Disability Law Center V Cox
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
DISABILITY LAW CENTER, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:25-cv-00307-RJS
v.
Chief District Judge Robert J. Shelby
SPENCER COX, GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, in his official capacity,
STATE OF UTAH, CHIEF JUSTICE
MATTHEW B. DURRANT, CHAIR OF
UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, in his official
capacity, UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
RONALD B. GORDON, JR., STATE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR, in his official
capacity, and UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
Defendants.
Now before the court are four motions: a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Chief
Justice Matthew B. Durrant, State Court Administrator Ronald B. Gordon, the Utah Judicial
Council, and the Utah Administrative Office of the Courts (together, the Judicial Defendants),1
two Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Utah Governor Spencer Cox and the State of Utah
(collectively State Defendants),2 and Plaintiff Disability Law Center’s (DLC) Motion for
1 Dkt. 28, Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint and Memorandum in Support (Judicial Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss).
2 Dkt. 34, State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6); Dkt. 35, State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
(State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion).
Preliminary Injunction.3 Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants’
Motions must be GRANTED and the other Motions are denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from Utah Senate Bill 199 (S.B. 199), a bill signed into law by Utah
Governor Spencer Cox on March 27, 2025 “establishing a new guardianship process for
individuals classified as having severe intellectual disabilities.”4 S.B. 199 was set to take effect
on May 7, 2025,5 but the parties stipulated to stay enforcement of the bill until this court
adjudicates DLC’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.6
DLC is “a private, non-profit organization dedicated to protecting the rights of Utahns
with disabilities.”7 DLC “advocates on behalf of its constituents: the over 500,000 Utahns with
disabilities.”8 DLC is designated as Utah’s authorized protection and advocacy organization
(P&A).9 P&As are governed by federal law, and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act (DD Act) governs DLC.10 All individuals with intellectual disabilities are
considered DLC constituents for purposes of the DD Act.11 The DD Act authorizes DLC, as
Utah’s P&A, to bring legal and administrative actions to ensure protection of, and advocacy for,
3 Dkt. 2, Plaintiff’s Motion and Memorandum in Support of a Temporary Restraining Order and for a Preliminary
Injunction (Motion for Preliminary Injunction).
4 Dkt. 1, Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief (Complaint) ¶ 43.
5 Id. ¶ 4.
6 Dkt. 24, Minute Entry.
7 Complaint ¶ 12.
8 Id. ¶ 14.
9 Id. ¶ 15.
10 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001, et seq).
11 Id. ¶ 16.
people with developmental disabilities and to provide information and referrals to programs and
services addressing the needs of people with developmental disabilities.12
S.B. 199 makes several changes to the existing guardianship framework in Utah for
individuals classified as having “severe intellectual disabilities.”13 The Act defines such an
individual as an adult who “(i) has lifelong functional limitations to the extent that the adult is
incapacitated; and (ii) has received a diagnosis from a physician or psychologist of a severe
intellectual disability that has existed since the adult was a minor.”14 S.B. 199 presumes that
courts will hear guardianship proceedings remotely absent a showing of good cause, whereas, for
guardianship proceedings outside of S.B. 199, courts have discretion to hold the hearing in
person, remotely, or as a hybrid of the two.15 S.B. 199 also restricts jury trial rights and “rights
to counsel and external oversight” for guardianship respondents classified as having severe
intellectual disabilities.16 For example, respondents are not guaranteed counsel where:
(a) the respondent is the child, grandchild, or sibling of the petitioner; (b) the value
of the respondent’s entire estate does not exceed $2,000 as established by an
affidavit from the petitioner; (c) the respondent appears in court with the petitioner
in-person or remotely; (d) the respondent is given the opportunity to communicate,
to the extent possible, the respondent’s acceptance of the appointment of a guardian;
and (e) the court is satisfied that counsel is not necessary in order to protect the
interests of the respondent.17
Furthermore, unlike in standard guardianship proceedings, the court is not required to appoint a
visitor if there is no counsel.18 Additionally, a guardianship under S.B. 199 is “more expansive
12 Id. ¶ 17.
13 Id. ¶ 43.
14 Id. ¶ 46.
15 Id. ¶ 59.
16 Id. ¶¶ 59–64.
17 Id. ¶ 61.
18 Id. ¶ 64.
than standard guardianships” because it grants the guardian “the right to restrict the disabled
person’s association with friends and family, the right to control their food and beverage
consumption, and the right to restrict any activity that the guardian believes would be harmful.”19
Under S.B. 199 guardianships, a guardian may limit a respondent’s associations “with no court
involvement or oversight.”20
DLC alleges S.B. 199 causes harm to DLC’s core business activities and its
constituents.21 DLC “regularly receives calls for assistance from people with disabilities who are
facing [guardianship] petitions, or who are already under guardianship.”22 DLC “provides
guidance, advocacy, and individual representation to some of these people, including some who
might be classified by a physician or psychologist as having a severe intellectual disability.”23
DLC alleges “S.B. 199 will funnel more of DLC’s constituents into highly restrictive
guardianships,” and that “[o]nce under guardianship, DLC will struggle to find and connect with
these constituents, because people under guardianship tend to be less engaged and involved in
civic life.”24 Thus, DLC will have more difficulty “engag[ing] these constituents in any of
DLC’s programs and services,” such as “investigating allegations of abuse or neglect of people
with intellectual disabilities who are under guardianship.”25 To counteract this, “DLC will need
to expend more resources (such as conducting additional visits to facilities where people with
intellectual disabilities live or spending additional time on those visits that it already conducts) to
19 Id. ¶ 71.
20 Id.
21 Id. ¶¶ 74–114.
22 Id. ¶ 75.
23 Id.
24 Id. ¶ 79.
25 Id. ¶¶ 79–80.
try to identify the possible instances of abuse and neglect that family members and friends might
otherwise see and report.”26 DLC also alleges its core programs unrelated to guardianship “will
be harmed by the implementation of S.B. 199,” such as “providing representation and advice in
employment, housing, education, and access to public accommodations matters” to its
constituents.27 DLC alleges the “independence, health, and well-being” of its constituents “will
suffer” under S.B. 199 and “will put DLC’s constituents at risk of abuse.”28
DLC brings the following claims: 1) violation of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) against the State of Utah, the Utah Judicial Council, and the Utah
Administrative Office of the Courts; 2) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against
the State of Utah, the Utah Judicial Council, and the Utah Administrative Office of the Courts;
3) a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against Governor Cox, Chief
Justice Durrant, and State Court Administrator Gordon; 4) a substantive due process claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation of physical liberty against Governor Cox, Chief
Justice Durrant, and State Court Administrator Gordon; 5) a substantive due process claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation of right to intimate association against Governor Cox,
Chief Justice Durrant, and State Court Administrator Gordon; and 6) a vagueness claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment against Governor Cox, Chief Justice Durrant, and State Court
Administrator Gordon.29 DLC seeks a declaration that S.B. 199 “and Defendants’
26 Id. ¶ 81.
27 Id. ¶ 82.
28 Id. ¶¶ 93–94, 103.
29 Id. ¶¶ 116–73.
implementation of it” violates the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment
as well as a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing S.B. 199.30
The Judicial Defendants and State Defendants separately filed Motions to Dismiss DLC’s
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).31 These Motions are fully briefed
and ripe for review.32
LEGAL STANDARD
“Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States to the
resolution of ‘cases’ or ‘controversies.’ As the parties invoking the court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiffs
have the burden of establishing their standing.”33 To establish standing, a plaintiff must make
three showings: “first, that they have suffered an injury in fact which is concrete and
particularized, and actual or imminent; second, that there is a causal connection between the
injury and the challenged conduct; and third, that the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.”34 A court lacking the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case
must dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.35
A 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss permits a defendant to challenge a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction both facially and factually.36 A facial challenge targets the adequacy of the
30 Id. p. 40.
31 Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss; State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion.
32 Dkt. 33, Plaintiff’s Opposition to State Court Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Opposition to Judicial
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss); Dkt. 37, Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
(Judicial Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss); Dkt. 45, Plaintiff’s Opposition to State Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. 34 & 35) (Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion); Dkt. 51, State Defendants’
Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
(Reply); Dkt. 54, Minute Entry.
33 Valdez v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 228 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1278 (D. Utah 2017).
34 Id. (quoting Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2009)).
35 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Estate of Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir.
2004).
36 United States v. Rodriguez–Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2001).
allegations in the complaint.37 When presented with a facial challenge, courts (1) identify
allegations entitled to an assumption of truth and (2) evaluate whether these allegations plausibly
support entitlement to relief.38 In resolving factual challenges to a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, the court “does not presume the truthfulness of the complaint’s factual allegations,
but has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to
resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1).”39
ANALYSIS
The Judicial Defendants and the State Defendants both separately appear to bring facial
challenges under Rule 12(b)(1) to DLC’s Complaint.40 The Judicial Defendants argue DLC fails
to establish a live case or controversy against them, and the State Defendants argue DLC fails to
raise a federal question and otherwise lacks standing to bring its claims. Both sets of Defendants
also contend they are immune from DLC’s suit under the Eleventh Amendment because they are
not responsible for enforcing or implementing S.B. 199, among other reasons. The court finds
DLC’s Complaint raises a federal question, but it fails to establish a live case or controversy
against the Judicial Defendants or establish standing as to the State Defendants. Although S.B.
37 Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
38 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680; Valdez, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 1279, & n.24.
39 Valdez, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 1279, & n.24.
40 Because the Defendants generally do not attack the veracity of DLC’s allegations or rely on extrinsic evidence and
instead challenge DLC’s Complaint as a whole for lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the court assumes Defendants
bring a facial challenge. See Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. And Energy Workers Int'l Union v. Cont'l Carbon Co., 428
F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the court declines to consider evidence outside the pleadings. See
Shields v. Pro. Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc., 55 F.4th 823 (10th Cir. 2022) (holding that the district court
properly disregarded Plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence when Defendants facially challenged subject matter jurisdiction
and did not provide evidence outside the pleadings). Although Defendants here provided extrinsic evidence in
opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Defendants do not rely on any of this evidence to
challenge subject matter jurisdiction. See generally, State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The State Defendants
cite to DLC’s website, Utah legislative committee minutes, and a Utah court website in their Motion. See id. at 12
n.3, 13 n.4, 15 n.5, 17n.6; see also Reply at 4 n.3. The court notes none of these authorities—even if considered
“extrinsic evidence” in the same way that admissible declarations and sworn affidavits would be—have any bearing
on this court’s ruling because the Defendants’ legal challenges to the sufficiency of DLC’s Complaint provide the
court with an adequate basis to rule on the Motions.
199 appears to inflict an injury to DLC as an organization, the State Defendants did not cause
this injury, and therefore this court cannot redress it.
I. Federal Question
Defendants contend the court lacks jurisdiction over this dispute because DLC fails to
invoke federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.41 The court disagrees.
Federal court jurisdiction is proper where a civil action “aris[es] under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”42 A case “arises under” federal law when a Plaintiff’s
well-pleaded complaint presents a federal question on its face.43 The State Defendants contend
DLC’s Complaint fails to raise a federal question because court guardianship proceedings are
“under state courts’ exclusive original jurisdiction.”44 As support, the State Defendants rely on a
case from the Northern District of Texas where an adult daughter sought appointment as her
mother’s guardian, and during the proceedings, another daughter challenged the constitutionality
of the court’s issuance of a restraining order against her.45 The court considered whether the
initial complaint containing only state law claims “necessarily raises” a federal issue that is
“actually disputed and substantial,”46 such that subject matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
would be proper. The court ultimately concluded it did not.47
41 State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss at 6–8.
42 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
43 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987).
44 State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 6–8.
45 Id. at 7 (citing Gromer v. Mack, 799 F. Supp. 2d 704, 706–07 (N.D. Tex. 2011)).
46 Gromer, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 708 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005)).
47 Id. at 712.
As DLC points out, the situation here is dissimilar. DLC initiated this action by asserting
six federal claims.48 And as both parties concede, a plaintiff invokes federal question jurisdiction
“by and large by [] pleading a cause of action created by federal law.”49 State Defendants’
reliance on the test for whether a state-law claim in a complaint nonetheless gives rise to federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is misplaced because DLC pleads only federal
claims.50 The court finds that DLC’s action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States”51 because DLC unambiguously raises several federal issues on the face of its
Complaint.
II. Judicial Defendants
The Judicial Defendants contend this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over DLC’s
claims against them because DLC fails to establish a live case or controversy.52 The court
agrees.
“It is fundamental that to be heard in a federal court, a ‘controversy’ between litigants
must be ‘definite and concrete, touching the legal relationships of the parties having adverse
legal interests.’”53 While judicial officials may be sued in their administrative capacities, they
have no “institutional stake” in legal challenges to laws they are tasked with adjudicating.54 As
48 Complaint ¶¶ 116–73; see also Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 1–2.
49 Grable, 545 U.S. at 312.
50 See State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 7 (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 314).
51 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
52 Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 6–9.
53 In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937)).
54 Id.
such, judicial officers are not proper defendants when the constitutionality of a law they are
tasked with adjudicating is the basis of the suit.55
The Judicial Defendants contend there is no case or controversy between themselves and
DLC because DLC challenges S.B. 199 as unconstitutional, and the Judicial Defendants have no
role in enforcing S.B. 199—only adjudicating it.56 According to the Judicial Defendants, they
have no interest in the outcome of this suit or position on whether the law should be upheld.57
DLC, on the other hand, contends the Judicial Defendants created “rules, documents, trainings,
and forms to implement and administer S.B. 199,” functions which are “not adjudicatory” and
give rise to a justiciable controversy between DLC and the Judicial Defendants.58
DLC mischaracterizes its own Complaint. Nowhere does DLC specifically challenge the
constitutionality or propriety of any rules, documents, trainings, or forms the Judicial Defendants
prepared in advance of S.B. 199 taking effect. Instead, the object of DLC’s suit is S.B. 199 itself
and the restrictions it places on guardianship respondents classified as having a severe
intellectual disability.
The Complaint alleges Chief Justice Durrant and the Utah Judicial Council together adopt
and enforce rules concerning “the administration of the Utah state Court System.”59 But it
identifies no rules these Defendants promulgated or intended to enforce related to S.B. 199.
DLC cites §§ 75-5-605(2)(a) and 75-5-611(10)(d) in S.B. 199 as evidence of the Judicial
Defendants’ role as implementors of S.B. 199,60 but these provisions merely require the Utah
55 Id. at 21–23.
56 Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 6–9.
57 Id.
58 Opposition to Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 6.
59 Complaint ¶¶ 21–22.
60 Opposition to Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4.
Judicial Council to create standardized forms to be used for giving notice to relevant parties
when a petitioner initiates a guardianship proceeding and standardized “accounting reports”
guardians must prepare if a conservator has not been appointed. The caselaw does not suggest
that, by creating such documents, judicial officers acquire an “institutional stake” in the outcome
of litigation challenging the law necessitating these forms.61 DLC repeatedly alleges that, in
addition to S.B. 199 itself, “Defendants’ planned implementation” of S.B. 199 is also illegal.62
But nowhere does DLC specifically challenge the legality of any forms or trainings that
purportedly “implement” S.B. 199—it only challenges the state law itself and the restrictions it
imposes on individuals with severe intellectual disabilities.63
One instructive case is In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,64 where the First
Circuit considered whether judicial officers were proper defendants in a suit challenging the
legality of statutes that required bar members to support the Puerto Rico Bar. The First Circuit
held judicial officers act in their adjudicative capacity “without a personal or institutional stake”
when a lawsuit entails a “constitutional controversy” concerning a challenged law or statute.65
The only interest the officers had in that lawsuit was finding out whether the challenged law was,
61 Justices of Supreme Ct. of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d at 21.
62 Complaint ¶¶ 127–28, 142, 149–50, 157–58, 165, 172.
63 See generally, id.
64 695 F.2d 17.
65 Id. at 21.
in fact, unconstitutional; they had no institutional interest in defending or advocating for the
law.66
The First Circuit contrasted the case before it with Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,67 where the United States Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs to
sue judicial officers for their independent role in promulgating and enforcing allegedly illegal bar
membership rules, a broad power expressly bestowed on the judicial officers via state statute.68
The rules themselves—independently created and enforced by the judicial officers being sued—
were the object of the lawsuit.69 The court found that because the Supreme Court of Virginia had
“independent authority on its own to initiate proceedings against attorneys, the Court and its
members were proper defendants in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief” challenging the
bar membership rules.70
Here, DLC does not allege S.B. 199 grants any express enforcement authority to the
Judicial Defendants, nor does DLC identify any rules promulgated by the Judicial Defendants
66 As Plaintiff’s counsel pointed out at Oral Argument, see Dkt. 54, Minute Entry, the First Circuit came to a
different conclusion with respect to the Plaintiff’s “[f]orensic and [n]otarial [s]tamp [c]laims,” which arose under a
different statute regulating the notary profession in Puerto Rico. Justices of Supreme Ct. of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d at
25. But this is of no help to DLC. For one, the judicial-official defendants did not contest whether plaintiffs had
Article III standing for these claims and the court evaluated the propriety of their status as defendants on other
grounds. See id. Moreover, the statute at issue for those claims expressly afforded enforcement authority to the
Chief Justice of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico generally: “The inspection of
notarial offices and the examination of protocols shall be in charge of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Puerto Rico . . . The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico may, after giving the notary an opportunity to be heard in his
defense, discipline him through a reprimand, a fine not to exceed five hundred (500) dollars, or a temporary or
permanent suspension from office, for any violation of the provisions of the Notarial Law or of any other law
relative to the practice of the notarial profession.” See 4 L.P.R.A. § 1038. This is similar to the express enforcement
authority described in the case below—but in no way resembles the Judiciary Defendants’ role within S.B. 199.
67 Id. at 23.
68 Supreme Ct. of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 724, 731 (1980).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 736.
pursuant to S.B. 199 as the basis for its suit.71 The Judicial Defendants’ duty to approve forms
related to S.B. 199 proceedings in §§ 75-5-605(2)(a) and 75-5-611(10)(d) is entirely dissimilar to
the judicial officers’ broad power to promulgate and enforce bar membership rules in Consumers
Union. After all, §§ 75-5-605(2)(a) and 75-5-611(10)(d) give unambiguous instruction to the
Judicial Defendants regarding what information must be contained in the forms. The provisions
do not invite the Judicial Defendants to initiate guardianship proceedings or promulgate rules
concerning how a S.B. 199 petition should proceed, unlike the judicial officers in Consumers
Union, who had broad power to create and enforce bar membership rules as they saw fit.72 Thus,
“[t]here is no reason to read into [Consumers Union] any further conclusion that plaintiffs can
appropriately sue judges whenever they attack a statute as unconstitutional.”73
Moreover, the First Circuit in In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico found
persuasive Mendez v. Heller, a case originating from the Eastern District of New York where a
plaintiff challenged the residency requirements of New York’s divorce statute and sought to
enjoin state judges from enforcing those requirements.74 A three-judge panel held that no
justiciable controversy existed between the plaintiff and the judicial officers, which the Second
Circuit affirmed on appeal, because “if, as plaintiff contends, the statute is unconstitutional, then
[the judge’s] sole interest is in so determining, and in denying effect of the statute. [The Judge]
71 The court acknowledges DLC brings a pre-enforcement challenge, but this does not excuse its burden to plausibly
establish a case or controversy by demonstrating either 1) the Judiciary Defendants’ role in implementing and
enforcing S.B. 199 or 2) unconstitutional actions the Judiciary Defendants have already taken or will imminently
take if S.B. 199 goes into effect. The court finds DLC has failed to do so.
72 Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. at 721–22, 724, 737. That the judiciary defendants “ha[ve] the
constitutional power to adopt uniform rules for the administration of the Utah State Court System,” see Complaint ¶
22, does not render judicial officials as proper defendants whenever a state statute is challenged as unconstitutional,
especially where the statute does not imbue the judicial officers with specific enforcement authority.
73 Justices of Supreme Ct. of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d at 23.
74 Id. at 22 (citing 380 F.Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court) (per curiam), aff'd, 530 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir.1976)).
is not an adversary of the plaintiff, but a judicial officer bound to decide the issue according to
the law as he finds it.”75 The Judicial Defendants’ “sole interest” here is the same: following the
laws and Constitution of the United States and the State of Utah.
DLC quickly dismisses the relevance of these cases because, here, “the judicial officers
are sued exclusively for their role in implementing and administering an illegal regime.”76 But
DLC provides no meaningful analysis explaining why the judicial officers in those cases were
not “implementing and administering” the challenged law, yet the named Judicial Defendants
here are responsible for implementing and administering S.B. 199—beyond their duty to create
two forms related to the law. The through line in In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,
Mendez, and this action brought by DLC is that each involved claims that a particular law passed
by a legislative, non-judicial body was unconstitutional. Judicial officers are not proper
defendants in such suits.
DLC repeatedly relies on inapposite cases where court rules and policies undertaken by
judicial officers are successfully challenged, with such officers properly named as defendants.77
For example, in Courthouse News Service v. Gilmer,78 the plaintiff sued state court officials to
challenge their policy of delaying public access to newly filed litigation, arguing that the policy
violated the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit held there was a case or controversy because
the “lawsuit [was] about ‘enjoin[ing] named defendants from taking specified unlawful actions,’ .
. . not ‘enjoin[ing] courts from proceeding in their own way to exercise jurisdiction.’”79 Here,
75 Id. at 990.
76 Opposition to Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 8.
77 Id. at 2, 5–6.
78 48 F.4th 908 (8th Cir. 2022).
79 Id. at 912.
holding court trainings and creating standardized court forms appear to be quintessential
examples of a court preparing its staff to exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, the Complaint
nowhere identifies forms and trainings as “specified unlawful actions” DLC seeks to enjoin. In
Gilmer, the express target of the lawsuit was “state-court business” related to delayed public
access to newly filed civil petitions—independent from any challenge to a state or federal law.80
Not so here.
Here, there is no adversity between DLC and the Judicial Defendants because DLC only
challenges the legality of a law passed by the Utah legislature. The Judicial Defendants have no
stake in S.B. 199, no predisposed view on its legality, played no role in its passage, and will play
no role in its enforcement.81 As the Judicial Defendants point out, “preparing to adjudicate” a
law is not the same as enforcing or implementing a law.82 If creating standardized court forms or
holding trainings in advance of a newly passed law constitutes court “enforcement” or
“implementation” of a statute, it would drastically expand the arenas in which judicial officers
may be sued. For example, court staff that circulate reading material on newly passed laws or
memoranda containing guidance on how court staff should handle cases under such laws may
expose themselves to liability if those laws get challenged.
DLC also cites a handful of cases where certain state agencies and actors—the Texas
Secretary of State and the Hawaii Department of Human Services—were deemed proper
defendants because of their role in enforcing challenged laws.83 It then argues the Judicial
80 Id. at 915.
81 Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 8; Judicial Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1–2.
See also infra § III(c).
82 Judicial Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4; see also Gilmer, 48 F.4th at 912.
83 Opposition to Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 8 (citing La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 618 F.
Supp. 3d 388, 421 (W.D. Tex. 2022) and Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Defendants’ “status as judicial agencies is immaterial,”84 citing cases where court officers were
proper defendants in challenges to a court’s failure to provide an interpreter for a deaf attorney85
and a similar court failure to provide accessible facilities for individuals with disabilities.86 Once
again, DLC glosses over the fundamental difference between its action before this court and
those cases: whether, as here, the plaintiff is challenging a law passed by a legislative body and
enforced by non-judicial actors, or whether the plaintiff is challenging unlawful court policies
and rules independently set in motion by court officials in their administrative capacities.
As DLC correctly points out, “appealability can be a proxy to determine whether
challenged conduct is adjudicatory, and, in turn, whether there is a case or controversy.”87 In its
view, the Judicial Defendants’ creation of rules, documents, trainings, and forms concerning S.B.
199 cannot be appealed and thus creates adversity between DLC and the Judicial Defendants.88
But again, the Judicial Defendants’ creation of rules, documents, trainings, and forms is not the
object of DLC’s suit; rather, S.B. 199 is.89 Whether S.B. 199 violates the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment may freely be appealed by any party with a
particularized injury caused by an individual or entity enforcing the edicts of S.B. 199, if and
when a court decides these issues. The fact that DLC purports to name the Judicial Defendants
in their non-adjudicative capacities does not change the fact these Defendants have no
84 Id.
85 Mosier v. Kentucky, 640 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
86 Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 473 (8th Cir. 1998).
87 Opposition to Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 6 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30,
39 (2021).
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 5 (“If S.B. 199 is permitted to go into effect, the gap between standard guardianships and
the second-class guardianship system for those found to have ‘severe intellectual disabilities’ will be a chasm. Such
a system is illegal.”).
institutional interest in the outcome of litigation challenging the constitutionality of a state law
they do not enforce. At bottom, DLC fails to raise a justiciable case or controversy against the
Judicial Defendants in its challenge to S.B. 199. Accordingly, the Judicial Defendants must be
dismissed from this suit.
III. State Defendants
The State Defendants contend this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over DLC’s
claims against them because DLC fails to establish standing.90 The court agrees.
Standing is an “irreducible constitutional minimum” requirement for a justiciable case or
controversy under Article III.91 A party has standing only when the party has: (1) suffered an
injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the alleged conduct, that is (3) likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision. DLC bears the burden to establish standing.92 DLC, as Utah’s P&A
for disabled individuals, puts forth two bases for standing—associational standing and
organizational standing. Although the court finds DLC may have demonstrated an
organizational injury, DLC fails to establish the causation and redressability requirements for
organizational standing. The court also finds associational standing insufficiently established.
a. Associational Standing
To demonstrate associational standing, a Plaintiff-organization must allege facts
demonstrating “[1] its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; [2] the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and [3] neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
90 State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss at 8–18.
91 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
92 Id.
lawsuit.”93 Associational standing permits traditional membership organizations “to invoke the
court’s remedial powers on behalf of its members.”94
Several Courts of Appeal diverge with respect to whether a P&A organization benefitting
disabled people may assert associational standing. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have denied
such organizations the right to establish associational standing because they do not have
traditional “members” who can participate in and guide the organization.95 The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits, however, have opined that such organizations may assert associational
standing when they are in compliance with statutory requirements and where the organization
alleges indicia of its constituents’ involvement in the operation of the organization.96
The court need not resolve this issue because inherent in Hunt’s associational standing
requirements, as DLC concedes, is a requirement that the plaintiff-organization must “show how
a particular constituent was (or will be) harmed by the challenged conduct,”97 and DLC fails to
93 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
94 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975).
95 See Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr., 19 F.3d 241,
244 (5th Cir. 1994) (determining that a P&A organization with a statutory mandate to protect and advocate for
mentally disabled people cannot satisfy the associational standing requirements because “[t]he organization bears no
relationship to traditional membership groups because most of its ‘clients’—handicapped and disabled people—are
unable to participate in and guide the organization’s efforts”) and Missouri Prot. & Advoc. Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan,
499 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2007) (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit).
96 Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 886 (11th Cir. 1999); Or. Advoc. Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1111–12 (9th Cir.
2003).
97 Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 6 (citing Conn. Off. of Prot. & Advoc. for Persons with
Disabilities v. Connecticut, 706 F. Supp. 2d 266, 284 (D. Conn. 2010)).
make this showing.98 DLC relies on a case from the District of New Mexico which required the
plaintiff-organization to “show that at least one specifically-identified member has suffered an
injury-in-fact” in order to establish an associational injury.99 The court continued, “[a]t the very
least, the identity of the party suffering an injury in fact must be firmly established.”100 But DLC
nowhere specifically identifies or firmly establishes any such member.101 Even if DLC is correct
that it “need not name a constituent,”102 the cases on which DLC relies nevertheless require
something more than what DLC has alleged.103
For example, DLC contends it identified constituents who face imminent harm from S.B.
199 in paragraphs 87 through 92 of its Complaint.104 But these paragraphs only establish that
98 As already discussed, Defendants here bring a facial challenge to DLC’s assertion of subject matter jurisdiction.
Unlike DLC, the State Defendants nowhere rely on outside declarations or affidavits to support its arguments
concerning associational standing or subject matter jurisdiction in general. See generally, State Defendants’ 12(b)(1)
Motion. Accordingly, the court declines to consider any such outside evidence and instead focuses on whether
DLC’s Complaint identifies any one particular individual who was or will be harmed by S.B. 199. However, the
court notes that not one of DLC’s evidentiary exhibits identify any member who has or will be harmed by S.B.
199—rather, DLC includes declarations from two medical doctors, a DLC staff attorney, the DLC executive director,
a Senior Director for Law and Policy of the Burton Blatt Institute at Syracuse University, a philosophy professor,
and a physically incapacitated individual who was previously released from an overboard guardianship but who
nowhere declares to expect to be subjected to S.B. 199. See Dkts. 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7.
99 Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 6 (quoting N. New Mexicans Protecting Land Water & Rts. v.
United States, 161 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1041 (D. N.M. 2016), aff’d, 704 F. App’x 723 (10th Cir. 2017) (emphasis
added)).
100 N. New Mexicans, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 1041 (emphasis added).
101 DLC does identify one signatory in favor of S.B. 199 as “an attorney who has a full guardianship of his son with
an intellectual disability” who DLC alleges intends to seek a more expansive guardianship under S.B. 199.
Complaint ¶ 90. This is the only information DLC alleges about this attorney and his son: it does not allege his son
would be classified as having a severe intellectual disability or in what way S.B. 199 would be likely to cause him
injury. One allegation about this attorney and his son that fails to make clear he would even be subject to S.B. 199
or identify which provisions would cause him harm and why is insufficient to establish that his son has suffered or
will suffer a concrete and particularized injury.
102 Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 6 (emphasis added).
103 See, e.g., N. New Mexicans, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 1041 (finding the plaintiff-organization to have adequately
identified members with injuries where plaintiff provided sworn affidavits and initial disclosures of “members that
own property that the Defendants’ actions allegedly harmed”). DLC provides no similar allegations in its Complaint
tying S.B. 199 to particular members, nor does it provide any extrinsic evidence that, even if the court were to
consider it, would establish an injury-in-fact on behalf of a particular constituent. See supra n. 98.
104 Id. at 7.
hundreds of Utahns spoke in favor of S.B. 199 during legislative committee and were signatories
in support of S.B. 199.105 DLC summarizes these paragraphs as “describing hundreds of
individuals facing particularized risk of being subjected to S.B. 199,” with the implication being
that, if hundreds of people support S.B. 199, hundreds of people will file guardianship
proceedings pursuant to S.B. 199.106
This reasoning is both paradoxical and speculative. It does the opposite of demonstrating
“how a particular constituent was (or will be) harmed by the challenged conduct,”107 or how one
“specifically-identified member has suffered an injury-in-fact.”108 Instead, it shows only DLC’s
general concern that innumerable unidentified individuals may be subject to S.B. 199, without
explaining how and why any one particular individual is imminently likely to be injured by its
provisions. DLC essentially asks the court to assume that, because scores of people advocated
for S.B. 199, the law will inevitably injure scores of people who are the subject of guardianship
proceedings pursuant to it. This generalized attack of S.B. 199, which takes for granted how it
will impact its constituents, fails to demonstrate that any one specific DLC constituent has
standing to “sue in their own right.”109 Paragraphs 87 through 92 of DLC’s Complaint do not
identify any one person—let alone any one person that is “firmly established”110—that has
suffered or will suffer “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and
105 Complaint ¶¶ 87–92.
106 Id.
107 Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 6 (emphasis added).
108 N. New Mexicans, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 1041 (emphasis added).
109 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. Even accepting that DLC’s facial challenge to S.B. 199 establishes a per se injury for
those against whom the law facially discriminates, DLC has failed to specifically identify or firmly establish any one
such specific person in its Complaint.
110 N. New Mexicans, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 1041.
particularized” and “actual or imminent” rather than “conjectural or hypothetical.”111 Without
any allegations tying a specific constituent to a particular harm DLC alleges S.B. 199 will cause,
and without explaining why such harm is likely and imminent for that individual, the court finds
DLC fails to establish associational standing. That some unidentified supporters of the law may
file guardianship proceedings on behalf of their unidentified family members, who may or may
not ultimately be subject to its provisions or injured by them, is insufficient.
b. Organizational Standing
Whether DLC has demonstrated an organizational injury is a closer call. For DLC to
establish an organizational injury, DLC must establish a “concrete and demonstrable injury to
[its] activities.”112 Organizations have standing “to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have
sustained.”113 The Supreme Court and many Federal Courts of Appeals have held that a
defendant’s conduct impacting a plaintiff-organization’s “core business activities” constitute an
injury-in-fact.114
DLC alleges many of its core business activities will be negatively impacted by S.B. 199.
For example, it alleges “protect[ing] the legal rights, choices, and opportunities of Utahns with
disabilities is a core part of DLC’s mission, and addressing guardianship is a critical part of that
work.”115 DLC adds that “[a]pproximately 1,000 guardianship petitions for adults with
disabilities are filed every year in Utah, and DLC regularly receives calls for assistance from
111 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (1992).
112 Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
113 Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 393–94 (2024) (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at
379, n.19).
114 Id. at 395; see also Republican Nat’l Comm. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 120 F.4th 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2024),
Deep S. Ctr. for Env’t Just. v. United States EPA, 138 F.4th 310, 319 (5th Cir. 2025), Fair Hous. Ctr. of Metro.
Detroit v. Singh Senior Living, LLC, 124 F.4th 990, 993 (6th Cir. 2025).
115 Complaint ¶ 74.
people with disabilities who are facing these petitions, or who are already under
guardianship.”116 Most of these calls are from adults with intellectual or developmental
disabilities.117 DLC alleges it “will need to provide representation to more individuals involved
in guardianship proceedings if S.B. 199 takes effect because individuals subject to the law will
be less likely to have other counsel representing them.”118
The State Defendants contend DLC puts forth only conclusory allegations concerning its
core business activities that this court should not accept as true.119 But DLC’s allegations go far
beyond inserting the term “core business activity” in a conclusory fashion merely to check a
jurisdictional box. DLC provides concrete details on the expected changes to its critical
operations if S.B. 199 takes effect: more representation in guardianship proceedings, fielding
more calls from adults with disabilities involved in guardianship proceedings, less capacity to
investigate abuse, and fewer resources for supporting individuals facing employment and
housing discrimination.120 The court acknowledges some of these changes are necessarily
speculative given the pre-enforcement nature of this suit. But accepting DLC’s well-pleaded
factual allegations as true, as the court must at this stage, DLC reasonably establishes S.B. 199
will hamper its ability to carry out its core functions, which are defined by statute: to provide
information and referrals to programs and services addressing the needs of people with
developmental disabilities and to investigate abuse and neglect allegations.121 Contrary to the
116 Id. ¶ 75.
117 Id.
118 Id. ¶ 84.
119 State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 10.
120 Id. ¶¶ 74–86.
121 Id. ¶ 17.
State Defendants’ argument, this statutory duty—not DLC’s “abstract social interests”122—will
plausibly be negatively impacted if S.B. 199 goes into effect. However, because the court finds
DLC fails to establish organizational standing for other reasons, the court declines to explicitly
find that DLC has properly asserted an injury-in-fact as an organization.
c. Causation and Redressability
Even assuming DLC has adequately alleged an organizational injury, DLC must still
demonstrate the injury is fairly traceable to Defendants’ conduct and can be redressed by this
court.123 DLC asks this court to evaluate causation and redressability by reference to its
argument contending the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity applies to
Governor Cox.124 Indeed, causation and redressability “are bound up with the Ex parte
Young analysis, because if there is a connection between the Defendants’ enforcement of the
challenged statute, then there will also be causation and redressability, and vice versa.”125
The Eleventh Amendment provides sovereign immunity to states from being sued in
federal court.126 This includes suits seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.127 However, Ex
parte Young provides one exception to sovereign immunity by “allow[ing] certain private parties
to seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing state
122 State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 11 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 379).
123 All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393–94.
124 Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 9 n.5.
125 Free Speech Coal., 119 F.4 at 747 (J. Phillips, dissenting) (citing Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.8
(10th Cir. 2013)).
126 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984).
127 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1974).
laws that are contrary to federal law.”128 “To come within this exception the ‘state official must
have some connection with the enforcement of the challenged statute.’”129
As already discussed, S.B. 199 does not establish the Judiciary Defendants as enforcers
of the law. Rather, the Judiciary Defendants will be tasked with adjudicating guardianship
proceedings filed by private parties pursuant to S.B. 199. Furthermore, as DLC appears to
concede, the Ex parte Young exception cannot not apply to the State of Utah itself.130
Accordingly, the court confines its analysis of the Ex parte Young exception to considering
whether it applies to Governor Cox.
Governor Cox raises arguments mirroring those advanced by the Judiciary Defendants—
that Governor Cox’s “general duty” to enforce the laws of the State of Utah is insufficient to
invoke the Ex parte Young exception and that Ex parte Young is inapplicable where the subject
statute places enforcement ability with a private party.131 Defendant Cox relies in large part on
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson and Free Speech Coalition v. Anderson, where the Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit respectively held that, where a statute places enforcement authority
with private parties, the Ex parte Young exception does not apply if the named officials otherwise
have no concrete connection to enforcement.132
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Texas Heartbeat Act,
which prohibits physicians from “knowingly perform[ing] or induc[ing] an abortion on a
pregnant woman if the physician detected a fetal heartbeat for the unborn child,” directs
128 Whole Woman’s Health, 595 U.S. at 39.
129 Free Speech Coal. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732, 736 (10th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
130 Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 15.
131 State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 19–23.
132 Whole Woman’s Health, 595 U.S. at 44–45; Free Speech Coal. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732, 740–41 (10th Cir.
2024).
enforcement “through . . . private civil actions.”133 Likening the Act to “private attorneys
general acts, statutes allowing for private rights of action, tort law, federal antitrust law, and even
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” the Court emphasized that many laws “delegate” the enforcement
of public policy to private parties and reward those who bring suits with exemplary or statutory
damages and attorneys’ fees.134 In turn, the Court found that a state court judge, a state court
clerk, and the state’s attorney general benefitted from Eleventh Amendment immunity.135 The
Tenth Circuit relied on Whole Woman’s Health in Free Speech Coalition when it ruled that
neither the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety nor the Utah Attorney
General could be sued to enjoin a statute allowing private parties to sue commercial entities that
provided certain restricted content without first verifying that user was at least 18 years old.136
In its briefing DLC never engages with either of these cases or Governor Cox’s
contention that private parties are the enforcers of S.B. 199 by virtue of being the only
individuals capable of initiating S.B. 199 guardianship proceedings. DLC does not attempt to
differentiate S.B. 199 from the laws at issue in Whole Woman’s Health or Free Speech
Coalition.137 Remarkably, DLC nowhere even cites Whole Woman’s Health or Free Speech
133 Whole Woman’s Health, 595 U.S. at 35 (citing the Texas Heartbeat Act).
134 Id. at 44–45.
135 Id. at 51.
136 Free Speech Coal., 119 F.4th at 741.
137 At Oral Argument, DLC for the first time attempts to make this distinction by explaining the laws at issue in
Whole Woman’s Health and Free Speech Coalition create private rights of action. See Dkt. 54, Minute Entry. But it
remains unclear why a statute affording a private right of action and a statute affording individuals the right to
initiate guardianship proceedings are meaningfully different. Nor does DLC successfully explain why S.B. 199 is
more akin to the tax allocation law at issue in Petrella v. Brownback, 697 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2012), which the
Tenth Circuit in Free Speech Coalition described as a law without “any particular enforcement provisions,” which
“necessarily” invokes “the attorney general’s overall enforcement authority.” Free Speech Coal., 119 F.4th at 740
(citing Petrella, 697 F.3d at 1294). DLC fails to adequately liken the tax allocation statute at issue in Petrella to
S.B. 199 or explain why Petrella’s holding with respect to an attorney general applies to Governor Cox. But at
bottom, DLC’s failure to confront these cases at all in its briefing prevents DLC from meeting its burden.
Coalition in its Opposition Brief to the State Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.138 Instead, DLC
maintains that Governor Cox has sufficient “connection with the enforcement of the challenged
statute” because he is responsible for “supervis[ing] the official conduct of all executive and
ministerial officers” and “see[ing] all offices are filled and the duties thereof performed.”139
DLC adds that Governor Cox oversees state court administration through his appointment power,
holds line-item veto power, and controls the budgetary process for state departments, which DLC
contends “give[] Defendant Cox practical authority to influence enforcement.”140 But these
generalized gubernatorial powers—none of which DLC alleges have textual reference in S.B.
199—are true of most every governor. And Free Speech Coalition makes clear that “if a general
duty to enforce the law were sufficient to avoid immunity, ‘then the constitutionality of every act
passed by the legislature could be tested by a suit against the governor . . . because the governor
is, ‘in a general sense, charged with the execution of all [a state’s] laws’. . . .’”141
Moreover, DLC’s reliance on Kitchen v. Herbert—where the Tenth Circuit ruled
unconstitutional Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage—is inapt because, there, the Tenth Circuit
identified a misdemeanor statute under which an attorney general would supervise criminal
actions against court clerks for “knowingly issu[ing] a license for any prohibited marriage,” and
under which “the Governor could order the Attorney General to assist in such prosecution,” such
that they were both appropriate defendants.142 DLC has not identified any similar scheme in
S.B. 199 or elsewhere purporting to connect Governor Cox to the enforcement of S.B. 199.
138 See generally, Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion.
139 Id. at 16 (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 2014)).
140 Id. at 17.
141 Free Speech Coal., 119 F.4th at 739 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157).
142 Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 2014).
DLC, in a separate part of its brief not dealing with the Eleventh Amendment or standing,
contends that this case does not “hinge” on “private individuals acting under their authority.”143
But DLC entirely fails to grapple with the thrust of the State Defendants’ Ex parte Young
argument: that private individuals, not the Governor, enforce S.B 199. Because of this failure,
the court cannot find DLC meets its burden in establishing subject matter jurisdiction on the
basis of Ex parte Young—whether in terms of asserting standing or the non-application of the
Eleventh Amendment.
Left unresolved is the fact that DLC asserts two other justifications for the non-
application of the Eleventh Amendment: that the State of Utah waived its sovereign immunity
under the Rehabilitation Act by accepting Rehabilitation Act funds, and that Congress abrogated
the State of Utah’s sovereign immunity for claims under the Americans with Disability Act. The
court has serious doubts whether the State of Utah itself is capable of waiving sovereign
immunity under the Rehabilitation Act,144 but the court also acknowledges Congress may have
abrogated the State of Utah’s sovereign immunity under the Americans with Disability Act with
143 Opposition to State Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion at 28.
144 The District of New Jersey allowed a Plaintiff to bring a Rehabilitation Act claim against New Jersey’s
Commissioner of the Department of Human Services but prohibited the State of New Jersey from being added to the
claim. Disability Rights New Jersey v. Velez, 862 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. N.J. 2012). It found that “under the statutory
definition in Section 504, the state, as a whole, cannot be a ‘program or activity.’” Id. at 375. The court relied on a
Third Circuit opinion holding that “if the entire state government were subject to § 504 whenever one of its
components received federal funds, subsection (b)(1)(B) would be redundant.” Koslow v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 171 (3d Cir. 2002). DLC argues that the Third Circuit nonetheless allowed the plaintiff
to bring suit against the entire Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, see Opposition to Defendants’ 12(b)(1) Motion to
Dismiss, but this is not entirely accurate. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania doing business as the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections was the Defendant. Koslow, 302 F.3d at 164.
respect to DLC’s claimed injuries.'*? But because DLC asked the court to consider its arguments
concerning causation and redressability with reference to its Ex parte Young analysis—which
applies only to Governor Cox—the court ultimately cannot assess these claims because DLC
failed to meet its burden demonstrating it has standing in the first instance. “6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Judiciary Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. !*”
The State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is also GRANTED.!** The State
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and DLC’s Motion for a Preliminary
Inunction are denied as moot.'”? The case is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is
directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED this 22nd day of July 2025.
BY THE COURT:
ROBERT i 7
United States Chief District Judge
The Supreme Court has held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, “as it applies to the class of cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ § 5 authority to
enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,” such that Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity
in such cases. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004). Still, the Supreme Court requires courts to engage
in a three-step inquiry to determine, on a case-by case basis, whether Title I validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity for the particular injury asserted. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006). This three-step
inquiry essentially begins with a consideration of whether a plaintiff adequately states a Title II claim under the
ADA. See Guttman vy. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 2012). The court declines to engage in this inquiry
given its other holdings.
146 The court expresses no position on whether, if the State of Utah did not have sovereign immunity for DLC’s
claims under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, it would be possible for DLC to adequately assert causation
and redressability.
47 Dkt. 28.
48 Dkt. 35.
4 Dkts. 2, 34.
28