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Paige V State

 VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT                                                          CIVIL DIVISION
 Washington Unit                                                               Case No. 24-CV-04712
 65 State Street
 Montpelier VT 05602
 802-828-2091
 www.vermontjudiciary.org


                                          H. Paige v. State of Vermont et al


                   Opinion and Order on Mr. Paige’s Motion for Reconsideration

        Plaintiff Mr. H. Brooke Paige brought this case challenging several features of

Vermont election law included in legislation from 2021 (Act 60) (“An act relating to

mailing out ballots, correcting defective ballots, and miscellaneous changes to State

election laws.”). On April 3, 2025, the Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss,

pursuant to both Vt. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6), concluding that he had failed to

adequately plead any claim under 17 V.S.A. § 2603 and that the allegations of the

complaint were conclusory and insufficient to demonstrate standing to pursue his other

potential claims.

        Mr. Paige has filed a motion to reconsider. He takes umbrage that the Court

described certain of the allegations of the complaint as allegations when such assertions

could have been easily verified, presumably if the Court had undertaken its own ex parte

investigation into the facts. He says that the Court’s word-choice “lessens the Plaintiff’s

assumption of the Court’s impartial consideration of the facts.” Additionally, he argues

that the Court improperly interpreted 17 V.S.A. § 2603 narrowly when it should have

interpreted it broadly, and he provides further argument as to why he thinks he has

standing in this case.



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24-CV-04712 H. Paige v. State of Vermont et al
        I.       Procedural Standard

        Mr. Paige’s motion to reconsider sounds in the Court’s power to alter or amend its

prior judgment under Vt. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend

judgment allow ‘the trial court to revise its initial judgment if necessary to relieve a

party against the unjust operation of a record resulting from the mistake or inadvertence

of the court and not the fault or neglect of a party.’ A Rule 59(e) motion ‘must clearly

establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered

evidence.’” Sutton v. Purzycki, 2022 VT 56, ¶ 67 (citations omitted). The Rule has a

“narrow aim,” N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mitec Elecs., Ltd., 2008 VT 96, ¶ 41, 184 Vt. 303, 319

(internal quotation omitted); and constitutes “an extraordinary remedy that should be

used sparingly,” 11 C. Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2810.1 (3d ed.)

        II.      Analysis

                 A.       Bias and the words Alleges/Allegations

        The Court’s use of the words alleges and allegations in its ruling reflects no bias

against Mr. Paige. The Court referred to the allegations of the complaint, facts that Mr.

Paige alleged, because that is what facts asserted in a complaint are. Rule 8(e)(1)

provides that the averments “of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” See also

Vt. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (“All averments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered

paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a

statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by

number in all succeeding pleadings.”). An averment is an allegation of fact. Black’s Law

Dictionary 131–32 (7th ed. 1999).




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24-CV-04712 H. Paige v. State of Vermont et al
        The procedural standards, explicitly described in the dismissal decision, required

the Court to accept as true all nonconclusory allegations of fact in the complaint. See,

e.g., Town of Bridgewater v. Dep't of Taxes, 173 Vt. 509, 510, 787 A.2d 1234, 1236 (2001)

(mem.) (In examining a motion to dismiss, “all uncontroverted factual allegations of the

complaint accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.”). The Court did so.

        Further, Courts have limitations on their ability to conduct independent

investigations into the facts. Rule 2.9(c), Vt. Code. Jud. Cond. 2019 (“A judge shall not

investigate facts in a matter independently and shall consider only the evidence

presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.”); see also id. cmt. [6]

(“The prohibition against a judge investigating the facts in a matter extends to

information available in all mediums, including electronic.”). It had no duty to verify Mr.

Paige’s allegations, and any attempt at doing may have been beyond its proper duties.

More importantly, as noted, in making its ruling, it accepted the veracity of all

nonconclusory allegations of the complaint.

        B.       Interpretation of 17 V.S.A. § 2603

        Mr. Paige’s argument as to the proper interpretation of § 2603 is not persuasive.

Applicable precedents are clear and were referenced in the dismissal decision.

        Mr. Paige’s principal arguments are that something about the legislative history of

§ 2603 suggests that the Court got it wrong, and that he consulted with an ex-legislator

and an ex-governor, and now represents that each has some general view as to the

intended breadth of § 2603. If Mr. Paige sought to rely on such arguments, he should

have raised them in his opposition briefing. It is too late now. A party may not wait for


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reconsideration to “wheel out all its artillery.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI

Industries, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Employers Ins. of Wausau v.

Bodi Wachs Aviation Ins. Agency, 846 F. Supp. 677, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1994)). In any event,

such arguments based on the views and memories individual political actors are not

persuasive. See In re Investigation to Rev. Avoided Costs that Serve as Prices for

Standard-Offer Program in 2020, 2021 VT 59, ¶ 14, 215 Vt. 247, 253 (“In considering

legislative history, however, the comments of individual legislators typically carry little

weight.” (internal quotation omitted)).

        C.       Standing

        Otherwise, Mr. Paige provides additional argumentation as to standing but

nowhere clearly identifies what controlling authority or facts he thinks the Court

overlooked. The appearance is that he is merely, and improperly, seeking to relitigate a

matter that already has been decided. That is insufficient to provide a solid basis for

altering a judgment under Rule 59. “[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted

where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Latouche v.

North Country Union High School Dist., 131 F. Supp. 2d 568, 569 (D. Vt. 2001).

        The Court perceives no basis for reconsideration.

                                                 Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Paige’s motion to reconsider is denied.

        Electronically signed on Monday, July 7, 2025, per V.R.E.F. 9(d).



                                                         _______________________
                                                      Timothy B. Tomasi
                                                      Superior Court Judge


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24-CV-04712 H. Paige v. State of Vermont et al