Capers V Walmart Louisiana L L C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION

TIMOTHY D. CAPERS CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-1202

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

WALMART INC. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is Defendant Walmart Inc.’s (“Walmart”) Motion for Summary
Judgment. See Record Document 26. Plaintiff Timothy D. Capers (“Mr. Capers”) opposed.
See Record Document 32. Walmart replied. See Record Document 35. For the reasons
stated below, Walmart’s Motion (Record Document 26) is GRANTED. All claims asserted
against Walmart are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Capers began employment with Walmart in January 2006 as an assistant
manager. See Record Document 1 at ¶ 10. At the time of his termination, he was the store
manager of Walmart Neighborhood Market Store No. 3752 in Bossier City, Louisiana. See
id. In May 2018, during a break at a meeting at the Walmart Academy in Minden,
Louisiana, Market Manager Brian Ducote (“Ducote”), Mr. Capers’s supervisor and a white
male, was allegedly overheard stating that he intended to fire all of the Market Store
Managers in Shreveport and Bossier City “by any means possible.” See id. at ¶ 11. All of
the Market Store Managers in those areas, including Mr. Capers, were black. See id. After
the meeting, Mr. Capers claims that each of the Market Store Managers under Ducote’s
supervision in Shreveport and Bossier were subjected to unjust working conditions in an
attempt to compel them to quit. See id. at ¶ 12.

In June 2018, Ducote issued a third written disciplinary notice to Mr. Capers after
a power outage occurred at the store. See id. at ¶ 13. Mr. Capers asserts that under
Walmart’s disciplinary policy, this should have been nothing more than a first coaching;
however, Ducote escalated the discipline to a third written notice. See id. at ¶ 14. In
August 2018, Mr. Capers suffered a mild stroke while on vacation. See id. at ¶ 15. He was
hospitalized for two days during his vacation but able to return to work upon conclusion
of vacation leave. See id. He alleges that the residual effects of the stroke were evident
when he returned to work. See id. at ¶ 16. He claims his speech was a little bit slower
than normal, he did not have as much stamina as before, and he had some muscle

weakness. See id.
In October 2018, Ducote allegedly told Mr. Capers that he should consider retiring.
See id. at ¶ 17. Mr. Capers claims he inquired about stepping down to an assistant
manager position. See id. He allegedly spoke to the manager of one of the local store
locations, who stated that she needed an assistant manager. See id. The manager of the
local store supposedly contacted the Human Resources representative for the area and
asked to have Mr. Capers re-assigned to her store as one of her assistant managers. See

id. at ¶ 18.
In January 2019, a Human Resources representative allegedly spoke to Mr.
Capers to initiate the process of re-assigning him to one of the vacant assistant manager
positions. See id. at ¶ 19. On February 7, 2019, Mr. Capers claims Ducote told him that
he could not refer him to the assistant manger position and then terminated his
employment without explanation. See id. at ¶ 20. Mr. Capers argues there was no just
cause or wrongful conduct that would have justified termination of his employment. See
id. at ¶ 21. Additionally, he asserts that Ducote did not follow Walmart’s disability
accommodation protocols or disciplinary protocols when he terminated his employment.
See id.

At the time of his termination, Mr. Capers claims there were vacant job positions
for assistant mangers at several locations in the Shreveport-Bossier area. See id. at ¶ 22.
He alleges he was an experienced employee, and managers had been requesting to hire
him as an assistant manager at their respective stores. See id. As a result of the alleged
discriminatory termination of employment, he argues he suffered immediate financial
injury, hardship, and serious emotional distress. See id. at ¶ 23.

Mr. Capers claims he has exhausted all administrative prerequisites to suit. See
id. at ¶ 24. He filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on June 20, 2019. See id. A “Dismissal and Notice of Rights” and
“Notice of Suit Rights” was issued on June 19, 2023 and is attached to his Complaint.
See id.

The first paragraph of Mr. Capers’s Complaint alleges race discrimination, sex
discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation. See id. at 1. However, his
Complaint only alleges race discrimination and disability discrimination with sufficient
specificity. See id. at ¶¶ 25–34. As to his sex discrimination claim and retaliation claim,
Mr. Capers provides no specific factual allegations or supporting evidence in either his
Complaint or opposition to Walmart’s Motion. Therefore, with respect to his potential sex
discrimination and retaliation claims, Walmart’s Motion is GRANTED, and these claims
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Furthermore, Mr. Capers has withdrawn his Title VII race discrimination claim.
Footnote one of his opposition provides, “Mr. Capers is pursuing a claim for disability
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and specifically a claim for failure
to accommodate his disability…Mr. Capers will not pursue a race discrimination claim….”
See Record Document 32 at 1, fn. 1. Therefore, the Court will not analyze whether the
prima facie case has been satisfied, as his withdrawal is clear and unambiguous. There
are no genuine issues of material fact to support a finding of racial discrimination. Thus,
with respect to his Title VII race discrimination claim, Walmart’s Motion is GRANTED, and
the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Court will now move on to its analysis of Mr. Capers’s specifically alleged
claims under the ADA for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate. The
Court’s recited legal standards, summary of the parties’ arguments, and analysis will only
focus on these two claims under the ADA. It will not focus on Mr. Capers’s claims for sex
discrimination, retaliation, or race discrimination, as they do not survive summary
judgment.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Legal Standards.

(a) Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists if the record, taken as a whole, could lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment,
the court must view “all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Romero v. City of Grapevine, Tex., 888 F. 3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2018).

“Once a movant submits a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the non-
movant to show that the court should not grant the motion.” Lucero v. General Motors
LLC, No. 21-02893, 2022 WL 16578415, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2022). “The non-movant
then must provide specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute.” Id. The non-moving
party “cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
assertions, or only a ‘scintilla of evidence.’” Hathaway v. Bazanay, 507 F. 3d 312, 319 (5th

Cir. 2007). A court may consider pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with any affidavits when determining whether summary
judgment is appropriate. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In evaluating a motion for summary
judgment, the court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” and
“must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434
(5th Cir. 2013).
(b) Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) Failure to Accommodate.

“The ADA prohibits covered employers from ‘discriminat[ing] against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability.’” Feist v. La., Dept. of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen.,
730 F. 3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). Under the ADA,
“[d]iscrimination includes the failure to make ‘reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability…unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). The Fifth Circuit has held that a
successful failure to accommodate claim under the ADA requires the plaintiff to prove
three elements: “(1) the plaintiff is a ‘qualified individual with a disability;’ (2) the disability

and its consequential limitations were ‘known’ by the covered employer; and (3) the
employer failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known limitations.” Id.
A reasonable accommodation under the ADA may include the following: (1)
“making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities” and (2) “job restricting, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,

appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,
the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.” Id. at 453 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)).
(c) ADA Disability Discrimination.

“In a discriminatory-termination action under the ADA, the employee may either
present direct evidence that [he] was discriminated against because of [his] disability or
alternatively proceed under the burden-shifting analysis first articulated in McDonnell
Douglas…, a Title VII case.” See E.E.O.C. v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F. 3d 688, 694 (5th
Cir. 2014). The “analysis first requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.” Id. To prove a prima facie case for a violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must
show that “(1) he is disabled or regarded as disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2)
he is qualified for the job position, and (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment
action on account of his disability or perceived disability.” Id. at 697.
If the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, “‘the burden shifts to the employer
to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions.’” Mueck v. La Grange
Acquisitions, L.P., 75 F 4th 469, 483 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Thompson v. Microsoft Corp.,

2 F. 4th 460, 470 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted)). If a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason is articulated by the employer, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff “‘to prove that
the employer’s explanation was a pretext for discrimination.’” Id. To meet this burden, the
plaintiff must rebut “‘each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer articulates.’” Id.
(quoting Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F. 3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001)). Specifically,
the plaintiff can display “‘evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the
employer’s proffered explanation is false or unworthy of credence.’” Id. (quoting Gosby v.
Apache Indus. Servs., Inc., 30 F. 4th 523, 527 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).

II. Summary of the Arguments.
Walmart asserts that Mr. Capers had a history of negative performance evaluations
and coachings throughout his twelve-year employment with Walmart. See Record
Document 26-2 at 9. Walmart states that he received three evaluations where he was
graded as “development needed,” most recently after his promotion to Store Manager in
2017. See id. He received negative feedback in his 2018 evaluation, including that he
“struggled with Customer experience in his store” and “need to…focus[] on associate

development rather than associate replacement.” See id. Walmart advances that Mr.
Capers was issued six coachings throughout his employment with Walmart, and three of
these coachings were for job performance issues. See id. His most recent coaching was
a level three disciplinary action for poor job performance after he allegedly failed to follow
protocol when his store lost power, causing “a total appox loss of $70,000, and a delayed
opening of store 3752 on the 4th of July, an extremely busy holiday.” See id. at 9–10.

Walmart contends that Mr. Capers does not dispute the facts of the incident and
acknowledges responsibility. See id. at 10. If Mr. Capers disagreed with this disciplinary
action, he could have used Walmart’s open door protocol to challenge the action, but he
did not. See id. Walmart contends this level three disciplinary action was part of his active
employment record when he was terminated in February 2019 and did not expire until
July 7, 2019. See id.

Walmart avers that it terminated Mr. Capers’s employment on February 7, 2019 for
his inability to perform his job. See id. at 11. Specifically, Walmart asserts that he “failed
to create an environment that executes inventory control processes timely and
accurately”; “failed to create an environment that teaches processes and execution with
his associates and management staff”; and “failed to create an expectation with all
associates and management staff to greet help and thank every customer.” See id.
Additionally, Walmart claims he was “unable to reach CFF goals for all of 2018.” See id.
Walmart submits that he signed and acknowledged his exit interview, which was

witnessed by another Walmart associate. See id. Even though Mr. Capers was eligible
for rehire, he did not apply for subsequent employment with Walmart. See id.
Although Mr. Capers was eligible for medical leave, Walmart argues he did not
request medical leave or otherwise notify his supervisors that he was missing work;
instead, he claims that his subordinates allegedly informed Ducote that he was in the
hospital. See id. Walmart asserts that Mr. Capers never requested an accommodation
under the ADA, despite his intimate knowledge as a high-level Walmart manager on the
ADA, his extensive training on the ADA, and his own work processing the accommodation
requests of his associates. See id. at 12.

Mr. Capers testified he did not make an accommodation request through Walmart’s
Accommodation Service Center (“ASC”) or provide any medical documentation to
Walmart regarding his alleged disability. See id. Rather, he requested to step down as an
assistant manager by emailing Matthew Baker (“Baker”), the Market Human Resources
Manager for Markets 507 and 542. See id. Walmart argues this email does not reference
needing an accommodation, the stroke that he suffered on vacation, or any subsequent
symptoms of his stroke. See id. at 12–13. Furthermore, Walmart contends that Mr. Capers

does not articulate how the position of assistant manager would have accommodated his
alleged limitations, especially since he subsequently obtained another job with Dollar
General as a store manager. See id. at 13. Thus, Walmart submits that the email sent to
Baker was insufficient notice that Mr. Capers was requesting to step down as an
accommodation for an alleged disability. See id. at 23.
In addition to the arguments above, Walmart contends Mr. Capers has not met his
prima facie case of showing that he was disabled. See id. at 21. Even if he could

adequately present the prima facie case, which Walmart denies, Walmart advances that
he cannot rebut that there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination.
See id. Ultimately, Walmart requests that the Court grant its Motion and dismiss all claims
with prejudice. See id. at 27.
Mr. Capers opposes, submitting that he has established the prima facie case for
disability discrimination under the ADA. See id. at 11. He asserts he was qualified for his
job, he had a disability, Walmart knew of his disability, and he requested an
accommodation. See id. at 12–16. He contends that under the ADA, a stroke qualifies as
a physical or neurological impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities. See id. at 13. Mr. Capers claims that after his stroke, he had numerous
impairments, such as inability to grip or hold with his right hand; foot and leg numbness;
unstable gait due to weakened right leg and foot; slowed speech; having to pause to
process communications; and reduced stamina. See id. at 13–14. He argues a jury could
find that he is disabled under the ADA because he had one or more significant
impairments of one or more major life activities. See id. at 14.

Additionally, Mr. Capers contends that there is overwhelming evidence that
Walmart knew of his disability. See id. When he became ill at work and then hospitalized
in August 2018, he claims that both he and his wife spoke directly to Ducote, disclosing
his stroke and symptoms. See id. He also claims that his coworkers informed Ducote of
his illness and symptoms. See id.
In September 2018, Mr. Capers avers that Walmart reached out to him regarding
the serious illness medical benefit, and thus, Walmart allegedly knew he had a stroke.

See id. He advances that his wife completed and returned the claim form to Walmart,
attaching the requested supporting documentation. See id. This form allegedly contained
physician statements documenting that Mr. Capers could not use his right hand; he had
high blood pressure and diabetes; and he suffered a stroke “with permanent neurological
deficit.” See id.
Mr. Capers also submits that he requested an accommodation in his email to
Baker. See id. at 15. While he admits there may be disputed facts regarding how much
Walmart knew, he argues it does not undermine or reduce the significance of the
information conveyed to Walmart in the email. See id. He contends that Walmart was
obligated to engage in further discussions with him about his impairments and reasonable

accommodation. See id. at 15–16.
Mr. Capers maintains that he can establish his ADA disability discrimination claim
through direct and circumstantial evidence. See id. at 16. He argues the document
detailing his exit interview is direct evidence that Walmart’s decision to terminate his
employment was based on his disability. See id. at 17. Within this document, Mr. Capers
points to the statement that his employment was terminated due to his “inability to perform

the job.” See id. He submits that this statement establishes “discriminatory bias.” See id.
Alternatively, Mr. Capers asserts that both this statement within the exit interview
document and Ducote’s statement that “he had to fire Mr. Capers because the
accommodation request was denied are circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.”
See id. at 18. He argues that he had no active disciplinary warnings at the time of his
termination. See id. Furthermore, he contends that Walmart’s records show that he had
no coaching entered into his record after July 2018 and prior to his termination. See id.

Mr. Capers advances that “even if Walmart’s articulated explanation could carry its
burden, [he can] show[] that a jury could consider the fact that Walmart’s explanation for
dismissal at least involved some consideration of whether or not he was ‘able’ to do his
job, and conclude that Walmart discriminated against his because of disability.” See id. at
20. He avers that a jury could reasonably accept his testimony and reject Walmart’s
“vague record entry regarding alleged ‘failures.’” See id. at 21.

Attached to Mr. Capers’s opposition is a separate document containing his
“objections to summary judgment evidence and responses to [Walmart’s] statement of
material facts.” See Record Document 32-1. He asserts that “[n]one of the challenged
exhibits are accompanied by an affidavit or declaration from a custodian of records or
other qualified witness establishing that the documents are what [Walmart] claims them
to be.” See Record Document 32-1 at 1–2. He submits that these documents “are not
self-authenticating under Federal Rule of Evidence 902 and do not satisfy Rule 901’s
foundational requirement.” See id. at 2.

Additionally, Mr. Capers avers that Walmart’s exhibits contain inadmissible
hearsay. See id. He continues that Walmart has also failed to demonstrate admissibility
for summary judgment purposes, as “[n]o declarations have been submitted under Rule
56(c)(4) to reduce these documents to admissible form.” See id. at 3. He ultimately
requests that the Court sustain his objections and strike the following exhibits submitted
by Walmart: Exhibits D, E, F, G, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, and X.1 See id.

Walmart replies, reiterating that the undisputed facts show he was not disabled
under the ADA, he never requested an accommodation, and he was terminated for
performance issues. See Record Document 35 at 5. Walmart contends that his opposition
relies primarily upon a self-serving and contradictory affidavit of Nicole E. Capers (“Mrs.
Capers”), his wife, as well as a claim for critical illness insurance benefits to a third-party,

1 The Court notes that Exhibit H is purposefully omitted from Mr. Capers’s list of objections.
Allstate. See id. Walmart submits that these exhibits are not appropriate summary
judgment evidence and do not create genuine issues of material fact. See id. at 6.

Walmart maintains that Mrs. Capers’s declaration is not competent summary
judgment evidence because it is a self-serving declaration that conflicts with Mr. Capers’s
deposition testimony regarding his alleged disability, contains legal conclusions, and
presents information to which she is not competent to testify. See id. Moreover, Walmart
advances that his reliance on the Allstate insurance documents is misplaced, as there is
no evidence that Walmart ever received them, and Mr. Capers specifically testified that
he did not submit medical documentation to Walmart. See id. at 6–7. Walmart also points
out that his EEOC Charge contains multiple hearsay statements and is not competent
summary judgment evidence. See id. at 7.

Walmart argues Mr. Capers’s attempt to discount its submitted business records
should be rejected. See id. The disputed exhibits include his employment records; his job
description; Walmart’s policies; and evidence of his poor job performance. See id.
Walmart contends that Rule 56 is clear that it can rely upon its business records produced
as competent summary judgment evidence; thus, Mr. Capers’s objections should be
overruled. See id. at 8, 10.

Walmart reasserts that Mr. Capers’s ADA failure to accommodate claim should be
dismissed. See id. at 10. It points out that the McDonnell Douglas framework does not
apply to an ADA failure to accommodate claim, and even if it did, his termination records
are not evidence of direct discrimination. See id. at 11. Walmart argues that he merely
infers and presumes the meaning of select words in the termination documents “far
beyond their logical meaning.” See id.
Walmart also reiterates that Mr. Capers has not presented genuine issues of
material fact that he is disabled under the ADA. See id. at 12. Prior to filing his opposition
and Mrs. Capers’s declaration, Walmart avers that Mr. Capers never stated that any of
his life activities were substantially impaired by his stroke. See id. at 12–13. Walmart
resubmits that he has not presented any genuine issues of material fact that Walmart

knew about his alleged disability or that he ever requested an accommodation. See id. at
14–15.
Walmart restates that it has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
Mr. Capers’s termination. See id. at 16. Walmart argues he has offered nothing but
unsupported assertions that the disciplinary action was not active when he was
terminated, which Walmart views as a “blatant misrepresentation.” See id. For all the

reasons stated in Walmart’s Motion and reply, it ultimately requests that its Motion be
granted and all claims be dismissed with prejudice. See id. at 17.
III. Analysis.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that all of Walmart’s proffered exhibits are

admissible, and Mr. Capers’s objections are overruled. A district court is “‘given broad
discretion in rulings on the admissibility of evidence.’” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n
v. Ryan’s Pointe Hous., LLC, No. 15-2782, 2025 WL 783429, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21,
2025) (quoting Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., 922 F. 2d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 1991)). “‘To
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent
must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is.’” Dugas v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 468 F. Supp. 3d 769, 773 (W.D. La. 2020) (quoting
FED. R. EVID. 901). A document can be authenticated “though ‘[t]estimony of a [w]itness
with [k]nowledge’ that ‘an item is what it is claimed to be.’” Id. The authentication
requirement can also be satisfied “‘if the document’s form and content, taken with other
circumstances, indicate the document is reliable.’” Id. at 774.

Mr. Capers’s deposition testimony has authenticated the majority of Walmart’s
exhibits. The Court will not go through his testimony line-by-line; however, counsel for
Walmart introduced and questioned Mr. Capers about Walmart’s policies, his employment
records, his exit interview, and other documents he now claims are inadmissible. See
Record Documents 32-3 & 32-4. Furthermore, these exhibits’ form and content, taken
with other circumstances, indicate they are reliable. Walmart’s logo appears on several
of the documents, and there is nothing to suggest that Walmart attempted to introduce
falsified business records or employment records. Therefore, these exhibits are

admissible at the summary judgment stage.
(a) ADA Failure to Accommodate.
Mr. Capers must satisfy all three elements of the prima facie case to overcome
summary judgment. There is a dispute with respect to the first element on whether he

qualifies as disabled under the ADA. “The ADA defines a ‘disability’ as ‘(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment….’” McKinney v. Sheriffs Office Rapides Parish, No. 19-01339, 2021 WL
1083979, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 19, 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). “The three
subsections of the disability definition are referred to as the ‘actual disability’ prong, the
‘record of’ prong, and the ‘regarded as’ prong, respectively.” Id. A plaintiff is only required
to prove disability under one prong. See id.
Here, the parties do not address which prong is applicable; however, the Court
finds prong one is sufficient to the facts of this case. Mr. Capers must prove two things:
(1) “that he had a qualifying ‘physical or mental impairment,’” and (2) the “impairment
‘substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.’” Id. Under the applicable EEOC
regulations, a physical or mental impairment is defined “as ‘[a]ny physiological disorder

or condition…affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and
endocrine.’” Id. at *4 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)).
Mr. Capers claims his stroke and accompanying symptoms qualify him as disabled
under the ADA. While the standards under the first prong are not implemented to be

demanding, he “is required to provide specific, detailed evidence regarding [his]
impairment and its effect on his abilities.” Id. at *5. Mr. Capers supports his argument with
several attached exhibits. See Record Document 32-2.
From the summary judgment record, it is evident that Mr. Capers never requested
any medical leave in connection with his stroke. See Record Document 32-3 at 82–83;
see also Record Document 32-4 at 75. From the time he suffered his first stroke in 2018
until his termination in February 2019, he testified that he was able to perform the day-to-

day duties as store manager. See Record Document 32-3 at 96. Mr. Capers never listed
having a disability while he worked at Walmart. See id. at 139. In fact, after his termination
at Walmart, he started working at Dollar General where he performed “more physical
labor” than he did at Walmart. See Record Document 32-4 at 81.
The Court finds Mr. Capers does not qualify as disabled under the ADA. One of
the key phrases under the ADA’s definition is “substantially impaired.” While he may have
experienced residual effects from his stroke, it was not enough to substantially limit a
major life activity. He did not take additional medical leave from work, he routinely
performed his daily duties at Walmart, and his subsequent employment at Dollar General

required more physical labor. Therefore, Mr. Capers does not qualify as disabled under
the ADA, thereby failing to satisfy the first element of the prima facie case.
Even if he qualified as disabled under the ADA, which he does not, Mr. Capers
cannot establish that Walmart knew of his disability, the required second element. To
support the second element, he points to several exhibits, such as his email with Baker,
Mrs. Capers’s declaration, Mona Oes’s (“Oes”) affidavit, his deposition testimony, and his

insurance claim with Allstate. The Court finds the majority of Oes’s affidavit includes
inadmissible hearsay. Her direct observations of Mr. Capers at work in September 2018
are admissible because they are based on her personal knowledge. However, her
speculative statements about what she heard regarding his medical condition are
hearsay. She states, “I learned that he would have to be admitted. His blood pressure
was extremely high. He was nauseated. I later found out he was threatening a stroke.”
See Record Document 32-5. She allegedly contacted Ducote “to inform him of what was
going on with [Mr. Capers] and that he would have to be out a couple of days after being
released from the hospital under whatever his doctors order may be.” See id. Oes merely
recounts what she told Ducote over the phone after Mrs. Capers called her about what

the doctors said in the hospital. This recounting is inadmissible hearsay because Oes
does not have personal knowledge of the information shared during these conversations
with the doctors. See Ripple v. Marble Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 99 F. Sup. 3d 662, 675
(W.D. Tex. 2015). Her statements are based on information and belief rather than
personal knowledge. See id. at 674. Therefore, the Court will not consider Oes’s
statements about Mr. Capers’s medical condition or the phone calls as admissible
summary judgment evidence.

Mr. Capers also points to his deposition testimony to support his argument that
Walmart knew of his alleged disability. He confirmed he never officially requested any
type of medical leave with Walmart. See Record Document 32-3 at 82–83. He claims
Ducote knew about his stroke after talking with him in person and Oes and Zandra Black
(“Black”) over the phone. See id. at 83–84. Mr. Capers does not have personal knowledge
of Oes’s and Black’s phone calls with Ducote, as he was not privy to these conversations.

His testimony about what was said during those alleged phone calls is inadmissible
hearsay, which is not competent summary judgment evidence.
Mrs. Capers’s declaration is also offered as an attempt to show Walmart was aware
of Mr. Capers’s stroke. See Record Document 32-2 at 1. She claims she “heard [Mr.
Capers] telling [] Ducote that he had suffered a stroke” over the phone. See Record
Document 32-2 at 1. This statement is also inadmissible hearsay because she does not
have personal knowledge to this phone call. She simply alleges that she overheard a

phone conversation, which does not demonstrate a showing of personal knowledge.
At the time of Mr. Capers’s hospitalizations, Walmart had both a national and
Louisiana medical-related accommodation policy. See Record Documents 26-13 & 26-
14. Both policies explain several ways to request a disability accommodation. A request
may be submitted to any salaried member, management, or an HR representative. See
Record Document 26-13 at 2; see also Record Document 26-14 at 2. Certain job
adjustments can be approved by facility management; however, if they are unable to grant
a request, a formal request can be made from Walmart’s ASC. See Record Document
26-13 at 2–3; see also Record Document 26-14 at 2. If a request is based on a medical
condition, a medical questionnaire form must be filled out to provide Walmart with the

necessary information it needs for the request. See Record Document 26-13 at 3; see
also Record Document 26-14 at 2. Mr. Capers never submitted any official medical
documentation to Walmart; he only submitted information to Allstate, a third-party
insurance company. See Record Document 32-3 at 88–89, 95. In his deposition, he
confirmed that from an overview of Walmart’s record, there is no indication that he had a
disability. See id. at 139.

Mr. Capers also points to his February 6, 2019 email to Baker and Ducote as
evidence of Walmart’s knowledge. The email provides, “I would like to put in request to
step down because of health reason [sic]. I have been struggling with my health for the
past year high blood pressure and getting my blood sugar levels under control. I was in
the hospital in July and August for these issues. Had conversation with my doctor and he
feels [I] should try something different.” See Record Document 26-28. While Mr. Capers
contacted his supervisor and an HR representative, this email provides no information
about his stroke. The only medical issues he mentions are high blood pressure and blood
sugar levels, which may or may not be related to his stroke.

Even though Walmart may have been aware of his high blood pressure and blood
sugar levels, it was not aware of the limitations resulting from them. It is Mr. Capers’s
responsibility to assert his limitations. See Decou-Snowton v. Parish, No. 21-1302, 2022
WL 4245492, at *15 (E.D. La. Sept. 15, 2022). He returned to work and did not request
additional medical leave, making it difficult for Walmart to know he was disabled and had
certain limitations. His email makes general claims “but provides no details that would
have alerted [Walmart] to the disability’s qualifying status.” Doe v. Spillman Ranch Homes
LP, No. 23-01525, 2025 WL 1692600, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2025). Thus, Mr. Capers

has failed to satisfy the second element of the prima facie case and demonstrate there
are genuine issues of material fact with respect to Walmart’s knowledge.
The Court will not analyze the third and final element, as the first two elements
have not been satisfied. Mr. Capers’s proffered evidence is insufficient to overcome
summary judgment. Therefore, with respect to his ADA failure to accommodate claim,
Walmart’s Motion is GRANTED, and the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(b) ADA Disability Discrimination.
The second and third elements of the prima facie case are easily satisfied. Mr.
Capers was qualified for the manager position at Walmart, and his employment was
ultimately terminated. Even so, as analyzed above, the Court finds that Mr. Capers does

not qualify as disabled under the ADA, and thus, he fails to satisfy the first element of the
prima face case. Even if the Court found that Mr. Capers could satisfy all three elements
of the prima facie case, which it does not, Walmart has established it had legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination.
Mr. Capers points to Walmart’s Exhibit C to show he was terminated due to his
disability. See Record Document 26-6 at 7. He claims he was terminated because he

could not perform his job duties due to his stroke; however, this is a misinterpretation of
the language. In addition to Exhibit C, Walmart also submits two other exhibits providing
further details about his termination. Exhibit D states that Mr. Capers’s termination was
due to unsatisfactory job performance. See Record Document 26-7. Exhibit X provides
the exit interview, in which Ducote lists several comments explaining why Mr. Capers was
ultimately terminated. See Record Document 26-27. Ducote’s comments include:

[Mr. Capers] has failed to create an environment that executes
inventory control processes timely and accurately. Some
examples include Shrink in D90 due to associate throwing
merchandise without processing through markdown or credit.
This has led to shrink doubling in D90 pro instock
performance, caused by lack of oversight on throw
verification. Additionally, [Mr. Capers] has failed to create an
environment that teaches processes execution with his
associates and management staff. The lack of discipline
around PI control processes does not realize the efficiencies
intended to reduce friction around availability for customers.
[Mr. Capers] has failed to create an expectation with all
associates and management staff to greet help and thank
every customer and has been unable to reach CFF goals for
all of 2018. Associate was on 3rd level discipline previously,
and this.
See id. These comments provide insight into what “inability to perform job” really means.
The Court does not interpret this language to mean he physically could not perform his
job duties; rather, he was not able to meet expectations as the store manager. In fact, Mr.
Capers testified that he never requested additional leave and returned to his duties. See
Record Document 32-3 at 96; see also Record Document 32-4 at 75. Therefore, Walmart
has sufficiently provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination.
Mr. Capers cannot prove that Walmart’s reasons were a pretext for discrimination.
He never reported any discrimination or harassment during his time at Walmart. See
Record Document 32-4 at 50. Additionally, he confirmed that during the power outage in
July 2019, his subordinates’ actions and the store were ultimately his responsibility. See
Record Document 32-3 at 73–74, 126. As a result of the power outage, store sales were
affected due to lost merchandise and refrigerated medication in the pharmacy. See id. at
74–75.

Mr. Capers also argues Ducote did not follow Walmart’s disciplinary protocols
when he escalated the situation to a third written notice, which ultimately led to
termination. See Record Document 32-3 at 77–78. According to Walmart’s “Disciplinary
Action Management Guidelines” in effect at the time of his termination, “[t]here may be
times when it is appropriate to skip disciplinary action levels based on the circumstances.”
See Record Document 26-12 at 1. Even if Mr. Capers did not have an active disciplinary

action pending, Ducote was permitted to place him on a third written notice under
Walmart’s protocol. See id. Walmart’s policy allows Ducote to skip to a third written notice
“for an unrelated concern or [if it] is more appropriate than a First or Second Written based
on the situation.” See id. at 2. This policy gives superiors, like Ducote, ample discretion
when deciding how to discipline an employee. Even though Mr. Capers did not expect to
be terminated, his termination was not due to his alleged disability. He has failed to show
pretext on the part of Walmart. Therefore, with respect to his ADA disability discrimination
claim, Walmart’s Motion is GRANTED, and the claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS ORDERED that Walmart’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Record Document
26) is GRANTED. All of Mr. Capers’s claims asserted against Walmart are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.

A Judgment accompanying this Ruling shall issue herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 22nd day of July, 2025.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE