Cravotta V State Of Cal Ca3

Filed 7/23/25 Cravotta v. State of Cal. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

ANTHONY CRAVOTTA II, C100643

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 34-2022-
00329028-CU-PO-GDS)
v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

Timely claim presentation under the Government Claims Act is a condition
precedent to a plaintiff’s maintaining an action against a public entity. (Shirk v. Vista
Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 (Shirk); Gov. Code, §§ 810 et seq.; 945.4
[statutory section citations that follow are to the Government Code].) “Complaints that
do not allege facts demonstrating either that a claim was timely presented or that
compliance with the claims statute is excused are subject to a general demurrer for not
stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Shirk, at p. 209.)

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Plaintiff Anthony Cravotta II, through his guardian ad litem and counsel, presented
a claim to defendants State of California and the California Department of State Hospitals
(collectively, the Department) to recover for severe injuries he incurred while he was an
inmate in a county jail waiting to be transferred to a Department state hospital for
treatment and to gain competency to stand trial. Approximately 85 days after plaintiff
presented his claim, the Department informed plaintiff that it had determined the claim
was filed untimely. But the Department also determined that the claim included an
application for leave to present a late claim, and it told plaintiff it would review the
application. Before receiving any response from the Department and without filing a
petition with the superior court for relief from the claim filing requirement, plaintiff filed
this action.
The trial court sustained the Department’s demurrer to the second amended
complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the action. It ruled that plaintiff
violated the Government Claims Act by not timely filing a petition with the superior court
for relief from the claim filing requirement, a statutory requirement for challenging a
public entity’s denial of an application to file a late claim. (§ 946.6, subd. (a).)
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment of dismissal. He contends (1) he presented a
timely claim and not an application to present a late claim, and the trial court erred by
determining on demurrer the discovery rule did not delay accrual of his action; (2) the
Department waived its timeliness defense by not providing him with the notice required
by section 911.3; and (3) his claim was timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling.
We reverse. We conclude that plaintiff’s claim was deemed denied as a matter of
law, and he could file this action without first petitioning the superior court for relief. We
will also direct the trial court to grant plaintiff leave to amend the complaint with specific
factual allegations showing the time and manner of his discovering his cause of action
and his inability to have made discovery earlier despite reasonable diligence.

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FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
“Because this case comes before us on appeal from a judgment sustaining a
demurrer, we assume the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and the reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” (Miklosy v. Regents of University of
California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 883.)
More than 20 years ago, plaintiff was diagnosed with mental illness, including
depression and bi-polar disorders. He has been on and off medications and in and out of
mental health facilities for the majority of his life, including being committed under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 on several occasions. His illness limits his
ability to care for himself, think, communicate, process information, and control and
express his thoughts and emotions.
On November 11, 2020, plaintiff was arrested and charged with possession of
child pornography in violation of Penal Code section 311.11, subdivision (a). He was
booked into the Sacramento County Main Jail. Jail staff designated him to be housed in
the jail’s psychiatric services unit. A clinical assessment concluded that plaintiff had a
history of schizoaffective disorder. He presented with disorganized thought and speech
characterized by nonsensical, disconnected statements. He was “ ‘clearly psychotic’ ”
and “ ‘gravely disabled.’ ”
On December 10, 2020, plaintiff was reclassified and discharged from the
psychiatric services unit. He was placed in the jail’s general population with a
recommendation for outpatient psychiatric housing. He continued to exhibit psychotic
behavior while in the general population.
The criminal court on February 22, 2021, determined that plaintiff was
incompetent to stand trial. The court suspended the proceedings and referred plaintiff to
the Department’s Conditional Release Program (CONREP). On April 5, 2021, the court

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reviewed the CONREP report, and it ordered plaintiff be placed at a Department state
hospital pending restoration of his competency.
Despite the criminal court’s order, the Department did not transfer plaintiff and
admit him to a state hospital. Plaintiff remained in the jail’s general population where he
continued to exhibit psychotic behavior. In August 2021, the jail reclassified plaintiff to a
lower security level of “ ‘Medium’ ” on its inmate security classification scale of low,
medium, or high.
On August 24, 2021, the criminal court scheduled a hearing to discuss plaintiff’s
transfer to the Department, as plaintiff “was ordered to the state hospital on April 5, 2021,
but he remains at the main jail.” The court’s minutes from the hearing, held
September 15, 2021, state plaintiff was “ ‘#26 on the waiting list for transportation to
[jail-based competency treatment] (sometime in November).’ ”
On September 24, 2021, the jail reassigned plaintiff to share a cell with Lemar
Burleson in the jail’s general population. Burleson suffered from mental illness. At one
point, the jail housed him in its total separation housing isolated from other inmates. Jail
staff reports noted that Burleson had “ ‘extreme psych issues’ ” and had often threatened
to assault any inmate he was housed with. Like plaintiff, Burleson was waiting to be
transferred and admitted to a state hospital.
The complaint alleges that on the same day, September 24, plaintiff’s “jail mental
health notes identified that he ‘said he got a new cellmate but “It’s not working out too
well.” Writer asked [him] to elaborate, but [he] said “I would rather talk to my attorney
lawyer about it.” [He] denied any physical or sexual contact occurred with his current
cell-mate, but said “if he gets physical I’ll have to defend myself.” [H]e inquired about
when he will go to [the state hospital] and talked about his next court date and said he’s
“praying for the judges.” ’ ”
On September 26, 2021, Burleson attacked plaintiff inside their cell. Plaintiff
sustained catastrophic injuries, including permanent brain injuries. He was transported to

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a hospital and placed into a medically induced coma. There is no prognosis that he will
recover from his brain injuries. Burleson was later charged with attempted murder of
plaintiff.
The criminal court granted plaintiff compassionate release from custody on
October 14, 2021. He remains hospitalized. He requires continuous medical care, which
he is expected to require for the remainder of his life.
Plaintiff alleges that through his guardian ad litem and counsel, he learned in
April 2022 of the Department’s potential liability for his injuries sustained from at least
April 5, 2021, to the present. Plaintiff himself was unable to discover his cause of action
due to his continuous and ongoing legal incompetence and mental incapacity. Through
his counsel, plaintiff presented a claim to the Department pursuant to the Government
Claims Act on April 27, 2022.
The Government Claims Program (GCP) of the Department of General Services,
which reviews claims presented to the state, did not act on the claim within 45 days of its
presentation. Nor did the GCP pursuant to section 911.3 give plaintiff written notice
within 45 days of the claim’s presentation that the claim was not presented timely, and his
only recourse was to apply to the GCP for leave to present the claim late.
However, by letter dated July 21, 2022, 85 days after plaintiff presented his claim,
the GCP informed plaintiff it had determined his claim was presented late. It found that
the cause of action accrued between February 22 and October 14, 2021, more than six
months before the claim was presented.
In addition, the GCP construed the claim as including an application for leave to
present a late claim. GCP stated it would review the application and inform plaintiff of
its final determination.
Plaintiff initiated this action on August 4, 2022, by filing an amended complaint in
a related federal action. The parties stipulated that plaintiff would dismiss his state law

5
claims without prejudice to allow him to assert them in a state action. This matter is that
action. Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this matter on October 28, 2022.
He filed a first amended complaint, and the Department filed a demurrer, arguing
that plaintiff did not comply with the Government Claims Act. The Department
contended that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued no later than September 26, 2021, the
day he was assaulted, and plaintiff did not petition the court within six months of the
deemed denial of his late-claim application. The parties disputed whether plaintiff had
presented a government claim or a late-claim application. The trial court sustained the
Department’s demurrer to the first amended complaint with leave to amend. It ruled that
plaintiff’s claim was a late-claim application.
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, which is the operative complaint
before us. Plaintiff alleged causes of action against the Department for failing to summon
medical care for a prisoner (§ 845.6), violating the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ.
Code, § 52.1), and negligence.
He alleged his cause of action accrued no earlier than April 2022 when, through
his guardian ad litem and counsel and on account of his mental incapacity and legal
incompetence, he learned of the Department’s potential liability for injuries he sustained
from April 5, 2021, to the present. He alleged he presented a timely claim on April 27,
2022, within six months of the cause of action’s delayed accrual.
Plaintiff also alleged the Department did not act on the claim within 45 days, and
thus the claim was deemed rejected on June 16, 2022, under section 912.4. He also
alleged his claim was not an application to present a late claim.
The Department filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint, and the trial
court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Treating plaintiff’s claim as an
application to present a late claim, the court stated the delayed discovery rule did not
apply to relieve plaintiff from his failure to timely file a petition with the court to be
relieved from the claim presentation requirement after his late claim application was

6
deemed denied. The trial court also ruled that the Department had not waived its
timeliness defense under section 911.3 for not notifying plaintiff of the claim’s
untimeliness within 45 days of its presentation and the need to apply for leave to present
a late claim, and that the time period was not equitably tolled. The court denied leave to
amend after finding that plaintiff could not amend the complaint to cure the defects.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

“The rules by which the sufficiency of a complaint is tested against a general
demurrer are well settled. ‘ “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.
[Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.]
Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its
parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether
the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when
it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the defect can be cured by amendment . . . .” ’ (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126, quoting Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
‘ “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” ’ (Zelig
v. County of Los Angeles, at p. 1126.) Our examination of the complaint is de novo.”
(Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.)
“In deciding whether a demurrer was properly sustained, ‘[w]e are not bound by
the trial court’s stated reasons, if any, supporting its ruling; we review the ruling, not its
rationale.’ ” (Center for Environmental Health v. Perrigo Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1,
16.)

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II

Plaintiff Presented a Claim

Plaintiff argues he presented a claim to the Department and not an application for
leave to present a late claim. He also contends that his claim was deemed denied by the
Department’s not responding to it within 45 days of its presentation.

A. Legal background

The Government Claims Act prohibits an action for money or damages against a
public entity until a written claim has been timely presented to the entity and the entity
has acted upon the claim or the claim has been deemed to have been rejected by the
entity. (§ 945.4.) A claim for damages arising from personal injury must be presented to
the public entity no later than six months after the cause of action accrued. (§ 911.2,
subd. (a).)
For purposes of computing the time limits imposed by the Government Claims
Act, a cause of action accrues on the date on which it would be deemed to have accrued
for purposes of the applicable statute of limitations if the cause of action had been
litigated between private parties. (§ 901; Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 208-209.) In
certain cases, the discovery rule, which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the
plaintiff discovers or has reason to discover the cause of action, may extend the time limit
to present a claim. (Nogart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397; Bastian v. County
of San Luis Obispo (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 520, 527.)
A public entity must act on a claim within 45 days after the claim was presented.
(§ 912.4, subd (a).) If the entity does not act on the claim within 45 days, the claim is
deemed to be rejected on the last day of the period. (§ 912.4, subd. (c).) This 45-day
period, however, is not jurisdictional, and a public entity may act on a claim after the
claim has been rejected by operation of law as long as an action on the clam is not barred

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by the statute of limitations. (§ 913.2; Kane v. County of San Diego (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d
550, 554.)
When the personal injury claimant does not present the claim within the six-month
period after the action accrues, the claimant may apply in writing to the public entity for
leave to present the claim late. (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) The claimant must present this
application to the entity no later than one year after the cause of action accrues. (§ 911.4,
subd. (b).) If the public entity takes no action on the application within 45 days, the
application is deemed to have been denied on the 45th day. (§ 911.6, subd. (c).)
If the public entity denies or is deemed to deny the application to present a late
claim, the claimant may petition the superior court for an order relieving the claimant
from the claim presentation requirement. (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) The claimant must file this
petition within six months after the public entity denies the application to file a late claim.
(§ 946.6, subd. (b).) This six-month period operates as a mandatory statute of limitations.
(J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 653.)
If a personal injury claim is presented more than six months after the action
accrues, and the claim does not contain an application to present a late claim, the public
entity may, within 45 days after the claim is presented, give written notice to the claimant
that the claim was not filed timely and is being returned without further action. (§ 911.3,
subd. (a).) The notice must state that the claimant’s only recourse is to apply to the
public entity for leave to present the claim late or to petition the superior court for an
order relieving the plaintiff from the claim filing requirement. (§ 911.3, subd. (a).) A
public entity waives any defense based on the timeliness of the claim if it does not timely
give this notice. (§ 911.3, subd. (b).)

B. Analysis

In its demurrer, the Department contended, and the trial court found, that this
action was barred because plaintiff did not petition the trial court within six months of the

9
denial of his late-claim application for relief from the claim presentation requirement, and
the time to file a petition had passed. The Department argued the claim disclosed that
plaintiff’s cause of action accrued as early as April 6, 2021, the day after the criminal
court had ordered him to be transferred to a state hospital, and no later than
September 26, 2021, when his cellmate attacked him. The Department asserted that
plaintiff was required to present a claim within six months of those dates. (§ 911.2.) The
Department argued, “[Plaintiff] failed to do so, such that his ‘government claim,’
submitted on April 27, 2022, was in fact an application to present a late claim under
section 911.4, as stated on the claim form itself.”
Before us, the Department contends that because plaintiff’s cause of action
accrued more than six months before he filed his claim, the claim “was necessarily an
application to present a late claim,” and plaintiff “did not present an untimely claim.”
And because the late-claim application was deemed denied 45 days later, the trial court
correctly held that plaintiff was required to petition the court to be relieved from the
claim presentation requirement, which he did not do.
We disagree with the Department’s and the trial court’s characterization of the
claim. Whether the claim was timely or not, and whether it included an application to
present a late claim, there can be no reasonable doubt that plaintiff presented a claim to
the Department. “When a public entity receives a document which contains the
information required by section 910 and is signed by the claimant or her agent as required
by section 910.2, the public entity has been presented with a ‘claim’ under the act, and
must act within 45 days or the claim is deemed to have been denied. (§ 912.4.)”
(Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 707 (Phillips).) Because plaintiff
used the Department of General Services’s claim form, the claim was deemed by statute
to conform with sections 910 and 910.2. (§ 910.4.) It was thus by law a claim. Its
purported untimeliness did not change that fact.

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The Department’s characterization of plaintiff’s claim as not being a claim is
inconsistent with the requirements of the Government Claims Act. That the claim may
have been presented untimely did not render it a nullity or strip it of its status as a claim.
Rather, its purported untimeliness rendered the claim a “claim as presented,” which is a
claim that is defective due to its not substantially complying with the information and
timeliness requirements of the Government Claims Act. (Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at
pp. 706-707 & fn. 6.)
When the Department receives an untimely claim as presented, it cannot deem it
not to be a claim simply because it was presented untimely. A defective claim, including
an untimely claim, triggers the notice and defense-waiver provisions of sections 910.8,
911, and 911.3. (Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 707.) “[I]f a public entity receives a
document that alerts it to the existence of a claim and the possibility of a lawsuit but fails
to comply substantially with sections 910 and 910.2, the purposes of the act are best
served by requiring the public entity to notify the claimant of the nature of the claim’s
insufficiencies or lack of timeliness or else waive, by operation of sections 911 and 911.3,
its defenses based on those deficiencies.” (Id. at p. 711, italics added.) A claim’s
untimeliness does not render the claim to be not a claim.
Because the Department did not return or otherwise act on the claim within 45
days of the claim’s presentation, the claim was deemed to have been rejected as a matter
of law. (§ 912.4.) Accordingly, plaintiff was free to file this action against the
Department in superior court and allege the claim was timely without also applying for
leave to present a late claim or petitioning the trial court for relief from the claim filing
requirement. (Phillips, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 707; Simms v. Bear Valley Community
Healthcare Dist. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 398.) Even if the trial court could not
relieve plaintiff from the claim filing requirement, “there was no bar, jurisdictional or
otherwise, to the trial court finding that he presented a timely claim.” (Simms, at p. 406.)

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III

Sufficiency of Complaint’s Allegations of Delayed Accrual

Even though plaintiff was authorized to file this action against the Department due
to the latter’s deemed rejection of his claim, he is still required to allege facts
demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (State of
California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243.) In this action, that
meant plaintiff had to allege facts showing he presented his claim within six months of
his cause of action’s accrual. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 209.)
Generally, a cause of action accrues when it is complete with all its elements.
(Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox).) An exception to
this rule is the discovery rule, also known as the delayed discovery rule, “which
postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to
discover, the cause of action.” (Id. at p. 807.)
“[T]he discovery rule most frequently applies when it is particularly difficult for
the plaintiff to observe or understand the breach of duty, or when the injury itself (or its
cause) is hidden or beyond what the ordinary person could be expected to understand.”
(Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1248.) The date of a cause of action’s
accrual and whether the discovery rule applies are factual issues to be decided by the trier
of fact. (Jefferson v. County of Kern (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 606, 611-612.) It is not
properly determined on demurrer unless the complaint’s allegations and the facts that are
properly subject to judicial notice can support only one reasonable conclusion. (People
ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
521, 552; Mandjik v. Eden Township Hospital Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1504, fn.
12.)
The Department argues that the complaint’s allegations of delayed discovery are
conclusory, conflicting, and insufficient. The Department also contends that the

12
allegations in plaintiff’s complaint establish that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued more
than six months before plaintiff presented his claim with the Department. The
Department argues the discovery rule does not apply because the complaint’s allegations
show that plaintiff had reason to know the basis of his cause of action more than six
months before he presented his claim.
The Department did not raise these contentions in its demurrer, and the trial court
did not base its ruling on them. But because a judgment may be affirmed on any theory,
a respondent may assert a new theory on appeal to establish that the judgment was correct
on that theory unless doing so would unfairly prejudice the appellant by depriving him of
the opportunity to litigate an issue of fact. (J.R. v. Electronic Arts Inc. (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1115, fn. 2.)
“In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a]
plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the
benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and
manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite
reasonable diligence.’ (McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th
151, 160.) In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court
places the burden on the plaintiff to ‘show diligence’; ‘conclusory allegations will not
withstand demurrer.’ (Ibid.)
“Simply put, in order to employ the discovery rule to delay accrual of a cause of
action, a potential plaintiff who suspects that an injury has been wrongfully caused must
conduct a reasonable investigation of all potential causes of that injury. If such an
investigation would have disclosed a factual basis for a cause of action, the statute of
limitations begins to run on that cause of action when the investigation would have
brought such information to light. In order to adequately allege facts supporting a theory
of delayed discovery, the plaintiff must plead that, despite diligent investigation of the
circumstances of the injury, he or she could not have reasonably discovered facts

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supporting the cause of action within the applicable statute of limitations period.” (Fox,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 808-809.)
Plaintiff’s complaint shows on its face that his action against the Department is
barred without the benefit of the discovery rule. As stated above, he was required to
present his claim to the Department within six months of his cause of action’s accrual.
He presented the claim on April 27, 2022. Without the discovery rule, his cause of action
accrued no later than September 26, 2021, when he was attacked in his jail cell. He
presented his claim to the Department more than six months after that date.
To plead the discovery rule, plaintiff’s complaint alleges he was mentally
incapacitated and legally incompetent from at least April 5, 2021, to the present. The
complaint further alleges that in April 2022, “at the earliest,” plaintiff, “through his
guardian ad litem and counsel,” learned of the Department’s potential liability. Plaintiff
was, and is, unable to discover, or have reason to discover, his cause of action due to his
continuous and ongoing incapacity and incompetence. He alleges he submitted a timely
claim to the Department within six months of the accrual of his cause of action, even if
the Department’s actions and inactions resulting in his injury occurred more than six
months earlier.
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege sufficient facts to plead the discovery rule.
Although plaintiff alleges his guardian ad litem and counsel learned of the Department’s
potential liability in April 2022 at the earliest, he does not allege the manner in which his
representatives discovered his cause of action against the Department. And although he
alleges he was unable to discover the cause of action earlier due to his continuous
incapacity and incompetence, he does not allege how his representatives were unable to
have discovered the cause of action earlier had they exercised reasonable diligence.
Their inability to discover the action and their exercise of reasonable diligence are
relevant because timely filing of a claim is an absolute requirement even for incapacitated
persons (Carr v. State of California (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 139, 146), and the

14
representatives presented the claim on plaintiff’s behalf. The present allegations,
however, are merely conclusory and are insufficient to overcome a demurrer.
Plaintiff contends he should be given leave to amend his complaint because the
trial court’s ruling was not based on the insufficiency of his delayed discovery
allegations. He states he can amend his complaint to allege, for example, that he, through
his guardian ad litem and counsel, was unable to discover the Department’s liability until
after he sued the County of Sacramento, obtained discovery, and learned of the
Department’s liability for his injuries which necessitated the filing of a claim.
The Department, on the other hand, contends plaintiff’s allegations establish that
the discovery rule and delayed accrual cannot apply. The Department argues the
allegations establish that plaintiff was aware of his cause of action—the Department’s
failure to transfer him to a state hospital for treatment and safety—no later than
September 26, 2021. Despite plaintiff’s pleaded incompetence, the complaint alleges that
two days before the 26th, plaintiff informed a jail staff member that it was not working
out well with his new cellmate, but he said he would rather talk to his attorney about it.
Plaintiff said if his cellmate got physical, “ ‘I’ll have to defend myself.’ ” Plaintiff also
asked the staff member about when he would go to a state hospital. He talked about his
next court date and said he was “ ‘praying for the judges.’ ” Plaintiff was attacked two
days later.
The Department claims these allegations show that plaintiff was aware of his
cause of action by September 26, 2021. By that date, plaintiff was aware of the criminal
court’s order for him to be transferred to the Department and that he had nonetheless
remained at the county jail for several months and thereby denied mental health treatment
by the Department. And he was attacked on the 26th. At that point, the cause of action
was complete, and plaintiff’s claim accrued by that date.
We agree with plaintiff that there is a reasonable possibility he may cure the defect
in his complaint, and that he should be granted leave to amend his complaint to

15
specifically plead facts showing (1) the time and manner of discovery of his cause of
action, and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.
The Department’s contentions that plaintiff’s claim was untimely based on the
complaint’s allegations is a timeliness defense, which the Department’s ability to raise is
conditioned on an eventual determination of whether plaintiff’s claim included an
application to present a late claim, an issue we discuss next.

Application for Leave to Present a Late Claim

Because the claim was deemed denied, whether the claim was also an application
for leave to present a late claim is relevant only for determining whether the Department
waived its timeliness defense. Recall that under section 911.3, a public entity waives its
timeliness defense if the untimely claim is presented without an application for leave to
present a late claim and the public entity does not notify the claimant within 45 days of
the claim’s presentation that the claim was untimely. (§ 911.3, subd. (b).) The
Department did not notify plaintiff of his claim’s purported untimeliness within 45 days
of its presentation. Thus, it has waived its timeliness defense if the claim is interpreted
not to include an application to present a late claim.

A. Background

The trial court took judicial notice of plaintiff’s claim and GCP’s July 21, 2022,
notice to plaintiff informing him his claim was late but that he had enclosed an
application for leave to present a late claim and GCP was reviewing the application.
Plaintiff presented his claim using a claim form prepared by the Department of General
Services. The form includes a box titled “LATE CLAIM EXPLANATION (Required, if
incident was more than six months ago.)” In this box, plaintiff typed “See Attachment,”
as he did for each box on the form that sought substantive information. The attachment is
a three-page explanation of the dates and circumstances giving rise to plaintiff’s claim

16
and a description of the causes of action plaintiff intended to pursue against the
Department.
In sustaining the Department’s demurrer to the first amended complaint, the trial
court found that the claim was a request to present a late claim and not a claim. The
manner in which plaintiff filled out the claim form “appeared to describe a late claim.”
Plaintiff wrote “See Attachment” in the box seeking a late claim explanation, and under
“DATE OF INCIDENT,” plaintiff typed “ ‘2/22/2021 – 10/14/2021.’ ” The court also
relied on the judicially noticed letter from GCP dated July 21, 2022, stating that plaintiff
had enclosed with his claim an application for leave to present a late claim.
Sustaining the demurrer to the operative complaint, the trial court again rejected
plaintiff’s contention that his claim was not an application to present a late claim. The
court stated, “Plaintiff’s argument . . . ignores the fact that the judicially noticed
documents show that the GCP determined that the Claim was presented late, and stated
that ‘You enclosed with your claim an application for leave to present a late claim (late
application).’ . . . Thus, as explained in the Court’s ruling on the demurrer to the First
Amended Complaint, GCP treated the claim as a request for leave to present a late
claim.”

B. Analysis

A general demurrer admits the contents of a written instrument attached to a
complaint and also any pleaded meaning to which the instrument is reasonably
susceptible. (Shine v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1081.)
Plaintiff alleged his claim was in fact a claim and not an application to present a late
claim. His claim is reasonably susceptible to that interpretation.
Nowhere does plaintiff’s claim indicate it is an application to present a late claim.
The claim form states it is a “State of California Government Claim.” The form explains
where the claimant is to mail or deliver the “claim form and all attachments.” Plaintiff’s

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attachment is entitled “Government Claim of [Plaintiff] Against State of California, [et
al.]” The claim was labeled “government claim” in at least eight locations. The contents
of the claim notified the Department that he was attempting to present a claim, and
litigation would result if the matter was not resolved.
The Department argues the trial court and GCP properly determined that plaintiff
submitted an application to present a late claim because the trial court found his cause of
action accrued no later than September 26, 2021, and thus his claim “was necessarily” an
application to present a late claim. Further, the form and the information plaintiff
submitted supports the conclusion he submitted a late-claim application. In addition to
typing “See Attachment” under “LATE CLAIM EXPLANATON,” plaintiff did not
explain in the claim how his cause of action accrued on a date different from those listed
on the form to show he intended the claim to be a timely claim regardless of the incident
dates he listed. The Department asserts that plaintiff is bound by his admissions in his
judicially noticed claim form. (Contrary to the Department’s argument, the trial court did
not determine that plaintiff’s cause of action accrued by September 26, 2021.)
While both parties ascribe reasonable but different meanings to the claim and its
attachment, “ ‘ “[s]o long as the pleading does not place a clearly erroneous construction
upon the provisions of the contract, in passing upon the sufficiency of the complaint, we
must accept as correct plaintiff’s allegations as to the meaning of the agreement.” ’ ”
(George v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1124.)
Plaintiff’s interpretation of the claim is not clearly erroneous.
The Department’s determining the claim was an application to present a late claim,
and the trial court’s taking judicial notice of the claim and the Department’s
determination, did not establish as a matter of law that the claim was an application to
present a late claim. When considering judicially noticed documents or exhibits to a
complaint on demurrer, courts may not resolve a dispute as to the underlying truth of the
documents’ statements or their proper interpretation. (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior

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Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 712-713, fn. 13.) When judicial notice is taken of a
document and the parties dispute the document’s meaning, “the truthfulness and proper
interpretation of the document are disputable.” (StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999)
20 Cal.4th 449, 456-457, fn. 9; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113; compare Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 743, 753-757 [court may take judicial notice of legal effect of document
where document’s meaning is not reasonably subject to dispute].) “The hearing on
demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of
having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper
interpretation are disputable.” (Fremont Indemnity Co., at p. 114.)
Because the claim was reasonably susceptible to plaintiff’s pleaded interpretation
of it as a claim and not also an application for leave to present a late claim, the demurrer
admitted plaintiff’s meaning as true for purposes of demurrer. (Shine v. Williams-
Sonoma, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1081.) The trial court erred in determining as a
matter of law that the claim was only an application to present a late claim
Also, because the trial court could not determine on demurrer whether plaintiff’s
claim was accompanied by an application to present a late claim, we cannot determine on
appeal whether as a matter of law the Department has waived its timeliness defenses
under section 911.3.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its judgment of
dismissal and its order sustaining the Department’s demurrer to plaintiff’s second
amended complaint without leave to amend, and to enter a new order sustaining the
Department’s demurrer with leave to amend consistent with this opinion.

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Costs on appeal are awarded to plaintiff. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ROBIE, J.

KRAUSE, J.