United States V Town Of Thornapple Wisconsin
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2931
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TOWN OF THORNAPPLE, WISCONSIN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 24-cv-664 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 14, 2025 — DECIDED JULY 14, 2025
____________________
Before BRENNAN, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In June 2023, the Town Board of
Thornapple, Wisconsin voted to stop using electronic voting
machines in elections. The Town implemented this decision
in Wisconsin’s 2024 federal primary elections and required
voters to use paper ballots. The United States sued the Town
and select Town officials in response, alleging that they failed
to make at least one accessible voting system available at the
Town’s polling place, in violation of section 301 of the Help
2 No. 24-2931
America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”). See 52 U.S.C.
§ 21081(a)(3)(A)–(B).
The United States also sought, and the district court
granted, a preliminary injunction requiring the Town to pro-
vide a HAVA-compliant system in the November 2024 federal
election. When granting the government’s motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, the district court rejected the Town’s ar-
guments that its use of paper ballots did not fall within
HAVA’s purview and that the government failed to demon-
strate a likelihood of irreparable harm. Finding no error in the
district court’s analysis of these issues, we affirm.
I. Background
Congress enacted HAVA in the aftermath of the Novem-
ber 2000 presidential election and “its attendant controver-
sies.” Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153,
1155 (11th Cir. 2008); see Colon-Marrero v. Velez, 813 F.3d 1, 9
(1st Cir. 2016). Among other aims, Congress sought “to estab-
lish minimum election administration standards” for federal
elections. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252
(codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901 et seq. (2002)). Section 301 of
HAVA, titled “Voting Systems Standards,” lays out some of
these minimum standards. Id. Pertinent here, each “voting
system” used in an election for federal office shall:
be accessible for individuals with disabilities, includ-
ing nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually
impaired, in a manner that provides the same oppor-
tunity for access and participation (including privacy
and independence) as for other voters[.]
52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(3)(A). A “voting system” satisfies this re-
quirement by providing “at least one direct recording
No. 24-2931 3
electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for
individuals with disabilities at each polling place[.]” Id.
§ 21081(a)(3)(B).
The Town of Thornapple, Wisconsin previously satisfied
this accessibility requirement by using a Dominion ImageCast
Evolution machine. But in June 2023, the Town Board
changed course and voted to stop using electronic voting ma-
chines and instead use paper ballots. The Town implemented
this decision in Wisconsin’s April 2024 and August 2024 fed-
eral primary elections, during which voters marked up paper
ballots by hand and placed their ballots in a locked box. The
Town then hand counted these ballots.
Soon after, the United States sued the Town, as well as the
Town Clerk and three members of the Town’s Board in their
official capacities, for allegedly failing to provide “at least one
direct recording electronic voting system or other voting sys-
tem equipped for individuals with disabilities” at the Town’s
polling place. Id. The government also moved for a prelimi-
nary injunction requiring the Town to provide an accessible
voting system in the November 5, 2024, general election,
among other things.
The district court granted the preliminary injunction. It re-
jected the Town’s argument that its paper ballots did not qual-
ify as a “voting system” under HAVA, relying on the text and
structure of section 301. It similarly rejected the Town’s argu-
ment that the government failed to demonstrate irreparable
harm, finding that individuals with disabilities would be “de-
prived of the opportunity to vote independently and pri-
vately.” In reaching this latter conclusion, the district court re-
lied on testimony from Thornapple’s Chief Election Inspector
Suzanne Pinnow who recounted instances where individuals
4 No. 24-2931
with disabilities received assistance in casting their votes.
Pinnow also testified that approximately “zero to one” disa-
bled voters cast ballots at the Town’s polling place per elec-
tion and that these voters had not asked to use a voting ma-
chine because they preferred receiving physical assistance
from someone.
In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court
directed the Town to ensure its polling place had a voting sys-
tem equipped for individuals with disabilities as required by
HAVA during the November 2024 election. The court’s order
also imposed several provisions that are ongoing to this day,
including provisions prohibiting the Town from enforcing its
June 2023 decision to stop using electronic voting machines
and requiring that the Town ensure election officers receive
appropriate training on implementing HAVA-compliant sys-
tems.
The Town now appeals the preliminary injunction, invok-
ing our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
II. Discussion
To secure a preliminary injunction, the government must
demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its suit,
it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of prelim-
inary relief, the balance of equities tips in its favor, and an in-
junction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
On appeal, the Town contests only the government’s like-
lihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. We
therefore limit our discussion to these requirements, review-
ing the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and findings
of fact for clear error. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Loc. 365 v. City
No. 24-2931 5
of East Chicago, 56 F.4th 437, 446 (7th Cir. 2022). A finding of
fact is clearly erroneous only when “we cannot avoid or ig-
nore a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made” after reviewing all the evidence. Id. at 447 (citation
modified).
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
HAVA requires that each “voting system” is “accessible
for individuals with disabilities,” and then elaborates on how
a “voting system” can satisfy this requirement. 52 U.S.C.
§ 21081(a)(3)(A)–(B). The Town does not argue that its deci-
sion to withhold the ImageCast Evolution machine and pro-
vide only paper ballots meets HAVA’s accessibility require-
ment. It instead argues that it is not subject to these provisions
because its use of paper ballots does not constitute a “voting
system” to which HAVA’s requirements attach. The govern-
ment’s likelihood of success on the merits therefore turns on
a narrow question of statutory construction: is the Town’s pa-
per ballot voting method a “voting system” under HAVA?
As with any question of statutory construction, we begin
with the text of the statute. The context in which a statutory
phrase appears and the phrase’s place in the overall statutory
scheme serve an essential role in our understanding of the
text. Loja v. Main St. Acquisition Corp., 906 F.3d 680, 683 (7th
Cir. 2018) (citing Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424, 438 (2016)).
We follow a “foundational principle of statutory interpreta-
tion” that the same term presumptively carries the same
meaning throughout a statute. Waukegan Potawatomi Casino,
LLC v. City of Waukegan, 128 F.4th 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2025); see
also White v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir.
2021) (presuming “identical words used in different parts of
6 No. 24-2931
the same act are intended to have the same meaning” (citation
modified)).
A straightforward application of these principles per-
suades us that the Town’s use of paper ballots is a “voting
system.” Congress referenced “paper ballot voting systems”
three times in section 301 when explaining how such a system
can satisfy other provisions of HAVA. See 52 U.S.C.
§ 21081(a)(1)(B), (c)(2). These repeated references to “paper
ballot voting systems” tell us that Congress views a munici-
pality’s use of paper ballots as a type of voting system in these
provisions. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
586 U.S. 9, 19 (2018) (“Adjectives modify nouns—they pick out
a subset of a category that possesses a certain quality.”). Be-
cause we presume that Congress uses a term consistently
throughout a statute, Congress’s use of “voting system”
within the accessibility provisions should encompass “paper
ballot voting systems,” too. The plain text of section 301 there-
fore strongly counsels against the Town’s assertion that
HAVA does not apply to its use of paper ballots.
Section 301’s definition of “voting system” adds support
to our conclusion that the Town’s paper balloting method is a
voting system. HAVA provides that “the term ‘voting system’
means—”
(1) the total combination of mechanical, electrome-
chanical, or electronic equipment (including the soft-
ware, firmware, and documentation required to pro-
gram, control, and support the equipment) that is
used—
(A) to define ballots;
(B) to cast and count votes;
No. 24-2931 7
(C) to report or display election results; and
(D) to maintain and produce any audit trail infor-
mation; and
(2) the practices and associated documentation used—
(A) to identify system components and versions of
such components;
(B) to test the system during its development and
maintenance;
(C) to maintain records of system errors and de-
fects;
(D) to determine specific system changes to be
made to a system after the initial qualification of the
system; and
(E) to make available any materials to the voter
(such as notices, instructions, forms, or paper bal-
lots).
52 U.S.C. § 21081(b) (emphasis added). By including “paper
ballots” within the definition, Congress once again demon-
strated its intent to cover paper balloting.
The Town attempts to sidestep this express reference to
paper ballots and the references to “paper ballot voting sys-
tems” by focusing on an alleged lack of “mechanical, electro-
mechanical, or electronic equipment” in its voting method.
Under the Town’s reading, a “voting system” requires some
form of this equipment because “and” connects subsection (1)
about equipment with (2) about practices and associated doc-
umentation.
8 No. 24-2931
“And” undoubtedly “connect[s]” specified terms, but how
it does so “depend[s] on context.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601
U.S. 124, 133, 151 (2024); see also Navy Fed. Credit Union v. LTD
Fin. Servs., LP, 972 F.3d 344, 356 (4th Cir. 2020) (“and alone tells
us little of how two items are to be combined”). When an in-
troductory phrase applies “independently and equivalently”
to all terms that follow, for example, “and” may mean that
each term satisfies the phrase in addition to the next, rather
than imposing a joint requirement. See Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at
133–34. We can read the introductory phrase here, “a voting
system means,” to do just that. That is, “a voting system
means” (1) the total combination of certain equipment used
throughout the voting process, and it also means (2) practices
and associated documentation. The practices and associated
documentation, which expressly include paper ballots, con-
stitute a voting system with or without equipment.
Indeed, this interpretation is the only one that “produces
a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the
law.” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest As-
socs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); see also CFPB v. Townstone
Fin., Inc., 107 F.4th 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2024) (declining to inter-
pret a term in a way that “frustrates the obvious statutorily
articulated purpose of the statute”). Consider the Town’s in-
terpretation. The Town suggests that its use of paper ballots
would constitute a “voting system” if it used mechanical,
electromechanical, or electronic equipment to count ballots
instead of hand counting them. During oral argument, the
Town also indicated that using a printer to create ballots
No. 24-2931 9
would satisfy its perceived equipment requirement. 1 The ac-
cessibility provisions at issue, however, concern an individ-
ual’s “access and participation (including privacy and inde-
pendence)” when casting his or her vote. Given Congress’s
focus on the rights of individuals with disabilities when cast-
ing ballots, an interpretation of “voting system” that guaran-
tees these rights only when certain equipment is used to pre-
pare or count ballots makes little sense.
The broad nature of HAVA’s statutory scheme also refutes
the Town’s interpretation. The preamble of HAVA states that
it seeks “to establish minimum election administration stand-
ards,” and Title III, which encompasses section 301, sets forth
“uniform … requirements.” Pub. L. No. 107-252. To achieve
these aims, Congress set forth a broad definition of “voting
system” that captures a wide array of equipment, practices,
and documentation used before, during, and after the voting
process. See 52 U.S.C. § 21081(b) (including equipment used
to display results and produce audit trails, along with prac-
tices used to test a voting system during development, within
the definition of “voting system”). The Town asserts that such
a broad reading renders the definition superfluous, but it fails
to harmonize its restrictive reading with the aim of establish-
ing minimum and uniform standards in federal elections. We
1 The record does not reflect whether the Town used a printer to create
its ballots, although we are hard-pressed to imagine that the Town hand
wrote each ballot.
10 No. 24-2931
decline to read in a loophole for hand counted paper ballots
in the face of clear textual indications to the contrary. 2
In light of Congress’s express reference to “paper ballot
voting systems,” the broad definition of “voting system” that
mentions paper ballots, and the statutory scheme, we con-
clude that the Town has a “voting system” under HAVA. In
turn, the district court did not err in finding that the govern-
ment demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.
B. Irreparable Harm
The government also has the burden of demonstrating
that it “is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. This means that the
alleged harm “must be more than a mere possibility,” but it
does not require that the harm “be occurring or be certain to
occur before a court may grant relief[.]” Michigan v. U.S. Army
Corps. of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 788 (7th Cir. 2011). 3 The Town
argues that the district court erred in its application of this
standard because the government has “not alleged a single
2 The Town contends that its interpretation does not create a loophole
because the Americans with Disabilities Act and Voting Rights Act protect
accessibility in voting. The Town does not provide support for its asser-
tion that overlapping or adjacent protection requires narrow construal of
the provision at issue.
3 The harm must also be irreparable such that it cannot be “prevented
or fully rectified by the final judgment after trial.” Whitaker v. Kenosha Uni-
fied Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1045 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation
modified), abrogated on other grounds by Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973
F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2020). The Town does not dispute the irreparable nature
of the alleged harm.
No. 24-2931 11
factual basis for the belief that the Town … has disenfran-
chised voters.”
The Town’s argument misunderstands both our prelimi-
nary injunction law and the harm alleged here. As to the law,
the government did not need to provide evidence that the
Town has already disenfranchised voters. See Michigan, 667
F.3d at 788. More fundamentally, the district court did not
grant the preliminary injunction based on finding past disen-
franchisement. Rather, the district court found that the
Town’s actions would likely “deprive” individuals with disa-
bilities “of the opportunity to vote independently and pri-
vately” that HAVA requires. And this requirement reflects the
critical role the secret ballot occupies in our democratic sys-
tem. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343
(1995) (referring to the secret ballot as “the hard-won right to
vote one’s conscience …”); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206
(1992) (describing the secret ballot as our nation’s time-tested
method for preserving free and fair elections). For this reason,
the Town’s focus on Chief Election Inspector Pinnow’s testi-
mony that individuals with disabilities prefer receiving assis-
tance over using a machine misses the point. Anecdotal pref-
erences do not speak to an injury that lies in a lack of choice.
Focusing on the injury of being denied the opportunity to
vote privately and independently, the district court did not
clearly err in its factual findings. Pinnow testified that indi-
viduals with disabilities had voted before at the Town’s poll-
ing place, approximated this number at “zero to one” an elec-
tion, and provided two examples of these voters receiving as-
sistance: a blind woman relied on her daughter’s assistance to
fill out a ballot and a man who had suffered a stroke disclosed
his vote to Pinnow so she could guide his hand to mark his
12 No. 24-2931
ballot. This testimony supports the court’s finding that the
Town has disabled voters who need assistance when casting
their vote. That the record suggests the Town’s removal of an
accessible option may only affect a small number of individ-
uals does not undermine the likelihood of harm. See League of
Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th
Cir. 2014) (explaining that a restriction on the right to vote is
an irreparable injury whether there are thirty or thirty thou-
sand impacted).
Pinnow’s testimony likewise supports the court’s finding
that individuals with disabilities would lack the opportunity
to vote privately and independently if they only had access to
a paper ballot. The man telling Pinnow “who he wanted to
vote for” and having her guide his hand exemplifies both a
lack of privacy and independence. Even based on the limited
record before us, we cannot say the district court clearly erred
in finding irreparable harm.
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.