In Re Zed Ca23

Filed 7/22/25 In re Ze.D. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

B338890
In re Ze.D. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP02270B–E)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Jessica G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Jessica G. (mother) appeals from an order removing her
children Ze.D., Zi.D., Layla Q., and Mia Q., from her custody and
control. Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile
court erred in finding it had no reason to believe the children are
or may be Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1900 et seq.). Mother and the
children’s fathers denied having any Indian ancestry, as did the
children’s maternal and paternal grandmothers. Mother
contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry to
determine whether the children are or may be Indian children.
We find no error and affirm the trial court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family came to the attention of DCFS in December
2022, due to reports that mother and Jose Q. (the Q. father) were
abusing drugs. The Q. father is the father of Layla and Mia.
Hugo D. (the D. father) is the father of Ze.D. and Zi.D. Although
the juvenile court initially removed Layla and Mia from the Q.
father and allowed all four children to remain in mother’s
custody, in December 2023, the juvenile court sustained
subsequent petitions alleging that domestic violence between
mother and the Q. father, and mother’s substance abuse, placed
the children at substantial risk of harm. At a June 2024
disposition hearing, the juvenile court removed the children from
the parents. Mother timely appealed.

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At the parents’ first respective appearances in court, they
each submitted Parental Notification of Indian Status ICWA-020
forms denying that they or their children are or may be members
of any federally recognized Indian tribe, and they denied any
other potential indicia of tribal membership.1 In September
2023, DCFS interviewed the maternal grandmother about ICWA.
She responded: “No we are Mexican and German.” In October
2023, Ze.D. and Zi.D.’s paternal grandmother told DCFS her
family is from Mexico and denied that Ze.D. and Zi.D. had any
Indian ancestry, stating, “No, only Mexico.” That same month,
the paternal grandmother of Layla and Mia also denied that the
children had any Indian ancestry. She told DCFS that there
were no other relatives to ask about ICWA.
In February 2023, the juvenile court found it had no reason
to know the children are Indian children. The court made
additional no ICWA findings in March 2023 and November 2023.

1 The D. father completed a version of the form which
permitted him to check boxes indicating he or the children are or
may be members of or eligible for membership in a federally
recognized Indian tribe; he or the children may have Indian
ancestry; one or more of his lineal ancestors is or was a member
of a federally recognized Indian tribe; or that he has no Indian
ancestry as far as he knows. The D. father checked the box
indicating he has no Indian ancestry as far as he knows. Mother
and the Q. father completed versions of the form which permitted
them to check boxes if they, the children, or any lineal ancestor is
or was a member of a federally recognized tribe; they or the
children are residents of or are domiciled on a reservation or
other tribal land; the children are or were wards of a tribal court;
they or the children possess an Indian identification card; or
“none of the above apply.” Both parents checked the box stating
“none of the above apply.”

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DISCUSSION
I. Duty of Inquiry
“[Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection 224.2 codifies
and expands on ICWA’s duty of inquiry to determine whether a
child is an Indian child.”2 (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112,
1131, fn. omitted (Dezi C.).) An Indian child is “any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of
an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, former subd. (a) [adopting federal
definition].)3
Section 224.2, subdivision (a), provides that both the
juvenile court and child welfare agency have an “affirmative and
continuing duty” to inquire whether a child is or may be an
Indian child. Under section 224.2, subdivision (b), when first
contacted regarding a child, and if a child is placed in the
agency’s temporary custody, the agency must inquire whether the
child is or may be an Indian child by asking a nonexclusive group
that includes the child, the parents, and extended family
members.
Under section 224.2, subdivision (i)(2), if “the court makes a
finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence as required in this section have been conducted and
there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,

2 Section 224 et seq., is the California Indian Child Welfare
Act. All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
3 Section 224.1 was amended, effective September 27, 2024.
(Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 2.) We refer to the definitions in effect
during the proceedings at issue.

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the court may make a finding that [ICWA] . . . does not apply to
the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.”
In In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005
(Ezequiel G.), disapproved on another ground by Dezi C., a panel
of this court concluded that a juvenile court’s finding that there is
no reason to know a child is an Indian child is reviewed for
substantial evidence. However, the determination of whether the
child welfare agency has engaged in a “proper and adequate
further inquiry and due diligence as required” under
section 224.2 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2).) While it did not prescribe the proper standard of
review, the Dezi C. court noted “that the juvenile court’s fact-
specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and
duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’
[quoting Ezequiel G.] subject to a deferential standard of review.”
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding ICWA
Does Not Apply
As we understand her argument, mother contends the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the
proceedings was erroneous because DCFS failed to conduct a
sufficient inquiry of available extended family members. In other
words, the juvenile court erred in making an implicit finding that
DCFS’s inquiry was adequate, proper, and duly diligent. We
disagree.4

4 The juvenile court made an initial no ICWA finding in
February 2023, before DCFS reported it had interviewed
extended family members. Thus, at that time, the court arguably

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Under section 224.2, subdivision (b), a child welfare agency
must ask extended family members whether a child placed in the
agency’s custody is or may be an Indian child. However, the
agency is not necessarily required to interview every possible
relative. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140 [reversal not
required where “every possible extended family member has not
been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry”].) Instead, the
juvenile court must determine whether the agency has
sufficiently inquired of extended family members to reliably
ascertain whether the child is or may be an Indian child. When
reviewing that determination, we employ a deferential standard
of review. Our focus is not “on the number of individuals
interviewed, but on whether the agency’s ICWA inquiry has
yielded reliable information about a child’s possible tribal
affiliation.” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009.)
Here, DCFS asked the maternal grandmother if the
children are or may be Indian children. She denied Indian
ancestry, informing DCFS that mother’s family is Mexican and
German. The juvenile court could accept this as a reliable
indication that the children are not Indian children by virtue of

lacked sufficient evidence to determine ICWA did not apply or to
conclude that DCFS had exercised due diligence in carrying out
its initial duty of inquiry under section 224.2. However,
consistent with the court and DCFS’s ongoing duty of inquiry, the
agency conducted further interviews of family members as the
case continued and provided the court with the results of those
inquiries. The court made further no ICWA findings in March
and November 2023. We therefore conclude that by the time of
the order mother has challenged on appeal, the juvenile court
could reasonably determine DCFS’s ICWA inquiry was adequate
and the court’s earlier findings remained appropriate.

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mother’s lineage. DCFS also asked the two paternal
grandmothers about ICWA. Both denied Indian ancestry. The D.
paternal grandmother indicated the family’s heritage was from
Mexico only. The Q. paternal grandmother was less specific, but
she denied Indian ancestry, and further denied that there were
any other relatives who might have relevant information.
Nothing in the record suggests these grandparents were
unreliable sources of information about mother’s or the respective
fathers’ lineage, ancestry, or membership in a federally
recognized Indian tribe. Mother contends DCFS was required to
interview a maternal aunt with whom Ze.D. was living, and other
Q. relatives who were interested in serving as potential visitation
monitors. However, the report indicating Q. paternal relatives
were to be considered as potential monitors specifically identified
only one relative—a Q. paternal aunt—and did not reveal
whether the other relatives were “extended family members”
within the meaning of section 224.1, former subdivision (c). The
information before the court did not suggest that father’s sister
was likely to have more or different information about the
children’s actual or potential membership in an Indian tribe than
her own mother, the Q. paternal grandmother.
Similarly, while DCFS was in contact with a maternal
aunt, mother and the maternal grandmother had also already
denied Indian ancestry, with the maternal grandmother
specifically identifying her children’s ancestry. The juvenile
court could reasonably conclude there was no need to “duplicate
inquiry efforts” by asking additional maternal and Q. paternal
aunts about ICWA when persons safely presumed to have
reliable information—the maternal and Q. paternal
grandmother—had already been interviewed and denied any

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Indian ancestry. (In re C.R. (June 12, 2025, B341335, B341338)
___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2025 WL 1833083, p. *5].)
Mother additionally argues the DCFS inquiry was
inadequate because the agency did not ask the maternal
grandmother or the D. paternal grandmother whether there were
other relatives DCFS might interview about whether the children
are Indian children.
As an initial matter, it is not clear that the record supports
mother’s assertion that the question was not asked. The DCFS
reports do not expressly state that a social worker asked the
maternal grandmother or D. paternal grandmother about other
relatives. Yet, they do indicate that a social worker asked the Q.
paternal grandmother this question, suggesting that it was
among the questions generally comprising the social worker’s
ICWA inquiry. Moreover, we typically presume that an official
duty has been regularly performed (Evid. Code, § 664; see In re
S.B. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 808, 812–813).
Further, while it is necessary for DCFS to create an
adequate record of the ICWA inquiry it has performed and
provide detailed descriptions, we are aware of no statute, court
rule, or case law that requires the child welfare agency to
document every single question it asks as part of the ICWA
inquiry. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5) [“The
petitioner must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a
detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has
undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child’s
Indian status . . . .”]; In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087,
1101–1102 [the less developed the record, the more limited the
court’s discretion to determine the agency’s inquiry was proper,
adequate, and duly diligent].)

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But even if we assume DCFS did not ask the maternal
grandmother and D. paternal grandmother to identify other
relatives, we still conclude the juvenile court could reasonably
determine that doing so was unnecessary. Mother and the D.
father were not uncertain about whether they or the children
were members of or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.
They had no knowledge or belief that they or the children are
Indian. Similarly, the maternal grandmother and the D.
paternal grandmother were both unequivocal and specific about
the children’s backgrounds—Mexican and German, according to
the maternal grandmother, and “only Mexico,” according to the
D. paternal grandmother. A child welfare agency is “not required
to ‘cast about’ for information or pursue unproductive
investigative leads.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1053.)
Indeed, even where there has been some indication that a
child may be an Indian child, courts have found an agency’s
inquiry sufficient without interviews of every possible relative.
For example, in In re E.W. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 314, the mother
initially informed the agency that the maternal grandmother had
some Native American ancestry, but she later repeatedly denied
any such heritage. (Id. at p. 322.) The father denied any Native
American ancestry. The agency interviewed a maternal aunt and
the paternal grandmother, both of whom denied either family
had Native American ancestry. The agency did not interview
other available relatives. (Id. at pp. 323–324.) The appellate
court found substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding of adequate inquiry and that ICWA did not apply. The
court explained the interviews conducted “ ‘reliably answered’ the
question of whether the children were Native American children”

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and the parents did not “explain how not interviewing additional
relatives . . . casts any doubt on the reliability of the answers
already obtained from the parents and relatives.” (Id. at p. 323;
cf. In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 689–690 [father indicated
he may have Indian ancestry and source of information was his
mother; agency’s interview with paternal grandmother was
adequate inquiry].) The same reasoning applies here.
The juvenile court could reasonably conclude the maternal
and paternal grandmothers were reliable sources of information
about the children’s potential or actual membership in an Indian
tribe. The information obtained from the parents and the
grandmothers was sufficient to allow the juvenile court to
conclude ICWA did not apply and that DCFS conducted an
adequate and diligent inquiry.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

HANASONO, J.