Haltom V City Of Henderson Tennessee Police Department
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
_____________________________________________________________________________
JOSHUA HALTOM, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) No. 1:24-cv-01215-STA-jay
)
CITY OF HENDERSON, TENNESSEE )
POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
)
Defendant. )
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(ECF NO. 49)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 24)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 57)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING MOTIONS AS MOOT
ORDER ON APPELLATE ISSUES
_____________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the United States Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation (ECF
No. 49) that the Court grant Defendant City of Henderson, Tennessee Police Department’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff Joshua Haltom has filed twenty-nine (29) different papers with
the Court since the Magistrate Judge issued his report and recommendation, only two of which
mention the word “objections.” On May 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document styled as “Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendant’s Report and Recommendation and Motion for a Public Hearing” (ECF
No. 51). On May 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed another document styled as “Plaintiff’s Urgent Plea to
the Honorable Thomas Anderson to Reject the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation and to
Strike/Deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss” (ECF No. 56). Plaintiff also filed Objections to
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Officers’ Knowledge of Plaintiff’s
Religion and Disability (ECF No. 79) but on June 24, 2025, far outside the 14-day time limit to
object to the report and recommendation.1 Because the Court rejects the objections Plaintiff did
preserve in these papers, the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is ADOPTED, and
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Joshua Haltom, who is representing himself, filed this action for the alleged
violation of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to Administrative Order 2013-05, this case was
assigned to the Magistrate Judge for the management of all pretrial matters, including the
determination of non-dispositive matters and the issuance of reports and recommendations on all
dispositive matters. The Magistrate Judge surmised from the Pro Se Complaint and a series of
other papers filed by Plaintiff the following background facts, which he included in his report and
recommendation and to which Plaintiff has not filed a specific objection. The Court therefore
adopts the Magistrate Judge’s construction of the pleadings as the findings of the Court.
I. Factual Background
On April 19, 2024, the Plaintiff and his mother were stopped in their vehicle by the City of
Henderson, Tennessee, Police Department (“Henderson Police Department”) for “crossing the
right line” of the roadway. ECF No. 9-3; ECF No. 17 at 1, PageID 73; ECF No. 33 at 1, PageID
217. Plaintiff apparently presented the officers with a “clergy ID” that was not issued by the State
of Tennessee and appears to have been issued by “Haltom Family Ministries and Consultants.”
Pro Se Compl. 1–2 (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff received traffic citations for this incident. Id. at 2.
1 More recently, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Clear Report and Recommendations”
(ECF No. 89) on July 12, 2025. In addition to being untimely, the paper consists of an outline
rather than a prose format, listing points about Plaintiff’s status as ambassador and his plea for
“divine reconciliation.”
2
Plaintiff alleges that during the traffic stop, law enforcement officers “escalated tensions through
excessive force, resulting in physical injury to [Plaintiff’s] mother and her wrongful arrest.” ECF
No. 33 at 2, PageID 218; see ECF No. 17 at 1, PageID 73. Halton’s mother is not a party to the
action.
Next, on May 6, 2024, Plaintiff’s wife, Lady Lyn Haltom (“Mrs. Haltom”), was stopped in
a vehicle bearing a self-printed license plate, reading “1611 - KJV - NOT FOR COMMERCIAL
USE - Clergy” (hereinafter “the License Plate”). ECF No. 12 at 1, PageID 58; see ECF No. 21 at
4, PageID 87 (picture of license plate provided by Plaintiff). Plaintiff alleges that Officer Norwalk
of the Henderson Police Department seized the License Plate without due process or Mrs. Haltom’s
consent. Id. Mrs. Haltom is also not a party to the action.
According to a statement submitted by Plaintiff, but authored by Mrs. Haltom, both the
Plaintiff and Mrs. Haltom attended traffic court on June 19, 2024, to dispute their traffic citations.
ECF No. 9-2 at 1. Plaintiff has not clearly alleged what occurred during the traffic court. The
Magistrate Judge drew several inferences from Mrs. Haltom’s statements. Judge Sherrod who is
not named as a Defendant in the Pro Se Complaint presided over the Haltoms’ case. Id. at 1–2;
ECF No. 24-1 at 1, PageID 95. When Plaintiff rose to address the court about the citations, Plaintiff
requested that the police return the License Plate, which Plaintiff described as “personal property
and a symbol of [] religious identity” and “personal conviction.” ECF No. 9-2 at 2. Judge Sherrod
allegedly asked court personnel about the whereabouts of the License Plate and received an
inconclusive response. Id. at 2. Plaintiff then had a brief verbal exchange with a uniformed police
officer. Id. Plaintiff reportedly stated that he needed the License Plate and would place it back on
his vehicle. Id. The police officer allegedly said something to the effect of “if you put that back,
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we will pull you over.” Id. Plaintiff apparently approached the bench to return a “pink paper”
(presumably the citation) and to retrieve the License Plate. Id. at 2–3. Judge Sherrod then issued
a $125 penalty for the traffic ticket, plus two $50 contempt penalties. Id.
On October 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Pro Se Complaint using the form for complaints for
the violation of civil rights based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Pro Se Complaint named the City of
Henderson, Tennessee Police Department as the only Defendant, though the pleading does
reference individual police officers employed by the City of Henderson. Plaintiff alleged that
“[a]gents for [the Henderson Police Department] were given my lawful Clergy ID when they
requested ID but all refused numerous times, given notice in court (sic) to which unfair trial were
ignored.” Pro Se Compl. 2. Officers allegedly seized Plaintiff’s “property unlawfully, demanding
fees for allegations that are contrived, commercial profit pursuits” without Plaintiff’s consent. Id.
The officers “also caused my licenses to be suspended on account of bogus scheme of lies.” Id.
The Pro Se Complaint appeared to assert a claim for the deprivation of “religious freedom” and a
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id. at 3. In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff
demanded an acknowledgment of his “lawful ID and evidence of law” and compensation for “my
family’s account for pain and suffering and [] deprivation of rights” in the amount of “2 million
USD or troy silver.” Id.
II. Procedural History
Upon filing his Pro Se Complaint, Plaintiff paid the civil filing fee and caused summons to
issue. According to a return of service (ECF Nos. 6, 7) filed with the Court on October 23, 2024,
Plaintiff effected service on the Henderson Police Department on October 7, 2024. When the
Henderson Police Department did not file a timely answer, the Magistrate Judge issued an order
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(ECF No. 8) explaining entry of default under Rule 55(a) and directing the Plaintiff to show cause
why his claims against the Henderson Police Department should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). On November 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
notice (ECF No. 9) with seven (7) documents purportedly supporting his claim.
The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s notice was insufficient under Rules 41(b) and
55 and so issued a second order (ECF No. 10) requiring Plaintiff to show cause as to why his
claims against Defendant should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff responded by
filing eight (8) more documents, none of which requested entry of default. See ECF Nos. 11, 12,
15–21. Soon thereafter, counsel entered notices of appearance (ECF Nos. 13, 14) on behalf of “all
Defendants,” even though Plaintiff named only the “the City of Henderson Police Department” as
a Defendant in the Pro Se Complaint and only caused summons to issue as to this Defendant. The
Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff “demonstrate[d] his intent to move forward with this case,
despite confusion” and ordered (ECF No. 22) the Henderson Police Department to show cause
why default should not be entered against them. Defendant and the other individuals named in
Plaintiff’s various papers responded by filing a response to the show cause order and a Motion to
Dismiss. For the sake of clarity, the Court will refer to “Defendants,” though the Court emphasizes
only the City of Henderson Police Department is named as a Defendant in the Pro Se Complaint.
Defendants have construed Plaintiff’s Pro Se Complaint (and his other filings) to raise
several claims, all of which Defendants argue the Court should dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The Magistrate Judge has summarized Defendants’ arguments in his report. In the absence of any
specific objection to that portion of the Magistrate Judge’s report, the Court now adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s summary of the arguments as the findings of the Court.
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First, Defendants argue that the First Amendment bars courts from considering “church
doctrine or ecclesiastical law” as part of its determination of this matter. Mot. to Dismiss 3 (ECF
No. 24-1, PageID 97) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 724–25 (1978))). Next, Defendants argue that the Pro Se Complaint fails to state the
essential elements of a barratry claim because Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants “stir[red]
up baseless litigation.” Id. at 3–4. As for the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
the Pro Se Complaint fails to state a claim against the City of Henderson Police Department
because police departments “are not legal entities capable of being sued.” Id. at 4 (citing Taylor
v. City of Jackson, No. 12-1221, 2013 WL 5781680 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 24, 2013) (citation cleaned
up)). To the extent the Court construes the claims against the Henderson Police Department as
claims against the City of Henderson, Defendants argue that “[m]unicipalities are not liable under
§ 1983 merely because they employ tortfeasors[,]” and Plaintiff “has not alleged any facts from
which this Court could reasonably infer that the City of Henderson, Tennessee, had a policy,
custom, or procedure that caused a violation of [his] civil rights.” Id. at 4–5 (citation omitted). To
the extent that the Pro Se Complaint invokes the Uniform Commercial Code, Plaintiff has not
alleged any purported violation of a sales or commercial transaction. Id. at 9.
Concerning the License Plate, Defendants note that Plaintiff’s willful violation of
Tennessee’s car registration and license plate laws means that “he has no cause of action for his
failure to display a properly issued license plate.” Id. at 5 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55–4–101,
55–5–114(d)). Similarly, Plaintiff “does not have a First Amendment right to display an
unapproved license plate of his own creation” and confiscating the License Plate “did not violate
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the free exercise clause” because Defendants did not interfere “with the practice of his religion.”
Id. at 5–6.
Regarding immunity, Defendants argue that Judge Sherrod and the individual officers are
all immune from the claims alleged. Judge Sherrod has absolute immunity because “[i]t is well
established that Judges enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising out of the performance of their
judicial duties.” Id. at 6 (citing Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004)). Defendants
note that Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Sherrod are derived from Mrs. Haltom’s statement
and not the pleadings. The statement clearly “show[s] that Judge Sherrod was presiding over the
court and [Plaintiff]’s dealings with [Judge Sherrod] were part of the adjudicatory process.” Id. at
6–7. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot bring the claims against the individual officers under
§ 1983, as the officers each assert qualified immunity. Id. at 7–9. Under Sixth Circuit precedent,
Defendants claim that the officers should be found immune because Plaintiff has not alleged with
specificity that the individual officers violated a clearly established constitutional right. Id. at 9.
The Magistrate Judge noted in his report that Plaintiff filed a series of papers in response
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Magistrate Judge has summarized the filings as notices
for submission of evidence, motions regarding production of evidence by Defendants, and motions
to strike. See generally ECF Nos. 25, 27–29, 33–36, 38– 42, 44, 46, 48. Other filings include
Plaintiff’s attempts to provide additional evidence in the form of radio broadcasts, Bible verses,
letters to the Mayor of Henderson, Vatican law, and screenshotted conversations with Artificial
Intelligence programs. See generally ECF Nos. 25, 27–29, 33–36, 38–42, 44, 46, 48. Nearly all
motions and filings have, to some degree, been opposed by Defendants as premature, frivolous, or
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otherwise irrelevant to the case at its current stage. See generally ECF No. 26, 30, 32, 37, 43, 45,
47.
The Magistrate Judge identified one brief as a specific response to the arguments raised in
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing Rebuttal to Attorney Conders
Statement and Second Motion for Dismissal by Joshua Haltom (ECF No. 27). Plaintiff also filed
a “Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Motion to Dismiss” (ECF No. 31). According to
the report and recommendation, this filing was quite different from Plaintiff’s other filings in that
it refers to the Plaintiff in the third person, presents Mrs. Haltom’s narrative of the Haltoms’
appearance in traffic court, provides additional details regarding Plaintiff’s alleged disability, and
presents new legal arguments for the first time. The document is signed by “Lady Lyn C. Haltom”
along with “Joshua Adam Haltom” in a separate signature block. Id. The Magistrate Judge,
reading the memorandum in context with other filings, determined that the paper was authored,
argued, and signed by Mrs. Haltom, not Plaintiff. Id. Defendants objected to the exhibits provided
and the memorandum itself on several grounds, including the fact that Plaintiff who is not an
attorney could not represent his spouse who is also not an attorney. ECF No. 32 (citing Jackson
v. Law Firm of O’Hara, 875 F.2d 1224, 1228–29 (6th Cir. 1989)).
The Magistrate Judge has recommended that the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss for largely the reasons argued in the Motion. Subsequent to the Magistrate Judge issuing
his report and recommendation, Plaintiff has filed a series of papers with the Court:
• Notice to Defense Counsel Regarding Improper Use of Derogatory Terminology
(ECF No. 50, filed May 14, 2025; corrected at ECF No. 52 & 53, filed May 18,
2025);
• Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Report and Recommendation and Motion for
Public Hearing (ECF No. 51, filed May 15, 2025);
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• Response to Defense Regarding Barratry, Personage Claims, and Desired
Resolutions (ECF No. 54, filed May 19, 2025);
• Plaintiff’s Urgent Plea to the Honorable Judge Thomas Anderson to Reject the
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation and to Strike/Deny Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 56, filed May 21, 2025);
• Motion to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 57, filed May 22, 2025);
• Motion for Clarification – Sui Juris (ECF No. 58, filed May 27, 2025);
• Notice of Threats, Duress, and Coercion (ECF No. 59, May 27, 2025);
• Motion to Admit Circumstantial Evidence: The Spiritual Roots of Constitutional
Violations in Haltom v. City of Henderson TN Police Department (ECF No. 62,
May 29, 2025);
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Overrule Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Admit Circumstantial Evidence (ECF No. 65, filed May 31, 2025);
• Motion to Admit Circumstantial Evidence: The Spiritual Roots of Constitutional
Violations in Haltom v. City of Henderson TN Police Department (ECF No. 66,
filed May 31, 2025);
• Plaintiff’s Notice of Clarification Regarding Jury Waiver (ECF, 20) and
Confidence in Judicial Review (ECF No. 67, filed June 3, 2025);
• Motion for Diplomatic Resolution in Haltom v. City of Henderson TN Police
Department (ECF No. 72, filed June 6, 2025);
• Notice of Judicial Default and Demand for Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff
(ECF No. 73, filed June 8, 2025);
• Notice to the Court of Defendant’s Posture in Haltom v. City of Henderson TN
Police Department (ECF No. 75, filed June 12, 2025);
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative
Deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 76, filed June 13, 2025);
• Plaintiff’s Notice to the Court of Defendant’s Confusional Tactics and Improper
Allegations of Untimeliness (ECF No. 78, filed June 16, 2025);
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• Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding
Officers’ Knowledge of Plaintiff’s Religion and Disability (ECF No. 79, filed June
24, 2025);
• Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defensive Procedural
Gamesmanship and Demand for Judicial Oversight (ECF No. 80, filed June 24,
2025);
• Notice of Correction to Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition
to Defensive Procedural Gamesmanship and Demand for Judicial Oversight (ECF
No. 81, filed June 24, 2025);
• Notice – Addendum – Halton – Concerning Patterns of Disconnect, Dismissal, and
the Pursuit of Mutuality (ECF No. 83, filed June 27, 2025);
• Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Public Declaration (ECF No. 84, filed
June 30, 2025);
• Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Public Declaration (ECF No. 85, filed
July 1, 2025);
• Notice of Diplomatic Responsibility (ECF No. 86, filed July 6, 2025);
• Clarification – A Letter to Mayor Terry Bell (ECF No. 88, filed July 9, 2025);
• Clear Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 89, filed July 12, 2025);
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery and Verification of Oaths of Office (ECF
No. 90, July 18, 2025); and
• Plaintiff’s Notice to the Court on the Theological Foundation of Jurisdiction and
the Divine Origin of Sovereignty (ECF No. 91, filed July 21, 2025).
The Court addresses Plaintiff’s filings below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge has recommended that the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the Court must treat all of the well–
pleaded allegations of the pleadings as true and construe all of the allegations in the light most
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favorable to the pleading party. Elec. Merchant Sys. LLC v. Gaal, 58 F.4th 877, 882 (6th Cir. 2023)
(citing Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2019)). However, legal conclusions
or unwarranted factual inferences need not be accepted as true. Fisher v. Perron, 30 F.4th 289,
294 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009)). Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain “(1)
a short and plain jurisdictional statement, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim, and (3) an
explanation of the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “That’s it. By listing these elements, Rule
8 implicitly ‘excludes other requirements that must be satisfied for a complaint to state a claim for
relief.’” Gallivan v. United States, 943 F.3d 291, 293 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 10, at 107 (2012) (other
citation omitted). Rule 8’s notice pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
However, Rule 8 does require more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. “Although the rule encourages brevity,” a plaintiff must
nevertheless “say enough to give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319, 127
S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (citing Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346, 125 S.Ct.
1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005)). “Rule 8 does not empower [a plaintiff] to plead the bare elements
of his cause of action, affix the label ‘general allegation,’ and expect his complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687. In order to state a claim for relief, the plaintiff must
allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level” and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
11
U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This means, a complaint “must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory.” Smith v. Gen. Motors LLC, 988 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.
2021) (citing Boland v. Holder, 682 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2012)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Ryan v.
Blackwell, 979 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2020) (“A complaint must contain enough ‘factual matter’
to raise a ‘plausible’ inference of wrongdoing.”) (quotation omitted).
“Pro se complaints are to be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants,
however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613
(6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his
pleading.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th
Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and
stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf.
Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf
of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts
from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly
12
charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass
advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).
ANALYSIS
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the federal judiciary by
permitting the assignment of district court duties to magistrate judges. See United States v. Curtis,
237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70
(1989)); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). While “a district judge
must determine de novo any part of a Magistrate Judge’s disposition that has been properly
objected to,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the district court is not required to
review (under a de novo or any other standard) “any issue that is not the subject of an objection.”
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the findings and rulings
of the Magistrate Judge to which no specific objection is filed. Id. at 151. “As long as a party was
properly informed of the consequences of failing to object, the party waives subsequent review by
the district court and appeal to [the Court of Appeals] if it fails to file an objection.” Miller v.
Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Arn, 474 U.S. at 147-50).
I. The City of Henderson’s Motion to Dismiss
As is evident from the Court’s recitation of the procedural history of the case, Plaintiff has
submitted a volume of papers in support of his claims, including twenty-nine (29) different
documents filed after the Magistrate Judge submitted his report and recommendation. Among
those filings only four different papers purport to object to (or even mention) the Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendation, and two of those were untimely and failed to preserve any
objections to the report and recommendation. In Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Report and
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Recommendation and Motion for Public Hearing (ECF No. 51), Plaintiff requests a public hearing
to address whether default judgment is warranted for Defendants’ failure to file an answer.
Plaintiff also states that Defendants have not responded to his requests for discovery. Plaintiff
maintains that Motu Proprio, which Plaintiff does not explain further, is relevant to his case.
Finally, Plaintiff defends the legitimacy of his identification document, a photocopy of which
Plaintiff has attached to his paper (ECF No. 51-1). The photocopy shows a smaller document,
which is entitled an “International Clergy Identification Card.” The card identifies Josiah Haltom,
who is apparently the same person as Plaintiff Joshua Haltom, as an “Ambassador” of the “Temple
of Life and Light, Haltom Family Ministries and Consultants.” The card includes the following
declaration:
I, Josiah Adam Haltom, The Clergy Minister for the Temple of Light and Life by
self-determination and ordination Declare Myself a legal Living, Breathing Man
operating Under the Divine Law and Will of God. The Pure Cambridge Authorized
1611 King James Version of the Bible is my evidence of Law. I am NOT a
corporate entity dealing in commerce requiring a license of any kind. I travel by
RIGHT not by Privilege. Anything you say or do in violation of my Rights, can
and will be used against you under the Common and Ecclesiastical Law.
The card goes on to make a number of additional claims about the correct interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Federalist No.
78, the Social Security Act, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
In Plaintiff’s Urgent Plea to the Honorable Judge Thomas Anderson to Reject the
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation and to Strike/Deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 56), Plaintiff describes the filing as a supplement to his Response (ECF No. 51). First,
Plaintiff asserts that the report and recommendation “fails to adequately address egregious
constitutional violations and misapplies the law.” Pl.’s Urgent Plea 2. Plaintiff then proceeds to
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restate his factual allegations about the traffic stop and the officers’ refusal to recognize the
legitimacy of Plaintiff’s clergy identification card. Plaintiff argues that he has satisfied the Iqbal
pleading standard. Second, Plaintiff restates his argument that Defendants have not filed a timely
answer to the Complaint and have not produced discovery. Plaintiff “vigorously dispute[s]”
Defendants’ position that the filing of their Motion to Dismiss tolled the time for Defendants to
file an answer. Because Defendants have not met their discovery obligations, Plaintiff argues that
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny the discovery-related motions is erroneous. Third,
Plaintiff argues that the concept of Motu Proprio is the source of an inherent authority possessed
by the Court to uphold justice. Plaintiff argues that under the Supreme Court’s decision on Bond
v. United States, he has the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Finally, Plaintiff renews his request for a public hearing and “restorative justice.”
The Court holds that none of the points raised in these two papers articulates a specific
objection to the Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition of the case. The Sixth Circuit has
held that objections to a Magistrate Judge’s order or recommendation must be specific “in order
to focus the busy district court’s attention on only those issues that were dispositive and
contentious” and thereby to serve judicial efficiency. Howard v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs.,
932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Although Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge misapplied
the law, Plaintiff’s briefs do not zero in on any specific issue of contention related to the Magistrate
Judge’s reasoning about Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Even reading the briefs liberally,
Plaintiff doubles down and simply reiterates a series of unorthodox premises on which his case
rests. Taken as a whole, Plaintiff’s overly long memoranda are nothing more than a general
objection to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.
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As already noted, the Court need not review any recommendation to which no specific
objection is made. Arn, 474 U.S. at 150.
A general objection to the entirety of the magistrate [judge]’s report has the
same effect as would a failure to object. The district court’s attention is not focused
on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the
magistrate useless. The functions of the district court are effectively duplicated as
both the magistrate and the district court perform identical tasks. This duplication
of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs
contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. We would hardly countenance an
appellant’s brief simply objecting to the district court’s determination without
explaining the source of the error. We should not permit appellants to do the same
to the district court reviewing the magistrate’s report.
Howard, 932 F.2d at 509 (citing Arn, 474 U.S. at 148). To the extent that most of the points made
in Plaintiff’s memoranda fail to raise specific and focused objections, the Court declines to comb
through Plaintiff’s briefs or any of the other documents filed by Plaintiff and attempt to divine
each and every possible objection to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation Plaintiff
might have raised. Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to show with specificity
which conclusion in the report and recommendation the Court should reject.
To the extent that Plaintiff did attempt to preserve any specific objection to the report and
recommendation, the points raised by Plaintiff do not show why the Court should not grant
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s primary argument seems to be that Defendants have
not filed a timely answer or responded to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. But Plaintiff’s contention
lacks merit. First and foremost, the Pro Se Complaint names only one Defendant and Plaintiff has
served only one Defendant with summons and the complaint, the City of Henderson Police
Department. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties . . .
.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) (“A summons—or a copy of a summons that is addressed to multiple
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defendants—must be issued for each defendant to be served.”). Plaintiff served the City of
Henderson, the only Defendant named in the original Pro Se Complaint, with a summons and copy
of the complaint on October 7, 2024. See Proof of Service 2 (ECF No. 6) (showing a blurred page
with the date of October 7 or 8, 2024, handwritten on the proof of service page).
Generally speaking, a defendant must serve an answer within 21 days after being served
with the summons and complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A). When more than 21 days passed
without Defendant filing an answer or entering an appearance, the Magistrate Judge ordered
Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute.
The Magistrate Judge’s order cited Rule 55(a) and explained the procedure for obtaining entry of
default against a non-responding defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”).
Rather than moving for entry of default in accordance with Rule 55(a), Plaintiff filed a
number of other papers, none of which had the effect of prosecuting the case against the City of
Henderson. As a result, the Magistrate Judge issued a second show cause order and once more
explained how Plaintiff could prosecute his case by obtaining entry of default against Defendant
under Rule 55(a). Plaintiff again responded to the show cause order by filing other papers about
the merits of his case but without requesting entry of default. A short time later, counsel for
Defendant entered a notice of appearance and ultimately filed the Motion to Dismiss. In short,
Plaintiff had the opportunity to obtain an entry of default against the City of Henderson but failed
to do so before Defendant acted to defend itself against Plaintiff’s claims. Now that the City of
Henderson (and other parties mentioned in the record) have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
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against them, Plaintiff’s request for the Court to convene a public hearing and consider default
judgment simply comes too late.
Furthermore, the filing of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, even though filed late, tolls the
City of Henderson’s deadline to file its answer to the Pro Se Complaint. Rule 12(b) requires a
defendant to raise certain defenses by motion before filing its responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b). Serving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) alters the time for filing a responsive
pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4). A defendant must file its responsive pleading within 14 days
of the Court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss. Id. Because the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation and holds that the Pro Se Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief,
Defendants are not required to answer the claims of the Pro Se Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
assignment of error is not a justification for denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
The only other issue raised in his Plaintiff’s objections concerns the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss rendered any requests or motions for
discovery moot. Plaintiff counters that Defendants have a duty to produce discovery before the
Court can dismiss his claims. But that gets the correct procedure backwards. Plaintiff has no right
to propound discovery prior to conferring with Defendant about a discovery plan. Fed. R. Civ. P.
R. 26(d) (stating that “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have
conferred as required by Rule 26(f)” regarding a plan for discovery and other case management
deadlines). What is more, Defendants have the right to test the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings
before being required to participate in the discovery process. Rule 8’s notice pleading standard
and Rule 12(b)’s defenses allow a defendant to move for dismissal of a case before any discovery
has occurred. “[F]ederal courts will not ‘unlock the doors of discovery’ for a fishing expedition
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based on a plaintiff’s speculative assertions.” Changizi v. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 82
F.4th 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). Plaintiff’s contention then that
he is somehow entitled to discovery before the Court reaches the merits of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss is unfounded.
Based on its de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation and
Plaintiff’s objections, though largely lacking in specificity, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate
Judge’s report and recommendation and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
II. Motion to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 57)
This just leaves Plaintiff’s request to amend his pleadings. On May 22, 2025, after the
Magistrate Judge had issued his report and recommendation, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend
Complaint (ECF No. 57). In point of fact, the Motion is not a “request for a court order” at all but
purports to be the amended pleading itself. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) (“A request for a court order must
be made by motion.”). The document has all the hallmarks of a pleading: the naming of the parties,
a statement on jurisdiction and venue, factual allegations, the causes of action based on the facts
alleged, and a prayer for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (listing the required elements of a
complaint to include “(1) a short and plain jurisdictional statement, (2) a short and plain statement
of the claim, and (3) an explanation of the relief sought”). The most important difference between
the amended pleading and the original Pro Se Complaint is that Plaintiff now states claims only
for the violation of this First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Monell liability against
the City of Henderson.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) allows a party to amend its pleading only with the
opposing party’s consent or by leave of court. Because Plaintiff filed the amended pleading without
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Defendant’s consent or permission from the Court, the Court will treat the filing as a motion to amend.
Rule 15(a)(2) adds that a court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc. the leave sought should,
as the rules require, be “freely given.”
Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 905 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). “[T]he thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the principle that cases should be tried on their merits
rather than the technicalities of pleadings.” Herhold v. Green Tree Savings, LLC, 608 F. App’x 328,
330-31 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1986)). The
Sixth Circuit has remarked that “the case law in this Circuit manifests liberality in allowing
amendments to a complaint.” Newberry v. Silverman, 789 F.3d 636, 645 (6th Cir. 2015).
The Court holds that Plaintiff is not entitled to amend his pleading. Plaintiff’s proposed
amended pleading would be futile because it does not cure the defects contained in the original
Pro Se Complaint. Just as with Plaintiff’s Pro Se Complaint, the proposed amended pleadings
allege no facts to show that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or any other right was violated.
Plaintiff’s theory of the case is that he has a kind of First Amendment immunity from state law
requirements to maintain a state-issued driver’s license or register his vehicle with a state-issued
license plate before operating a vehicle on the roads of the State of Tennessee. These propositions
are patently frivolous. Without any plausible allegation that members of the Henderson Police
Department violated his constitutional rights, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against the City
itself.
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Having determined that Plaintiff is not entitled to amend his pleadings, this matter is hereby
DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment.
III. Appeal Issues
The next issue to be addressed is whether the Court should authorize Plaintiff to appeal this
decision in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), an appeal may not be taken in forma
pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith. “‘Good faith’ has
been defined as a requirement that an appeal present a nonfrivolous question for review.” Cruz v.
Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 62 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). The good faith standard is an objective
one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The same considerations that lead the
Court to dismiss this case, Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim and failure to make specific objections
to the report and recommendation, also compel the conclusion that an appeal would not be taken
in good faith. It is therefore CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in
this matter by Plaintiff would not be taken in good faith and Plaintiff may not proceed on appeal
in forma pauperis.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s decisions in McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612–13 (6th Cir. 1997) and Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105
F.3d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 1997) apply to any appeal filed by Plaintiff in this case. If Plaintiff files a
notice of appeal, he must pay the entire $605 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1913 and 1917.
By filing a notice of appeal, Plaintiff becomes liable for the full amount of the filing fee, regardless
of the subsequent progress of the appeal. The entire filing fee must be paid within thirty (30) days
of the filing of the notice of appeal. If Plaintiff fails to comply with the above assessment of the
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appellate filing fee within thirty (30) days2 of the filing of the notice of appeal or the entry of this
order, whichever occurred later, the Court will notify the Sixth Circuit, which will dismiss the
appeal. If the appeal is dismissed, it will not be reinstated once the fee is paid. McGore, 114 F.3d
at 610.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: July 23, 2025.
2 The district court may extend this deadline one time by thirty (30) days if the motion to
extend is filed before the expiration of the original deadline. McGore, 114 F.3d at 610.
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