In The Interest Of Dg Ag Kr And Mr Minor Children
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0798
Filed July 23, 2025
IN THE INTEREST OF D.G., A.G., K.R., and M.R.,
Minor Children,
K.R., Mother,
Appellant,
M.R., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Paul G. Crawford,
Judge.
Parents separately appeal the termination of their parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Jennie Wilson-Moore of Wilson Law Firm, Conrad, for appellant mother.
Jeffrey P. Hazen of Hitchins & Thronson, PLC, Marshalltown, for appellant
father.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Mary Cowdrey, State Public Defender’s Office, Marshalltown, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and
Sandy, JJ.
2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children,
D.G. (born in 2011), A.G. (born in 2014), K.R. (born in 2018), and M.R. (born in
2019). The father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his children,
K.R. and M.R. Upon our review, we affirm on both appeals.1
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This family most recently became involved with the Iowa Department of
Health and Human Services (the department) on a voluntary basis in 2021,2 due
to concerns of domestic violence between the parents, substance use, erratic and
hostile behavior by the parents, unsanitary household conditions, lack of
supervision, and other related issues. Family-preservation services were put in
place, but the concerns worsened. The children were adjudicated in need of
assistance. They were removed from the parents’ custody in May 2023. They
were placed in different foster homes. In July 2024, after neither parent made
notable progress toward reunification, the State initiated termination-of-parental-
rights proceedings.
The termination hearing took place over two days in February 2025. The
department caseworker detailed the parents’ “dishonesty” about their housing.
They had “abandoned” their home in Liscomb after the children were removed.
Eventually, the parents moved into a home in Waterloo. But they had at least one
1 The parental rights of A.G.’s father were terminated in a separate order, which is
not at issue here. D.G.’s father consented to the termination of his parental rights.
2 But the department reported it had been involved with the family “off and on since
2012.”
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other person living there, in violation of the safety plan. They were evicted from
the home in December 2024, due to nonpayment of rent.
Since then, the father had been living with his mother in a one-bedroom,
low-income apartment. His mother was not allowed to have people stay with her
“past two weeks” so he was “looking for a place.” The father reported that he
began a two-year program at a community college in January 2025. The
department caseworker testified the father had been asked to drug test “over 26
times,” which were all “no shows” except for three tests. The three tests the father
completed were positive for methamphetamine, most recently in January. The
father maintained he had not used since August 2024, explaining that he was
exposed to methamphetamine by some acquaintances who were using. He
requested “three to six months” additional time, explaining he could “voluntarily
take parenting classes if I am not at college or I could engage in outpatient
treatment.” In the meantime, he believed the children should return to the mother’s
custody.
At the time of the termination hearing, it was unclear where the mother was
living. She reported that after the eviction, she stayed in a hotel, then the father’s
mother’s apartment, then back at the hotel. But her plan was to get a trailer with
the father’s education loan. Despite maintaining they had ended their relationship,
the mother and father were often together.
The mother failed to appear for requested drug tests forty-six times. She
participated in a sweat patch in September 2024 but failed to appear to have it
removed. The mother completed a test in January 2025 that was negative for all
substances. But the department caseworker felt the mother needed additional
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time to show sobriety before the children could be safely returned. Aside from
housing issues and substance use, concerns remained about the mother’s mental
health (which she had not addressed with any consistency) and domestic violence
with the father. The mother reported incidents in which the father had “choked her
out,” held her down, and broken her nose. The children provided similar reports,
and D.G. had intervened during such violent interactions.
The department and guardian ad litem recommended termination of
parental rights.3 Following the hearing, the court entered an order terminating the
parents’ rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2024). They separately
appeal.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re A.S.,
906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). We give weight to, but are not bound by, the
court’s fact findings. Id.
In our review, we use a three-step analysis: first, determine if a ground for
termination exists under Iowa Code section 232.116 paragraph (1); next, apply the
best-interest framework from paragraph (2); and last, consider if any exceptions
from paragraph (3) apply to preclude termination. Id. at 472–73. “However, if a
parent does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not address it.” In re
J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).
3 D.G., who was thirteen years old, also testified on behalf of her younger siblings.
She stated, “I kind of like question myself why like it has to be so long . . . .” She
then told the mother, “at the end of the day if you’re generally doing it for your kids,
for my sibling, make it seem that way. I guess don’t wait until the end because it
is not fair for my siblings.”
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III. Father’s Appeal
The father claims termination of his parental rights is not in the best interests
of K.R. and M.R. Our best-interests framework considers “the child[ren]’s
safety,” “the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of
the child[ren],” and “the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the
child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive
a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under
section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be
able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa
2014) (citation omitted). In addition to a myriad of other concerns, the most blatant
reunification impediment the father faces is that he either missed drug tests or
tested positive for methamphetamine throughout the entirety of this proceeding.
He acknowledged his positive test in January 2025 but provided an unlikely
explanation. The department caseworker testified she did not believe the father
was sober. In any event, she opined that by this point in the proceeding, the father
should have engaged in the necessary services to show he could achieve long-
term sobriety. Termination is in the children’s best interests.
The father also claims that an additional six months would “allow [him] and
his children to be reunified.” To grant an extension of time for reunification, the
court must “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral
changes” providing a basis to determine the children will be able to return to the
parent at the end of the additional six months. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). We
note that the father had ten months between the permanency and termination
hearings in which he could have shown the progress he suggested he could
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achieve. The caseworker opined the father “has had more than enough time.” He
has not demonstrated the ability to maintain stable housing or sobriety in the
community. On this record, the court had no basis to grant an extension.
IV. Mother’s Appeal
The mother’s parental rights to the children were terminated pursuant to
section 232.116(1)(f). This paragraph provides the juvenile court may terminate
parental rights if all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
as provided in section 232.102.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f).
The mother does not challenge any of these elements. Instead, she claims
she “maintained significant and meaningful contact with [the children], and her
rights should not have been terminated.” The mother’s only claim relates to the
final element of section 232.116(1)(e); accordingly, she has waived a challenge to
the grounds for termination found by the court under section 232.116(1)(f). In any
event, we conclude the court correctly determined the children could not be
returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. See id.
§ 232.116(1)(f)(4); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting
“present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”). The mother
conceded that her children could not stay with her where she was currently living.
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Because the children could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of
the hearing, section 232.116(1)(f) was satisfied.
The mother next argues termination is not in the children’s best interests
due to the bond she shares with them.4 The caseworker testified the children share
a bond with the mother and acknowledged the mother did most of the parenting
during visits, often helping the father. However, the mother made many choices
that were not in the children’s best interests. For example, she failed to acquire
adequate dental care for the children after being prompted to do so by the
department, which resulted in the children’s teeth rotting and having to be pulled.
The mother also exposed the children to dangerous situations, substance use,
unsanitary living conditions, and domestic violence. The court noted:
The children are with multiple foster families but are safe. The foster
families took action to fix the children’s teeth. Their behaviors have
noticeably improved over time with their parents. In order to further
the long-term nurturing and growth of the children, their best
placement is with an adoptive family/families instead of waiting for
parental stability. The children’s physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs can be best met by termination and adoption[.]
As noted above, the rule is well-established that, when the statutory grounds
are otherwise satisfied, a mere hope that a parent will be able to someday provide
a better home is not enough to withhold permanency. A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 112.
Although services were offered to the mother for many years, she did not make
4 The mother does not separately claim her bond with the children should preclude
termination pursuant to the permissive exception under section 232.116(3), so we
analyze her claim only as a best-interests challenge. See In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d
529, 534 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (“We interpret the father’s bond-based
argument as a best-interests argument rather than a permissive-exception
argument because his issue heading referenced only best interests and that is the
thrust of his argument.”).
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meaningful progress to eliminate the reasons for the children’s removal.
Termination is in the children’s best interests.
Finally, the mother claims the court “erred in bifurcating the termination
hearings for [the parents] and for not granting the mother’s motion to continue her
portion of the hearing to coincide with the father’s hearing.”5 The State argues the
mother failed to preserve error on this claim because even though she initially
objected to the father’s hearing being held separately, “she acquiesced and lodged
no objection” when asked again. We observe the same. Specifically, at the outset
of the first day, after the mother’s objection, the court asked her attorney, “Wouldn’t
the court still be able to consider that fact [information about the parents’
relationship] if it is raised here today by you and your client and raised at a future
date [by the father]?” The mother’s attorney responded, “Absolutely,” but she
maintained concern about her ability to “put [her] client back up if we completely
bifurcate these cases.” At the outset of the second day, the court asked the mother
if it was “acceptable” for the court to consider the mother’s case submitted, to which
the mother’s attorney agreed. The mother’s attorney was allowed to question
witnesses on the second day of hearing, and the court’s order terminating the
parents’ rights collectively discusses the evidence presented on both days of the
hearing.
Even assuming the mother preserved this claim, she provides no authority
to support it. Accordingly, we deem the issue waived and will not consider it. See
5 The hearing began on February 4, at which time the court granted the father’s
motion to continue due to his attorney being ill and allowed the mother’s case to
proceed. The remainder of the hearing took place on February 26.
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Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (requiring petitions on appeal to “substantially comply
with rule 6.1401—Form 5”), 6.1401—Form 5 (“[S]tate what findings of fact or
conclusions of law the district court made with which you disagree and why,
generally referencing a particular part of the record, witnesses’ testimony, or
exhibits that support your position on appeal: . . . Include supporting legal authority
for each issue raised, including authority contrary to appellant’s case, if known.”);
In re A.T., No. 25-0119, 2025 WL 1085210, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2025).
Having addressed the issues properly before this court, we affirm the
termination of the parents’ parental rights to their children.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.