Parkes V Nyu Langone Health
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TIFFANY ANNE PARKES,
Plaintiff,
-against- 24-CV-8099 (KMW)
NYU LANGONE HEALTH; GRAMERCY ORDER OF DISMISSAL
GYNECOLOGY,
Defendants.
KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), filed this complaint claiming
federal question jurisdiction and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants
violated her rights. By order dated June 9, 2025, ECF No. 8, the Court directed Plaintiff to
amend her complaint to address deficiencies in the original pleading. Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint on July 7, 2025. The action is dismissed for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
In the original complaint, Plaintiff named as Defendants NYU Langone Health (“NYU”),
Gramercy Gynecology, and Dr. Temitope Awosogba.1 (ECF 1.) Plaintiff resides in New York,
and in the complaint she provided New York addresses for all Defendants. (Id.) According to
Plaintiff, she sought medical treatment from Dr. Awosogba for a “large mass that had been
protruding from” her abdomen.” (ECF 1 at 2.)2 After Plaintiff had “fibroid removal surgery” in
1 The Court assumes familiarity with the June 9, 2025 order, which detailed Plaintiff’s
allegations.
2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation
appear as in the complaint unless noted otherwise.
2020, on the advice of Dr. Awosogba, Plaintiff experienced multiple medical problems and
painful conditions. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also stated her belief that she will now have a harder time
getting pregnant. (Id. at 4.)
In 2023, doctors at John Hopkins took an ultrasound of Plaintiff’s uterus, which revealed
internal scarring that did not exist before the surgery. Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Awosogba lied to
her, misled her, was negligent, and committed medical malpractice. (Id.) Plaintiff also claimed
that NYU falsified its medical records to cover up its culpability. (Id.) Plaintiff asserted that
Defendants violated her rights under 22 U.S.C. § 2702, and she sought hundreds of millions of
dollars in damages. (Id. at 4.)
By order dated June 9, 2025, the Court dismissed the complaint with leave to replead, for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF 8.) First, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s allegations did
not give rise to any federal claims. The federal statute to which Plaintiff cited, 22 U.S.C. § 2702,
had no apparent relevance to the circumstances underlying her complaint. See Blades v.
DeJoseph, No. 20-CV-3239, 2020 WL 1902427, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2020) (holding that
Section 2702 pertains only “to actions for malpractice of physicians who work for the
Department of State or any other federal department, agency or instrumentality”) (quoting
Thomas v. Griffin Mem’l Hosp., 9 F.3d 1557 (10th Cir. 1993)). Second, because Plaintiff alleged
that all parties are citizens of New York, she failed to show that the Court had diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of her state law claims of negligence and medical
malpractice. In an abundance of caution, and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court
granted Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead her claim.
In her amended complaint, Plaintiff names only NYU and Gramercy Gynecology as
defendants, removing Dr. Awosogba. (ECF 9.) Plaintiff reiterates the factual allegations
andagain cites Section 2702. (Id. at 2.) In this amended complaint, Plaintiff adds claims under
18 U.S.C. §§ 113, 114, and “PBH 24-A-2442” and “PBH 2805-D.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
A. Previously asserted claim
Plaintiff’s previously asserted claims are dismissed for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
June 9, 2025 order. In short, Plaintiff fails to allege facts giving rise to any federal causes of
action, and in the absence of complete diversity of citizenship, the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction of any state-law claims.
B. Newly asserted claims
Claims arising under federal criminal statutes
Plaintiff invokes 18 U.S.C. §§ 113 and 114, which penalize “Assaults within maritime
and territorial jurisdiction” and “Maiming within maritime and territorial jurisdiction.” There are
no claims in Plaintiff’s amended complaint that involve maritime law. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot
assert claims under federal criminal statutes. The “decision to prosecute is solely within the
discretion of the prosecutor.” Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981). Additionally,
neither Plaintiff nor the Court can direct prosecutors to initiate a criminal proceeding because
only prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, and they are “immune
from control or interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co.,
457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972).
Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to cause the federal criminal prosecution of others.
See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1973). The Court dismisses, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, any claims in which Plaintiff seeks the federal criminal prosecution of
anyone, including the defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (“If [a] plaintiff[ ] lack[s] Article III standing, a [federal] court
has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear [her] claim.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
“PBH 24-A-2442” and “PBH 2805-D.”
Plaintiff cites to “PBH 24-A-2442” and “PBH 2805-D,” which the Court understands to
refer to provisions of New York States’s Public Health Law. For the reasons set forth in the June
9, 2025 order, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of any state-law claims Plaintiff
seeks to assert.
C. Supplemental jurisdiction
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and
only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (footnote omitted). Having dismissed
the federal claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v.
New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367
‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances
in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
D. Further leave to amend denied
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend a complaint to cure its
defects, but leave to amend may be denied if the plaintiff has already been given an opportunity
to amend and has failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. See Ruotolo v. City of New York,
514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because
the defects in Plaintiff’s amended complaint cannot be cured with a further amendment, the
Court declines to grant Plaintiff another opportunity to amend.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1), for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 21, 2025
New York, New York
/s/Kimba M. Wood
KIMBA M .WOOD
United States District Judge