Soto V Ten Bridges
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
ARGYLL VEGA SOTO,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
TEN BRIDGES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants/Appellants.
No. 1 CA-CV 24-0759
FILED 07-24-2025
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2021-004184
The Honorable John L. Blanchard, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Law Offices of Kyle A. Kinney, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Kyle A. Kinney
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Zwillinger Wulkan PLC, Phoenix
By Scott H. Zwillinger, Peter A. Silverman, Jennifer L. Allen,
Samantha T. Lee
Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
Legal AZ, Tempe
By Morgan Seegmiller
Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
SOTO v. TEN BRIDGES, et al.
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
T H U M M A, Judge:
¶1 Defendant Ten Bridges, LLC (Ten Bridges) appeals from a
judgment entered after a jury verdict, challenging the admission of parol
evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting common law fraud and
a punitive damages award in favor of plaintiff Argyll Vega Soto. Because
Ten Bridges has shown no error, the judgment is affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Vega Soto owned real property in Maricopa County, Arizona.
He fell behind on homeowners’ association (HOA) payments, and in 2018,
the HOA sought foreclosure against him. In December 2018, a default
judgment entered against Vega Soto, and a judicial foreclosure was
ordered. A sheriff’s foreclosure sale took place in June 2019. The sheriff used
the proceeds to pay the HOA lien and deposited $117,277.39 in excess
proceeds with the court.
¶3 Ten Bridges buys distressed properties and the right to excess
proceeds. Ten Bridges’ employee Sharon Leckey left a voice mail message
with Vega Soto in November 2019, offering Ten Bridges’ services and
mentioning options. Vega Soto did not return the call. Leckey then sent
Vega Soto an email on December 27, 2019, stating there were “excess funds
related to” the property he had owned and that Ten Bridges had expertise
in recovering excess proceeds and had helped people all around the country
to do so. Leckey’s email stated the process to recover excess proceeds was
“extensive,” “exhausting” and “tedious.” On behalf of Ten Bridges,
Leckey’s email offered Vega Soto two options: either sell his rights to the
excess proceeds for a lump sum he would receive upon signing the
agreement or split with Ten Bridges the legal costs of filing an application
for excess proceeds.
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Decision of the Court
¶4 In the following three days, Vega Soto and Leckey exchanged
emails and texts, and had telephone conversations, about the excess
proceeds. Ultimately, Vega Soto agreed to sell Ten Bridges the right to
pursue the $117,277.39 in excess proceeds in exchange for a cash payment
of $10,000. Vega Soto alleges Leckey also promised that, if Ten Bridges
successfully recovered the excess proceeds, it would pay him an additional
$5,000.
¶5 The next afternoon, Leckey told Vega Soto to drive to a UPS
store to meet a notary and sign a quit claim deed, giving up any interest
Vega Soto had in the property. As Vega Soto was driving to UPS, Leckey
read the agreement to him over the phone. Then, Leckey emailed Vega Soto
a copy, which he signed less than 30 minutes later after “glanc[ing]” at it.
Once Vega Soto sent proof he had signed the contract, Leckey deposited
$10,000 in Vega Soto’s account. Vega Soto texted Leckey a few days later,
asking her to “remember the $5,000 left when [Ten Bridges] gets more
money.”
¶6 Ten Bridges applied for the excess proceeds and, in mid-2020,
obtained an order distributing the $117,227.39. After the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) received payment
of a $30,479.59 lien it had on the property, Ten Bridges received $86,797.80.
Ten Bridges did not, at that time, pay Vega Soto the $5,000 he claimed they
agreed upon if Ten Bridges successfully recovered the excess proceeds.
¶7 In January 2021, Vega Soto called Leckey to ask for an update.
Leckey responded that Ten Bridges had yet to recover the funds and
blamed the delay on COVID. Vega Soto, however, knew Ten Bridges had
recovered the excess proceeds about seven months earlier.
¶8 Vega Soto then filed this case against Ten Bridges, alleging
common law fraud in the inducement and breach of contract.
¶9 A five-day trial followed, where Vega Soto, Leckey and Ten
Bridges’ owner and manager Demian Heald testified. Ten Bridges moved
for judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract claim, arguing
that, when looking at the four corners of the contract, Ten Bridges had
fulfilled the terms of the agreement. The court denied the motion and found
that parol evidence of the verbal agreement for an additional $5,000, once
Ten Bridges recovered the excess funds, was admissible as evidence of
fraud in the inducement.
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Decision of the Court
¶10 After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Vega
Soto on both counts. The jury awarded $5,926.05 in damages on the breach
of contract claim along with a combined total of $500,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages on the fraud claim.
¶11 Ten Bridges renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of
law on the breach of contract claim and also moved for new trial, both of
which were denied. Ten Bridges timely appealed. This court has appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Sections 12- 120.21(A)(1) and - 2101(A)(1)
(2025).1
DISCUSSION
¶12 Ten Bridges presents three arguments on appeal. First, Ten
Bridges challenges the admission of testimony regarding a verbal
agreement to pay an additional $5,000 if Ten Bridges successfully recovered
the excess proceeds. Second, Ten Bridges argues Vega Soto presented
insufficient evidence to support common law fraud. Third, Ten Bridges
argues it was error to award punitive damages, and even if punitive
damages were appropriate, the amount awarded was excessive and
unconstitutional. The court addresses each argument in turn.
I. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Admitting Evidence of a Verbal
Agreement for an Additional $5,000 if Ten Bridges Recovered the
Excess Proceeds.
¶13 This court reviews rulings on the admission of evidence for
an abuse of discretion and will reverse if “unfair prejudice resulted” or “the
court incorrectly applied the law.” Larsen v. Decker, 196 Ariz. 239, 241 ¶ 6
(App. 2000) (citing cases).
¶14 The contract signed by Vega Soto states Vega Soto (referred
to as Grantor) “for and in consideration of $10,000.00 (Ten-Thousand
Dollars) received, conveys and quit claims to Ten Bridges LLC (‘Grantee’) .
. . all of Grantor’s rights, title, and interest in the following described real
property.” The contract has an integration clause, stating it “represents the
entire and exclusive agreement between the Grantor and the Grantee. There
are no other verbal agreements, terms, or conditions between the parties
which are not expressly provided herein.”
1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited
refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
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Decision of the Court
¶15 Ten Bridges argues it was error to admit evidence of a verbal
agreement that Ten Bridges would pay Vega Soto an additional $5,000 if
Ten Bridges successfully recovered the excess proceeds. It more specifically
argues that, under the parol evidence rule, any evidence of a verbal
agreement inconsistent with the written contract was inadmissible, and
thus the superior court erred in allowing Vega Soto’s testimony and
submitting the breach of contract claim to the jury.
¶16 The parol evidence rule generally “precludes admission of
any understandings or representations made prior to or
contemporaneously with the written contract if the contract was intended
as a final and complete integration of the parties’ agreement.” Formento v.
Encanto Bus. Park, 154 Ariz. 495, 498 (App. 1987). But here, Ten Bridges
failed to timely object to the introduction of testimony regarding the verbal
agreement, thereby waiving any such objection. See Cedic Dev. Corp. v.
Sibole, 25 Ariz. App. 185, 187–88 (1975). The evidence of the verbal
agreement was admitted without objection and, after admission, no motion
was made to strike it. Ten Bridges admits it did not raise any objection until
its motion for a judgment as a matter of law, when it stated there was no
basis to “open the four corners of the document and admit extrinsic
evidence” for purposes of the breach of contract claim. As noted in Sibole:
Although counsel showed an awareness of the
applicability of the parol evidence rule, no
intention was demonstrated by these comments
that the court consider a formal, specific
objection to have been made. Therefore, the
court was entitled to consider parol evidence in
reaching its decision, and when considered, it
supplies a sufficient foundation for the trial
court’s decision.
Id. Accordingly, the court did not err in admitting evidence of the verbal
agreement for an additional $5,000.
II. Vega Soto Presented Substantial Trial Evidence of Common Law
Fraud.
¶17 Ten Bridges argues Vega Soto presented insufficient evidence
of fraud. In reviewing a jury’s verdict, this court views the evidence and
resulting inferences in the light most favorable to upholding the judgment.
Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co., 184 Ariz. 120, 123 (App. 1995). This court
will affirm a judgment if substantial evidence was presented to permit
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Decision of the Court
reasonable people to reach the decision reached by the jury. Hutcherson v.
City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 53 ¶ 13 (1998) (citing cases). “Substantial
evidence” is “any relevant evidence from which a reasonable mind might
draw a conclusion.” Troutman v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 170 Ariz. 513, 518
(App. 1992) (citation omitted).
¶18 The nine elements of common law fraud under Arizona law
are “a material, false representation, scienter, the fraudfeasor’s intent to
induce reliance upon the misrepresentation, the fraud victim’s ignorance of
its falsity, his actual, reasonable reliance, and his consequent and proximate
injury.” Parks v. Macro-Dynamics, Inc., 121 Ariz. 517, 520 (App. 1979). To
prevail, a plaintiff must prove the nine elements of fraud with particularity,
Hall v. Romero, 141 Ariz. 120, 124 (App. 1984), and by clear and convincing
evidence, Comerica Bank v. Mahmoodi, 224 Ariz. 289, 291 (App. 2010). Ten
Bridges argues Vega Soto failed to prove (1) a false, material representation
and (2) resulting damages.
A. Substantial Trial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Conclusion
that Leckey Made a False, Material Misrepresentation to
Vega Soto.
¶19 Ten Bridges alleges the undisputed evidence shows that
Leckey’s statements to Vega Soto were true, and that Vega Soto did not
identify any intentionally false statement Leckey made. The record,
however, was sufficient for the jury to reach contrary conclusions.
¶20 Vega Soto’s complaint alleged five material
misrepresentations made by Ten Bridges, through its agent Leckey: (1) that
Leckey was there to help Vega Soto and provide a service, (2) that Leckey
was an expert in Arizona foreclosure, (3) that Vega Soto had no chance to
recover any excess proceeds on his own and would have to pay substantial
attorneys’ fees he could not afford, (4) that Vega Soto’s only chance to
recover anything was by accepting this deal with Ten Bridges and (5) that
if Ten Bridges was successful in recovering the excess proceeds, it would
pay Vega Soto an additional $5,000.
¶21 Leckey emailed Vega Soto informing him that there were
“excess funds related to” the property he had owned and that her company
had expertise in retrieving these funds and had helped people all around
the country to do so. Vega Soto testified he believed Leckey was helping
him and offering him her services to retrieve the funds. Leckey testified that
she understood Vega Soto believed Ten Bridges was offering to help him
and providing him a service and that she did not correct him or let him
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Decision of the Court
know she was in fact only interested in furthering the interests of Ten
Bridges.
¶22 Vega Soto testified that, when Leckey contacted him to
discuss his options, she said “it will be almost impossible” for him to
recover the excess proceeds on his own, that there were “other existing
loans and liens on the property,” and that she knew other cases where
people had lost their excess proceeds to creditors. Leckey testified that it
was Ten Bridges’ business practice to independently investigate and
perform a title search before contacting the previous homeowners of
distressed properties and that she was aware before contacting Vega Soto
that only HUD had an outstanding lien on the property. She also testified
she was aware the HUD lien for was for $30,479 of the total excess proceeds.
¶23 Leckey’s email stated the process to recover the excess
proceeds can be “extensive,” “exhausting” and “time consuming and
tedious.” The email also stated the results from retrieving excess proceeds
“were often less than the filing party expected.” Leckey also admitted she
told Vega Soto there was a tight timeline to recover the excess proceeds,
even though she believed the excess proceeds would not be lost to the State
for at least 3 to 5 years.
¶24 Leckey admitted that her job was to make sure Ten Bridges
beat competitors vying for Vega Soto’s exceeds proceeds and that obtaining
his signature on the contract was the real deadline. Leckey also admitted
her job was to convince Vega Soto that $10,000 was a beneficial deal and
that he should surrender his rights to the excess proceeds to Ten Bridges.
¶25 Vega Soto testified that Leckey promised an extra $5,000
payment if Ten Bridges was able to recover the excess proceeds. He also
testified she told him not to worry about the fact the contract said nothing
about the extra $5,000. Leckey countered she never made any deal with
Vega Soto for an extra $5,000 payment. However, she admitted she received
a text message from Vega Soto nine days after signing the deed asking her
to “remember the $5,000 left when [Ten Bridges] gets more money,” to
which she responded without addressing the $5,000 request.
¶26 Ten Bridges alleges Leckey’s words about the difficulty of
applying for excess proceeds are statements of opinion and cannot form the
basis of a fraud claim. In general, for a representation to “constitute
actionable fraud, it must relate to either a past or existing fact. It cannot be
predicated on unfulfilled promises, expressions of intention or statements
concerning future events unless such were made with the present intention
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Decision of the Court
not to perform.” Staheli v. Kauffman, 122 Ariz. 380, 383 (1979) (citing cases).
But there are exceptions to this general rule, and the issue must be dealt
with on a case-by-case basis. Page Inv. Co. v. Staley, 105 Ariz. 562, 564 (1970).
¶27 An opinion can be actionable when it is accompanied by other
false representations. Id. at 564–65. “[A]n expression of an opinion may
[also] be treated as a representation of fact if the maker holds himself out as
possessing superior knowledge or special information regarding the subject
of the representation.” Walters v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phoenix, 131
Ariz. 321, 325 (1982). Whether these exceptions apply depends upon the
status of the parties. Id. “They must have adverse interests in the transaction
and the maker must have special experience or training in the matter or
purport to have them.” Id.
¶28 Leckey’s statement about the difficulty in recovering excess
proceeds was only one of many of her representations made to Vega Soto
on behalf of Ten Bridges. Ten Bridges and Vega Soto clearly had adverse
interests in the transaction, with Ten Bridges buying the rights to Vega
Soto’s excess proceeds. And Leckey portrayed to Vega Soto that Ten
Bridges had superior knowledge, with expertise and training, helping
people all around the country recover excess proceeds. Although Leckey’s
misrepresentations about the difficulty in recovering excess proceeds
without the help of Ten Bridges might be characterized as opinions, they
were actionable under these circumstances.
¶29 Finally, Ten Bridges alleges Vega Soto failed to prove it made
misrepresentations to him. Ten Bridges argues Leckey induced Vega Soto
to sign the agreement by creating a false sense of urgency, and a false sense
of urgency “will not support a fraud claim where, as here, [Vega Soto] had
the opportunity to examine the agreement before signing it.” But even if a
false sense of urgency by itself will not support a fraud claim, the
substantial evidence of various other material misrepresentations made to
induce Vega Soto to sign the contract would allow the jury to conclude
Leckey made false, material misrepresentations to Vega Soto. See Wells
Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Loc. No. 395 Pension
Tr. Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 481 ¶¶ 8, 482 ¶ 12 & 490 ¶ 57 (2002) (noting
convening a meeting on short notice with knowledge of false statements
provided further support for “aiding and abetting fraud”).
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Decision of the Court
B. Substantial Trial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Conclusion
that Vega Soto Suffered Damages.
¶30 Ten Bridges argues Vega Soto failed to prove he suffered any
damages as a result of selling his rights to recover the excess proceeds of
the foreclosure sale. It argues Vega Soto “was in no position to pursue the
proceeds” because he testified he did not know there were excess proceeds
to recover, and even if he did, he could not afford legal counsel to recover
the funds. According to Ten Bridges, “evidence that [Vega Soto] would
have [pursued the excess proceeds] was speculative at best.”
¶31 “[C]onjecture or speculation cannot provide the basis for an
award of damages.” Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ariz.
174, 186 (App. 1984). Vega Soto, however, testified he independently found
out about the excess proceeds, prompting him to contact Leckey to discuss
the $5,000 he believed he was owed. Because he had two years to apply to
recover the excess proceeds before they were deemed abandoned, see A.R.S.
§ 33-812(L), the jury properly could conclude that, based on the trial
evidence, Vega Soto would have found out about the excess proceeds with
enough time to file an application to recover them. And because Vega Soto
could agree with a third party for assistance in recovering the excess
proceeds, A.R.S. § 33-812(P), the jury properly could conclude that his
financial limitations would not have prevented him from recovering the
excess proceeds. Indeed, Ten Bridges itself initially offered Vega Soto a fee
splitting arrangement to recover the excess proceeds.
¶32 The trial record contains substantial evidence supporting the
jury’s conclusion that Vega Soto suffered damages as a result of Ten
Bridges’ misrepresentations.
III. Ten Bridges Has Shown No Error in the Punitive Damages Award.
¶33 Ten Bridges argues that, even if Vega Soto properly proved
his fraud claim, there was no substantial evidence to support the award of
punitive damages. Punitive damages may be awarded in tort cases to
punish the wrongdoer and deter others from emulating the
misconduct. Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 330 (1986).
“[A] jury may award punitive damages only if clear and convincing
evidence exists that the tortfeasor possessed an ‘evil mind’ while engaging
in aggravated and outrageous conduct. Additionally, this conduct must
have proximately caused harm to the claimant to constitute a basis for
punitive damages.” Hudgins v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 221 Ariz. 472, 486 ¶ 38
(App. 2009) (citing cases). A defendant acts with an evil mind if he “should
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Decision of the Court
be consciously aware of the evil of his actions, of the spitefulness of his
motives or that his conduct is so outrageous, oppressive or intolerable [so]
that it creates a substantial risk of tremendous harm to others.” Linthicum,
150 Ariz. at 330. An award of punitive damages will be affirmed “if any
reasonable view of the evidence would satisfy the clear and convincing
standard.” Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & Strawn, 184 Ariz.
120, 132 (App. 1995).
¶34 Ten Bridges argues there is no evidence it had an “evil mind”
or intentionally tried to harm Vega Soto. It also argues its conduct did not
harm Vega Soto and instead benefitted him “to the tune of $10,000 he would
not have otherwise had.”
¶35 “To determine whether sufficient evidence exists that a
defendant acted with an evil mind, a court examines factors such as the
reprehensibility of the conduct, the severity of harm that was actually or
potentially imposed and the defendant’s awareness of it, the duration of the
misconduct, and any concealment of the risk of harm.” Hudgins, 221 Ariz.
at 487 ¶ 40 (citing cases). “A defendant acts with the requisite evil mind
when he intends to injure or defraud, or deliberately interferes with the
rights of others, ‘consciously disregarding the unjustifiable substantial risk
of significant harm to them.’” Hyatt Regency, 184 Ariz. at 132 (citation
omitted). Viewed in a light most favorable to sustaining the punitive
damage award, the trial record would allow the jury to properly conclude
Ten Bridges acted with an evil mind.
¶36 The jury also could conclude Ten Bridges targeted Vega Soto,
who was financially vulnerable, having lost his home in a judicial
foreclosure. Similarly, the jury could conclude the contract was the result of
deceit, as evidenced by Leckey’s misrepresentations and the practices she
and Ten Bridges followed offering $10,000 to a vulnerable homeowner in
exchange for a net recovery (after satisfying the HUD lien) of nearly
$87,000. Leckey understood Vega Soto believed Ten Bridges was offering to
help him, and she did not correct him or let him know her focus was
furthering the interests of Ten Bridges. Leckey misrepresented the number
of parties that had an interest in Vega Soto’s excess proceeds, as well as the
difficulty in recovering them without the help of Ten Bridges. Leckey also
admitted her job was to convince Vega Soto $10,000 was a beneficial deal,
despite knowing there was $117,277.39 in excess proceeds and the only lien
attached to the property was for about $30,000.
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Decision of the Court
¶37 Leckey admitted she had told Vega Soto there was a tight
timeline to recover the money, despite knowing the excess proceeds would
not be lost to the State for years. Vega Soto also testified that Leckey
promised an extra $5,000 once Ten Bridges was able to recover the excess
proceeds and that she told him not to worry about the fact the contract said
nothing on the extra $5,000 to induce him to sign. When viewing the trial
record in the light most favorable to the jury verdict for Vega Soto, it
properly supports the jury’s conclusion Ten Bridges acted with
an evil mind. Thus, the superior court did not err in rejecting Ten Bridges’
challenges to the award of punitive damages.
IV. The Punitive Damages Award is Neither Excessive Nor
Unconstitutional.
¶38 Ten Bridges argues that even if punitive damages were
appropriate, the amount awarded was excessive, meaning it violated due
process.
¶39 The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution “imposes a substantive limit on the size
of punitive damages awards.” Nardelli v. Metro. Grp. Prop. and Cas. Ins.
Co., 230 Ariz. 592, 609 ¶ 83 (App. 2012) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the
court reviews punitive damages awards de novo, “exercis[ing] exacting
discretion” in reviewing the constitutional principles and acting as the
“gatekeeper” over punitive damages verdicts. See id. at 609 ¶ 83–84.
¶40 When reviewing the constitutionality of a punitive
damages award, the court considers: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of a
defendant’s conduct, (2) the disparity between a plaintiff’s actual or
potential harm and the punitive damages award and (3) the difference
between the jury’s punitive damages award and the authorized civil
penalties in comparable cases. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 409 (2003). The court views “the evidence in a light most favorable
to upholding the jury verdict” and will affirm “if any substantial evidence
exists permitting reasonable persons to reach such a result.” Sec. Title
Agency, Inc. v. Pope, 219 Ariz. 480, 498 ¶ 83 (App. 2008) (citation omitted).
Although the parties cite no authorized civil penalty in comparable cases,
the court will address the other two factors below.
A. The Reprehensibility of Ten Bridges’ Conduct.
¶41 In analyzing reprehensibility, the court considers whether: (1)
“the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;” (2) “the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or
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safety of others;” (3) “the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;”
(4) “the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident” or
(5) “the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or
mere accident.” Id. at 501 ¶ 95 (citation omitted). No single factor is
dispositive. See Hudgins, 221 Ariz. at 490 ¶ 52.
¶42 Here, the jury properly could conclude Ten Bridges caused
economic harm to Vega Soto, who was entitled to a net award of nearly
$87,000 in excess proceeds but received only $10,000. Ten Bridges targeted
financially vulnerable people like Vega Soto, who had lost his home in a
judicial foreclosure and did not know he could recover the excess proceeds
for his equity. The conduct at hand involved repeated actions, as shown by
the testimony of Ten Bridges’ owner and manager, explaining he has been
in the business of distressed real estate for more than ten years, and his
companies, including Ten Bridges, have dealt with hundreds of
homeowners. Furthermore, the harm was the result of intentional malice,
trickery or deceit, as evidenced by Leckey’s misrepresentations and the
practices she and Ten Bridges followed offering $10,000 to a vulnerable
homeowner in exchange for a net award of nearly $87,000. Thus, the record
contains various reprehensible acts committed by or on behalf of Ten
Bridges. These acts weigh in favor of affirming the jury’s punitive damages
award.
B. Comparing Vega Soto’s Actual Harm and the
Punitive Damages Award.
¶43 There is no bright-line ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages, but “an award of more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety . . . [and] ‘[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, . . . a
lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee.’” Pope, 219 Ariz. at 503 ¶ 103
(quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–25).
¶44 Ten Bridges alleges even if Vega Soto’s real harm were
somehow nearly $87,000, the almost 5:1 ratio between Vega Soto’s actual
harm and the award is too great. The verdict returned on the fraud count,
however, was a general verdict of $500,000. The verdict states the jury
found the full damages to be $500,000 and does not distinguish between
compensatory and punitive damages. Ten Bridges did not seek a verdict
form allocating the compensatory and punitive damages associated with
the fraud claim. The verdict form, without objection by Ten Bridges, used
one line for damages (compensatory and punitive) for the fraud claim. It
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Decision of the Court
did not allocate compensatory or punitive damages and did not contain
other interrogatories allocating compensatory and punitive damages. In
response to Vega Soto’s request for the jury to find a specific amount of
punitive damages, Ten Bridges seemed to take the position that such an
inquiry was not necessary. Thus, the allocation between compensatory and
punitive damages necessary to support Ten Bridges’ ratio argument is not
contained in the record.
¶45 Moreover, as Vega Soto correctly points out, “[t]here is
nothing cited in the record showing that the jury awarded over $400,000 of
punitive damages as opposed to $392,722.70 or some other amount.” The
only hint at how much the jury might have awarded in punitive damages
is a deliberation question asking for the context of Ten Bridges’ mention of
$376,000 in punitive damages in its closing argument, to which Ten Bridges
responded the $376,000 came directly from Vega Soto’s complaint.
Assuming the jury used this amount, the ratio between Vega Soto’s actual
harm and punitive damages would be a bit more than 3.2:1, which is not
constitutionally infirm in this case. See Pope, 219 Ariz. at 503 ¶ 103.
ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL
¶46 Both Ten Bridges and Vega Soto request their attorneys’ fees
and costs on appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -341.01. Because Ten
Bridges is not the successful party on appeal, its request is denied. Because
Vega Soto is the successful party on appeal, he is awarded his reasonable
attorneys’ fees and taxable costs pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -341.01,
contingent upon his compliance with ARCAP 21.
CONCLUSION
¶47 The judgment is affirmed.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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