Stipe V Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BENJMAIN STIPE, : Civil No. 1:24-CV-1894
:
Plaintiff :
:
v. :
:
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLLVANIA, : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on a fourth motion for appointment of
counsel for the plaintiff, a pro se prisoner litigant. (Doc. 33). While we appreciate
the plaintiff’s interest in securing court-appointed counsel, we also recognize that
there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to counsel for civil litigants.
Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d
147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) simply provides that
“[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to employ
counsel.” Under §1915(e)(1), a district court’s appointment of counsel is
discretionary and must be made on a case-by-case basis. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157-58.
In Parham, the United States Court of Appeals outlined the standards to be
considered by courts when reviewing an application to appoint counsel pursuant to
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In passing on such requests we must first:
[D]etermine[] that the plaintiff's claim has some merit, then [we]
should consider the following factors: (1) the plaintiff's ability to
present his or her own case; (2) the complexity of the legal issues; (3)
the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the
ability of the plaintiff to pursue such investigation; (4) the amount a
case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; (5) whether the case
will require the testimony of expert witnesses; [and] (6) whether the
plaintiff can attain and afford counsel on his own behalf.
Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d at 457.There is yet another practical consideration
which must be taken into account when considering motions for appointment of
counsel. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly
observed:
Finally, in addressing this issue, we must take note of the significant
practical restraints on the district courts' ability to appoint counsel: the
ever-growing number of prisoner civil rights actions filed each year in
the federal courts; the lack of funding to pay appointed counsel; and the
limited supply of competent lawyers who are willing to undertake such
representation without compensation. We have no doubt that there are
many cases in which district courts seek to appoint counsel but there is
simply none willing to accept appointment. It is difficult to fault a
district court that denies a request for appointment under such
circumstances.
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1993). Mindful of this consideration it has
been Aemphasize[d] that volunteer lawyer time is extremely valuable. Hence, district
courts should not request counsel under § 1915(d) indiscriminately. As the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has warned: “Volunteer lawyer time is a precious
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commodity. . .. Because this resource is available in only limited quantity, every
assignment of a volunteer lawyer to an undeserving client deprives society of a
volunteer lawyer available for a deserving cause. We cannot afford that waste.”
Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989); Tabron v. Grace, 6
F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1993).
In this case our analysis of these factors leads us to conclude that counsel
should not be appointed in this case at the present time. At the outset, appointment
of counsel would be premature since we have not had the opportunity to fully
consider the threshold factor we must examine: the arguable merits of the
plaintiff’s claims which are the subject of a pending motion to dismiss. In any
event, the issues in this case appear to be well-known to the plaintiff.
Taking all of these factors into account we DENY this request to appoint
counsel (Doc 33), at this time without prejudice to re-examining this issue at the
request of the plaintiff, or sua sponte, as this litigation progresses.
SO ORDERED, this 22d day of July 2025.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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