Pepe V Finley
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
THOMAS PEPE,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:25cv837-TKW-HTC
SUSAN FINLEY,
Defendant.
____________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Thomas Pepe, proceeding pro se, has filed yet another complaint
arising out of his dissatisfaction with the handling and results of probate proceedings
that are or were pending in a state court in the Middle District of Florida, involving
the administration of his father’s estate. Doc. 1. As discussed further below, by the
undersigned’s count, this is the sixteenth case Plaintiff has filed in this District in the
last few months.
In this case, as he has done in others, Plaintiff sues an attorney who was
involved in those probate proceedings. Also, as he has done in other cases, he filed
this case in the wrong venue. However, because this case belongs in state court, the
undersigned recommends the action be dismissed rather than transferred to the
Middle District. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406. Additionally, based on Plaintiff’s history of
filing frivolous litigation, the undersigned recommends the Court issue an injunction
restricting Plaintiff’s ability to file further cases in this District.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper (1) in any judicial district in
which any defendant resides, (2) in any judicial district in which a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) if there is no district in
which the action may otherwise be brought, any judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the action.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(3). As stated above, venue is not proper in this District.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Finley, an attorney located in Boca Raton, Florida,
engaged in fraud, legal malpractice, and civil conspiracy by failing to notify him an
escrow payment was not made during a real estate transaction involving his father’s
home; as relief, he seeks $250 million in damages. Based on the exhibits attached
to the complaint, the property at issue is located in Fort Myers, Florida. Thus, despite
Plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary, venue is not proper in this District.
When a case is filed in the wrong district, the district court “shall dismiss, or
if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which
it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Here, the case should be
dismissed rather than transferred because Plaintiff’s claims belong in state court.
“[A] federal district court must have at least one of the three types of subject
matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466,
1469 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies
outside [of federal courts’] limited jurisdiction, … and the burden of establishing the
contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff asserts he is invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, but he
does not allege a violation of any federal law, and his complaint does not otherwise
present a substantial federal question. See Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d
1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2011) (The federal question at issue “must appear on the face
of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.”). Instead, his claims for fraud, legal
malpractice, and civil conspiracy are all state law claims. “The appropriate
jurisdiction for such state law claims, absent a showing of federal diversity
jurisdiction, is state court. Therefore, the record does not support federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”1 Betts v. Betts, No. 3:13-CV-288, 2013 WL
1 While Pepe also references 28 U.S.C. § 1367, that statute only allows federal courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are related to a federal claim. See Royal Canin
U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 27 (2025) (Under § 1367, “jurisdiction over a federal-
law claim brings with it supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim arising from the same
facts.”). It does not provide a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction in the absence of a federal claim.
4096086, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2013) (finding no federal jurisdiction in a case
involving fraud under Florida law); see also Kinsey v. King, 257 F. App’x 136, 139
(11th Cir. 2007) (“Any state-law claims, including legal malpractice, arise out of
Gould’s representation of the Kinseys in negotiating a settlement agreement and his
refusal to continue that representation after the Kinseys rejected that agreement. The
district court lacks federal question jurisdiction over any such claims.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish the Court has diversity
jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts have original
jurisdiction of actions between citizens of different states when the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintiff indicates he and Defendant Finley are
located in Florida.2 Therefore, there is no diversity of citizenship. See McDonald v.
Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (“[F]or
diversity jurisdiction to exist, there must be ‘complete diversity,’ that is, each
defendant must be a citizen of a state different from that of each plaintiff.”) (citations
omitted). Because Plaintiff has not established this case involves a question of
federal law, or that the Court has diversity jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed.
Finally, Plaintiff has filed at least twenty cases in this District. Sixteen were
filed in the past month and a half and most have been dismissed or recommended
2 Plaintiff indicates he resides in Gulf Breeze, Florida, and Defendant Finley is an attorney with
an office in Boca Raton, Florida.
for dismissal for: (1) failure to state a claim; (2) judicial immunity; (3) improper
venue; or (4) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3 See e.g., Pepe v. Shenko, Case No.
3:25cv709-TKW-ZCB, Doc.12 (dismissing suit against state court judge with
prejudice based on judicial immunity); Pepe v. Pepe, Case No. 3:25cv739-TKW-
HTC, Doc. 7 (pending report recommending dismissal based on improper venue and
frivolity); Pepe v. Pivachek, Case No. 3:25cv667-TKW-ZCB, Doc. 9 (dismissing
suit against state court judge with prejudice based on judicial immunity); Pepe v.
Confreda, Case No. 3:25cv730-TKW-HTC, Doc. 9 (dismissing suit based on
improper venue and failure to state a claim); Pepe v. Winesett, Case No. 3:25cv665-
MCR-ZCB, Doc. 6 (pending report recommending dismissal based on judicial
immunity in suit against state court judge); Pepe v. Lajqi, et al., Case No. 3:25cv565-
MCR-ZCB, Doc. 8 (pending report recommending dismissal based on lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction); Pepe v. Harrell, et al., Case No. 3:25cv725-TKW-ZCB,
Doc. 7 (pending report recommending dismissal based on lack of subject-matter
3 Two of the sixteen cases were dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Local Rule
5.3, which requires a plaintiff to pay the filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
when filing a complaint. See Pepe v. Shenko, Case No. 3:25cv644-TKW-ZCB; Pepe v. Fuller,
Case No. 3:25cv645-TKW-ZCB. The remaining cases suffer from the same deficiencies as the
cases that have been dismissed or recommended for dismissal. See Pepe v. Brown, Case No.
3:25cv723-TKW-ZCB (suing attorneys and judges involved in state court proceedings in the
Middle District); Pepe v. Goldin, Case No. 3:25cv727-MCR-ZCB (suing attorney involved in state
court proceedings in the Middle District); Pepe v. Cattano, Case No. 3:25cv742-MCR-ZCB (suing
his sister for interfering with their father’s estate in the Middle District); Pepe v. Rubino, Case No.
3:25cv838-MCR-ZCB (suing attorney who represented Plaintiff in the probate proceedings in the
Middle District).
jurisdiction); Pepe v. Laboda, Case No. 3:25cv666-MCR-HTC, Doc. 4 (transferring
case filed against state court judge to the Middle District of Florida); Pepe v. Fuller,
Case No. 3:25cv707-TKW-ZCB, Doc. 7 (pending report recommending dismissal
based on judicial immunity in suit against state court judge). Indeed, on May 22,
2025, the Court warned Plaintiff “that his ability to file cases in this Court may be
restricted if he continues filing multiple, meritless lawsuits against anyone and
everyone connected to his state court proceedings.” See Pepe v. Pivachek, Case No.
3:25cv667-TKW-ZCB, Doc. 6. Despite this warning, Plaintiff has continued to file
similar frivolous cases.
Given Plaintiff’s abusive litigation history, the undersigned recommends
Plaintiff be enjoined from filing a new pro se complaint in this district without the
payment of the filing fee or the submission of an affidavit from an attorney in good
standing attesting that Plaintiff’s complaint has been reviewed and that the factual
allegations contained therein provide a good faith basis for venue and jurisdiction in
this Court.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:
1. That this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28
U.S.C. § 1406.
2. That Plaintiff be enjoined and prohibited from filing any new pro se
complaints in this District unless the complaint is accompanied by either:
a. full payment of the filing fee; or
b. an affidavit by a licensed attorney in good standing in this
District or in the jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted, attesting that the
attorney has reviewed the complaint and finds the factual allegations alleged provide
a good faith basis for venue and jurisdiction in this District.
3. That all pending motions be TERMINATED.
4. That the clerk close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 24th day of June, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.