B D V Samsung Sdi Co Ltd
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2444
B.D., a minor, by and through
his guardian ad litem, BRYAN MYERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SAMSUNG SDI CO., LTD.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:22-cv-00107-MPB-MKK — Matthew P. Brookman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 16, 2025 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2025
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. B.D. sued Samsung SDI, a South
Korean manufacturer, in Indiana after one of its batteries ex-
ploded in his pocket there. The company moved to dismiss
B.D.’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), which the district court
granted. Relevant here, a court may exercise specific personal
2 No. 24-2444
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant only when that party has
purposefully availed itself of the forum through its in-state
contacts, the plaintiff’s lawsuit relates to those contacts, and it
would otherwise be fair for the court to subject the defendant
to its coercive power.
Samsung SDI sells batteries to sophisticated customers for
use as components in consumer products, including products
widely available across the Hoosier State. The company has
thus purposefully availed itself of the Indiana forum by ex-
ploiting an end-product stream of commerce. Samsung SDI
has not, however, availed itself of the forum through sales of
individual batteries—that is, the derivative product. It instead
conducts its business to prevent ordinary consumers from
purchasing those individual batteries in Indiana.
Still, B.D. received the individual battery that exploded in
his pocket after his stepfather purchased it from an e-cigarette
retailer through an unauthorized transaction. There is a dis-
connect, then, between Samsung SDI’s purposeful contacts
with the Indiana forum, through an end-product stream of
commerce, and B.D.’s lawsuit, which stems from a consumer
purchase of the derivative product. That disconnect forecloses
an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. We therefore af-
firm the district court’s decision granting Samsung SDI’s mo-
tion to dismiss.
I
Where, as here, the parties engaged in jurisdictional dis-
covery but the district court did not hold an evidentiary hear-
ing before resolving a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the plaintiff must
make only a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. NBA
Props., Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 620 (7th Cir. 2022). When
assessing whether the party has carried its burden, we
No. 24-2444 3
consider as true the facts alleged in its well-pleaded com-
plaint. Id. But we may also rely on each party’s written decla-
rations. B.D. ex rel. Myers v. Samsung SDI Co., 91 F.4th 856, 859
(7th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). 1 In the face of a factual dispute,
we construe the record in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. The facts,
from B.D.’s perspective, follow.
Samsung SDI, a battery manufacturer organized under the
laws of South Korea, maintains its headquarters and principal
place of business in that country. The company conducts busi-
ness internationally, but it does not have a physical presence
in Indiana. No Samsung SDI employees or agents work in that
state, nor is the organization registered to do business there—
or anywhere in the United States for that matter.
Samsung SDI’s product offerings include the 18650 lith-
ium-ion battery, which is named for its dimensions. The bat-
tery is 18mm in diameter, 65mm in length, and resembles a
cylinder. The 18650 battery looks like a typical AA battery, but
it holds more power and is rechargeable. And, unlike AA bat-
teries, individual 18650 batteries are not intended for con-
sumer purchase. Samsung SDI instead markets this model
battery only to sophisticated corporate customers.
The company sells millions of batteries annually to these
corporate middlemen. They, in turn, incorporate those batter-
ies into packs. Battery packs combine several individual 18650
batteries into a single encasement. Unlike the individual
18650 battery, batteries encased in a pack are monitored by a
circuit board meant to prevent thermal runaway—a danger-
ous heat cycle that can lead to explosions. Some Samsung SDI
1 The caption of the previous per curiam opinion in this successive
appeal erroneously spelled Myers as “Myer.”
4 No. 24-2444
customers then sell the battery packs, while others integrate
them directly into widely available end products, such as lap-
tops, power drills, and vacuum cleaners. Samsung SDI does
not restrict where its customers sell their end products. So,
even though the company does not maintain a physical pres-
ence in Indiana, its batteries are available to residents across
the state as components in consumer products.
Samsung SDI takes steps to ensure its customers use 18650
batteries only for approved purposes. Customers must apply
to purchase the individual batteries and disclose to the man-
ufacturer how they plan to utilize them. Each customer must
also, as a precondition of sale, acknowledge that 18650 batter-
ies should not be used outside of a pack. The batteries are par-
ticularly dangerous when employed outside of a pack to
power e-cigarette—or vaping—devices. Such devices are of-
ten kept close to a person’s body, so the risk of injury from an
exploding battery is severe. For that reason, Samsung SDI will
not sell 18650 batteries to a customer if its purchase applica-
tion exposes ties to the e-cigarette industry.
Despite Samsung SDI’s efforts, individual, unpackaged
18650 batteries—the derivative product—are nonetheless
available to Indiana consumers. People can purchase the bat-
teries from third parties both online and in retail stores. B.D.’s
stepfather, Bryan Myers, did just that. According to B.D.’s
complaint, Myers purchased one of Samsung SDI’s 18650 bat-
teries from an e-cigarette store in Vincennes, Indiana. It re-
mains unclear from the record how the third-party retailer ac-
quired the battery. Regardless, B.D. eventually received it
from his stepfather. While he was carrying the battery in his
pocket, it exploded. B.D. sustained severe burns and was
No. 24-2444 5
hospitalized for three weeks. To address his injuries, doctors
had to perform a skin graft.
B.D., through his stepfather, then filed this products
liability lawsuit against Samsung SDI in Indiana state court,
alleging the exploding 18650 battery was defective. The South
Korean company removed the case to federal court based on
diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(b). It then
moved to dismiss B.D.’s complaint for lack of personal juris-
diction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). The district court denied the
motion. It concluded that B.D. made out a prima facie case for
personal jurisdiction.
Samsung SDI appealed. But the record was insufficient to
decide whether an Indiana-based court could exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. As a result, we
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
“permit discovery about Samsung SDI’s contacts with Indi-
ana concerning B.D.’s claimed injuries”—facts essential to
making a jurisdictional determination. B.D., 91 F.4th at 864.
On remand, the parties conducted additional discovery.
Samsung SDI then renewed its motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. This time, the district court granted the
motion and dismissed the lawsuit. It reasoned that B.D. failed
to show Samsung SDI purposefully availed itself of the Indi-
ana forum—a prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion.
B.D. now appeals. Once again, the sole issue is whether
the district court erred in its resolution of Samsung SDI’s Rule
12(b)(2) motion. We review de novo whether a plaintiff failed
to make a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. NBA
Props., 46 F.4th at 620.
6 No. 24-2444
II
A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant to the extent
permissible under state law and the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Hotai Ins. Co.,
938 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J.); FED. R. CIV. P.
4(k)(1)(A). Indiana’s long-arm statute—located in Trial Rule
4.4(A)—and the Due Process Clause are coterminous. Ad-
vanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc.,
751 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2014); Boyer v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505,
509 (Ind. 2015). So, our personal jurisdiction analysis collapses
into a single inquiry: whether the Constitution permits an ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction here.
From the early days of our Republic, a court’s “compe-
tence was generally constrained only by the territorial limits
of the sovereign that created it.” Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry., 600
U.S. 122, 128 (2023) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation
omitted). A court had jurisdiction over a defendant if it could
be found within the forum state. Id. at 128–29; Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). This same basic rule “still applies to
natural persons today.” Mallory, 600 U.S. at 129. “Tag jurisdic-
tion,” as it is sometimes called, comports with due process
now, just as it did in the 18th century. Burnham v. Superior Ct.,
495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
But early jurisdictional rules based on territorial limits
were not always well suited for a developing country and an
evolving economy. As corporations began to flourish in the
19th century, “the question arose how to adapt the traditional
rule[s] … for individuals to artificial persons created by law.”
Mallory, 600 U.S. at 129. Technological developments allowed
organizations to conduct affairs in a state without also
No. 24-2444 7
maintaining a physical presence there. A corporation could
thus derive an economic benefit from a forum yet avoid being
haled into the forum’s courts to answer lawsuits related to its
in-state business activities. To many, the jurisdictional rules
needed to change to meet the modern environment. See Rob-
ert H. Jackson, What Price “Due Process”?, 5 N.Y. L. REV. 435,
438 (1927) (“We do not feel that due process of law should be
construed to mean that non-resident traders shall be at liberty
to seek our markets and to avoid our courts.”). And so they
did. Indeed, “the tremendous growth of interstate business
activity[] led to an inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on
state jurisdiction over nonresident individuals and corpora-
tions.” Burnham, 495 U.S. at 617 (internal quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court’s opinion in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), became the “canonical deci-
sion” delineating the constitutional limits on a court’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a nonconsenting, foreign defend-
ant. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351,
358 (2021). To satisfy due process, a defendant must have suf-
ficient contacts with a forum such that it would “not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” for that
party to be exposed to a court’s coercive power there. Int’l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotation omitted). Over time,
courts have distilled two types of personal jurisdiction from
International Shoe and its progeny: general and specific.
A court with general personal jurisdiction over a defend-
ant may hear any claim brought against that party, regardless
of whether its activities in the forum relate to the underlying
lawsuit. But a defendant is subject to such far-reaching juris-
diction in only a select set of circumstances. Its contacts with
the forum, as contemplated in International Shoe, must be “so
8 No. 24-2444
continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home
in the forum.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (internal quotation omitted). Courts
located in the state where an organization is incorporated, as
well as the state where it principally conducts its business,
may exercise general personal jurisdiction over a corporate
defendant. Id. at 924.
Specific personal jurisdiction is of another kind. Courts
may exercise this narrower form of jurisdiction over defend-
ants less affiliated with the forum—though only over a
correspondingly smaller world of claims. Whether specific
personal jurisdiction exists turns on “the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag.,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)). Many courts, including ours,
have set forth the specific personal jurisdiction inquiry in a
three-prong test. See, e.g., Lexington Ins., 938 F.3d at 878.
First, the defendant must “purposefully avail[] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
319). “The contacts must be the defendant’s own choice and
not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’” Ford, 592 U.S. at 359
(quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774). The “unilateral activity of a
third party” will not “satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 291 (internal quotation omit-
ted).
Second, an adequate connection must exist between the
defendant’s activities in the forum and the underlying law-
suit. Said another way, “the suit must arise out of or relate to”
its forum contacts. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 582
No. 24-2444 9
U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (citation modified). If the defendant’s con-
tacts caused the plaintiff’s alleged injury, that will, of course,
suffice. Yet “a strict causal relationship” is not necessary; a de-
fendant’s contacts may “relate to” the lawsuit absent “proof
of causation.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 362. Still, the relatedness in-
quiry “incorporates real limits” aimed at protecting foreign
defendants from being haled into distant courts for claims
only tangentially related to their forum contacts. Id.
Third and finally, personal jurisdiction must accord with
notions of fairness. If the defendant “present[s] a compelling
case that the presence of some other considerations would
render jurisdiction unreasonable,” then the forum court may
not exercise it. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
477 (1985).
The Supreme Court’s specific personal jurisdiction
caselaw embodies several principles. To start, it is intimately
linked with the “idea of reciprocity between a defendant and
a State.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 360. A company that purposefully
avails itself of the benefits of doing business in a forum, in-
cluding the protection of that state’s laws, must also answer
for any related misconduct in the forum’s courts. Id.; Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 319. Just so, a defendant owes no reciprocal obli-
gation to a state—and thus cannot be haled into that state’s
courts—when it has insufficient contacts with the forum or
when its contacts do not relate to the plaintiff’s lawsuit. In this
way, the doctrine reflects a quid pro quo. Importantly, too,
these jurisdictional rules are primarily designed to protect de-
fendants foreign to a forum. For that reason, the principle of
“fair warning” supports the doctrine. Ford, 592 U.S. at 360
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472). A defendant must have
notice or “knowledge that a particular activity may subject it
10 No. 24-2444
to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Id. (citation modi-
fied). That way, the party can conduct itself in a manner that
will allow it “to lessen or avoid exposure to a given State’s
courts.” Id. The defendant can, in other words, avert engaging
in a quid pro quo with the forum state.
All agree Samsung SDI, a South Korean company, is not
subject to general personal jurisdiction in Indiana. Only spe-
cific personal jurisdiction is in dispute. But that issue is easier
to identify than it is to resolve. Applying the Supreme Court’s
personal jurisdiction doctrine, as outlined above, has “proven
fertile ground for debate by law students, lawyers, and judges
alike.” Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d
1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008) (Gorsuch, J.). This case illustrates
that debate. Not only did the district court reach opposite con-
clusions before and after jurisdictional discovery, but courts
across the country have split on the question of exercising spe-
cific personal jurisdiction over foreign battery manufacturers
under similar circumstances. Compare Ethridge v. Samsung SDI
Co., 137 F.4th 309 (5th Cir. 2025) (Oldham, J.) (jurisdiction),
Sullivan v. LG Chem, Ltd., 79 F.4th 651 (6th Cir. 2023) (same),
LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. 2023)
(same), and Dilworth v. LG Chem, Ltd., 355 So. 3d 201 (Miss.
2022) (same), with Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496 (9th
Cir. 2023) (O’Scannlain, J.) (no jurisdiction), Ethridge, 137 F.4th
at 323–31 (Jones, J., dissenting) (same), and LG Chem, Ltd. v.
Superior Ct., 295 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) (same).
Mindful of this diverging authority and that “[t]he
greys”—rather than the black and white—“are dominant”
when applying personal jurisdiction doctrine, we consider
the facts here under the inquiry’s three prongs. Kulko v.
No. 24-2444 11
Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
A
Whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of a par-
ticular forum depends on whether it “deliberately reached
out beyond its home—by, for example, exploiting a market”
there. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (citation modified). A defendant
need not be physically present in a state to have sufficient con-
tacts for jurisdictional purposes. Purposeful availment can,
instead, “appear in different guises.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at
1071. Particularly relevant to products liability cases, one of
those guises comes in the form of the stream-of-commerce
theory.
The Supreme Court first articulated the stream-of-com-
merce theory in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980). The Court observed that a defendant corpora-
tion may purposefully avail itself of a forum when it “delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that” in-state consumers will purchase those products. Id. at
297–98. The circuits have split on the precise contours of this
theory. Some have adopted a stream-of-commerce-plus test
wherein a corporate defendant cannot purposefully avail
itself of a forum by simply placing its products into a distri-
bution system. See, e.g., Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 503. Rather, the
defendant must target a market by, for example, “creat[ing],
control[ling], or employ[ing] the distribution system” that
drives the product to the state. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (opinion of O’Connor, J.).
This circuit, however, has adopted a less demanding vari-
ant of the stream-of-commerce theory, which we have re-
ferred to as the “knowledge version.” B.D., 91 F.4th at 861.
12 No. 24-2444
Under the knowledge version, a defendant purposefully
avails itself of a forum if it “is aware that the final product is
being marketed in the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); Curry v. Revolution Lab’ys, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 399–400
(7th Cir. 2020) (rejecting a “per se requirement that the de-
fendant especially target the forum in its business activity”);
see also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1067.4 (4th ed.) (collecting cases and discussing the circuit
split).
Because Samsung SDI has no physical presence in Indiana,
the parties dispute whether, applying the knowledge version,
the company was aware its 18650 batteries would reach the
forum state through a stream of commerce. Two streams of
commerce are at play here, though. The first is an end-product
stream of commerce. The second is a derivative-product
stream of commerce. Samsung SDI purposefully availed itself
of the Indiana forum through the first but not the second.
1
Begin with what we call the end-product stream of
commerce. Samsung SDI sells its 18650 batteries in bulk to so-
phisticated customers that eventually incorporate them into
battery packs. As described above, battery packs consist of
several 18650 batteries and a circuit board designed to prevent
thermal runaway. Samsung SDI’s customers essentially create
a different product by producing these battery packs with all
their enhanced safety features. See Ethridge, 137 F.4th at 326
(Jones, J., dissenting) (“At the appropriate level of generality”
individual batteries and battery packs “are not the same prod-
ucts.”). The customers then sell the packs or integrate them
into end products.
No. 24-2444 13
Samsung SDI does not itself ship 18650 batteries to Indi-
ana. The stream-of-commerce theory, however, “contem-
plates that a defendant’s product may go through middlemen
before reaching consumers.” J.S.T. Corp. v. Foxconn Intercon-
nect Tech. Ltd., 965 F.3d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.).
Samsung SDI’s corporate representative confirmed that the
company’s customers include the likes of Black & Decker, HP,
and Dell. Those customers rely on battery packs to power
their products, including everything from power tools to lap-
tops. The corporate representative explained that, although
Samsung SDI limits its customers to those who intend to pur-
chase 18650 batteries for approved uses, it does not limit
where its customers distribute their end products. And the
record confirms Samsung SDI-powered products are indeed
available to consumers across Indiana.
On these facts, we can easily conclude that Samsung SDI
delivered its 18650 batteries to nationally recognized busi-
nesses, intending for them to be incorporated into packs and,
later, end products. The company did so “with the expecta-
tion” that those end products would be available to consum-
ers across the country, including in Indiana. World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298. At the least, Samsung SDI knew,
or was aware, its batteries would wind up in that state. Asahi,
480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Curry, 949 F.3d at 399–400.
So, though Samsung SDI has not reached out directly to
Indiana consumers, it has still “deliberately exploited” the In-
diana market by leveraging corporate middlemen to funnel
18650 batteries, encased in packs, to the state. Keeton, 465 U.S.
at 781. In short, Samsung SDI purposefully availed itself of
14 No. 24-2444
Indiana insofar as it expected battery packs to reach the forum
through its sales of 18650 batteries to sophisticated customers.
2
Turn now to the derivative-product stream of commerce.
Samsung SDI does not sell individual 18650 batteries directly
to consumers because the batteries are not designed to be
used outside of a pack. The company takes additional precau-
tions to ensure its batteries are handled safely. It screens its
corporate customers to verify they plan to use the batteries
only for approved purposes. And, as a precondition of sale,
every customer must acknowledge that 18650 batteries
“should not be dismantled from the battery pack.”
But people may still purchase individual 18650 batteries.
This case and others show that the derivative product is avail-
able to consumers at third-party vendors, including e-ciga-
rette stores. Yet nothing in the record suggests that Samsung
SDI “reached out beyond its home” to sell individual batteries
directly to Indiana consumers, either on its own or through
middlemen. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (internal quotation omitted).
Quite the opposite. Samsung SDI actively sought to avoid ex-
ploiting a stream of commerce that would lead to consumers
purchasing individual 18650 batteries.
The purposeful availment inquiry centers on the defend-
ant’s deliberate contacts with a forum. See, e.g., id.; Walden, 571
U.S. at 284; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly explained that “the ‘unilateral activity of an-
other party or a third person’” does not constitute purposeful
availment. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)).
World-Wide Volkswagen is instructive on this point. There, the
Court held that Oklahoma courts lacked personal jurisdiction
No. 24-2444 15
over a New York-based car dealer and regional distributor.
Worldwide-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288–89, 295. The de-
fendants conducted no business in Oklahoma, yet they sold a
car that was later involved in an accident in that state. Id. at
288. Still, the Oklahoma courts could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendants in the ensuing products lia-
bility lawsuit because it was the actions of third parties
alone—the buyers of the car—that caused the vehicle to end
up in the forum. Id. at 298–99.
Here, the unilateral actions of unknown third parties have
made individual 18650 batteries accessible to consumers in
Indiana. These third parties have created and exploited a de-
rivative-product stream of commerce. Absent their unilateral
actions, individual batteries would not be available to Indiana
consumers for purchase. Like World-Wide Volkswagen, the
third-party forum contacts do not amount to purposeful
availment by Samsung SDI. See id.
Admittedly, World-Wide Volkswagen is not a perfect ana-
logue to this case. As explained, Samsung SDI has sufficient
contacts with the forum through an end-product stream of
commerce, whereas the defendants in that case did not have
sufficient contacts with Oklahoma. But we read World-Wide
Volkswagen to say that, when analyzing each potential in-state
contact, our inquiry focuses on “the defendant’s conduct and
connection with the forum,” rather than those of other actors.
Id. at 297.
Samsung SDI had no hand in directing individual 18650
batteries to Indiana. In jurisdictional terms, it did not “contin-
uously and deliberately exploit[]” the derivative-product
stream of commerce. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781. Third-party ac-
tors did.
16 No. 24-2444
We pause to acknowledge that, on similar facts, other
courts have declined to “granulat[e] … the forum … into dis-
tinct market segments when evaluating personal jurisdic-
tion.” See, e.g., Morgan, 670 S.W.3d at 348; Sullivan, 79 F.4th at
672; Ethridge, 137 F.4th at 318 (“reject[ing] this ‘different mar-
kets’ understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment”). True,
the personal jurisdiction inquiry focuses on a defendant’s “af-
filiation with the State,” not some artificial subdivision. See
Walden, 571 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added). But in our view,
distinguishing between the end-product stream of commerce
and the derivative-product stream of commerce does not
amount to dividing the forum. Instead, it accurately differen-
tiates between the types of contacts Samsung SDI has with the
forum.
Recall, the stream-of-commerce theory is just one of the
“guises” in which purposeful availment can appear. Dudni-
kov, 514 F.3d at 1071; Curry, 949 F.3d at 398. It serves as a
method of establishing that a defendant has sufficient con-
tacts with a state. Courts routinely differentiate among de-
fendants’ forum contacts. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582
U.S. at 258–59 (distinguishing a pharmaceutical company’s
research and advocacy contacts from its manufacturing con-
tacts); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (separating a car
dealer’s retail contacts from its more “fortuitous” single-vehi-
cle contacts). Because streams of commerce are types of con-
tacts, courts can differentiate between them, too. And a single
forum can implicate two streams of commerce, one of which
a defendant deliberately exploits and the other of which it
does not. See Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 507–08 (differentiating
No. 24-2444 17
“consumer product[]” sales and “stand-alone batter[y]” sales
in a single forum). 2
What is more, the Supreme Court has advised defendants
that they can “‘structure [their] primary conduct’ to lessen or
avoid exposure to a given State’s courts.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 360
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). Consistent
with this advice, courts may differentiate among various con-
tacts—including streams of commerce—to acknowledge a de-
fendant’s efforts to do just that. A corporate defendant might
reduce its exposure to a forum’s jurisdiction by exploiting one
stream of commerce but not another. See Ethridge, 137 F.4th at
325 (Jones, J., dissenting). That is precisely what Samsung SDI
did here.
* * *
Samsung SDI has not availed itself of the Indiana forum
through the derivative-product stream of commerce. Individ-
ual 18650 batteries are available to consumers only because of
the unilateral actions of third parties. But the company has
availed itself of the Indiana forum through the end-product
stream of commerce. It no doubt expected that its batteries
would reach the state—yet only encased in packs, as evi-
denced by how it structured its business activities. “[F]or pur-
poseful availment purposes, a single sufficiently deliberate
2 Because identifying various forum contacts is a routine task in the
personal jurisdiction context, we do not share the concern of other courts
that distinguishing between streams of commerce would be unworkable.
See, e.g., Ethridge, 137 F.4th at 319–20 (declining to account for the fact that
Samsung SDI sells individual batteries only to sophisticated customers for
integration into packs).
18 No. 24-2444
contact can suffice,” so the first prong of the specific personal
jurisdiction is satisfied here. Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 504.
B
On the second prong, courts assess the relationship be-
tween a defendant’s purposeful contacts with a forum and the
underlying lawsuit. The Supreme Court’s “most common for-
mulation of the rule demands that the suit ‘arise out of or re-
late to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” Ford, 592
U.S. at 362 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb,
582 U.S. at 262).
In Ford, the Court explained that this formulation of the
rule can be satisfied in two ways. First, personal jurisdiction
will lie when a defendant’s in-state contacts caused the injury
that instigated the lawsuit—that is, when the lawsuit arose
out of the defendant’s contacts. Id. The second sufficient
showing requires something short of “a strict causal relation-
ship.” Id. A plaintiff need only show the suit relates to the de-
fendant’s forum contacts. The Supreme Court has provided
precious little guidance on how strong the link must be. But it
cautioned against an “anything goes” test. Id. Rather, the re-
latedness prong “incorporates real limits” on exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction meant “to adequately protect defendants
foreign to a forum.” Id.
Courts must scrutinize the relationship between in-state
contacts and lawsuits to police the boundary between the two
types of personal jurisdiction. The looser the connection be-
comes, the more an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction
will start to look like one of general personal jurisdiction. And
at a certain point, “the core distinction between” the two will
“collapse” altogether. Bernhardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 47
F.4th 856, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
No. 24-2444 19
B.D. does not argue that his injury arose directly out of
Samsung SDI’s forum contacts. Instead, he submits that the
company’s Indiana-based activities “relate to” his products li-
ability lawsuit to satisfy the second sufficient showing articu-
lated in Ford. We disagree.
B.D.’s stepfather purchased the individual 18650 battery
that later exploded in B.D.’s pocket at an e-cigarette retail
store. The battery was not encased in a pack and was therefore
acquired through an unauthorized, derivative-product trans-
action. The resulting products liability lawsuit thus does not
relate to Samsung SDI’s deliberate forum contacts. To be sure,
both B.D. and Samsung SDI have Indiana affiliations. B.D. re-
sides in the state and his injuries occurred there. And, again,
Samsung SDI is affiliated with the forum through the down-
stream consequences of selling 18650 batteries to sophisti-
cated customers for use as parts. But, fatal to establishing
personal jurisdiction here, those independent relationships
with Indiana do not overlap with one another.
There is a disconnect between Samsung SDI’s purposeful
in-state contacts, through an end-product stream of
commerce, and B.D.’s lawsuit, which stems from a consumer
purchase of an individual battery. Absent the requisite “rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,”
personal jurisdiction over Samsung SDI must be lacking. Wal-
den, 571 U.S. at 284 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775).
As explained at the outset, the legitimacy of maintaining
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonconsenting, foreign
defendant is rooted in reciprocity. “When (but only when) a
company exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state—thus enjoying the benefits and protections of
its laws”—may the state “hold the company to account for
20 No. 24-2444
related misconduct.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 360 (citation modified).
Here, Samsung SDI does not exercise the privilege of
conducting the type of business that led to B.D.’s injury and
subsequent lawsuit. That is, it does not sell individual 18650
batteries with the knowledge that they will be used outside of
a pack in Indiana. The company accordingly owes Indiana no
reciprocal obligation to appear in its courts to defend against
B.D.’s allegations, which relate only to that kind of business
activity.
Holding otherwise would undermine a related precept of
the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence: no-
tice. A defendant must have “fair warning—knowledge that a
particular activity may subject it to the jurisdiction of a foreign
sovereign.” Id. (citation modified). Because Samsung SDI
structured its activities to ensure only encased 18650 batteries
reached consumers in Indiana, it was not on “clear notice”
that it would have to answer for injuries occasioned by
consumers obtaining individual batteries—injuries wholly
unrelated to the company’s in-state activities. Id. (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
This would be a closer case if, for example, an 18650
battery exploded in a pack powering a laptop. In that coun-
terfactual, B.D. would have acquired the battery through the
end-product stream of commerce that Samsung SDI deliber-
ately exploited. The mismatch between Samsung SDI’s
purposeful contacts with the forum and B.D.’s lawsuit that
forecloses an exercise of personal jurisdiction here would thus
disappear. The relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the lawsuit would be stronger. So, B.D. would have a cor-
respondingly better argument that Samsung SDI’s reciprocal
obligation to appear in an Indiana court to answer for alleged
No. 24-2444 21
misconduct attaches under those circumstances. See id. And
the company would also have fair notice of the lawsuit, as
B.D.’s injury would be a downstream consequence of its in-
tentional, forum-based business activities. See id. This is not
that case, though. The disconnect between Samsung SDI’s
purposeful contacts with the state through the sale of 18650
batteries as components and B.D.’s injury—the consequence
of an unauthorized, individual-battery purchase—precludes
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 3
B.D. resists this conclusion. As he sees it, no jurisdictional
daylight exists between a fact pattern where a consumer pur-
chases an individual 18650 battery that explodes and one
where a battery acquired from a pack explodes. According to
B.D., in a case like his, Samsung SDI can raise product misuse
as a merits defense. In other words, the fact that he obtained
an individual 18650 battery even though consumers are not
meant to handle individual batteries outside of a pack could
allow the company to avoid liability. See, e.g., Hoffman v. E.W.
Bliss Co., 448 N.E.2d 277, 283 (Ind. 1983) (“Misuse is a well-
recognized defense” to strict products liability.). But, B.D.
says, an unauthorized purchase has no bearing on the juris-
dictional analysis. See, e.g., Dilworth, 355 So. 3d at 208 (sup-
porting the argument that a “consumer’s purported misuse of
the product may be a valid merits defense,” but “it is not an
3 One could also imagine a scenario in which Samsung SDI availed
itself of the Indiana forum through the derivative-product stream of com-
merce—either on its own or by leveraging middlemen. There, the mis-
match between the company’s deliberate contacts and B.D.’s lawsuit
would disappear, too. But as explained, supra, there is no evidence that
Samsung SDI exploited that stream of commerce here. So, the disconnect
remains.
22 No. 24-2444
argument that defeats a prima facie case of personal jurisdic-
tion”). We cannot agree.
For one, our holding does not depend on B.D.’s misuse of
an 18650 battery. Rather, it depends on his stepfather having
purchased it in a stream of commerce that Samsung SDI did
not deliberately exploit. For another, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction
is an essential element of district court jurisdiction, without
which the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”
Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., 751 F.3d at 800 (alteration
omitted) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S.
574, 584 (1999)). Say jurisdictional and merits defenses over-
lap. The first cannot be circumvented by relying on the possi-
bility that the second may later come into play. See LG Chem,
295 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 682.
B.D.’s primary objection to a dismissal, though, focuses on
his understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford. In
that case, two individuals were injured while driving Ford ve-
hicles in their home states of Montana and Minnesota. Ford,
592 U.S. at 356. The plaintiffs sued the car manufacturer in
their respective home states. Ford moved to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, arguing neither lawsuit related to its
forum contacts because it did not design, manufacture, or sell
the vehicles at issue in those states. Id. at 356–57. “Only later
resales and relocations by consumers had brought the vehi-
cles to Montana and Minnesota.” Id. at 357.
The Supreme Court rejected Ford’s arguments and
concluded that the courts in each state could exercise specific
personal jurisdiction. The company’s problem was that it con-
ducted substantial business in both states. “By every means
imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots,
print ads, and direct mail—Ford urge[d] Montanans and
No. 24-2444 23
Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including” the model vehi-
cles in which the plaintiffs were injured. Id. at 365. The com-
pany also “foster[ed] ongoing connections to its cars’ owners”
in Montana and Minnesota by, for example, providing in-
state repair services. Id. Though it was true the precise cars at
issue were not sold or manufactured in those states, “Ford
had systematically served a market in Montana and Minne-
sota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege[d] malfunc-
tioned and injured them.” Id. (emphasis added).
To the Court, Ford’s contacts with the states were thus re-
lated enough to the lawsuits to support specific personal ju-
risdiction. Id. at 371. It observed that “[w]hen a company …
serves a market for a product in a State and that product
causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the State’s
courts may entertain the resulting suit.” Id. at 355.
In B.D.’s view, if we strictly apply Ford, this is an open-
and-shut case. Samsung SDI serves the Indiana market be-
cause its 18650 batteries reach the state through a stream of
commerce. He was injured when that model battery exploded
in his pocket. And he is an Indiana resident. Ford requires no
more, so an Indiana court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over Samsung SDI. B.D.’s position finds support in some of
our fellow circuits and state courts. See, e.g., Ethridge, 137 F.4th
at 318 (exercising personal jurisdiction over Samsung SDI be-
cause the plaintiff was “a Texas resident, he used his 18650
battery in Texas, and he suffered an injury in Texas” (footnote
omitted)); Morgan, 670 S.W.3d at 349 (same). With great re-
spect for those decisions, we do not read Ford so expansively.
Critical here is the issue the Court in Ford did “not ad-
dress.” 592 U.S. at 365. It left for another day a scenario where
“Ford marketed the models” involved in each plaintiff’s
24 No. 24-2444
accident “in only a different State or region.” Id. It would have
been more difficult for the Court to find the plaintiffs’ suits
related to Ford’s forum contacts if they were injured in F-150s
but the automaker had not served a market in Montana and
Minnesota for that model truck. See Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 505–
06; Ethridge, 137 F.4th at 325–26 (Jones, J., dissenting).
The issue presented here more closely resembles that open
question than it does the question resolved in Ford. Samsung
SDI does not market individual 18650 batteries in Indiana—it
expects only batteries encased in packs to reach the state. Yet
it was an individual battery that exploded in B.D.’s pocket
and led to this lawsuit. Swap vehicles in for batteries and Ford
in for Samsung SDI, and the differences between this case and
Ford emerge. We must decide whether the automaker is sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in Indiana for a consumer-plain-
tiff’s in-state injury in a Ford Explorer when the company sells
Explorers only to police departments. See Yamashita, 62 F.4th
507–08 (discussing the same analogy). The rationale in Ford
does not control on these facts. In the counterfactual, Ford
would no longer have “systematically served a market” in the
forum “for the very vehicle[]” that led to the plaintiff’s injury.
Ford, 592 U.S. at 365. Indeed, the company did not intend for
the plaintiff to get behind the wheel of an Explorer.
We doubt the relationship between the lawsuit and Ford’s
forum contacts is “close enough to support specific jurisdic-
tion” under the hypothetical circumstances. Id. at 371; see also
Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 507–08 (expressing a similar doubt). But
of course, those are the circumstances of this case. Substitute
back in batteries for vehicles and Samsung SDI for Ford, and
we do not think the Supreme Court would consider the
No. 24-2444 25
relationship here close enough to support an exercise of spe-
cific personal jurisdiction. See Yamashita, 62 F.4th at 508.
On B.D.’s contrary reading of Ford, if a corporate defend-
ant has some sufficient contact with the forum, a court may
exercise specific personal jurisdiction so long as the plaintiff
resides in the state and is injured there. But that reading
downplays the importance of the defendant’s forum contacts
and gives too much weight to the plaintiff’s contacts. Put an-
other way, B.D.’s reading impermissibly shifts the jurisdic-
tional inquiry from defendant focused to plaintiff focused.
The Supreme Court has “consistently rejected attempts to sat-
isfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by
demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff … and the fo-
rum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284. Because B.D.’s lawsuit does not
relate to Samsung SDI’s purposeful contacts with the forum,
neither his Indiana residency nor the location of his injury es-
tablishes personal jurisdiction.
If we accepted B.D.’s rule by watering down the related-
ness requirement and shifting our focus to his contacts, we
would blur the distinction between general and specific per-
sonal jurisdiction. Time and again, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that “a corporation’s continuous activity of some
sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that
the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activ-
ity.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U.S. at 264 (citation modified);
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. Samsung
SDI’s sales of 18650 batteries for use in end products, contin-
uous as they may be, cannot support jurisdiction over B.D.’s
unrelated lawsuit—not without transforming specific per-
sonal jurisdiction into “a loose and spurious form of general
jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 582 U.S. at 264.
26 No. 24-2444
C
Assuming a defendant has purposefully availed itself of
the forum and the plaintiff’s lawsuit relates to the defendant’s
in-forum contacts, a court must still “determine whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair
play and substantial justice.’” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476
(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320). Several factors inform that
analysis. These include “[t]he burden on the defendant” in
having to litigate in a foreign court, “the forum State’s interest
in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the under-
lying dispute, and the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Curry,
949 F.3d at 402 (alteration omitted) (quoting Purdue Rsch.
Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 781 (7th Cir.
2003)). Because B.D.’s lawsuit does not relate to Samsung
SDI’s Indiana-based contacts, we need not evaluate this last
prong of the jurisdictional inquiry.
III
Samsung SDI purposefully availed itself of the Indiana fo-
rum but only through an end-product stream of commerce.
The company expected its 18650 batteries to reach the state
encased in packs. Yet B.D.’s injury occurred when an individ-
ual battery—purchased outside of a pack—exploded in his
pocket. The relationship between his resulting lawsuit and
Samsung SDI’s purposeful forum contacts is too attenuated to
support an exercise of personal jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.