposition and objections.
The trial court granted the State Bar’s request for judicial
notice of the documents it submitted. It noted the parties did not
dispute that rational basis review was the appropriate standard
for Getzels’s equal protection claim. It then found that funding
the State Bar’s regulatory functions was a legitimate government
purpose, and requiring licensees to pay the active license fee was
related to this purpose. The court concluded the State Bar
7
sufficiently articulated a rational basis for the disparate
treatment of inactive licensees from other individuals serving as
private arbitrators and mediators. It sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend.
Getzels timely appealed from the ensuing judgment of
dismissal.
DISCUSSION
Getzels argues that rule 2.30 violates equal protection
under the federal and California Constitutions by precluding
inactive licensees from acting as private arbitrators and
mediators in California while all other persons, such as active
and nonlicensees, are permitted to serve in such capacities.
Getzels contends strict scrutiny applies to his equal protection
claim and rule 2.30 does not meet this standard. Alternatively,
he argues that rule 2.30 fails rational basis review. We conclude
Getzels’s equal protection claim is subject to rational basis review
and that rule 2.30 has a rational basis.
A. Demurrer Standard of Review
We review an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to
amend de novo. (United Talent Agency v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 821, 829.) “‘We treat the demurrer as admitting
all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also
consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.]
Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) When a demurrer is
sustained without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a
8
reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion
and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and
we affirm.” (Ibid.) “The burden of proving such reasonable
possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
B. Equal Protection Principles
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no state may “deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S.
Const., 14th Amend.) “This provision is ‘essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’”
(People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847 (Hardin).) The
California Constitution likewise prohibits the denial of equal
protection. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) 3 “At core, the
requirement of equal protection ensures that the government
does not treat a group of people unequally without some
justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288.)
Traditionally, California courts engaged in a two-part
inquiry to determine if there has been an equal protection
violation. (Cole v. Superior Court (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1280,
1289.) The threshold question was whether a classification
affected two or more groups “‘similarly situated in all material
respects’” in an unequal manner. (Ibid.) In Hardin, our Supreme
3 In addressing Getzels’s equal protection claim, we consider
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts
as persuasive authority because the equal protection provision of the
California Constitution is “‘substantially the equivalent of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.’” (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537,
571.)
9
Court held that courts no longer needed to ask this threshold
question when the challenged classification appears on the face of
the law. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 849–850; Cole, at
p. 1289.) The pertinent inquiry in such a case is “whether the
challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under
the applicable standard of review.” (Id. at pp. 850–851.)
Here, rule 2.30 identifies inactive licensees as a class that
may not have a position where they are called upon to give legal
advice, examine the law, or pass upon the legal effect of an act,
document, or law. (Cole, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290.)
Neither the State Bar nor Getzels makes any argument
concerning whether inactive licensees are similarly situated in all
material respects to those who are not impacted by rule 2.30.
Both address their arguments to whether the treatment of
inactive licensees is adequately justified under the applicable
standard of review, as set forth in Hardin. We therefore begin by
addressing the appropriate standard to analyze Getzels’s claim.
C. Rational Basis Review Applies
Getzels argues that strict scrutiny review applies to his
challenge to rule 2.30, subdivisions (B) and (C) because the rule
“impairs the freedom of contract liberty rights of disputants and
litigants to choose whomever they want to arbitrate or mediate
their disputes.” 4 He asserts “the freedom of contract liberty” is a
4 Getzels raises this argument, which the State Bar contends has
been forfeited, for the first time on appeal. Because Getzels’s claim
involves a facial constitutional challenge presenting a pure question of
law, and because the parties have fully briefed and argued the issue,
we will consider it on the merits. (See In re Spencer S. (2009) 176
Cal.App.4th 1315, 1323 [appellate courts have discretion to address
constitutional issues raised on appeal, particularly where issue
10
fundamental right guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. We are not persuaded.
The degree of justification required to satisfy equal
protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847.) Courts apply strict
scrutiny when a challenged statute or regulation involves a
suspect class, such as one based upon race, or a fundamental
right, such as the right to vote. (Ibid.) “‘“Under the strict
standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of
establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which
justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are
necessary to further its purpose.”’” (Warden v. State Bar (1999)
21 Cal.4th 628, 641 (Warden).)
“But when a statute involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.’” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
This standard—rational basis review—“‘is the basic and
conventional standard for reviewing economic and social welfare
legislation in which there is a ‘‘discrimination’’ or differentiation
of treatment between classes or individuals.’” (Warden, supra, 21
Cal.4th at p. 641.) It is traditionally applied in cases examining
equal protection claims involving regulations governing
professional licensing and conduct, including in the legal
presented is a pure question of law]; see also Cardona v. Soto (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 141, 149 [application of forfeiture rule is not
automatic, and an appellate court may exercise its discretion to
consider merits of a constitutional challenge].)
11
profession. (Id. at pp. 642–643, citing Bib’le v. Committee of Bar
Examiners (1980) 26 Cal.3d 548, 555.)
In contending “the freedom of contract” is a fundamental
right and strict scrutiny applies to his claim, Getzels relies on
overruled and repudiated case law. (See e.g., Lochner v. New
York (1905) 198 U.S. 45, overruling recognized in Ferguson v.
Skrupa (1963) 372 U.S. 726, 729–730; Allgeyer v. State of La.
(1897) 165 U.S. 578, repudiated as noted in Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. (1949) 335 U.S. 525,
535–536.) More recently, the United States Supreme Court has
held “‘that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute,
right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to
contract as one chooses.’” (West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937)
300 U.S. 379, 392 (West Coast Hotel).) Indeed, “[t]he Constitution
does not speak of freedom of contract.” (Id. at p. 391; see San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1,
17 [Strict scrutiny is reserved for cases involving laws that
operate to disadvantage suspect classes or interfere with the
exercise of fundamental rights explicitly or implicitly protected
by the Constitution].)
Other cases Getzels cites to support his argument merely
recognize that parties to an arbitration agreement may designate
the neutral they wish to arbitrate their disputes. (See e.g.,
Bunker Hill Part Ltd. v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326; Ramos v. Superior Court (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 1042, 1059–1060.) These cases do not address or
establish whether the freedom to contract, or the right to select a
particular arbitrator, is a fundamental constitutional right. 5
5 Getzels also cites Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (1978)
438 U.S. 234, to argue his equal protection challenge is subject to strict
12
(Cal. Bldg. Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1043 [“It is axiomatic that cases are not
authority for propositions that are not considered”].)
In sum, Getzels does not show that rule 2.30 involves a
suspect class or interferes with a fundamental constitutional
right. Thus, the rational basis test governs our consideration of
Getzels’s equal protection claim, which concerns the regulation of
professional conduct. 6 (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 847;
Warden, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 642–643.) We must therefore
determine whether rule 2.30’s classification bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
scrutiny review because rule 2.30 violates the Contract Clause of the
federal Constitution. Getzels has forfeited this argument. (High
Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102,
130, fn. 2 [“New arguments may not be raised for the first time in an
appellant’s reply brief”].) Further, his citation to Spannaus is
unpersuasive, as the case did not concern an equal protection challenge
or strict scrutiny review. (See Spannaus, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 236,
244–245; see also California Grocers Ass’n. v. City of Long Beach (C.D.
Cal. 2021) 521 F.Supp.3d 902, 914. [“alleged Contract Clause violations
committed in the exercise of a municipality’s police power are subject
to analysis under their own separate framework, which does not
automatically assume that strict scrutiny applies”].)
6 Although Getzels’s complaint also alleges that rule 2.30 is
discriminatory “in that it overwhelmingly negatively affects senior
citizens,” he does not raise any arguments concerning this allegation
on appeal. In any event, “‘age is not a suspect classification under the
Equal Protection Clause.’” (Perez v. County of Monterey (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 257, 264.) A law that allegedly discriminates based on age
is reviewed for a rational basis. (Ibid.; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents
(2000) 528 U.S. 62, 83 [“States may discriminate on the basis of age
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification
in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest”].)
13
D. Rule 2.30 Withstands Rational Basis Review
Getzels argues there is no rational basis for prohibiting
inactive licensees from acting as private arbitrators and
mediators when “the rest of the world other than inactive
licensees” are permitted to do so. We disagree.
“Rational basis review ‘sets a high bar’ for litigants
challenging legislative enactments.” (Hardin, supra, 318 Cal.5th
at p. 852.) The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of a
classification under rational basis review “rests squarely upon the
party who assails it.” (Warden, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 641.)
“Under this deferential standard, we presume that a given
statutory classification is valid ‘until the challenger shows that
no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
conceivable.’” (Hardin, at p. 852; F.C.C. v. Beach
Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 314–315 [law being
challenged is given “a strong presumption of validity, and those
attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the
burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support
it”].)
“A legislative ‘choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.’” (Kimco Staffing Services, Inc. v.
State of California (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 875, 885 (Kimco
Staffing).) “‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts
may not second-guess its “‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’”’” (Hardin,
supra, 318 Cal.5th at p. 852.) Rational basis review “‘‘‘requir[es]
merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some
rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.’’
[Citation.]’” (Warden, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 641.) “‘[W]e will not
overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment
14
of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement
of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only
conclude that the [government’s] actions were irrational.’” (Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 84.)
California has a legitimate interest in maintaining a
competent bar and assuring the professional conduct of licensees.
(See Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Cal. (9th
Cir. 1995) 67 F.3d 708, 712–713 [“California’s attorney
disciplinary proceedings implicate important state interests”
because “[t]he State . . . has an extremely important interest in
maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of the
attorneys it licenses”].) Rule 2.30’s distinction between licensees
who engage in conduct considered closely related to the practice
of law and those who distance themselves from such conduct
bears a rational relationship to the goal of assuring the
professional conduct of licensees.
The State Bar could rationally conclude that an inactive
licensee “occupying a position wherein he or she is called upon in
any capacity to give legal advice or counsel or examine the law or
pass upon the legal effect of any act, document or law” (rule 2.30,
subd. (B)) would burden its regulatory system. The 2005 Staff
Report noted that inactive licensees performing private
arbitration and mediation services were likely to generate
demand on the State Bar’s regulatory jurisdiction, even if their
conduct did not constitute the practice of law per se. 7 The State
Bar could receive complaints about attorneys serving as
arbitrators or mediators and would need to assess and respond to
7 Getzels does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s ruling
granting the State Bar’s request for judicial notice of the documents
and reports it filed in support of its demurrer.
15
them. Getzels does not dispute that inactive licensees remain
subject to the State Bar’s jurisdiction and to discipline for
misconduct. It is rational to conclude that licensees who act as
private arbitrators and mediators should be required to continue
paying active annual licensee fees, whereas those who have
distanced themselves from the practice of law should not. 8
Furthermore, there is a rational basis for rule 2.30’s
disparate treatment of inactive licensees compared to
nonlicensees who may work as private arbitrators or mediators.
Arbitrators and mediators who are not licensees are not subject
to the State Bar’s jurisdiction. Nonlicensees therefore would not
burden the State Bar’s regulatory system and cause the State
Bar to incur costs. (See In re Nguyen (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 15,
24 [“equal protection does not mean ‘that different things must be
treated as though they are the same’”].)
Getzels cites City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432 (Cleburne), in arguing that the State
Bar’s “unsubstantiated fears” that licensees who perform private
arbitration and mediation services might burden its regulatory
jurisdiction are insufficient to satisfy rational basis review. In
Cleburne, the United States Supreme Court declared that a city
zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for a group
home for persons with mental disabilities, but not for other types
of group homes and multiple-dwelling facilities, violated the
8 Getzels does not identify any equal protection issues specific to
the classification in subdivision (C) of rule 2.30. The State Bar notes
that the Code of Judicial Ethics applies to temporary judges, referees,
and court-appointed arbitrators. (Code of Jud. Ethics, Canon 6D.)
Violations of the Code of Judicial Ethics are handled by the
Commission on Judicial Performance and the superior court, rather
than the State Bar.
16
Equal Protection Clause. (Id. at p. 448.) The record did not
reveal any rational basis for believing that the group home would
pose a special threat to the city’s legitimate interests, and the
court rejected all the city’s justifications for the law. (Ibid.) The
court concluded the ordinance was based on an irrational
prejudice against persons with mental disabilities, not a
legitimate state interest. (Id. at pp. 448–450.)
While a “more searching form of rational basis review” was
used in Cleburne, the United States Supreme Court has
“generally reserved this form of review for cases in which the sole
motivation underlying the enactment is baseless prejudice
against a politically unpopular group.” (Hardin, supra, 318
Cal.5th at p. 852, fn. 3.) In this case, Getzels does not argue that
the State Bar was motivated by such a prejudice. The State Bar
was motivated by concerns that complaints about licensees might
burden its regulatory system, and such concerns need not be
empirically substantiated. (Kimco Staffing, supra, 236
Cal.App.4th at p. 885; Hardin, at p. 852.)
We conclude that rule 2.30 does not violate the Equal
Protection Clauses of the federal or state constitutions. Getzels’s
complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law. As Getzels
makes no argument as to how he could amend the complaint to
state a cause of action, we discern no error in the trial court
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The State Bar is
awarded costs on appeal.
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
DAUM, J. **
** Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.
18