Jeffrey Steven Of The House Of Jarrett V State Of Hawaii
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JEFFREY-STEVEN OF THE HOUSE OF CIV. NO. 24-00040 LEK-KJM
JARRETT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAI`I, JUDICIARY OF
HAWAI`I, ANNALISA BERNARD-LEE,
DANLYN KAPAKU, JESSICA
TAKITANI-MOSES, CHRISTOPHER
COBLE, SHELLY MIYASHIRO, WADE
MAEDA, JOHN PELLETIER, JARED
DUDOIT, JOSH GREEN, SYLVIA
LUKE, DOES A THRU Z-999
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey-Steven of the House of
Jarrett (“Plaintiff”) filed the First Amended Complaint
(“Amended Complaint”) on February 26, 2025. [Dkt. no. 70.]
Before this Court are:
-Defendants Jessica Takitani-Moses (“Takitani-Moses”),
Christopher Coble (“Coble”), Shelly Miyashiro
(“Miyashiro”), Wade Maeda (“Maeda”), John Pelletier
(“Pelletier”), and Jared Dudoit’s (“Dudoit” and
collectively “County Defendants”)1 motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint (“County Defendants’ Motion”); [dkt.
no. 72;]
1 Takitani-Moses, Coble and Miyashiro will be referred to
collectively as “the Prosecutor Defendants.” Maeda, Pelletier
and Dudoit will be referred to collectively as “the Police
Defendants.”
-Defendants Josh Green (“Governor Green”) and Sylvia Luke’s
(“Lieutenant Governor Luke” and collectively “State
Defendants”) motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint
(“State Defendants’ Motion”); [dkt. no. 73;] and
-Defendants the Honorable Annalisa M. Bernard-Lee (“Judge
Bernard-Lee”) and Danlyn Kapuku’s (“Kapuku” and
collectively “State Court Defendants”) motion to dismiss
the Amended Complaint (“State Court Defendants’ Motion”),
[Dkt. no. 74,]
all filed on March 12, 2025 (collectively (“Motions”). On
March 25, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey-Steven of the House of
Jarrett (“Plaintiff”) filed his “Memorandum to Deny Motion(s) to
Dismiss; NOTICE UPON THE COURT; *Special Cause*, *Private*”
(“Memorandum in Opposition”). [Dkt. no. 79.] The County
Defendants and the State Defendants filed their respective
replies on April 9, 2025. [Dkt. nos. 81, 82.] Plaintiff filed a
“Memorandum in Support of This Special Cause in Private
Exclusive Equity and to Deny Motion(s) to Dismiss” on April 14,
2025, and filed a “Memorandum to Deny Motion(s) to Dismiss;
Response ECF No. 81” on April 28, 2025. [Dkt. nos. 83, 87.]
These filings are construed as surreplies responding to the
County Defendants’ and the State Defendants’ replies.2
2 Plaintiff filed docket numbers 83 and 87 without obtaining
leaving from this Court. See Local Rule LR7.2 (stating that,
other than the opposition to a motion and the optional reply in
support of a motion, “[n]o further or supplemental briefing
shall be submitted without leave of court”). However, this Court
has stated it will consider those filings in ruling on the
Motions. [Order: (1) Construing Plaintiff’s “Exparte Motion for
Decree Pro Confesso; Motion for Joinder” as a Motion Seeking
(. . . continued)
The Court finds these matters suitable for disposition
without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.1(c) of the Local Rules
of Practice for the United States District Court for the
District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”). Defendants’ Motions are
hereby granted for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a “FEDERAL TORT CLAIM re: Deprivation
of Right Under Color of Law; Breach of Contract, trespass,
Failure to Respond; Civil Rights Violation Under Title 42;
Constitutional Question per FRCP Rule 5.1” (“Complaint”) on
February 1, 2025. [Dkt. no. 1.] On December 30, 2024, this Court
issued its Order: Granting in Part and Denying in Part the State
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Filed February 1, 2024;
and Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with Limited Leave to Amend
(“12/30 Order”). [Dkt. no. 61.3]
Reconsideration of this Court’s December 30, 2024 Order, Seeking
Leave to Add New Defendants, and Seeking Leave to File a Third
Surreply Regarding the Pending Motions to Dismiss; and
(2) Denying Plaintiff’s Motion in its Entirety, filed 7/10/25
(dkt. no. 94) (“7/10 Order”), at 13.]
3 The 12/30 Order is also available at 2024 WL 5246580. On
December 31, 2024, an entering order was issued denying two
other motions to dismiss on the ground that they were moot in
light of the rulings in the 12/30 Order (“12/31 EO”). [Dkt.
no. 62.] On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking
reconsideration of the 12/30 Order and the 12/31 EO. [Dkt.
no. 64.] Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an
order filed on March 28, 2025 (“3/28 Order”). Dkt. no. 80,
available at 2025 WL 950036.
In the 12/30 Order, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s
Complaint in its entirety, but granted Plaintiff limited leave
to amend his claims. [12/30 Order at 28.] This Court dismissed
with prejudice Plaintiff’s Title 42 United States Code
Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims seeking damages against both
the State Defendants and the State Court Defendants, in their
official capacities, based on these Defendants’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. [12/30 Order at 11-12, 22.] This Court
further dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the State
Defendants, in their individual capacities, the State Court
Defendants, and the Prosecutor Defendants without leave to
amend, pursuant to the Younger abstention analysis, [id. at 17,
22, 24,] which prohibits a federal court from enjoining a state
criminal proceeding without a valid showing of “extraordinary
circumstances” warranting federal intervention. See id. at 13-14
(quoting McCoy v. Sequeira, CIV. NO. 20-00384 DKW-RT, 2020 WL
5604031, at 3* (D. Hawai`i Sept. 18, 2020) (discussing Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny)). In dismissing
Plaintiff’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims that were
subject to the Younger abstention doctrine, this Court granted
Plaintiff limited leave to file a new action subsequent to the
conclusion of State v. Jeffrey-Steven, Case Number 2DTC-23-
04182, a traffic crime case pending in the State of Hawai`i
Second Circuit Court, Wailuku Division (“the state court”).
[12/30 Order at 4, 27-28.] This Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s
Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims against the Police
Defendants without prejudice for failure state a claim. See id.
at 25.
In the 12/30 Order, this Court instructed Plaintiff
that, in his amended complaint, he could include:
-the claims that he attempted to allege in the original
Complaint against the Police Defendants, subject to the
limitations that he must specify whether he is suing any of
those defendants in their official capacities, individual
capacities, or both; and, if Plaintiff is suing them in
their individual capacities, he must state how each of them
personally participated in the alleged violation of
Plaintiff’s rights; see id. at 25-26;
-claims for prospective injunctive relief against the State
Defendants in their official capacities that Plaintiff
attempted to assert in the original Complaint but were not
addressed in the 12/30 Order; [id. at 26;]
-claims for damages against the State Defendants in their
individual capacities that Plaintiff attempted to assert in
the original Complaint but were not addressed in the 12/30
Order; [id.;] and
-claims under federal law against Defendant State of Hawai`i
(“the State”) and/or Defendant State Judiciary (“the
Judiciary”), where there has been an abrogation or waiver
of sovereign immunity, [id.].
The 12/30 Order expressly stated that the amended
complaint must only allege the claims described above against
the State, the Judiciary, Governor Green, Lieutenant Governor
Luke, Maeda, Pelletier, and/or Dudoit. [Id. at 26-27.]
I. The Amended Complaint
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he Right to Travel the
common ways without license is a Constitutionally protected life
and liberty,” which is neither addressed or codified by the
State nor the Judiciary, and which has “result[ed] in numerous
unlawful suits at law in State Courts.” [Amended Complaint at
¶¶ F.1-3.] Plaintiff alleges he “serve[d] due process notice to
Defendants et al,” which “created standard and specific
Obligations.” [Id. at ¶¶ F.4-5.] Subsequently, the State
Defendants allegedly failed to “correct public State statutes,
codes and records,” which “resulted in a traffic citation on
Nov. 3, 2023.” [Id. at ¶ E.5.] Plaintiff alleges the traffic
citation was therefore based on a false arrest, and that the
Prosecutor Defendants, Maeda, Pelletier, and Lieutenant Governor
Luke failed to rebut Plaintiff’s request for monetary damages
through his “Fee Schedule” and therefore acquiesced to his
claims.4 [Id. at ¶¶ E.6-8.]
Plaintiff alleges that the State Court Defendants and
Takitani-Moses failed to explicitly define the state court’s
jurisdiction in Case Number 2DTC-23-004182, constituting
4 The “Fee Schedule” appears to refer to a chart listing
“[f]ees now due and payable” on pages 6 and 7 of the first
Memorandum A attached to the Amended Complaint. [Dkt. no. 70-1
at PageID.972-93.] The First Memorandum A is a document that
Plaintiff filed in Case Number 2DTC-23-004182.
constructive fraud. [Id. at ¶¶ E.11, E.14.] Plaintiff argues
“[i]t is well established practice and codified into law thru
precedent that once Jurisdiction is questioned it must be
proved,” [id. at ¶ F.7 & 6 (some citations omitted) (citing
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)),] and alleges that, on
numerous occasions, he “inquired as to subject-matter and
personal jurisdiction in the State matter, and if that matter
was to be adjudicated under Admiralty, Common Law or an unknown
Jurisdiction,” [id. at ¶ F.7]. “These inquiries went without
answer by the Judge or Prosecution, making [the case] untenable
and unable to plead . . . .” [Id.] Further, the “[s]tate court
practice, State Statutes and rules being implemented make equity
in these matters impossible to attain,” violating due process as
required by the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. [Id. at
¶ E.15.]
Plaintiff argues that the instant case falls under
“Equity of Chancery” and seeks “this Chancery Court” to
“promulgate new or amended law and statute in Hawaii” to
recognize “the right to travel the common ways without a
license.” [Id. at pg. 1; id. at ¶ G.1.A.] Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages from all defendants as well as injunctive
relief in requiring the State to,5 among other things:
-“inform litigants of the Full Nature and Cause of any action
and the exact jurisdiction under which the matter will be
adjudicated BEFORE any matter is to proceed and BEFORE
suggesting the pro per or pro se litigant is advised to get
an attorney”; [id. at ¶ G.1.B (emphases in original);]
-“teach relevant rights of the people including the right to
travel the common ways for non-commercial purposes, and the
status differences between people living in the private and
those operating in the public as US citizens”; [id. at
¶ G.1.C;]
-provide Plaintiff with “two sets of automobile plates . . . .
showing to all police [policy] officers exemption from
licensing requirements,” as well as “identification card(s)
. . . without any form of new or required driver’s training
course or testing,” [id. at ¶¶ G.2.D-E (brackets in
original)].
II. The Motions
The County Defendants seek dismissal of the claims
against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. [County Defs.’ Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 4.]
They argue: (1) Plaintiff cannot allege claims against the
Prosecutor Defendants because this Court dismissed those claims
without leave to amend in this case; (2) Plaintiff has neither
5 The 7/10 Order notes that the State is not identified as a
defendant in the Amended Complaint, and that Plaintiff sought
leave to add the State back in as a defendant, which was denied.
[7/10 Order at 5-6.] Since the State is not a party in the
Amended Complaint, the request for injunctive relief is
liberally construed as being sought against the State
Defendants. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
identified in what capacity he is suing the Police Defendants
nor sufficiently pled a claim that is not based upon the issues
before the state court in Case Number 2DTC-23-04182;
(3) Plaintiff states no claims against the County of Maui (“the
County”) and, even if Plaintiff has stated a claim against the
County, the claim would be barred by the Younger abstention
doctrine;6 and (4) dismissal with prejudice is warranted. [Id. at
5-11.]
The State Defendants seek dismissal of the claims
against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). [State Defs.’ Motion at
2.] They argue: (1) Plaintiff’s claims regarding the right to
travel are without merit; (2) Plaintiff fails to state a
plausible Section 1983 claim; (3) the Younger abstention
doctrine remains applicable; and (4) allowing Plaintiff to file
a second amended complaint would be futile. [Id., Mem. in Supp.
at 5-10.]
The State Court Defendants seek dismissal of the
claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6). [State
Court Defs.’ Motion at 3.] They argue: (1) Plaintiff’s claims
are based on frivolous legal theories; (2) any claims against
the State Court Defendants in their official capacities are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) any claims against the
6 At the time the Motions were filed, Case No. 2DTC-23-04182
was still pending before the state court.
State Court Defendants in their individual capacities are barred
by absolute judicial immunity and quasi-judicial immunity;
(4) the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine.
[Id. at 2.]
III. The 7/10 Order
On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a document titled
“Exparte: Motion for Decree Pro Confesso; Motion for Joinder”
(“6/4 Motion”). [Dkt. no. 89.] Plaintiff requested, among other
things, reconsideration of the 12/30 Order based on new evidence
of the dismissal of Case Number 2DTC-23-004182 with prejudice.
See 6/4 Motion at 2. This Court declined to reinstate
Plaintiff’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims that were
dismissed pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine because,
although the Younger analysis no longer applied, those claims
would have failed as a matter of law, and no amendment to those
claims would cure the defects in those claims. [7/10 Order at
12.] This Court also denied Plaintiff’s request for leave to add
new defendants without prejudice to the filing of a motion
seeking leave to file a second amended complaint that complies
with Local Rule 10.4, as well as Plaintiff’s request to file a
third surreply addressing the instant Motions. [Id. at 12-13.]
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of the Amended Complaint
Although Plaintiff does not cite Sections 1983, 1985,
or 1986 in the Amended Complaint, he appears to be asserting
claims based on those sections. Further, although Plaintiff
refers to a number of different statutes, he does not appear to
be asserting claims under those statutes. See, e.g., Amended
Complaint at ¶ D (citing Title 28 U.S. Code § 1746(1)); id. at
¶ D.2 (citing Title 18 U.S. Code § 1346); id. at ¶ G.2.F (citing
Title 18 U.S. Code § 1346, § 1951(b)(2)-(3), § 242, § 241). The
Amended Complaint is therefore liberally construed as only
alleging the same Section 1983, 1985 and 1986 claims alleged in
the original Complaint.
Plaintiff argues that the “amended complaint moved
this matter into Chancery and out of Common Law Jurisdiction,”
[Mem. in Opp. at 3,] and that the Younger abstention doctrine
and the Eleventh Amendment do not apply in cases brought under
equity jurisdiction, [id., at 13-14]. The difference in law and
equity is relevant to the type of relief sought; Plaintiff seeks
relief under law and equity by seeking monetary damages as well
as injunctive relief. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ G.1.A-2.G;
Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (stating
that the “system of equity derived its doctrines, as well as its
powers, from its mode of giving relief” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, both the Younger abstention
doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment are applicable to claims
seeking equitable relief. See, e.g., Buckwalter v. Nev. Bd. of
Med. Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Younger
abstention requires federal courts to abstain from hearing
claims for equitable relief as long as the state proceedings are
ongoing, implicate important state interests, and provide an
adequate opportunity to raise federal questions.” (citations
omitted)); Nice v. Lopez, CIV. NO. 25-00029 JMS-RT, 2025 WL
673454, at *3 (D. Hawai`i Mar. 3, 2025) (“‘[t]he Eleventh
Amendment jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of
relief sought,’ absent unequivocal consent by the state”
(alteration in Nice) (quoting Krainski v. Nev. ex rel. Bd. of
Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th
Cir. 2010))).
The Amended Complaint names the State Court Defendants
and the Prosecutor Defendants in claims related to Case Number
2DTC-23-04182. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ D.8, E.11-14. This
Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the State
Court Defendants and the Prosecutor Defendants arising from Case
Number 2DTC-23-04182 without leave to amend in the instant case
and declined to reinstate those claims in the 7/10 Order. See
12/30 Order at 27-28; 7/10 Order at 12. Therefore, it is
unnecessary for this Court to address the claims and arguments
against these defendants. The State Court Defendants’ Motion and
the County Defendants’ Motion are granted insofar as the claims
against the State Court Defendants and the Prosecutor Defendants
are dismissed with prejudice in the instant case.
II. Failure to State a Claim
A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the State Defendants
The State Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to
state a plausible Section 1983 claim against the State
Defendants. [State Defs.’ Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 7-8.] As
noted in the 12/30 Order, the following standards apply to a
Section 1983 claim:
“Traditionally, the requirements for relief
under section 1983 have been articulated as:
(1) a violation of rights protected by the
Constitution or created by federal statute,
(2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a
‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.”
Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.
1991) (citations omitted). Additionally, a
defendant “cannot be held liable for a
constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
unless they were integral participants in the
unlawful conduct.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d
1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted);
see also Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 292 F.
Supp. 3d 1080, 1090 (D. Hawai`i 2018) (“For an
individual capacity suit under Section 1983,
plaintiff must allege personal participation in
the constitutional violation on the part of the
individual to subject that person to individual
liability.” (citation omitted)).
[12/30 Order at 18-19 (quoting McCoy v. Hawai`i Dep’t of Hum.
Serv., CIV. NO. 21-00063 LEK-RT, 2021 WL 5040197, at *7 (D.
Hawai`i Oct. 29, 2021)).]
Plaintiff argues that the State Defendants have failed
to address the “fundamental right to Travel,” see Amended
Complaint at ¶ A.1, nor have they addressed the right to operate
a vehicle without a driver’s license, see id. at ¶ A.3.
Plaintiff argues they have failed to “conform State laws and
practices” to acknowledge these rights. See id. at ¶ A.2.
Plaintiff further argues that this failure to update the law
resulted in the traffic citation in Case Number 2DTC-23-004182.
See id. at ¶¶ E.4-6. The original Complaint raised the same
argument against Governor Green and Lieutenant Governor Luke.
See Complaint at PageID.7-8, PageID.16. In the 12/30 Order, this
Court emphasized that “any claims asserted against the State
Defendants in the amended complaint cannot be based upon on
issues before the state court in Case Number 2DTC-23-04182.”
[12/30 Order at 18.] Because the requirements of the Younger
abstention doctrine are no longer met in this case, this Court
no longer needs to abstain from Plaintiff’s claims that are
based upon issues in Case Number 2DTC-23-04182. See 7/10 Order
at 8.
However, as stated in the 7/10 Order, “there is no
right to intrastate travel, or if there is such a right, . . .
driver’s licensing and motor vehicle registration requirements
do not violate that right.” [Id. at 11.] Therefore, Plaintiff’s
claims against the State Defendants are dismissed because they
do not state plausible claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Further,
because it is absolutely clear that Plaintiff cannot cure the
defect in his Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims against the
State Defendants, the dismissal must be with prejudice. See
Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can
cure the defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice
of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend
prior to dismissal of the action.” (citations omitted)).
B. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the County Defendants
The County Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint
does not state a plausible claim against the Police Defendants.
[County Defs.’ Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 6.] Plaintiff alleges
the same claims against the Police Defendants as he did in the
original Complaint, claiming that they did not “conform . . .
[County] practices to acknowledge Travel, a common right,”
[Amended Complaint at ¶ A.2,] which resulted in the traffic
citation against him that led to Case Number 2DTC-23-04182, [id.
at ¶ A.7]. See Complaint at PageID.13-14. The right to travel
analysis above also applies to Plaintiff’s claims against the
Police Defendants. These claims are therefore dismissed with
prejudice because no amendment to these Section 1983, 1985, and
1986 claims would cure the defect in those claims. See Lucas, 66
F.3d at 248.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the County Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Filed February 26,
2025, [dkt. no. 72,] the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
First Amended Complaint, Filed February 26, 2025, [dkt. no. 73,]
and the State Court Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed February 26, 2024
[ECF No. 70], [dkt. no. 74,] all of which were filed on
March 12, 2025, are HEREBY GRANTED. Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, filed February 26, 2025, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PagelD.1291
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, July 23, 2025,
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> 9 /s/ Leslie E. Kobayashi
Leslie E. Kobayashi
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JEFFREY-STEVEN OF THE HOUSE OF JARRETT VS. STATE OF HAWAII, ET
AL; CV 24-00040 LEK-KJM; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
17