State Of Iowa V Laura Margaret Mangrich
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1660
Filed July 23, 2025
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LAURA MARGARET MANGRICH,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Elizabeth Dupuich,
Judge.
A defendant appeals her sentences for second-degree theft and
unauthorized use of a credit card. AFFIRMED.
Raya D. Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and
Langholz, JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.
While serving as treasurer of the Iowa City Girls Softball Association for
three years, Laura Mangrich stole money from the association. She pleaded guilty
to second-degree theft, a class “D” felony, and unauthorized use of a credit card,
an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 714.1, 714.2(2), 715A.6(1),
715A.6(2)(c) (2020). In her plea, Mangrich admitted that she took between $1000
and $10,000 of funds from the association and obtained funds of less than $1500
through the credit card. And before her sentencing, she repaid the association
almost $30,000—the full amount the association claimed as pecuniary damages.
At sentencing, she asked the district court to impose deferred judgments. But the
court disagreed, sentencing Mangrich to concurrent suspended sentences—a five-
year suspended sentence on the felony and a two-year suspended sentence on
the misdemeanor. Mangrich now appeals, arguing that the district court abused
its discretion in selecting suspended sentences rather than a deferred judgment.
Seeing no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, we affirm.
We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions, including the
exercise of its discretion whether to grant a deferred judgment, for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This
deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a
particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption
in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And even when
the court would have been justified in imposing the sentence sought by the
defendant, “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the
district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable
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grounds.” Id. at 725. So it is not enough that the defendant disagrees with the
court’s weighing of the sentencing factors and the sentence ultimately selected.
See Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 863 (“The test for whether a sentencing court abused
its discretion is not whether we might have weighed the various factors
differently.”); Iowa Code § 901.5.
The district court did not abuse its discretion here. Mangrich does not point
to any unreasonable or untenable grounds of the court’s decision. Rather, she
argues that the court should have weighed the sentencing factors differently to
reach the conclusion that a deferred judgment was appropriate. She contends it
should have put more weight on—among other things—her substance-use and
mental-health issues, her engagement with treatment for those issues, her
performance on pretrial release, and her efforts to strengthen her relationships with
supportive family.
But the court’s reasoning expressed at the sentencing hearing and the
written sentencing order shows that it considered these factors. It also carefully
explained why it disagreed with her request for deferred judgments:
It does appear the Defendant has made significant gains in repairing
the damage she has caused and in improving her circumstances.
This is with the unwavering support of her family. This is why she’s
not spending any time in jail. This is the break she’s getting, and I’m
sure she appreciates it very much. But the Court can’t ignore the
fact that her scheme spanned approximately three and a half years
throughout which she repeatedly breached her position of trust in
executing countless decisions and demonstrating relatively
sophisticated deception to deprave a nonprofit which supports
female athletes.
A large part of my job in protecting the community is keeping
people from committing crimes of this nature. While I sincerely
appreciate the request for a deferred judgment and the excellent
arguments advanced by [Mangrich’s trial counsel] with a very
impressive presentation, I don’t believe the goals can be met with a
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deferred judgment. I’m going to deny the request for a deferred
judgment based on all of the information that I was just provided.
And the court summed up its judgment “that the sentences and convictions
imposed will offer Defendant the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation balanced
against the need to protect the community from future offenses by Defendant and
others.” Seeing no abuse of discretion in this exercise of the district court’s
sentencing judgment, we affirm Mangrich’s sentences.
AFFIRMED.