Henderson V Amerson Mag2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

SEAN HENDERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:24-cv-374-RAH-CWB
)
CODY AMERSON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction
Sean Henderson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Cody Amerson and Brady Amerson
(“Defendants”) in their individual capacities—asserting claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
(See Doc. 22). In short, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to excessive force
due to racial animus while he was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Elmore County,
Alabama Sheriff’s Department.
Now pending for resolution is a partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendants collectively.
(See Doc. 26). For the reasons set out below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion
be granted such that this action hereafter proceeds only on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause claim.1

1 The “facts” relied upon herein are gleaned from the allegations in the Amended Complaint,
the contents of those documents properly annexed thereto, and matters of which judicial notice
may be taken. See, e.g., Mack v. Alabama Dep’t of Youth Servs., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1261
(M.D. Ala. 2000); see also Collier v. Buckner, 303 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1258 n.24 (M.D. Ala. 2018)
(citing United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994)).
II. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is an African American male, and Defendants are white males employed by the
Elmore County, Alabama Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. 22 at ¶¶ 2-4). On or about April 22, 2024,
Cody Amerson and another officer arrested Plaintiff for alleged domestic violence. (Id. at ¶ 5).
According to Plaintiff, Defendants approached him while he was changing into his jail clothes

inside the bathroom of the Elmore County Jail. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 14). Plaintiff further alleges that
Cody Amerson punched him on the left side of his face and that Brady Amerson punched him on
the right side of his face—causing him to fall to the floor. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-17). Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants then began beating, punching, kicking, and hitting him, caused him to bleed profusely,
and repeatedly told him, “You ain’t never going to put your hands on a white girl (Plaintiff’s
child’s mother is Caucasian) again!” (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19). Plaintiff asserts that he suffered a
broken nose, a ruptured eardrum, and bruised ribs as a result of the incident. (Id. at ¶ 21).
And Plaintiff denies that he used any type of physical force against Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-29).
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss that seeks the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims

under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
(See Docs. 26 & 27). Plaintiff’s claims for excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause are not subject to the pending motion. (Doc. 27 at p. 2).
III. Legal Standard
To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure
to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The standard was explained
in Twombly and refined in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), as follows:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a notable
and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior
era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will … be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that the pleader
is entitled to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citations and internal edits omitted).
The Twombly-Iqbal two-step analysis begins “by identifying the allegations in the
complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth” because they are conclusory. Id. at 680;
Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F. 3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Following the Supreme Court’s
approach in Iqbal, we begin by identifying conclusory allegations in the Complaint.”). After all
conclusory statements are set aside, the Twombly-Iqbal analysis requires the court to assume the
veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and to determine whether they “possess enough heft
to set forth ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’” Mack v. City of High Springs, 486 F. App’x 3, 6
(11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Establishing facial plausibility, however, requires more than
stating facts that establish a mere possibility of legal culpability. See Mamani, 654 F. 3d at 1156
(“The possibility that – if even a possibility has been alleged effectively – these defendants acted
unlawfully is not enough for a plausible claim.”) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs instead are
required to “allege more by way of factual content to nudge [their] claim[s] … across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683 (internal editing and citation omitted).
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally may consider only allegations contained
in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.
See Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Day v. Taylor,
400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[A] court may consider a document attached to a motion
to dismiss ... if the attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed.
In this context, ‘undisputed’ means that the authenticity of the document is not challenged. ... [A]
document need not be physically attached to a pleading to be incorporated by reference into it;

if the document’s contents are alleged in a complaint and no party questions those contents, we
may consider such a document provided it meets the centrality requirement[.]”) (citation omitted);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of
the pleading for all purposes.”).
The court must accept all of the allegations in the complaint as true and construe them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284
(11th Cir. 2008). And the court “presume[s] that general allegations embrace those specific facts
that are necessary to support the claim.” Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249,
256 (1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The court need not,

however, accept as true any legal conclusions that are couched in the form of factual allegations.
See Diverse Power, Inc. v. City of LaGrange, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2019)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Davila v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185
(11th Cir. 2003) (“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” ).
IV. Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
Brady Amerson contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because he does not allege any facts demonstrating how
other similarly situated persons were treated and does not reference a similarly situated comparator
in the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 27 at p. 8). In response, Plaintiff acknowledges that
he has failed to name a similarly situated comparator and concedes that his Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause claims are due to be dismissed. (Doc. 31 at p. 2 n.1).
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall

‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must allege that he is “similarly situated” to
individuals “who received more favorable treatment” and that “his discriminatory treatment was
based on some constitutionally protected interest such as race.” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944,
946-47 (11th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). “Conclusory allegations or assertions of personal belief of
disparate treatment or discriminatory intent are insufficient.” McFarlin v. Rick, No. 3:23CV24698,
2024 WL 1723557, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2024), report and recommendation adopted,

No. 3:23CV24698, 2024 WL 1718079 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2024); see GJR Inv., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by
Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir.2010); Coon v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1569
(11th Cir. 1987). Alternatively, a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim as a “class of one.”
Holloway v. Lawson, No. 2:20-cv-148, 2022 WL 18159030, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 2022),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-cv-148, 2023 WL 131100 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2023).
“A ‘class of one’ equal protection claim does not allege discrimination against a protected class,
but rather it alleges that the plaintiff ‘has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” Wilder v.
Aramark, No. 3:17CV239, 2017 WL 4159382, at *11 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2017), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:17CV239, 2017 WL 4157535 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2017) (quoting
Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000))) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The same ‘similarly
situated’ standard applies whether an equal protection claim is brought under a ‘class of one’

theory or a traditional theory of unlawful discrimination.” Clark v. Walton Cnty. Sheriff's Off.,
No. 3:24CV414, 2024 WL 5264941, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2024), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3:24-CV-414, 2024 WL 5264428 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2024) (citing Griffin Indus.,
496 F.3d at 1204-05). “Indeed, the ‘similarly situated requirement must be rigorously applied in
the context of class of one claims.’” Id. (quoting Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n,
558 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The only facts asserted by Plaintiff in support of his Equal Protection Clause claims
are that excessive and unnecessary force was used against him, that it was based upon his race,
that Brady Amerson was a state actor, and that Brady Amerson denied him equal protection of

the law because of his race. (Doc. 22 at ¶¶ 55-58). Because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts
to show that similarly situated pretrial detainees received more favorable treatment with regard
to use of force, the Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible Equal Protection Clause claim.
See Mann v. Joseph, 805 F. App’x 779, 785 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming dismissal where the
plaintiff “identified no comparator, much less a similarly-situated nonminority [comparator],
in his complaint who the officers had treated differently than him.”); see also Smith v. Deal,
760 F. App’x 972, 975 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient
to withstand a motion to dismiss because “conclusory allegations that Division employees
‘intentionally treated [him] differently from other similarly situated’ people of ‘other races
and national origin’ lacked any supporting facts necessary to state a plausible claim that he was
denied equal protection of the law”); Ashley v. Tucker, No. 1:23-CV-3564, 2023 WL 12007026,
at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-3564,
2023 WL 12007025 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2023). Accordingly, and as Plaintiff has conceded
(see Doc. 22 at p. 2, n.1), all Equal Protection Clause claims are due to be dismissed.2

B. Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 19813
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims fail because Plaintiff does not allege an
impaired contractual relationship. (Doc. 27 at pp. 5-6). In support of their contention, Defendants
rely upon the precedent of Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) and
Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., Inc., 490 F.3d 886, 890 (11th Cir. 2007). (Id. at p. 6).
Plaintiff in turn asserts that those cases both applied the “make and enforce contracts” clause and
that he is traveling instead under the “full and equal benefit” clause. (Doc. 31 at p. 7).
The text of § 1981 provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.

2 Plaintiff asserts his equal protection claims in sections VIII and IX of the Amended Complaint.
(See Doc. 22 at pp. 4-5). Plaintiff makes the same allegations in both sections; however,
Brady Amerson is named as the defendant in each section. Presumably such repetition was a
typographical error and reference to Cody Amerson was intended in one of those sections as
appearing elsewhere in the Amended Complaint. (See id. at pp. 3-4). To the extent Plaintiff also
intended to assert an equal protection claim against Cody Amerson, it likewise would fail.
3 “Section 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors; instead, claims against
state actors or allegations of § 1981 violations must be brought pursuant to § 1983.” Baker v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 531 F.3d 1336, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008).
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). In Domino’s Pizza, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]ny claim brought
under § 1981 ... must initially identify an impaired ‘contractual relationship,’ … under which
the plaintiff has rights.” Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476; see also Kinnon, 490 F.3d at 890 (“To
state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must identify ‘an impaired “contractual relationship” ...
under which the plaintiff has rights.’”) (quoting Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476). Plaintiff thus

argues that Domino’s Pizza and Kinnon “are actually contract dispute cases” and do not apply here.
The plaintiff in Domino's Pizza filed suit under § 1981 to assert that Domino’s breached
a contract with his company because of his race and that in doing so Domino’s interfered with
his right to contract on behalf of his principal. 546 U.S. at 473-75. The Supreme Court held that
§ 1981 does not protect an agent’s right to negotiate a contract on behalf of a principal, but rather
applies only where the plaintiff personally has rights under the contract. Id. at 475-76. In reaching
its decision, the Supreme Court expressly emphasized the contract requirement:
Consistent with our prior case law, and as required by the plain text of the statute,
we hold that a plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1981 unless he has (or would
have) rights under the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes “to make and
enforce.” Section 1981 plaintiffs must identify injuries flowing from a racially
motivated breach of their own contractual relationship, not of someone else’s.
Because the District Court correctly recognized and applied these principles,
the Ninth Circuit erred in reversing its judgment.

Id. at 479-80 (footnote omitted)
Plaintiff points to Mazloum v. District of Columbia Metro. Police, 522 F. Supp. 2d 24
(D. D.C. 2007) where the court distinguished Domino’s Pizza. Mazloum involved allegations
that off-duty officers used excessive force on the plaintiff at a nightclub. Id. at 30, 37. Relying on
Domino’s Pizza, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 failed
to identify an “impaired contractual relationship under which the plaintiff has rights.” Id. at 37.
The court distinguished Domino’s Pizza on grounds that it had held “because the plaintiff in his
personal capacity had no rights or liabilities under the contract, he lacked standing to sue for
impairment of that contract under Section 1981.” Id. The court reasoned that “Domino’s does not
require a contractual relationship for a Section 1981 claim, but only requires that where a contract
is the basis of a Section 1981 claim, the plaintiff must have rights to assert under the contract”:
In this case, the off-duty officers latch on to some of the broad language in
Domino’s to argue that the case precludes any claim under Section 1981 that does
not involve a strict contractual relationship. Although it is true that some of the
Supreme Court’s statements could arguably be read to imply such a result, a close
reading reveals that the Supreme Court’s holding was limited to the “make and
enforce” contracts clause of Section 1981. Because plaintiff’s claim in this case
arises out of the “full and equal benefit” clause of Section 1981, the Court concludes
that a lack of contractual privity does not foreclose plaintiff’s claim.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the plaintiff in Domino’s explicitly framed
his claim in terms of the “make and enforce contracts” clause of the statute.
546 U.S. at 475, 126 S.Ct. 1246 (establishing that plaintiff argued that he had a
cause of action because he “made and enforced contracts” for the corporation).
Thus, the Supreme Court did not have occasion to discuss any other part of
Section 1981, and in particular the opinion makes no reference to the “equal
benefit” clause of the statute.

Id. at 37-38.
After noting other circuit cases pre-dating Domino’s Pizza, which had “maintained ...
allegations of overt acts of discrimination” that did not involve contractual relationships, the court
in Mazloum stated that the operative question was “whether the Supreme Court intended Domino’s
to alter the structure of claims under the equal benefit clause.” Id. at 38-39. Recognizing that
Domino’s was devoid of any reference to the equal benefit clause and dealt exclusively with
the “make and enforce contracts” clause, the court refused to apply the logic from Domino’s:
A claim involving the deprivation of the equal benefit of laws need not rely on a
contractual obligation to create any rights: the applicable substantive law already
performs that role. Moreover, if the Supreme Court had meant to preclude any
claim under Section 1981 in the absence of a contract, including causes of action
derived from the equal benefit clause, then surely the Court would have made at
least a passing reference to the equal benefit clause and the body of authority it was
displacing. But it did not, and this Court now concludes that plaintiff need not rely
on a contractual relationship to proceed with his Section 1981 claim based on the
equal benefit clause.

Id. at p. 39 (emphasis in original).4

4 Recognizing that the Supreme Court used “sweeping language that may be read to encompass
the entire scope of Section 1981,” the court was not convinced that Domino’s Pizza was intended
to foreclose civil actions not arising out of contract—as “[t]he issue simply was not presented.”
Id. To put into context the “sweeping language” used in Domino’s Pizza that the Mazloum court
referenced, the following from Domino’s Pizza will be quoted at length:
As an alternative to ignoring corporation and agency law, McDonald proposes a
new test for § 1981 standing: Any person who is an “actual target” of
discrimination, and who loses some benefit that would otherwise have inured to
him had a contract not been impaired, may bring a suit. Under this theory, an
individual is the “actual target” if he was the reason a defendant chose to impair its
contractual relationship with a third party. McDonald’s formulation simply ignores
the explicit statutory requirement that the plaintiff be the “perso[n]” whose “right
... to make and enforce contracts,” § 1981(a), was “impair[ed],” § 1981(c), on
account of race. It is just the statutory construction we have always rejected.
...
McDonald resorts finally to policy arguments. Unless his reading of the statute
prevails, he warns, many discriminatory acts will go unpunished. Corporations,
for instance, may choose not to bring suit for the racially motivated contract breach.
It is not likely to be a common occurrence that the victim of a contract breach
will forgo a potent available remedy. Injured parties “usually will be the best
proponents of their own rights,” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114, 96 S.Ct.
2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (plurality opinion). And if and when “the holders of
those rights ... do not wish to assert them,” id., at 113-114, 96 S.Ct. 2868, third
parties are not normally entitled to step into their shoes. Moreover, § 1981 is only
one of a multitude of civil rights statutes. Many of McDonald’s hypothetical
examples of unpunished discrimination would in fact be reachable under Title
VII—or even under general criminal law. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent 27
(concerning a scenario in which “Domino’s officials had beaten up McDonald in
an attempt to intimidate him”). The most important response, however, is that
nothing in the text of § 1981 suggests that it was meant to provide an omnibus
remedy for all racial injustice. If so, it would not have been limited to situations
involving contracts. Trying to make it a cure-all not only goes beyond any
expression of congressional intent but would produce satellite § 1981 litigation of
immense scope. McDonald’s theory would permit class actions by all the minority
employees of the nonbreaching party to a broken contract (or, for that matter,
minority employees of any company failing to receive a contract award), alleging
that the reason for the breach (or for the refusal to contract) was racial animus
against them.
Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 478-79 (emphasis in original).
Defendants contend that the same argument has previously been rejected by this court
in Keith v. Agrella, No. 1:22-cv-418, 2024 WL 1349016, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2024).
(Doc. 32 at p. 3). There, the plaintiff expressly argued that she should be allowed to proceed
with a § 1981 claim for false arrest based upon her race and relied upon Mahone v. Waddle,
564 F.2d 1018 (3rd Cir. 1977)—a case pre-dating Domino’s Pizza. Id. The court explained its

disagreement as follows:
This Court, bound only by decisions of the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court of
the United States, agrees with the Defendants. Notably, Mahone was decided
almost thirty years before the Supreme Court decided Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v.
McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006). In Domino’s Pizza, the Supreme Court opined
that “nothing in the text of § 1981 suggests that it was meant to provide an omnibus
remedy for all racial injustice.” Id. at 476. “If so, it would not have been limited
to situations involving contracts.” Id. Rather, “[a]ny claim brought under § 1981,
therefore, must initially identify an impaired ‘contractual relationship,’ § 1981(b),
under which the plaintiff has rights.” Id. at 476. The Eleventh Circuit has made
this observation as well. See Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., Inc., 490 F.3d
886, 890 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Domino's Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476). Without
caselaw from this Circuit supporting Keith’s argument, the Court finds that
Keith has failed to allege a violation of a right protected by § 1981, and
Count III is due to be dismissed. See Jones v. Flathmann, 2008 WL 918702,
at *3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 2008) (granting summary judgment “[b]ecause § 1981
protects against racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts,
however, and not excessive force as alleged in the Complaint”); see also Bartley v.
Kim's Enter. of Orlando, Inc., 2010 WL 11626849, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010)
(dismissing § 1981 claim because plaintiff, who claimed Fourth Amendment
violations, “fail[ed] to identify the impairment of any contractual relationship”);
Lapread v. Buis, 2024 WL 916541, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2024) (finding the
same).

Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
While it is true that other courts have found § 1981 to extend beyond contract-related
discrimination, that is not the current view in either the Eleventh Circuit or this court. Because
Plaintiff has failed to identify an impaired contractual relationship under which he has rights,
Defendants are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge
that Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss (Doc. 26) be GRANTED such that Plaintiff's claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and § 1981 are dismissed.
It is ORDERED that all objections to this Recommendation must be filed no later than
July 7, 2025. An objecting party must identify the specific portion(s) of all factual findings/
legal conclusions to which objection is made and must describe in detail the basis for each
objection. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered.
After receiving objections, the District Judge will conduct a de novo review of the findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. The District Judge may accept, reject, or modify
the Recommendation or may refer the matter back to the Magistrate Judge with instructions for
further proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party shall be deemed to have waived the
right to challenge on appeal a District Judge’s order to the extent it is based upon unobjected-to
findings or recommendations. The court on appeal may review unobjected-to factual and legal
conclusions only for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
No party may appeal this Recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. A party may appeal only from a final judgment ultimately entered by the
District Judge.
DONE this the 23rd day of June 2025.
Ld

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE