State Of Iowa V Loren Arthur Wilson
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1680
Filed July 23, 2025
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LOREN ARTHUR WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sac County, Christopher C. Polking,
Judge.
A criminal defendant appeals from his conviction and sentence for second-
degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.
Elena Greenberg of Greenberg Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., Badding, J., and Carr,
S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2025).
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CARR, Senior Judge.
Loren Wilson appeals from his conviction and sentence for second-degree
sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. Wilson argues the district court erred
in not reopening the record to allow him to testify and in denying him a new trial
and that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of the charged crimes. We
affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Wilson attended the 2022 Christmas Day celebration of his girlfriend’s
family at their home in Sac City. His girlfriend’s two younger sisters lived at the
home and were also in attendance. Later in the day, Wilson befriended the ten-
year-old sister—the victim in this case—playing with her and her toys. They played
late into the evening. Later in the evening, everyone else in the home went to bed,
and Wilson continued to play loudly with the child. Wilson’s girlfriend eventually
came into the room that he and the child were in and told them to quiet down.
Wilson said he would “be down in a few,” so his girlfriend went back downstairs
and began texting him “alluring or provocative” pictures to which he did not
respond. Wilson then joined the child in her bedroom upstairs.
The child got ready for bed, turned off the light, and got into her bed under
the covers. Wilson also got into the bed and drank a couple beers while watching
YouTube videos with the child on his phone. Wilson asked the child if she wanted
to cuddle to which she “said yes.” Wilson’s girlfriend continued to text him multiple
times to come down to the downstairs bedroom with her so they could have sex.
Wilson again did not respond.
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Meanwhile, Wilson, who was sitting next to the child in bed, requested to
kiss the child on the lips, pulled her over “close to him,” proceeded to kiss her on
the lips, and then pulled her even closer, which made the child “uncomfortable and
confused.” Then he asked the child if he could tell her a secret and “made a weird
noise in [her] ear.” Wilson grabbed the child’s hand and “put it on his privates,”
which caused the child to “scream and [fling her] hand away.”
The child testified that after she screamed, Wilson “turned over real quick
and then turned back over and asked what happened.” The child said she “had a
nightmare.” Wilson responded that “[she] must have been sleeping.” The child
testified she could not have been sleeping because “[she] never woke up from
anything and [she] didn’t sleep. . . . And [she] never had a nightmare that would
even be close to that.” The child then observed that “the zipper on [Wilson’s] pants
[was] down.” The child then asked Wilson to retrieve her “anxiety ring” that she
used sometimes to calm down and left the room to wash her hands because “[she]
had the ick, and because [she] felt skin, and [she] kn[e]w that’s not a good thing.”
The child, then “terrified,” “[s]haking,” “hyperventilating,” and with “[a] look
in her eyes [her mother will] never get out of her head,” woke her mother up to
report what had happened. Her mother tried to lay her down and cuddle her but
the child jumped up and said “I can’t. I can’t.” The child’s mother took her
downstairs and went out to smoke while the child was with her father, who was
now also awake. When the mother came back in, she and the child returned to
the mother’s room, where the child told her what had happened. After leaving that
room, the mother “made eye contact” with the father and said Wilson “needs to get
out,” causing the father “to bolt from the couch.” Fearing the father’s reaction, the
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mother then called law enforcement to the premises. Sac County police officers
and sheriff’s deputies responded to the scene and found Wilson in the basement.
Wilson denied the child’s story and claimed he was “lost,” but admitted he was in
bed with her and claimed she awoke from a nightmare screaming.
On December 26, a criminal complaint was filed against Wilson. On
January 4, 2023, he was formally charged by trial information with second-degree
sexual abuse under Iowa Code section 709.1 and .3(1)(b) (2022) and lascivious
acts with a child under Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(b) and .8(2)(a). Following jury
trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Wilson guilty on both counts on August 25.
Wilson moved for new trial and in arrest of judgment, and the district court denied
both motions in full. Wilson was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years on count one with a mandatory
minimum of seventy percent and an indeterminate term of incarceration not to
exceed ten years on count two. Wilson was also sentenced to a special sentence
under to Iowa Code section 903B.1; was ordered to pay a surcharge, victim
restitution, and civil penalty; was ordered to register on the sex offender registry;
and was found to be subject to additional statutory restrictions.
Wilson now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s refusal to reopen the record for abuse of
discretion. State v. Long, 814 N.W.2d 572, 575–76 (Iowa 2012). Denials of
motions for new trial are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Ary, 877
N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). The district court’s decision to deny a request to
reopen the record “will ordinarily not be interfered with by a reviewing court.” Id.
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We review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence for correction of legal
error. State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012).
III. Discussion
A. Reopening the Record
Wilson argues the district court abused its discretion in not reopening the
record to allow him to testify after he previously waived his right to testify, and on
that basis, also abused its discretion in not granting him a new trial.
A court must consider the Teeters factors when deciding whether to reopen
the record for the introduction of new evidence:
(1) the reason for the failure to introduce the evidence; (2) the
surprise or unfair prejudice inuring to the opponent that might be
caused by introducing the evidence; (3) the diligence used by the
proponent to secure the evidence in a timely fashion; (4) the
admissibility and materiality of the evidence; (5) the stage of the trial
when the motion is made; (6) the time and effort expended upon the
trial; and (7) the inconvenience reopening the case would cause to
the proceeding.
Long, 814 N.W.2d at 578 (quoting State v. Teeters, 487 N.W.2d 346, 348
(Iowa 1992)). We consider whether the district court’s discretion on these factors
“was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable.” Id. at 576 (citation omitted).
At trial, after the State rested its case and after Wilson’s motion for directed
verdict was overruled, the court engaged him in a very complete colloquy on his
decision not to testify:
THE COURT: So, Mr. Wilson, I need to ask you a few
questions about that. So you have two rights here that are exact
opposites. You have the absolute right to testify in this matter if you
want to. You also have the absolute right to remain silent and not
testify in this matter. If you don’t want to.
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The decision whether to testify or not testify is yours and yours
alone. You obviously should make that decision in my mind under
the advice of your counsel.
Without telling me anything that the two of you have discussed
in detail, have you had opportunity to discuss the issue of whether
you want to testify with your counsel?
WILSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you had adequate time to do that?
WILSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And after receiving that advice of counsel and
thinking about the matter, what is your decision as to whether to
testify or not testify in this matter?
WILSON: I choose to not testify, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Do you want an instruction to the jury
that they should not take any inference from the fact that he’s elected
not to testify?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
The defense then rested and jury instructions were given to the jury.
Notably, the jury was instructed via standard uniform instruction that Wilson did not
testify and that it must draw no adverse conclusions from that decision. On the
next day, Wilson changed his mind and requested that the district court reopen the
record to allow him to testify. The district court refused to reopen the record,
stating:
Mr. Wilson, the state rested their case yesterday. At that point
I had what’s called a colloquy with you, a conversation with you
regarding your right to testify or not testify.
The decision was up to you. But that was the time you needed
to make your decision. I asked you what your decision was, and you
stated it was not to testify. At that point the defendant rested. The
state had rested. The defendant had rested. The evidentiary record
was closed.
The jury has already received their instructions of law, and
those instructions of law included an instruction requested by you
that they were not to take anything from the fact that you had decided
not to testify.
There’s a phrase that’s often used by the appellate courts in
regards to the motion—motions for summary judgment in civil cases
which is that in civil cases it’s the put up or shut up moment of the
case.
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When you said you didn’t want to testify and the defense rests,
your put up or shut up moment was over. It’s gone. So you cannot
testify. That time is passed. We’ll now proceed on to closing
arguments.
In its well-reasoned ruling on Wilson’s motions in arrest of judgment and for
new trial, the district court considered the factors outlined in Teeters. The
strongest consideration was given to the first factor—the sole reason for Wilson’s
failure to testify was that he “had a change of heart.”
The district court ran through an extensive colloquy with Wilson during
which Wilson confirmed that he had an opportunity to consult with his counsel on
whether to testify, had adequate time to do so, had made the express decision not
testify while understanding his right to do so, and that he wished an instruction be
given to the jury directing them not take any inference from the fact that Wilson
elected not to testify. As the court later found, “It was therefore in no way through
accident, inadvertence or mistake that he had not testified in the normal order of
trial when the record was open.” The district court noted that every reason Wilson
gave for wanting to reopen the record—trial not going as expected, two character
witnesses not testifying, disagreements with his trial counsel over the motion in
limine, information that could have been cleared up by his testimony—all existed
at the time he expressly chose to not testify.
Additionally, prejudice would have occurred to the State, which would have
been forced to either delay trial for rebuttal witnesses or “forgo any chance at
rebuttal.” We also consider that giving the defendant the very last word on the
evidence, even after the jury instructions, would risk giving it too much weight by
the jury. And diligence was not used to secure Wilson’s testimony. The district
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court pointed out that Wilson “had nine months to prepare for trial” and “was on the
third day of trial before he finally needed to make his decision whether to testify.”
He “was aware of all the ways in which he now says the trial had not ‘gone his
way,’ and after colloquy [Wilson] elected not to testify.” Wilson “did not make a
record at trial of what he expected to elicit from his own testimony” and how such
testimony would be admissible and relevant. Further, the jury heard from Wilson
in the statements he made to police on the night of the abuse. And as the district
court observed, Wilson’s indication that he wanted to emphasize his “deep and
serious relationship with his girlfriend” would have made it all the more confusing
as to why he chose to cuddle with a ten-year-old child rather than going to bed with
his adult girlfriend who wished to have sex with him.
His cross at the hearing showed that while he could have
denied the inappropriate touching, he would have had to admit that
he was in the same bed as a ten-year-old girl, late at night, that he
had been drinking, was anticipating sexual activity with his girlfriend,
that he and the victim were lying next to each other, and that the
victim suddenly became startled and scared, and yelled in his ear.
Lastly, the jury instructions would have needed to be rewritten and
redelivered to the jury, which would have likely introduced confusion. The district
court also recognized that the court was “stretched thin” and would have to rely on
the chance that a senior judge was available to cover court business on the
following Monday if reopening the record caused an extension of the trial. And the
jury would have been asked to serve longer than their predicted three-day service
week.
All the Teeters factors weigh against granting Wilson’s request to reopen
the record, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson’s
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request to do so. Likewise, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Wilson a new trial on the same grounds. In his motion for
new trial, Wilson contends he “should have the opportunity to testify before the
jury.” Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b), the district court may
grant new trial “[w]hen from any other cause the defendant has not received a fair
and impartial trial.” But Wilson received a fair and impartial trial. As we have
extensively analyzed above, Wilson carefully considered and then expressly
waived his right to testify. He cannot now un-ring that bell.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Wilson lastly argues that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of the
charged crimes.
To convict Wilson of second-degree sexual abuse, the State was required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. On or about December 26, 2022, [Wilson] performed a sex
act with [the child].
2. [Wilson] performed the sex act while [the child] was under
the age of 14 years.
“Sex act” was defined as “any sexual contact between the finger or hand of one
person and the genitals or anus of another person.”
To convict Wilson of lascivious acts with a child, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. On or about December 26, 2022, [Wilson] with or without
[the child]’s consent, permitted or caused [the child] to fondle or touch
[Wilson]’s genitals or pubes;
2. [Wilson] did so with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy
the sexual desires of [Wilson] or [the child].
3. [Wilson] was then 16 years of age or older.
4. [The child] was then under the age of 14 years.
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It is undisputed that the child was under fourteen years old and that Wilson
was at least sixteen years old. From a combination of the child’s, girlfriend’s, and
mother’s testimony, we know that Wilson had followed the ten-year-old child into
bed, stayed in bed with the child after his girlfriend repeatedly asked him to come
to bed and have sex with her, asked to kiss the child on the lips, pulled her close
to him, grabbed her hand and put it on his privates, had his pants zipper down,
gave the child the “ick,” and caused the child a severe traumatic response that
disturbed her mother.
Wilson points to the child’s statements that she “thought it was a dream”
and referred to the incident as a “nightmare.” But the jury was free to credit or
discredit the child as a witness. The jury chose to credit the witness—her retelling
of the events was consistent despite being told by Wilson her experience was a
dream. And the surrounding circumstances could support a reasonable
factfinder’s conclusion that the child’s story was true. Wilson did not respond to
his girlfriend’s texts to come to bed despite being on his phone watching YouTube
with the child. Wilson admitted to an officer that he followed the child to bed.
And the jury was instructed that they “should consider the facts and
circumstances surrounding the act to determine the defendant’s specific intent.”
They were further instructed that they “may, but are not required to, conclude a
person intends the natural results of his acts.” The jury could reasonably conclude
the intended natural result of a grown man asking a child to kiss him on the lips
and using her hand to touch his “privates” while his pants were unzipped was to
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satisfy his specific intent to arouse his or the child’s sexual desires. Consequently,
Wilson’s sufficiency challenge fails. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.