Shepperson V State

Travis Rashad Shepperson v. State of Maryland, No. 36, September Term, 2024, Opinion
by Killough, J.

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 – DNA APPEALS – ABUSE OF
DISCRETION – NO DETECTABLE DNA RESULTS
Maryland Code Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) § 8-201(b)(1) provides that an eligible
person convicted of a crime of violence may file a petition for postconviction DNA testing
of evidence possessed by the State that is related to the judgment of conviction. A petitioner
may file a motion for a new trial based on such DNA testing. Under CP § 8-201(i), the
postconviction court shall dismiss a motion for a new trial if the DNA results are
unfavorable. If the results of the DNA testing are favorable, the petitioner may move for a
new trial. Under CP § 8-201(i), the postconviction court may grant a new trial if it finds
that: (1) a substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if
the DNA testing results had been known or introduced at trial, or (2) a new trial is in the
interest of justice.

Shepperson was convicted of first- and second-degree sexual offenses, use of a handgun in
the commission of a crime of violence, robbery with a dangerous weapon, robbery, and
theft. One piece of evidence introduced at the 2009 trial was a DNA result showing the
presence of the victim’s DNA on the barrel of a gun found in his possession (“Gun Barrel
Sample”). DNA testing conducted 16 years later on a different portion of the Gun Barrel
Sample pursuant to CP § 8-201 detected no DNA and was not processed further because
the sample was below the threshold for analysis. The postconviction court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Shepperson’s motion for a new trial based on the new test results.
The postconviction court found that the 2024 Bode Technology test result did not contradict
the earlier DNA profile introduced at trial, nor did it undermine the State’s theory of the
case. Moreover, the new result pertained to an act for which Shepperson was acquitted and
bore no connection to the sex offenses for which he was convicted. Accordingly, the new
DNA result did not create a substantial possibility of a different verdict and did not warrant
a new trial in the interest of justice.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No.: CT080924X
Argued: May 5, 2025
IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 36

September Term, 2024

TRAVIS RASHAD SHEPPERSON

STATE OF MARYLAND

Fader, C.J.,
Watts,
Booth,
Biran,
Gould,
Eaves,
Killough,

JJ.

Opinion by Killough, J.

Filed: July 24, 2025
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2025.07.24
15:33:30 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
This case involves the denial of Petitioner Travis Rashad Shepperson’s motion for

a new trial by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Shepperson sought relief

under Maryland Code Ann., Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) § 8-201, following

postconviction DNA testing of evidence used at his 2009 trial. At trial, one piece of

evidence introduced by the State was a DNA result showing the presence of the victim

N.M.’s DNA on the barrel of a gun found in his possession. At the conclusion of the trial,

Shepperson was convicted of first- and second-degree sexual offenses, use of a handgun in

the commission of a felony, and other robbery-related charges. The trial judge merged the

convictions for the second-degree sex offense and robbery into their respective greater

offenses. Shepperson was sentenced to life for the first-degree sex offense, a consecutive

20-year sentence for the use of a handgun conviction, and a consecutive 20-year sentence

for the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction.

In a postconviction proceeding in 2023, Shepperson sought DNA testing of a

residual swab from the barrel of the handgun used during the attack on N.M. The test

“results were below the limit of detection and, therefore not processed further.” In his

postconviction motion for a new trial, Shepperson argued that the absence of detectable

DNA on the 2024 test conducted by Bode Technology 1 was favorable as it contradicted

the 2008 test conducted by BRT Laboratories 2 and created a substantial possibility of a

1
Bode Technology is an independent accredited laboratory that the Prince George’s
County Police Department works with to conduct forensic testing.
2
BRT Laboratories was an independent accredited laboratory that the Prince
George’s County Police Department worked with to conduct forensic testing.
different outcome. The postconviction court denied Shepperson’s motion for a new trial,

finding that the new DNA evidence did not refute the N.M.’s testimony or the State’s

evidence adduced at trial.

We agree with the postconviction court and affirm its judgment. The jury convicted

Shepperson of first-degree sex offense based on N.M.’s testimony that he forced her to

perform fellatio on him at gunpoint. The forensic and non-forensic evidence presented at

trial overwhelmingly identified Shepperson as the person in possession of the gun allegedly

used in the assault. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

the absence of detectable DNA on a previously untested portion of the gun barrel swab

does not materially undermine the evidence presented at trial. As discussed below, the “no

detectable DNA” finding related to the rape offense for which Shepperson was acquitted

and had no bearing on the charge related to the forced fellatio—the sole sexual offense for

which he was convicted. Thus, the new DNA result neither contradicts the State’s theory

of the case nor creates a substantial possibility that the jury would have reached a different

verdict. Under these facts, the new DNA results prove nothing and do not warrant relief.

Cf. Diggs & Allen v. State, 213 Md. App. 28, 66–67 (2013), aff’d sub nom. Allen v. State,

440 Md. 643 (2014) (inconclusive DNA results that prove nothing do not warrant relief).

The Assault

The events giving rise to this DNA appeal occurred on May 5, 2008, in Landover,

Maryland.

2
On May 5, 2008, N.M. was working as a sales representative at a wireless

communications store in Landover, Maryland. N.M. arrived at work at 10:00 a.m. and sat

behind the counter waiting for customers. About 20 minutes after the store opened, a

masked assailant later identified as Shepperson entered the store, pointed a silver revolver

with a black handle at N.M., and demanded money. N.M. advised that there was no money

in the cash register but offered to give him $100 of her own money and to activate some

phones for him. The assailant took N.M.’s money but was adamant that there was money

in the backroom. He then ordered N.M. to the back, where she showed him the safe that

contained phones but no money.

After realizing that there was no money in the safe in the backroom, the assailant

demanded sex from N.M. At trial, N.M. testified that he forced her to perform fellatio on

him at gunpoint and then, despite N.M.’s false claim that she had chlamydia, forced her to

engage in vaginal and anal intercourse, threatening her life and continuing to point the gun

at her, opening the gun to display the bullets. N.M. described the bullets in the gun as one

gold and the rest silver to the investigating officers. At trial, N.M. testified that the assailant

wore a condom during the assault. N.M. also testified that during the vaginal rape, he stuck

“the gun in [her] mouth” and forced her to suck on the barrel of the gun.

N.M. testified that the assailant stopped sexually assaulting her when he saw a

customer enter the store on the video monitor in the backroom. When the assailant went

to speak with the customer, N.M. ran into the bathroom and locked the door. After the

customer left the store, the assailant returned to the backroom and threatened N.M., saying

3
that she had better come out of the bathroom, or he would take her car. N.M. remained in

the bathroom until he left the store.

When the assailant left the store, N.M. grabbed her purse and noticed her phone was

missing. N.M. then ran next door to another store to call the police. When speaking with

the 911 dispatcher, N.M. did not inform the dispatcher that she had been raped, only that

there was a robbery. At trial, N.M. testified that she did not inform the 911 dispatcher that

she had been raped because there were several elderly women around and she did not want

to disclose in front of them that she had been raped.

When officers from the Prince George’s County Police Department arrived, N.M.

described the assailant as a six-foot-tall black male weighing 160 pounds with droopy

brown eyes. N.M. informed officers that he was wearing a black mask, black North Face

jacket, blue jeans, and blue and gray New Balance sneakers. N.M. notified officers that he

may have taken her cellphone, a brown Motorola Sidekick. N.M. also disclosed to a female

officer that the assailant had raped her.

After being transported to the police station, N.M. was taken to Prince George’s

Hospital Center for a sexual assault forensic examination. The examination was conducted

by a physician, with the hospital’s custodian of records present. During the examination,

N.M. described the assault, including acts of fellatio, vaginal intercourse, and anal

intercourse. Swabs and a blood sample were collected from N.M., placed into separate

envelopes, and sealed.

At trial, N.M. testified that she disclosed during the examination that the assailant

had forced his gun in her mouth. However, that disclosure was not documented in the

4
medical records. The day following the incident, N.M. returned to the police station to

provide a written statement, which did not include any reference to a gun being placed in

her mouth. During trial testimony, N.M. stated that the barrel of the gun was inserted into

her mouth during vaginal intercourse.

On the day of the assault, officers tracked N.M.’s cellphone to the District Court

Office of Parole and Probation in Hyattsville, Maryland. The officers located, arrested,

and transported to the station a man, later identified as Shepperson, who matched the

description provided by N.M.—wearing the same clothing and in possession of her

cellphone. Pursuant to a search warrant executed at a residence associated with

Shepperson, officers recovered a silver revolver from a dresser drawer. N.M. later

identified the gun as the one used during the assault and recognized the combination of

four silver bullets and one gold bullet.

The Trial

The matter proceeded to trial before the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

from March 17 to 20, 2009, on seven counts: (1) first-degree rape, Md. Code Ann., Crim.

Law (“CL”) § 3-303; (2) first-degree sexual offense, CL § 3-305; (3) second-degree sexual

offense, CL § 3-306; (4) sodomy; (5) use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of

violence, CL § 4-204(a); (6) robbery with a dangerous weapon, CL § 3-403; and (7)

robbery, CL § 3-402. The first-degree rape charge related to the vaginal intercourse

allegation, the sexual offense charges related to the fellatio allegation, and the sodomy

charge related to the anal intercourse allegation.

5
During the four-day trial, the State presented both forensic and physical evidence.

Jessica Charak, a forensic chemist and senior DNA analyst with the Prince George’s

County Police Department, cataloged the evidence and screened several items for the

presence of blood and semen. Blood was detected on the vaginal and anal swabs but not

on the oral swabs. All three swabs tested negative for semen.

Charak received “two swabs that were recovered from the cylinder release button,

the trigger, and the grips of” Shepperson’s gun. Charak saw no reason to conduct serology

testing on these swabs and “repackaged the swab and sent it to BRT Laboratories for DNA

analysis.”

In November 2008, a Prince George’s County police officer swabbed the barrel of

the revolver recovered during the investigation. That swab was introduced at trial as State’s

Exhibit 25 (hereinafter, the “Gun Barrel Sample”). Upon receipt, Charak immediately

forwarded the sample to BRT Laboratories for DNA analysis without opening it to ensure

timely processing before trial.

Alison Shao, a forensic DNA analyst employed by BRT Laboratories, received

multiple items for testing, including reference samples from N.M. and Shepperson, as well

as swabs collected from the gun. Shao testified that she analyzed the Gun Barrel Sample

by removing a small cutting from the swab, leaving more than half of the swab intact for

potential future testing, and then processed the sample for DNA. Shao was able to generate

a DNA profile consistent with N.M. being the major contributor.

On cross-examination, Shao testified that she also tested a sample from the grip of

the gun (hereinafter “Gun Grip Sample”), taken from the cylinder release, trigger, and grips

6
of the gun. That analysis revealed a mixed DNA profile from more than one contributor.

N.M.’s DNA profile was consistent with that of the major contributor, and Shepperson’s

profile matched eight of the nine loci 3 tested.

The jury ultimately convicted Shepperson of first- and second-degree sexual

offense, both of which related to the fellatio allegations; use of a handgun in the

commission of a crime of violence; robbery with a dangerous weapon; robbery; and theft.

Shepperson was acquitted of the rape and sodomy charges, which related to the vaginal

and anal intercourse allegations, respectively. The trial judge sentenced Shepperson to life

imprisonment for first-degree sexual offense, followed by a consecutive 20-year sentence

for the handgun offense, and a consecutive 20-year sentence for robbery, merging the

remaining convictions.

The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the convictions in Shepperson v. State,

No. 714, September Term, 2009 (filed Jan. 11, 2012), and a petition for a writ of certiorari

to this Court was denied on May 14, 2012. Shepperson v. State, 426 Md. 429 (2012).

3
“A locus (or loci, plural), is the actual location of the gene on a region of a
chromosome.” National Institute of Justice, Principles of Forensic DNA for Officers of the
Court, Locus and Allele, available at, https://perma.cc/6BAY-KXVM.

7
Postconviction Proceedings

On February 17, 2023, Shepperson filed a Petition for Postconviction DNA Testing

to test the Gun Barrel Sample. The State consented to additional testing, and the

postconviction court ordered the testing of the Gun Barrel Sample on November 21, 2023. 4

After the DNA testing results were completed, Shepperson filed a motion for a new

trial, asserting that the DNA results from the Gun Barrel Sample were favorable to his

defense. Shepperson raised two primary arguments: (1) that had the jury known

independent DNA testing of the gun barrel revealed no detectable DNA, there was a

substantial possibility that he would not have been convicted; and (2) that if the jury had

been aware of the discrepancy between the 2024 Bode Technology test (indicating no

DNA) and the State’s theory—that Shepperson forced the victim to perform a sexual act

using a gun—a substantial possibility existed that the trial outcome would have changed.

4
Although the State consented to the Petition for Postconviction DNA Testing, the
postconviction court remains the statutory gatekeeper under CP § 8-201(d) and is not
obligated to authorize testing merely because the parties agree. Here, it appears that all
parties were operating under a mistaken assumption concerning the evidence adduced at
trial. At best, the new test could have confirmed the original result, shown that N.M.’s
DNA was not present, or—as ultimately occurred—yielded no detectable DNA. As we
explain below, none of these results would create a reasonable probability that the DNA
testing would reveal exculpatory or mitigating evidence let alone rise to the substantial
possibility standard required to grant a new trial under CP § 8-201(i), as the barrel-in-mouth
incident was related to a charge for which Shepperson was acquitted, first-degree rape.
However, the parties and postconviction court appear to have believed that the barrel-in-
mouth incident was related to the fellatio-related sexual assault charges of which
Shepperson was convicted.

8
A hearing on the motion was held on November 6, 2024. During the hearing,

Shepperson’s DNA expert testified that “[t]he [Gun Barrel] [S]ample was screened for

human DNA and the results were below the limit of detection and, therefore, not processed

further.”

Following the hearing, the postconviction court issued a written memorandum

opinion denying the motion. The postconviction court held that there was not a substantial

possibility that Shepperson would not have been convicted had the jury at the 2009 trial

known that independent DNA testing of the Gun Barrel Sample was inconclusive. The

court relied on Diggs & Allen, 5 holding that “an inconclusive test is evidence of nothing,

and it could not prejudicially affect the fairness of the [Petitioner’s] trial.” The court further

found that “even if the jury knew about the mismatch between the [2024] Bode Technology

report of inconclusive DNA and the State’s theory that Petitioner put a pistol in [N.M.]’s

mouth to force her to perform a sexual act, there is not a substantial possibility that a

different outcome exists.” The postconviction court reasoned that “the report does not

refute the victim’s testimony and evidence adduced at trial.” That evidence included

N.M.’s description of the silver .38 Smith & Wesson revolver allegedly used, which was

5
Although the Appellate Court in Diggs & Allen described an inconclusive DNA
result—one that neither includes nor excludes a person—as “evidence of nothing,” that
principle applies only by analogy here. See Diggs & Allen v. State, 213 Md. App. 28, 66–
67 (2013). The DNA result at issue in this case involved no detectable DNA due to
insufficient material for analysis, not an inconclusive interpretation of an existing profile.
In some contexts, a “no detectable DNA” finding might cast doubt on earlier results. But
as explained below, that is not the case here. Thus, while Diggs & Allen may offer a helpful
framework for evaluating postconviction DNA results, it does not control the outcome in
this case.
9
later recovered from Shepperson’s residence with N.M.’s DNA present on the barrel,

cylinder release button, trigger, and grips.

II.

Maryland is one of many states “in this country that have enacted post-conviction

DNA testing[.]” Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 218 (2006). In 2001, the General Assembly

passed what is now CP § 8-201, “authorizing a person who is convicted of manslaughter,

murder in any degree, or first or second-degree rape or sexual offense to file a petition for

postconviction DNA testing of ‘scientific identification evidence’ in the possession of the

State that is related to the judgment of conviction.” Maryland Fiscal Note, 2001 Sess. S.B.

694. The statute was enacted “in line with a nationwide trend to adopt postconviction DNA

testing statutes designed to provide an avenue for the exoneration of the actually innocent.”

Blake, 395 Md. at 219.

CP § 8-201(b)(1) provides that an eligible “person who is convicted of a crime of

violence under § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article may file a petition . . . for DNA testing

of scientific identification evidence that the State possesses that is related to the judgment

of conviction[.]” An eligible “petitioner may move for a new trial under this section on

the grounds that [1] the conviction was based on unreliable scientific identification

evidence and [2] a substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have been

convicted without the evidence.” Id. § 8-201(c). If the postconviction court finds the DNA

results are unfavorable, the petition shall be dismissed. Id. § 8-201(i)(1). However, if the

“DNA testing [is] favorable to the petitioner, the court shall . . . (iii) on a finding that a

substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if the DNA

10
testing results had been known or introduced at trial, order a new trial.” Id. § 8-

201(i)(2)(iii). Alternatively, “[i]f the court finds that a substantial possibility does not exist

under paragraph (2)(iii) of this subsection, the court may order a new trial if the court

determines that the action is in the interest of justice.” Id. § 8-201(i)(3).

“A postconviction court’s rulings under CP § 8-201 are subject to direct review by

this Court.” Brown v. State, 431 Md. 576, 583 (2013) (citing CP § 8-201(k)(6)). We review

the denial of a motion for a new trial filed pursuant to postconviction DNA testing for

abuse of discretion, upsetting the trial court’s decision only if it is “well removed from any

center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court

deems minimally acceptable.” Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524, 552 (2009) (internal

citation omitted). In elaborating on the abuse of discretion standard, we explained in Gray

v. State:

“Abuse of discretion” is one of those very general, amorphous terms that
appellate courts use and apply with great frequency but which they have
defined in many different ways.... [A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court
would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has
to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court
and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable. That
kind of distance can arise in a number of ways, among which are that the
ruling either does not logically follow from the findings upon which it
supposedly rests or has no reasonable relationship to its announced objective.
That, we think, is included within the notion of “untenable grounds,”
“violative of fact and logic,” and “against the logic and effect of facts and
inferences before the court.”

388 Md. 366, 383–84 (2005) (internal citations omitted).

In addition to this deferential standard for discretionary rulings, the postconviction

court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Brown, 431 Md. at 583. A factual

11
finding is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by competent evidence in the record.

Simms v. State, 445 Md. 163, 185 (2015).

In assessing motions based on postconviction DNA testing, courts apply the

substantial possibility standard. This Court has interpreted substantial possibility to occupy

a middle ground—more demanding than “might [but] less stringent than probable.”

McGhie v. State, 449 Md. 494, 510 (2016). The question is whether the newly discovered

evidence creates a substantial possibility that the result of the trial may have been different

had the evidence been available at the time. Although this Court has not definitively

construed the “interest[] of justice” standard in the context of postconviction DNA testing,

it has recognized the breadth of the term in other contexts. Gray, 388 Md. at 382 n.7. For

example, in Gray, this Court noted that the phrase “interest[] of justice” encompasses a

“wide array of possibilities[,]” including instances where there has been “ineffective

assistance of postconviction counsel or a change made in the law that should be applied

retroactively.” Id.

Here, the only new testing conducted by Bode Technology in April 2024 was on

an untested fragment of the Gun Barrel Sample. That test returned a “below the limit of

detection” result and no DNA profile. Consequently, the sample was not further

processed. Shepperson argues that the absence of DNA on the barrel of the gun would

have led jurors to discredit N.M.’s testimony that the barrel was pressed into her mouth to

12
compel fellatio, thereby creating a substantial possibility of a different outcome. 6 This

argument falls short under both prongs of CP § 8-201 and provides no basis to conclude

that the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

Under CP § 8-201(i), a postconviction court may grant a new trial if (1) the DNA

testing yields results “favorable to the petitioner,” and (2) there exists “a substantial

possibility” that the petitioner would not have been convicted had those results been

known or introduced at trial, or, alternatively, if the court concludes that a new trial is

warranted “in the interest of justice.” Neither condition is satisfied on the record before

us.

Favorability

This Court has held that postconviction DNA results are “favorable” when they

directly refute the State’s theory or materially undermine evidence admitted at trial. See

Thompson v. State, 411 Md. 664, 689–90 (2009). In Thompson, a woman was found

deceased in her home after she had been stabbed, strangled, and sexually assaulted. Id. at

667. The day after the victim’s body was discovered, the petitioner turned over a knife that

he found near the victim’s home and a pair of bloodstained cut-off jeans he claimed to have

on when he found the knife. Id. During closing arguments, “[t]he State emphasized that

the blood found on [the petitioner’s] jeans was the same blood type of [the victim] and

6
There is an error in Shepperson’s recollection of N.M.’s testimony. During the
2009 trial, N.M. testified that the barrel of the gun was put in her mouth during the vaginal
rape, stating “[w]hile on the table, while he’s still in me having sex with me on the table. .
. . He sticks the gun in my mouth and tells me to suck on the gun.”
13
linked this with testimony that blood of an unspecified type was found on the murder

weapon[,]” stating:

[T]hat knife is the murder weapon. It is positive for blood. It is consistent
with the wound on [the victim’s] body and also these pants.

[The petitioner’s] shorts, if you will. They test positive in this corner of the
pocket for a positive blood. That is the blood of [the victim]. He said when
he got the knife the knife was bloody and he put the knife in his pants.
Clearly the blood from the knife. And we know there was blood on the knife.
It had seeped onto his shorts and he didn’t notice.

Id. at 670–71 (emphasis and footnote omitted). Although the petitioner was convicted,

later DNA testing of the blood on the jeans revealed the blood was not the victim’s. Id.

at 672–73. The postconviction court nonetheless denied a new trial, reasoning that the

DNA did not remove the petitioner from the scene and thus did not exculpate him. Id. at

674. This Court reversed, holding that the new testing “refuted” the State’s theory that

the blood linked the petitioner to the murder, and remanded the case for further

proceedings. Id. at 690.

Unlike in Thompson, where the postconviction DNA evidence directly undermined

a key pillar of the prosecution’s case, the 2024 Bode Technology test did not refute the

State’s theory or undermine the 2008 BRT Laboratories test of the Gun Barrel Sample

that linked the gun to the victim. During the postconviction hearing, the Prince George’s

County analyst testified that the original 2008 BRT Laboratories testing was conducted

on a different portion of the same swab, and that her independent review of the 2008 case

file revealed no indication the results were erroneous or cross-contaminated. She further

described the condition of the residual sample as sealed in an untorn manila envelope and

14
noted that while DNA can persist “for years, decades” under ideal conditions, the passage

of 16 years meant the remaining portion might simply lack enough material to detect.

The 2024 test was not favorable to Shepperson. At most, it could have confirmed

the original result, shown that N.M.’s DNA was not present, or, as occurred here, yielded

no detectable DNA. A “no detectable DNA” result, like an inconclusive one, is not

“favorable” unless it casts doubt on the validity of the initial findings. Cf. Diggs & Allen,

213 Md. App. at 66–67 (“an inconclusive test is evidence of nothing”). Because the 2024

test neither refutes the State’s theory nor undermines the 2008 analysis, it fails the

favorability prong of CP § 8-201(i).

Substantial Probability

Even if the 2024 result were deemed favorable to Shepperson, CP § 8-201(i)(2)(iii)

requires a showing that “a substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have

been convicted if the DNA testing results had been known or introduced at trial[.]” This

standard demands more than conjecture; it asks whether, in light of the entire trial record,

there exists a real possibility of acquittal. Shepperson did not meet that burden.

In Arrington, we granted relief where exculpatory postconviction DNA results flatly

contradicted the State’s trial evidence—serology results that the jury clearly relied upon,

as shown by their deliberation notes. 411 Md. at 554–55. By contrast, in Brown, where

the State never claimed that DNA linked the defendant to the crime, the absence of his

DNA on an alleged weapon did not create a substantial possibility of a different verdict.

431 Md. at 589–90. In short, DNA results that do not call into question a material part of

the prosecution’s theory do not warrant relief under CP § 8-201(i)(2)(iii).

15
This case resembles Brown in that the postconviction DNA evidence does not

undermine any material aspect of the State’s case. The 2024 Bode Technology test did not

exclude Shepperson or N.M. as contributors to any DNA profile relevant to the offenses of

conviction, and it does not contradict the State’s theory that he used a gun to compel N.M.

to perform fellatio. N.M. described three distinct acts—forced fellatio, vaginal rape, and

anal rape—and testified that the barrel of the gun was inserted into her mouth only during

the second act. The jury acquitted Shepperson of the vaginal and anal rape charges. Thus,

the “no detectable DNA” result from the 2024 Bode Technology test relates solely to a

charge on which he was acquitted and bears no connection to his conviction for forcing

N.M. to perform fellatio at gunpoint.

Nor does the 2024 Bode Technology test undermine the rest of the forensic

evidence. The original 2008 BRT Laboratories test from a separate portion of the gun

barrel identified N.M. as a major contributor. Swabs from the cylinder release, trigger, and

grips of the gun found in Shepperson’s residence—never retested—also produced mixtures

in which N.M. was the major contributor. During the postconviction hearing, the DNA

analyst testified that variation in yield across swab fragments is routine, especially after

years of storage, and does not suggest flaws in the original testing.

In light of the full record—including the unchallenged 2008 DNA results, the

analyst’s testimony, and the jury’s acquittal on the rape charge linked to the gun barrel-in-

mouth allegation—the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to

deny a new trial was neither “well removed from the center mark” nor “beyond the fringe

of what” is minimally acceptable. Gray, 388 Md. at 383.

16
B.

CP § 8-201(i)(3) provides that “[i]f the court finds that a substantial possibility does

not exists under paragraph (2)(iii) of this subsection, the court may order a new trial if the

court determines that the action is in the interest of justice.” While we have not looked at

the “interest of justice” in terms of CP § 8-201, we have looked at the “interest of justice”

in another context. In Gray, we opined that, “[w]hile it is within the trial court’s discretion

to decide when ‘the interest[] of justice’ require[s] reopening, . . . some reasons for

reopening could include, . . . ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel or a change

made in the law that should be applied retroactively.” 388 Md. at 382 n.7 (internal citation

omitted). Neither of those situations apply here. Certainly, there are other reasons to grant

a new trial in the “interest of justice,” but such decisions rest in the sound discretion of the

postconviction court. Ordinarily, we defer to the postconviction court’s judgment on

whether the “interest[] of justice” warrants reopening the case unless its decision plainly

lacks a logical connection to its factual findings. See id. at 383.

The postconviction court’s denial of Shepperson’s motion for a new trial rests on

the “no detectable” DNA result from the 2024 Bode Technology test of the Gun Barrel

Sample. CP § 8-201(i)(3), however, cannot be invoked to justify a new trial based solely

on the absence of DNA on a different portion of the Gun Barrel Sample tested 16 years

after collection—particularly where that evidence pertains to a charge on which

Shepperson was acquitted. The 2024 Bode Technology test of the Gun Barrel Sample does

not affect assessments of force, the victim’s credibility, or any other material element. It

does not undermine the non-forensic evidence adduced at trial, such as recovering the gun

17
from Shepperson’s residence, N.M.’s accurate description of the gun and bullets used in

the sexual assault, Shepperson possessing N.M.’s phone, and witnesses placing Shepperson

in the same shopping center on the date and close to the time of the assault. Granting a

new trial on that basis would contravene CP § 8-201’s requirement of genuinely material

new evidence and inject unwarranted uncertainty into convictions supported by a coherent,

complete record.

III.

For all these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Shepperson’s

motion for a new trial. Under the facts of this case, the 2024 Bode Technology test proves

nothing. The “no detectable DNA” result related to a charge for which Shepperson was

acquitted and was, therefore, neither favorable nor created a substantial possibility that

Shepperson would not have been convicted had this evidence been presented to the jury

during the original trial in 2009. Nor did the postconviction court abuse its discretion in

determining that it was not in the “interest of justice” to grant a new trial.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE
PAID BY PETITIONER.