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Rana V Bondi

    24-1286
    Rana v. Bondi
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                                Reid, IJ
                                                                       A243 155 188/189
                                                                       A243 156 037/038



                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                              SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.


          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of July, two thousand twenty-
    five.

    PRESENT:
                    EUNICE C. LEE,
                    BETH ROBINSON,
                    MYRNA PÉREZ,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    BODRUZZAMAN RANA, T.Z.I., A.Z.A.,
    HIRA AKTER,
             Petitioners,

                    v.                                           24-1286

    PAMELA BONDI, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
           Respondent. *
_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONERS:                     Xiaotao Wang, Esq., Law Office of Xiaotao
                                     Wang, P.C., New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General,
                                     Civil Division; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant
                                     Director; Jennifer A. Singer, Senior Trial
                                     Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
                                     United States Department of Justice,
                                     Washington, DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioners Bodruzzaman Rana, a citizen of Bangladesh and Paraguay, his

wife Hira Akter, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, and their children, natives and

citizens of Brazil, seek review of an April 11, 2024 decision of the BIA that affirmed

a September 11, 2023 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Rana’s

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”) and ordering Petitioners removed to Bangladesh or, in

the alternative, to Brazil where Rana and Akter are lawful permanent residents.



*The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set
forth above.
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In re Bodruzzaman Rana, et al., Nos. A 243 155 188/189, 243 156 037/038 (B.I.A. Apr.

11, 2024), aff’g, Nos. A 243 155 188/189, 243 156 037/038 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Sep.

11, 2023).   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

procedural history.

      We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan

Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for

substantial evidence and questions of law and application of law to fact de novo.

See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). “[T]he administrative

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

      Rana has abandoned the claims relating to Bangladesh by not addressing

the agency’s dispositive bases for denying relief. “We consider abandoned any

claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure

to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” Debique v. Garland,

58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).         Rana does not

challenge the agency’s finding that he is barred (along with his family as derivative

applicants) from asylum because he firmly resettled in Brazil.        See Makadji v.

Gonzales, 470 F.3d 450, 458 (2d Cir. 2006) (“An a[pplicant] seeking asylum in the

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United States by reason of persecution in his homeland is ineligible for this relief

if he firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States.”

(quotation marks omitted)).

      The agency also found that Rana’s testimony, while credible, required

corroboration, and the evidence Rana offered was insufficient to corroborate his

claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief. Rana does not challenge this

finding in his brief, as he fails to “explain why the BIA and IJ erred” in requiring

corroborating evidence or in finding that his documentary evidence did not

adequately corroborate his claim. Debique, 58 F.4th at 684. Instead, he argues

that the agency ignored certain U.S. State Department reports for Bangladesh,

Petitioners’ Br. at 30, but this argument is misplaced: we will not consider these

reports because they were not before the agency, and Rana neither submitted them

to the agency nor requested that the agency take administrative notice thereof.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (“[T]he court of appeals shall decide the petition only

on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based . . . .”).

      Rana’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal to Brazil fail for lack

of a nexus to a protected ground. “The burden of proof is on the applicant” for

asylum and withholding of removal “[t]o establish that . . . race, religion,

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nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or

will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), or that his “life or freedom would be threatened . . . because of”

one of those protected grounds, id. § 1231(b)(3)(A). “Whether the requisite nexus

exists depends on the views and motives of the persecutor.” Paloka v. Holder, 762

F.3d 191, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).

      Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Rana was not

targeted in Brazil because of a protected ground. Rana testified that members of

the Brazilian mafia vandalized his home and threatened him because they could

not find his cousin, who had informed on them to the police, and he refused to tell

them where his cousin was, but Rana did not testify that the mafia members

mentioned his race or national origin. Thus, the record supports the agency’s

conclusion that the mafia targeted Rana because they wanted to retaliate against

his cousin, not because of his race or national origin. Rana now also asserts that

the mafia targeted him because of a political opinion. But “opposition to criminal

elements such as gangs, even when such opposition incurs the enmity of these

elements, does not thereby become political opposition simply by virtue of the

gang’s reaction.” Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2021).

                                          5
While there are circumstances in which opposition to gang activity can constitute

political activity, id. at 198–201, Rana has made no argument and pointed to no

evidence in the record that he fears retribution in Brazil for political activity rather

than “over purely personal matters,” id. at 199 (quotation marks omitted).

      Lastly, Rana has abandoned his claim for CAT relief with respect to removal

to Brazil by failing to raise it in his brief. Debique, 58 F.4th at 684.

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioners’

motion to stay is DENIED, and the government’s motion to expedite is DENIED

as moot.

                                         FOR THE COURT:
                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                         Clerk of Court




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