State V Cleveland
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
v.
ALVIS OTTRE CLEVELAND, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 24-0335
FILED 07-22-2025
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2023-129943-001
The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge
AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED
COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee
The Law Office of Kyle T. Green, Mesa
By Kyle T. Green
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. CLEVELAND
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
C A T T A N I, Judge:
¶1 Alvis Ottre Cleveland appeals his convictions and sentences
for possession of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine) and unlawful flight
from a law enforcement vehicle. Cleveland’s counsel filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon,
104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that, after a diligent search of the record, he
found no arguable question of law that was not frivolous. Cleveland was
given the opportunity to file a supplemental brief but did not do so.
Counsel asks this court to search the record for reversible error. See State v.
Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). After reviewing the record, we
affirm Cleveland’s convictions and sentences, corrected as described below
to resolve minor technical errors in the sentencing order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In mid-June 2023, Cleveland was granted pretrial release on
his own recognizance on pending felony charges. Two weeks later, Phoenix
Police officers in a marked patrol vehicle observed Cleveland, who was
driving a black motorcycle, commit a traffic violation. The officers followed
Cleveland, activating their emergency lights and siren to make a traffic
stop. Cleveland turned left into a parking lot, but did not stop and instead
drove through the lot and back to the street, where he doubled-back the
way he had come.
¶3 At that point, the officers saw Cleveland reach into his
waistband and toss a small plastic baggie to the ground. The officers
stopped to retrieve the baggie, which contained a white crystalline
substance later identified as 4.64g of methamphetamine. A nearby police
helicopter continued the pursuit.
¶4 The motorcycle malfunctioned and came to a full stop a few
minutes later, and Cleveland was taken into custody. After being read his
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STATE v. CLEVELAND
Decision of the Court
Miranda1 rights, Cleveland acknowledged knowing the police were
following and trying to pull him over and that now it was “felony flight.”
When asked whether the baggie contained fentanyl or methamphetamine,
Cleveland responded that it was “not fentanyl” and “could be”
methamphetamine.
¶5 The State charged Cleveland with possession of dangerous
drugs (methamphetamine), a class 4 felony, and unlawful flight from a law
enforcement vehicle, a class 5 felony. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3407(A)(1), (B)(1), 28-
622.01(A)(1). Cleveland testified at the resulting jury trial, asserting that he
did not initially realize the police were trying to pull him over and denying
that the baggie of methamphetamine was his or that he had thrown it from
the motorcycle. The jury found him guilty as charged and later found that
he had committed the offenses while on felony release.
¶6 After a trial on priors, the superior court found Cleveland had
five prior felony convictions, at least two of which qualify as historical prior
felony convictions. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 13-105(22)(d), -703(C). The court
sentenced him as a category three repetitive offender to concurrent,
minimum terms of imprisonment, the greater of which is 8 years plus 2
calendar years, with credit for 337 days of presentence incarceration. See
A.R.S. §§ 13-703(J), -708(D). The court also imposed required fees and
assessments, including a mandatory $1,000 fine for the drug offense. See
A.R.S. § 13-3407(H).
¶7 Cleveland timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶8 We have read and considered counsel’s brief and have
reviewed the record for reversible error. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300; see also
State v. Flores, 227 Ariz. 509, 512, ¶ 12 (App. 2011). We find none.
¶9 Cleveland was present and represented by counsel at all
stages of the proceedings against him. The record reflects that the superior
court afforded Cleveland all his constitutional and statutory rights, and that
the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The court conducted appropriate pretrial hearings,
and the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s
verdicts. Cleveland’s sentences fall within the range prescribed by law,
with proper credit given for presentence incarceration.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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STATE v. CLEVELAND
Decision of the Court
¶10 We note, however, certain minor technical errors in the
sentencing order. First, although the court found five prior (and thus more
than two historical prior) felony convictions and sentenced Cleveland as a
category three repetitive offender on both counts, the sentencing order lists
four of the priors with the dangerous drugs count and one under the
unlawful flight count. We correct the sentencing order to reflect that all five
priors apply to both counts.
¶11 Second, although the court imposed minimum terms of
imprisonment on each count, the sentencing order classifies the prison term
for dangerous drugs as presumptive and the term for unlawful flight as
maximum. Only the classification, not the duration, of each sentence is in
error; because of the 2-year enhancement under § 13-708(D) applicable to
each count, the total prison terms imposed are correct. We nevertheless
correct the sentencing order to reflect the appropriate classification of each
sentence as a “Minimum” term. Subject to those technical corrections, see
A.R.S. §§ 13-4036, -4037(A); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(c), we affirm Cleveland’s
convictions and sentences.
¶12 Upon the filing of this decision, defense counsel shall inform
Cleveland of the status of the appeal and of his future options. See State v.
Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Counsel has no further obligations
unless, upon review, he finds an issue appropriate for submission to the
Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See id. On the court’s own
motion, Cleveland shall have 30 days from the date of this decision to
proceed, if he desires, with a pro se motion for reconsideration or petition
for review.
CONCLUSION
¶13 We affirm as corrected.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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