Wang V United States Postal Service

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EVELYN WANG

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-02419

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
et al.

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Evelyn Wang filed a pro se complaint against the U.S. Postal Service, the U.S.

Attorney General, and the U.S. Attorney of the District of Columbia (collectively, “the

Government.”). She alleges various violations stemming from USPS’s policy of designating her

address’s secondary indicator as “Unit 53” instead of what she claims is her legal address, “2-A-

1.” She has since filed many motions, including the nearly twenty outstanding motions before

the Court today. Despite multiple opportunities to amend and repeated attempts to do so—

resulting in a 450-page Complaint—Wang still fails to present a viable legal claim to the Court.

Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Wang’s Federal Torts Claims

Act claim, the Court will dismiss it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). For the rest

of Wang’s claims, the Court will dismiss them under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

More, since amendment would be futile, the Court will deny leave to amend. That renders her

remaining motions moot.

Although this case is in its early stages, it boasts a long docket. But the Court recalls how

to eat an elephant, and it proceeds apace.
On August 8, 2024, Wang filed her original Complaint against the Government. Original

Compl., ECF No. 1. On September 12 and 13, she filed two motions for leave to file an

amended complaint. Mots. File Am. Compl., ECF Nos. 11 and 13. The Court granted Wang’s

first motion and denied the second as duplicative. Min. Order 9/16/2024. On September 17,

Wang filed the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 15, only to move the next day to amend the

Amended Complaint, ECF No. 16. Again, the Court granted Wang’s motion for leave to amend.

Minute Order 9/24/2024.

The same day, Wang filed her Second Amended Complaint. Second Am. Compl., ECF

No. 21. On October 1, she moved for leave to file a “case file.” Mot. Leave File Case File, ECF

No. 23. On October 7 and 11, she moved to amend the Second Amended Complaint. Mots. Am.

Second Am. Compl., ECF Nos. 28 and 30. On October 16, the Court denied the motion for leave

to file a case file as futile because it was duplicative of the Second Amended Complaint. Min.

Order 10/16/2024. It also denied Wang’s additional motions to amend without prejudice. Id.

The Court stressed to the Wang that “the privilege of amending is not exhaustive” and “that

future motions to amend may be denied.” Id. It therefore urged Wang to “make every

reasonable effort to include all relevant factual assertions and claims in her amended complaint.”

Id.

The same day, Wang filed yet another motion to amend the Second Amended Complaint.

Third Mot. Am. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32. Nine days later, she again moved to amend.

Fourth Mot. Am. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 37. If the reader is keeping track, that is now (at

least) seven motions to amend filed by Wang, not counting the so-called “case file.”

On October 28, the Court dismissed her Second Amended Complaint without prejudice

and denied her motions to amend without prejudice. Order, ECF No. 40, at 1–2. The Court

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warned Wang that her “voluminous, rambling complaint” failed to “satisfy the minimum

pleading requirements of Rule 8(a),” thereby depriving the Government of the opportunity to

“receive fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 1 (citing Jones v.

Kirchner, 835 F.3d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). It thus invited Wang to file a Third Amended

Complaint but instructed her to comply with the relevant rules of pleading if she did so. Id. at 2–

3. And the Court advised Wang that the Third Amended Complaint would “likely serve as the

operative complaint” and should thus “include all intended claims and name all intended

defendants.” Id. at 3.

On November 12, Wang filed that Third Amended Complaint. Third Am. Compl., ECF

No. 43. Still, she was dissatisfied. On November 20 and 26, she filed two motions to amend the

Third Amended Complaint. See Mots. Am. Third Am. Compl., ECF Nos. 47 and 49. At this

point, the Court determined an in-person hearing was necessary and scheduled one for the next

month. Min. Order 11/27/2024. Before the hearing, Wang filed another motion to amend.

Third Mot. Am. Third Am. Compl., ECF No. 51. Motions to amend count: eleven.

On December 18, the Court held a hearing on the pending motions. At the hearing, the

Court stressed that it had “never seen anybody file so many motions.” Hearing Tr., ECF No. 95,

at 2:18–19. The Court reminded Wang that she was “spending taxpayer money” for the Court

and Government to respond to the motions. Hearing Tr. at 2:21–23. It urged her to “figure out

what [her] claim is and ground it in the law and just proceed.” Hearing Tr. at 3:2–3. But when

the Court asked Wang if her most recent motion to amend would be her final one, she responded

in the negative, and asked “if she could have some more time to complete it properly, because

[she] ha[s] been having issues where there’s a hacker that is constantly hacking [her] document.”

Hearing Tr. 3:13–25. The Court obliged this request, offering Wang one more month to file the

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“final version” of her complaint. Hearing Tr. 4:14–16. And it left her with the supplication to

“please understand” that she should “assume that this [was] [her] last chance to file an amended

complaint.” Hearing Tr. 6:14–16.

Accordingly, the Court denied the motions to amend the Third Amended Complaint as

moot and awaited what should have been Wang’s final amended complaint. Min. Order

12/18/2024.

Five days later, Wang filed for leave to file that Fourth Amended Complaint. Mot. Leave

File Fourth Am. Compl., ECF No. 54. But the motions kept coming. Wang also moved for

access to the Maryland State Archives. Mot. Archives Records, ECF No. 53. And then she

moved for a protective order. Mot. Protective Order, ECF No. 55. Next came a motion for leave

to file a pretrial statement. Mot. Leave File Pretrial Statement, ECF No. 59. Then she wanted to

amend that motion. Mot. Am. Mot. Leave File, ECF No. 63. On February 3, she filed a motion

for an order to instruct the “Cyber Defense Agency National Coordinator Critical Infrastructure

Security and Resilience of the United States Department of Homeland Security to produce the

Complaints [she submitted]”; to “ask the United States Postal Office of the Instructor General to

produce the original emails that their OIG Hotline Team sent to [her]”; and to “ask Google” to

produce those same emails. Mot. Order, ECF No. 66. She also moved for leave to file a

surreply, ECF No. 67; a motion to certify a class, ECF No. 68; and another motion to amend her

pretrial statement, ECF No. 71. The “pretrial statement” and “surreply” motions are nearly

identical to her pending motion to amend the Third Amended Complaint.

On February 18, she filed another motion to amend the motion for leave to file a pretrial

statement, ECF No. 74, and again on March 27, ECF No. 77; on April 15, ECF No. 81; on May

5, ECF No. 84; on June 26, ECF No. 88. She also filed again for a protective order, ECF No. 94.

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Where does that slew of docket gobbledygook leave the Court? Outstanding motions

include Wang’s motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, ECF No. 54; a motion for

leave to file a pretrial statement, ECF No. 59 and various motions to amend this, ECF Nos. 63,

71, 74, 77, 81, 84, 85, and 88 (which are largely duplicative of her pending motion to amend and

thus the Court construes them as such); motions for a protective order, ECF Nos. 55 and 94; a

motion for leave to file a surreply, ECF No. 67; a motion to file exhibit list and exhibits, ECF

No. 93; a motion for order asking for documents from Department of Homeland Security and

Google, ECF No. 66; a motion to certify class to sue on behalf of “all Americans” whose

addresses listed with USPS differ from their address “listed on their deeds/legal documents,”

ECF No. 68; and a motion for Maryland State Archives Records, ECF No. 53.

The Government opposes Wang’s dozen attempts to amend. Mem. Opp’n Pl.’s Twelfth

Mot. Leave Am., ECF No. 56, at 5–13. This impressive bevy of motions is ripe for review.

II.

Federal courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). They “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and

statute.” Id. “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the

burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (cleaned up).

If a court find it lacks jurisdiction over a suit, it must dismiss that suit sua sponte. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3).

Even if a court has jurisdiction, the complaint still must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for the case to proceed. To do so, a “complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relied that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim sua

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sponte where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

[her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d

725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam); accord Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31,

37 (1st Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Though Wang’s factual allegations will be “accept[ed] as

true” for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Id.

While a pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers,” even a pro se complainant must plead factual matter that permits the court

to “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Leave to amend a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) “shall be freely

given when justice so requires.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). But a court “may

properly deny a motion to amend if the amended pleading would not survive a motion to

dismiss.” In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing

Foman, 371 U.S. 178, 182). Leave to amend is particularly unwarranted when the amended

complaint shows a “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.”

Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (affirming

dismissal of entire action because the amended complaint suffered from the same Rule 8

deficiencies as before).

III.

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over one of Wang’s claims, so it must be

dismissed. And the rest of her allegations fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

Thus the Court will dismiss Wang’s Third Amended Complaint. More, Wang’s proposed

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amendments are futile. So the Court denies that chunk of motions. With no viable complaint,

the remainder of Wang’s motions are moot.

Starting with Wang’s claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq.

(“FTCA”). Sovereign immunity bars this count.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that the federal government can be sued

only insofar as it has agreed to be sued. Under this doctrine, suits against federal government

and its agencies are barred absent a waiver. See Stoddard v. Wynn, 68 F. Supp. 3d 104, 112

(D.D.C. 2014). The plaintiff carries the burden to establish that immunity has been abrogated

and “must overcome the defense of sovereign immunity in order to establish the jurisdiction

necessary to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.” Jackson v. Bush, 448 F. Supp. 2d 198,

200 (D.D.C. 2006).

The Federal Torts Claim Act waives an agency’s sovereign immunity in certain

circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346. But the Act explicitly carves out from this waiver for

claims that “arise out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal

matter.” Id. § 2680(b).

Here, Wang claims that USPS’s practice of designating her secondary indicator as “Unit

53” instead of her preferred “2-A-1” “mak[es] it difficult for [her] to get [her] government mail

delivered properly.” Third Am. Compl. at 6. This claim is outside the FTCA’s sovereign

immunity waiver. See Georgacarakos v. United States, 420 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2005)

(affirming dismissal of claim that plaintiff did not receive USPS package for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction); Marynowych v. United States, 1994 WL 114672 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1994)

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(dismissing claim that USPS altered the address on package of mail sent to plaintiff for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction). So the Court cannot hear it.

Thus, the Court will dismiss this claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Move now to the next tranche of allegations. These vaguely echo constitutional and

criminal law claims. Wang alleges USPS’s practice violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

Protection clause because it violates “fifteen different laws” that “protect against Title Fraud,

Mortgage Fraud, Insurance Fraud,” and various other types of fraud. Third Am. Compl. at 4.

She also asserts that this practice leads to slavery and therefore violates the Thirteenth

Amendment, id. at 14, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because she

is “unable to properly build Payment History and thus proof of residency and ownership,” id. at

16. And she asserts that the challenged practice aids and abets two Hollywood actors in

racketeering and international terrorism, id. at 7, and that the actors, along with “other Iranian

terrorists, and Nazi White Supremacists, and Mobsters” are retaliating against her for speaking

out against the conduct, id. at 17–18. Finally, she asserts that this practice denies military

personnel of their constitutional rights. Id. at 13.

Wang’s Complaint relies heavily on a plethora of “legal conclusion[s] couched as . . .

factual allegation[s].’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). For example, when Wang

contends that USPS aids and abets international terrorists through two Hollywood actors as

proxies, she baldly asserts, “[The two actors] have been spreading misinformation on the internet

on a mass scale using A[I]. They have been hacking into databases and destroying government

archives.” Third Am. Compl. at 11. Intending to fortify this allegation, Wang notes that one of

the Hollywood actors played in a TV show called The Walking Dead, where he “got a taste for

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ruling in the Zombie Apocalypse and now is trying to make it into reality . . . . [T]his is in fact

related to my complaint about United States Postal Service.” Id. at 13. In support for her claim

that USPS’s practice violates the Thirteenth Amendment, she starkly asserts, “[The two actors]

are Sex Trafficking people in Hollywood. This is a form of slavery.” Id. at 16. These

allegations unsupported by factual detail “are exactly the type of unsupported allegations that

this Court does not have to accept and properly dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Richards

v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 239 (D.D.C. 2007) (rejecting plaintiff’s allegations that the

government was involved in a conspiracy to surveil her on 12(b)(6) grounds when she failed to

offer specific facts or allegations associated with her claim).

More, when she does include non-conclusory factual assertions, these assertions, even

entitled to the assumption of truth, do not bolster her argument because they bear no relation to

her legal claims. To buttress her claim that USPS is aiding and abetting international terrorism

through the two Hollywood actors, for example, she claims the Hollywood actors have owned

units in her condominium and that one of the actor’s brothers lives in her neighborhood. Third

Am. Compl. at 10–11. Since Hollywood “made $93 Billion for America” two years prior, the

actors have the “Financial Resources” to aid a terrorist group, id. at 12–13; she also references a

book to support the idea that North American countries may be assisting a terrorist organization.

Id. at 12. Her Complaint is littered with disjointed and perplexing factual assertions like these,

none of which “give rise to a plausible inference” that USPS’s practice aided or abetted criminal

activity or infringed on constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. In short, Wang’s

allegations wholly lack coherence. Thus “it is crystal clear” that she will be unable to prevail on

them. Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 257 F.3d at 37.

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Because Wang “has not advanced a shred of a valid claim,” the Court will dismiss the

Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Baker,

916 F.2d at 726.

Now to Wang’s most recent motion to amend her Third Amended Complaint. 1 The

Court will refuse that attempt. The proposed amendments would not survive a motion to dismiss

and so amendment would be futile.

The Court has repeatedly warned Wang that her various complaints have failed to

provide sufficient notice under Rule 8 and flunked other pleading rules. It has offered her

multiple chances to correct those deficiencies. The Court also warned her that the opportunities

to amend were not exhaustive. Yet Wang’s final proposed complaint fares no better. Despite

many opportunities to amend her Complaint to provide enough detail so that Government

receives fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests, the baffling document has

grown in length but not in legal sufficiency. It balloons from 155 to 460 pages, and the extra

content may well be described as hot air. For instance, Wang adds lengthy recitations of the

plots of movie and TV shows in which the Hollywood actors have starred. See Eighth Mot.

Leave File Am. Pretrial Stmt. at 134–135. After asserting that the actors have “planned to entrap

[her]” in the Camelback Village Condominium, she notes that there is an incinerator onsite at the

condominium. Id. at 135. She includes the results of a Google search stating that “incinerators

are not required at . . . [a]partment houses” and includes a link to a clip of one of the actors’ TV

shows, during which he “enjoyed throwing people into the firepit.” Id. at 136–137. This typifies

1
Although styled as a motion to amend her “pretrial statement,” ECF No. 88, it is better understood as a motion to
amend the complaint. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003) (observing that courts may “ignore the
legal label that a pro se litigant attaches to a motion and recharacterize [it].”).

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the attempts throughout her Complaint to add factual support. She also adds another claim

equally unsupported by any factual assertions—that the two Hollywood actors are trying to

coerce the federal government to deny the privilege of birthright citizenship. Mot. Leave File

Am. Pretrial Stmt. at 235.

These new claims do not state a plausible claim of relief, so granting motion to amend

would be futile. See James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

More, Wang has had repeated opportunities to amend her Complaint and has failed to correct the

deficiencies. Thus the Court denies Wang’s motion to amend. See Naartex Consulting Corp. v.

Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts are not obliged to indulge litigants

indefinitely, especially when their amendments constitute futile gestures.”). Because there is no

operative Complaint, the rest of Wang’s pending motions will be dismissed as moot.

One final note. The Court will dismiss the claims on 12(b)(6) grounds with prejudice.

“Dismissal with prejudice is warranted only when a trial court determines that the allegation of

other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.”

Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

The Court has already afforded Wang many chances to amend her complaints. And the

Court has already warned her that her Complaint failed to provide Government the opportunity

to “receive fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.” Order at 1–2. “The fact

that [Wang] failed to correct these deficiencies in [her] [Third] Amended Complaint is a strong

indication that [Wang] ha[s] no additional facts to plead.” In re Vantive Corp. Secs. Litig., 283

F.3d 1079, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002). So the Court may “dismiss[] the [Third Amended Complaint]

with prejudice, since it was clear that [Wang] had made [her] best case and had been found

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wanting.” Id.; see also Metzler Inv. v. Corinthian Colls, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir.

2008) (upholding a dismissal with prejudice where the deficiencies at issue “persisted in every

prior iteration of the [complaint]”); Bowser v. Smith, 401 F. Supp. 3d 122, 126 (D.D.C. 2019)

(dismissing pro se case with prejudice for repeated failures to file justiciable complaint).

VI.

For all these reasons, Wang’s Third Amended Complaint must be dismissed and her case

closed. Enough is enough. A separate Order will issue today.

2025.07.24
11:38:10 -04'00'
Dated: July 24, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.