Tidrick V Fca Us Llc

Filed 6/26/25; certified for publication 7/22/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ASHLEY TIDRICK,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063186

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-
01188037)
FCA US LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Glenn R. Salter, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions. Request for Judicial Notice. Granted.
JDP, Jeff Dominic Price; Consumer Law Experts, Jordan G.
Cohen, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, John A. Taylor, Jr., Melissa B. Whalen; Clark
Hill and Erin E. Hanson, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Tidrick filed a lawsuit alleging problems with a motor
vehicle she purchased in Fresno County from defendant FCA US LLC (FCA).
The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement, which included
attorney fees and costs, pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act (Song-Beverly Act), Civil Code section 1790 et seq. Tidrick sought an
award of attorney fees and costs in a total amount of $82,719.33, consisting of
$74,275 in attorney fees and $8,444.33 in costs. The trial court awarded
Tidrick a total of $15,000 in fees and costs, a reduction of 82.9 percent.
Tidrick appeals from the trial court’s award. We conclude the
court erred in applying hourly attorney rates prevailing in Fresno County
and abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the lodestar method and
to specify the amount of costs. We therefore reverse the court’s award of
attorney fees and costs and remand with directions to recalculate Tidrick’s
award.
FACTS
Tidrick alleged she brought the vehicle she purchased from FCA
to its repair facilities six times in approximately 10 months for transmission
issues. Tidrick subsequently contacted FCA and requested it comply with its
obligations under the Song-Beverly Act to repurchase the vehicle, but it
declined to do so.
A. Litigation
Tidrick filed a complaint against FCA in Orange County Superior
Court, the judicial district in which FCA maintains its principal place of
business, alleging violations of various provisions of the Song-Beverly Act.
FCA’s counsel sent an email to Tidrick’s counsel, offering to “make restitution
of the actual price paid or payable for [Tidrick’s] vehicle and to pay any
additional expenses incurred pursuant to Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(B),

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less an offset for use pursuant to Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(C).” FCA
also agreed to pay Tidrick’s “reasonable [attorney] fees and costs.” Tidrick
declined the settlement offer.
More than a year later, FCA agreed to repurchase Tidrick’s
vehicle and pay full restitution plus a civil penalty amounting to 1.58 times
the restitution price. FCA also agreed to pay attorney fees and costs pursuant
to a noticed motion. The parties’ settlement agreement was memorialized in a
confidential written agreement in which FCA agreed Tidrick would be
deemed the prevailing party for purposes of the fee motion.
B. Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
Tidrick filed a motion for fees and costs, seeking a total of
$82,719.33, comprised of $74,275 in attorney fees and $8,444.33 in costs.
Tidrick’s request for attorney fees was based on a lodestar calculation of 173
hours at hourly rates of $415–$500 per hour, the prevailing hourly rate in
Orange County.
In support of the motion, Tidrick attached a declaration of
counsel, which included a summary of the litigation history, sworn
statements regarding counsel’s litigation experience, prior orders awarding
attorney fees in Song-Beverly Act litigation in Los Angeles, Orange, and San
Bernardino counties, a survey report of consumer and bankruptcy attorneys,
billing records, and a memorandum of costs. The declaration also stated FCA
had agreed to resolve Tidrick’s action “in principle for full restitution and
civil penalties amounting to a 1.58-time multiplier.”
FCA filed an opposition to the fee motion, arguing the hourly
attorney rate should be capped at $443 per hour for partners and $308 per
hour for associates. FCA concluded Tidrick’s attorney fees amounted to
$50,494.80 based on these hourly rates, but argued the amount should be

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further reduced to $34,358.90. FCA did not argue venue was improper in
Orange County or that the attorney fees should be awarded based upon
prevailing hourly rates in Fresno County. FCA also did not challenge
Tidrick’s request for $8,444.33 in costs.
The trial court ordered additional briefing regarding whether
venue was proper in Fresno County and if so, whether Fresno County hourly
rates should apply to Tidrick’s attorney fee request. Tidrick’s counsel filed a
supplemental declaration which argued venue was proper in Orange County
because FCA’s principal place of business was there and therefore local
attorney rates applied.
The trial court ordered Tidrick to file a copy of the parties’
settlement agreement and invited the parties to file a second supplemental
brief addressing Smart v. Ford Motor Company (Jan. 21, 2020, CO87422), an
unpublished opinion of the Third District Court of Appeal, which noted
hourly attorney rates in Fresno County for Song-Beverly Act litigation. The
court ordered notice be given to FCA and for FCA to give notice to the other
party. FCA’s counsel later admitted she failed to serve the order on Tidrick’s
counsel. Neither party filed supplemental briefing or declarations in response
to this order and did not provide a copy of the settlement agreement to the
court.
C. Trial Court’s Ruling
After hearing argument on Tidrick’s motion, the trial court
awarded Tidrick a total of $15,000 in attorney fees and costs, a reduction of
82.9 percent from the requested award of $82,719.33.
The trial court found “as a matter of law” that it “must award
attorney fees based on the prevailing hourly rate for consumer attorneys in
Fresno County” because Tidrick “is and always has been a resident of Fresno

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County, the vehicle was purchased in Fresno County, and the vehicle was
serviced in Fresno and Kings Counties.”
The trial court acknowledged it was “unaware of any specific
venue provisions in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.” However, the
court concluded Fresno County was the proper venue for Tidrick’s action
based on Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (b),1 which provides
for venue either where the consumer resides or where the consumer good was
purchased. The court concluded “it must use the prevailing hourly rates for
consumer attorneys handling [Song-Beverly Act] cases in Fresno County.”
Relying on Smart as “evidence” for determining hourly attorney rates in
Fresno County, the court concluded rates of $350 per hour for partners, $225
per hour for associates, and $110 per hour for paralegals were “reasonable.”
The trial court “accept[ed] that the 173 hours of attorney time
claimed were based on time actually expended.” However, the court found
such hours were not “‘reasonably incurred’” for the following reasons: (1)
because the parties failed to provide a copy of the settlement agreement to
the court, it was “possible . . . . [it] violate[d] the public policy of the [S]tate of
California” and therefore the court “would be within its discretion to deny an
award of any attorney fees to the buyer”; (2) Tidrick’s failure to accept FCA’s
“repurchase offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998,” lead to two
years of litigation, which was “unreasonable on its face”; (3) the number of
attorney hours billed seemed unreasonable for a “simpl[e] [Song-Beverly Act]
case that should have been resolved quickly”; and (4) the court had “no
competent or compelling evidence as to whether the final settlement was

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
1

Procedure unless otherwise stated.

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better than what the defendant initially offered” because the parties failed to
provide the court with a copy of the settlement agreement.
The trial court neither specified how many of the 173 hours
claimed by Tidrick’s counsel were “reasonably incurred” nor what hourly rate
applied to any of the allowable hours. The court also did not directly address
Tidrick’s request for $8,444.33 in costs. In awarding Tidrick a total of
$15,000, the court did not specify how much of the award was attributable to
attorney fees and how much to costs.
DISCUSSION
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Applicable Law
The Song-Beverly Act is “‘manifestly a remedial measure,
intended for the protection of the consumer.’” (Murillo v. Fleetwood
Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 990 (Murillo).) A prevailing buyer in
an action under the Song-Beverly Act “shall be allowed by the court to
recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs
and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended,
determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in
connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ.
Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) In enacting this provision, the “Legislature has
provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a
situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been economically
feasible.” (Murillo, at p. 994.)
B. Standard of Review
“‘We review an award of attorney fees under [the Song-Beverly
Act] for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] We presume the trial court’s attorney

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fees award is correct, and “[w]hen the trial court substantially reduces a fee
or cost request, we infer the court has determined the request was inflated.”
[Citation.] “The “‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of
professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her]
judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the
appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’”’” (Goglin v. BMW of
North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 470–471 (Goglin).) This
standard of review applies to a trial court’s application of correct legal
standards to the circumstances of a specific case. (569 E. County Boulevard
LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 434
(569 E. County).)
The trial court’s discretion is “‘subject to the limitations of legal
principles governing the subject of its action . . . .’” (Etcheson v. FCA US LLC
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 831, 841 (Etcheson).) “[T]he determination of whether
the trial court selected the proper legal standards in making its fee
determination is reviewed de novo [citation] and, although the trial court has
broad authority in determining the amount of reasonable legal fees, the
award can be reversed for an abuse of discretion when it employed the wrong
legal standard in making its determination.” (569 E. County, supra, 6
Cal.App.5th at p. 434.) When the record affirmatively demonstrates the
court’s discretionary determination of fees depended on factual findings
unsupported by the evidence, “the matter must be reversed with instructions
to redetermine the award.” (Etcheson, at p. 841.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING FRESNO COUNTY ATTORNEY RATES
We agree with Tidrick the trial court erred in finding “as a
matter of law” that hourly attorney rates prevailing in Fresno County applied

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to her fee request based upon the court’s conclusion section 395, subdivision
(b) mandated venue in Fresno County. We review de novo the court’s
decision. (Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258
[applying de novo review when entitlement to attorney fees and costs
depends on interpretation of a statute].)
Section 395, subdivision (b) provides that a consumer action
“arising from an offer or provision of goods [or] services” is proper “where the
buyer or lessee in fact signed the contract, where the buyer or lessee resided
at the time the contract was entered into, or where the buyer or lessee resides
at the commencement of the action.” However, the trial court failed to cite,
and we have been unable to locate, any authority making the venue
provisions of section 395, subdivision (b) mandatory in Song-Beverly Act
cases.2
Because Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (b) is
not mandatory, generally applicable venue rules apply. Code of Civil
Procedure section 395.5 specifies where venue may be had in a case, such as
this one, where a party to the action is a corporation: “A corporation may be
sued in the county where a contract is made or is to be performed, or where
the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where
the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the
power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” A foreign

2 The authority cited by FCA does not convince us otherwise. In
Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, the court applied
section 395, subdivision (b) to an action brought under the Rosenthal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.), not the Song-Beverly
Act; and Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Superior Court (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th
1067, addressed section 392, subdivision (a), a different venue statute.

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corporation may obtain a county residence under Corporations Code section
2105, subdivision (a)(4), which allows it to designate its principal office
within the state, thus granting a county of residence for venue purposes.
Here, FCA is a foreign corporation with its principal place of
business in Newport Beach, California.3 Thus, pursuant to section 395.5,
venue was proper either in Fresno County, where the contract was made and
the alleged breach occurred, or in Orange County, where FCA maintains its
principal place of business in California.
Generally, “when venue is proper in more than one county, a
plaintiff has the choice of where to file the action from among the available
options.” (Battaglia Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 309, 313.) There is a presumption the county in which the
plaintiff chose to file is correct and the burden rests on the party seeking a
change of venue to defeat this presumption. (Id. at pp. 313–314.) FCA failed
to challenge Tidrick’s choice of venue in Orange County and therefore waived
any alleged defect. (§ 396b; Hennigan v. Boren (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 810,
816.)
Because venue was proper in Orange County, the trial court
should have applied local hourly attorney rates. “The reasonable hourly rate
is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v.

3 On May 3, 2024, Tidrick filed a motion for judicial notice of
statements of information FCA filed with the California Secretary of State. A
court may take judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive,
and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United
States.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) Accordingly, the motion for judicial
notice is granted.

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Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM). The relevant “community” is
generally based on where the services are rendered, i.e., where the court is
located. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242–1243.)
Accordingly, the reasonable hourly rate in this case is that charged by
consumer attorneys practicing in the local legal community in Orange
County.
Although a “trial court may deviate” from this established default
rule, to do so must be “justified by the circumstances.” (Altavion, Inc. v.
Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 72.)
Here, as discussed above, the trial court’s justification for awarding attorney
fees was its erroneous conclusion venue was mandatory in Fresno County
pursuant to section 395. Its deviation from the default rule was not justified
by the circumstances. Accordingly, upon remand, we direct the court to apply
the local hourly rates for consumer attorneys in Orange County.
III.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CALCULATING TIDRICK’S ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS
A. Failure to Apply the Lodestar Method
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
apply the lodestar method when calculating Tidrick’s attorney fees.
Determining a reasonable attorney fee award in Song-Beverly
Act cases “‘ordinarily begins with the “lodestar,” [which is] the number of
hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.’”
(Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1134.) The lodestar may “then be
adjusted based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair
market value of the legal services provided.” (Warren v. Kia Motors America,
Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36 (Warren).) The lodestar method “anchors

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the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the
attorney’s services,” and thus ensures the amount awarded is not arbitrary.
(PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)
The Song-Beverly Act’s attorney fee provision “‘requires the trial
court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then
to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of
actual time expended, and the monetary charge being made for the time
expended are reasonable. These circumstances may include, but are not
limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural
demands, the skill exhibited, and the results achieved. If the time expended
or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable
under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and
award attorney fees in a lesser amount. A prevailing buyer has the burden of
“showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary
to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’”’’’ (Goglin,
supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 470 [citing Civ. Code § 1794(d)].)
The trial court failed to properly apply the lodestar method in
evaluating Tidrick’s fee request because it did not multiply the number of
reasonably expended hours by the reasonable prevailing hourly rate. Tidrick
sought compensation for 173 hours of attorney time at hourly rates between
$415–$500 per hour, based on local Orange County attorney rates. The total
amount of unadjusted lodestar attorney fees sought by Tidrick was $69,775.
Tidrick requested an additional $4,500 in attorney fees for briefing and
arguing the fee motion, for an overall total of $74,275.
However, the trial court neither identified the particular number
of hours it concluded were reasonably expended nor specified what hourly
rate applied to those hours, as required when applying the lodestar method.

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Instead, the court awarded a total sum of $15,000 for both fees and costs, an
82.9 percent reduction from the amount requested.
“[W]hen a trial court applies a substantial negative multiplier to
a presumptively accurate lodestar attorney fee amount, the court must
clearly explain its case-specific reasons for the percentage reduction.”
(Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 37 [trial court required to explain its
decision to reduce lodestar amount of attorney fees by 33 percent]; Morris v.
Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 37 [trial court sufficiently
explained its decision to reduce fee award where it found it was unreasonable
to have 11 attorneys working on a simple matter, there were no discovery
motions, and the attorney hourly rates were unreasonably high].)
Here, although the trial court generally criticized the amount of
time spent on a “simple Song-Beverly Act case that should have been resolved
quickly,” it did not provide a case-specific reason for cutting any of Tidrick’s
attorney fees. (Compare Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 240, 245–246 (Mikhaeilpoor) [upholding attorney fee award
where court ‘“went through all the bills’” and calculated “amount of hours for
a reasonably experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do the tasks
that [plaintiff’s trial counsel] claim to have done”].)
An award of attorney fees may be reversed “‘“if the amount
awarded is so large or small that [it] shocks the conscience and suggests that
passion or prejudice influenced the determination.”’” (Mikhaeilpoor, supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.) Here, the trial court’s award of a total of $15,000 in
both attorney fees and costs represented a reduction of 82.9 percent from the
requested award of $82,719.33. Notably, if the court awarded the entire
$8,444.33 in costs requested by Tidrick, the remaining $6,555.67 in attorney
fees represents an 88 percent reduction, sufficiently large to “shock the

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conscience,” particularly where the court failed to articulate case-specific
reasons for reducing Tidrick’s attorney fees. (Compare Snoeck v. ExakTime
Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 928, 932 [court’s reduction of
attorney fees by 40 percent for attorney’s persistent misrepresentations and
incivility to opposing counsel did not “shock the conscience”].)
B. Failure to Address Amount of Costs
Additionally, the trial court erred by failing to specify what part,
if any, of its total award of $15,000 was attributable to costs. A notice of
motion to strike or tax costs must be served and filed within 15 days after
service of the bill of costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).) FCA never
challenged Tidrick’s costs bill, thus waiving any objection. (Douglas v. Willis
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 287, 290.)
Here, it is impossible to determine the amount of costs awarded
because the trial court ordered a lump sum of $15,000 in both attorney fees
and costs. We cannot assume the court awarded Tidrick her requested fees
where its order is silent on the issue. (McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 695, 708 [remanding to court to clarify whether its original
award included costs].) We therefore remand to the court to clarify whether
its original order awarded Tidrick any costs, and if it did not, to make a
specific award of costs.4

4 Because we conclude the fee award must be reversed, we
decline to address Tidrick’s other contentions.

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DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order is reversed and the case is remanded to
the trial court with directions to (1) award Tidrick reasonable attorney fees,
determined by applying the lodestar method, including employing the
prevailing hourly rate for consumer attorneys in Orange County; and (2) to
clarify whether its original order awarded Tidrick her costs, and if it did not,
to make an additional award of such costs. Tidrick is entitled to recover her
costs on appeal.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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Filed 7/22/25

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION