Meranelli V Hylden
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
CHERRITY HONESTY-ALEXIS MERANELLI,
also known as, Eric M. Sorenson,
Civil No. 24-2983 (JRT/DTS)
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ADOPTING REPORT AND
ERIC HYLDEN, Judicial Officer of the RECOMMENDATION
Carlton County District Court, sued in his
official capacity; and ALL OTHERS WHOSE
TRUE NAMES ARE NOT PRESENTLY
KNOWN,
Defendants.
Cherrity Honesty-Alexis Meranelli, also known as Eric M. Sorenson, 1111
Highway 73, Moose Lake, MN 55767, pro se Plaintiff.
Madeleine DeMeules, MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 445
Minnesota Street, Suite 1400, Saint Paul, MN 55101, for Defendant Eric
Hylden.
In two different petitions in state court, Plaintiff Cherrity Meranelli tried to change
her legal name to match her gender identity. The state court denied her first petition,
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal on procedural grounds. The
state court found her second petition frivolous and refused to allow her to proceed in
forma pauperis. Meranelli did not appeal that second decision. Instead, she filed the
instant action against the state court judge who found her second petition to be frivolous.
But because this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of state court decisions, and
because the state court judge is entitled to sovereign immunity, the Court must dismiss
this case without reaching the merits of whether the state court erred in declaring her
name change petition frivolous.
BACKGROUND
I. FACTS
Through multiple state court actions, Plaintiff Cherrity Honesty-Alexis Meranelli
has attempted to change her legal name to conform with her gender identity.1 Meranelli
first filed for a legal name change in 2021 by filing a petition in the District Court for
Carlton County. (Compl. ¶ 13, July 25, 2024, Docket No. 1.) The Sherburne County
Attorney’s Office objected to the name change under Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subd. 2, out
of concern that a name change would make it more difficult to connect Meranelli to her
criminal records if she were released from civil commitment. See Objection, Index # 11,
In re Application of Eric Sorenson for a Change Name (“Sorenson I”), No. 09-CV-21-1309
(Carlton Cnty. Dist. Ct., filed July 27, 2021);2 (Compl. ¶ 18.) After conducting a Zoom
hearing, the state court denied Meranelli’s petition but opined that “[p]erhaps if
1 In her pleadings, Meranelli makes clear that she now uses she/her pronouns and the
name Meranelli. Though the changing of her legal name is at the heart of this action, the Court
uses her preferred pronouns and name in this Order without making any findings on the validity
of the underlying state court actions.
2 The Court takes judicial notice of the relevant state court proceedings in this matter.
See Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy,
200 F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1999)). In her Complaint, Meranelli refers to these actions as
Sorenson I and Sorenson II. The Court will do the same.
Applicant can remain crime free for several more years this can be revisited.” Order
Denying Name Change, Index #25, Sorenson I; (Compl. ¶¶ 19–20.)3 Though Meranelli
appealed that decision to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, her appeal was dismissed on
procedural grounds. See Appellate Court Order, Index #78, Sorenson I.
In 2023, Meranelli filed another name change application. See In the Matter of the
Application of Eric Michael Sorenson for a Change of Name (“Sorenson II”), No. 09-CV-23-
2123 (Carlton Cnty. Dist. Ct., filed Dec. 6, 2023); (Compl. ¶ 21.) This time, Judge Eric
Hylden denied her application to proceed in forma pauperis as frivolous because her prior
name change application had just been denied on the merits a year prior. See Order
Denying Fee Waiver, Index # 11, Sorenson II. Meranelli did not pay the filing fee, so the
matter was dismissed on May 14, 2024. See Dispositions, Sorenson II. Meranelli did not
appeal any decision in Sorenson II directly to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Meranelli filed this action against Judge Eric Hylden and various unknown
defendants. (See Compl.) Judge Hylden moved to dismiss. (Mot. Dismiss, Oct. 11, 2024,
Docket No. 10.) Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz issued a report and recommendation
(“R&R”) recommending the Court dismiss Meranelli’s claims based on the Rooker-
3 Meranelli alleges Judge Eric Hylden conducted the hearing and denied the petition.
However, the state court docket suggests Referee John Schulte and Judge Amy Lukasavitz
presided over the matter. In follow up briefing, Meranelli admits this error but says it is irrelevant
because she is suing Judge Hylden in his official capacity and thus is in effect suing the State of
Minnesota.
Feldman doctrine and sovereign immunity. (R. & R. at 5–9, Mar. 10, 2025, Docket No. 44.)
Meranelli timely objected to both dismissal grounds. (Obj. to R. & R., Apr. 17, 2025,
Docket No. 45.)
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
After a magistrate judge files an R&R, a party may “serve and file specific written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2);
accord D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(1). “The objections should specify the portions of the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which objections are made and
provide a basis for those objections.” Mayer v. Walvatne, No. 07-1958, 2008 WL 4527774,
at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2008). For dispositive motions, the Court reviews de novo a
“properly objected to” portion of an R&R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); accord D. Minn. LR
72.2(b)(3). Sometimes courts review general and conclusory objections for clear error.
Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit instructs that clear error
is appropriate when general and conclusory objections “make it difficult for the district
court to focus upon the alleged errors if insufficiently directed by the parties.” Id.
Because Meranelli makes specific objections, the Court will conduct de novo review.
II. ANALYSIS
Meranelli’s claim must be dismissed on either of two independent grounds: the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, or sovereign immunity.
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Because Meranelli’s claim is, in essence, an attempt to seek judicial review of a
state court decision in federal district court, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, with the exception of habeas corpus
petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state
court judgments.” Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Meranelli’s Complaint principally alleges that, in denying her second requested
name change, Judge Hylden has provided her inadequate medical care. Though Meranelli
argues her claim is not an attempt to appeal that state court decision, her Complaint
strongly suggests otherwise. Meranelli’s Complaint alleges a constitutional right to a
name change, referencing the same Minnesota felony name change statute the state
courts used to deny her claim. Her prayer for relief, though, is an injunction against Judge
Hylden that would force him to grant the name change and/or allow her to proceed in
forma pauperis in state court—precisely the issues already decided by the state courts.
See Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Rooker-Feldman
precludes a federal action if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively
reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.”). Meranelli cannot avoid Rooker-
Feldman simply by recharacterizing an appeal as a new federal claim. See Rued v. Hatcher,
No. 23-2685, 2023 WL 10409535, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2023) (“[Plaintiffs] do not
describe this action as an appeal, but that is what it is.”); cf. Bechtold v. City of Rosemount,
104 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[A] litigant cannot circumvent Rooker-Feldman by
recasting his or her lawsuit as a § 1983 action.”).
If Meranelli is unsatisfied with the state court’s decision, she must follow the
proper channels: she may appeal first to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, then the
Minnesota Supreme Court, and then to the United States Supreme Court. Because
Meranelli instead chose to file her de facto appeal of a state court decision directly in
federal district court, the Court cannot consider her claims and will dismiss the Complaint
without prejudice.
B. Sovereign Immunity
Even if the Court had jurisdiction, Meranelli’s claim would fail because Judge
Hylden and the State of Minnesota are entitled to sovereign immunity.
“Generally, States are immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021). A “narrow exception . . . allows certain private parties to
seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing
state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Id. (discussing the exception from Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908)). But that exception “does not normally permit federal
courts to issue injunctions against state-court judges or clerks.” Id. Rather, “the
traditional remedy has been some form of appeal” of the state court decision. Id. Still,
the Eighth Circuit has acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment is not an absolute bar
to suits against members of a state judiciary. Courthouse News Serv. v. Gilmer, 48 F.4th
908, 913 (8th Cir. 2022). When members of a state judiciary act like an executive official,
for example through administrative functions, those individuals may be “subject to suit
under Ex parte Young.” Id. at 912 (citing Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr, 932 F.3d
1123, 1131–32 (8th Cir. 2019)).
Discussing the difference between Whole Woman’s Health and Courthouse News
Service helps illustrate the spectrum of cases that stretch across sovereign immunity
cases.
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court decided that a federal court could
not enjoin state-court clerks from placing civil abortion cases on the docket under Texas’s
Heartbeat Act, nor state judges from hearing those cases. 595 U.S. at 39. Sovereign
immunity shielded those defendants because an injunction against them “would be a
violation of the whole scheme of our government,” and there were no “actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants.” Id. (quoting first Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. at 163 then Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911)).
But in Courthouse News Service, the Eighth Circuit found that sovereign immunity
did not prevent First Amendment claims against a Missouri state court clerk for failing to
provide timely access to state court filings. 48 F.4th at 911–13. The Eighth Circuit
determined that this case was different than Whole Woman’s Health for a few reasons.
First, unlike in Whole Woman’s Health, the injunction would not prevent the state court
from “acting” or “exercising jurisdiction” in any case, meaning it would not “upset the
whole scheme of government.” Id. at 912 (citation modified). Instead, it would force the
state court “to carry out [its] administrative duties differently.” Id. (citation modified).
Second, the action against the Missouri clerks could not be appealed in the state court
system in the usual way. Id. Finally, unlike in Whole Woman’s Health, the case against
the Missouri clerks had all the hallmarks of true adversity between parties rather than
centering “the merits of any underlying lawsuit.” Id. at 913.
Overall, this case does not resemble the type of case against state judges that
Courthouse News Service contemplates could survive an Eleventh Amendment defense.
Meranelli is asking the Court to interfere directly with state judicial decision-making, the
traditional state court appellate process is available in this case, and this case is much
more about the merits of the name change decision than it is about real adversity with
Judge Hylden and other judicial defendants. Rather, the Court’s review on the merits of
this state court decision is precisely the kind of improper intervention that would
undermine the federalist structure contemplated by the Framers in building our
Constitution.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Judge Hylden and the various unnamed judicial
defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity, so the Court must dismiss this case
without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The Court stresses to Meranelli that in rendering the decision it does today, it does
not opine on the merits of the underlying state court decision to deny her legal name
change. It very well may be that her petition had merit and that the state court erred in
denying it. However, the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent require Meranelli
to follow a particular appellate route through the judicial process. She must first appeal
the decision to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, then to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
and then to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court cannot provide Meranelli the relief she seeks because of the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine and Defendants’ sovereign immunity. So the Court will overrule
Meranelli’s objections, adopt the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, and dismiss the Complaint
without prejudice.4
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Objections [Docket No. 45] to the Report and Recommendation
are OVERRULED;
4 On either ground, the Court’s dismissal is without prejudice. See Hart v. United States,
630 F.3d 1085, 1091 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity are both without prejudice).
2. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 44] is
ADOPTED;
3. Defendant Hylden’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 10] is GRANTED; and
4. The Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: July 21, 2025 Oy W. ( Wedatin
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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