Dan V State Of New York
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
CHONG LEE DAN,
Plaintiff,
vs. 1:24-CV-1233
(MAD/PJE)
STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
Chong Lee Dan
Cairo, New York 12413
Plaintiff Pro Se
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff Chong Lee Dan commenced this action, pro se, against the
State of New York, Greene County, the Town of Cairo, various state, county, and town actors,
and one private actor alleging violations of his rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986.1 See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff also moved to proceed in forma pauperis. See Dkt. No. 2.2
1Plaintiff also alleges violations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and New
York State Penal Code. See Dkt. No. 1. The individual Defendants include the following:
Deputy Sheriff Ryan Schrader; Deputy Sherrif Kaitlyn Raynor; Sergeant Shawn Marriott;
Sergeant Scott Christman; Sheriff Peter Kusminksy; Commissioner of the New York State
Department of Motor Vehicles Mark J.F. Schroeder; County Administrator Shaun S. Groden;
Town Supervisor Jason Watts; Greene County Attorney Edward I. Kaplan; District Attorney
Joseph Stanzione; Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Sandleitner; Public Defender Angelo F.
Scaturro; and John Vandenburgh, owner of JR's Transmission. See id. at 3-6.
2 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed another action in this District on January 27, 2025. See Dan
v . Hochul, No. 1:25-CV-122, Dkt. No. 1 (N.D.N.Y.). The Court deemed that case related to the
On May 20, 2025, Magistrate Judge Paul J. Evangelista issued a Report-Recommendation
and Order granting Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and recommending that Plaintiff's
federal claims be dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), and that the Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. See Dkt. No. 6 at
28. On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed objections. See Dkt. No. 7.3
II. BACKGROUND
This case arises from events that took place on March 15, 2024, at approximately 3:20
p.m., when Plaintiff used his 2005 Chevrolet Astro to drive to Cairo Food Mart in the Town of
Cairo in Greene County, New York. See Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Defendant Ryan Schrader, Deputy
Sherriff with the Greene County Sheriff's Office, confronted Plaintiff because of an expired
Maryland tag on Plaintiff's vehicle and later learned that the vehicle had an out-of-date
registration and Plaintiff did not have a driver's license. See id. at 7, 8-9. Plaintiff recorded the
interaction with Defendant Schrader, wherein Plaintiff received two traffic citations, one for
unlicensed operation of a vehicle and another for lack of valid registration. See id. at 11. Plaintiff
contested these citations with Defendant Schrader on the belief that New York traffic law requires
a driver's license and registration only when "driving" a vehicle and not when "traveling" with a
present action as Plaintiff raises nearly identical claims against Governor Kathy Hochul arising
from the same events. A motion to dismiss was filed on April 14, 2025. See id., Dkt. No. 17. A
letter motion from Plaintiff requesting an adjournment to amend his complaint was filed on June
24, 2025, and denied on June 25, 2025. See id., Dkt. Nos. 21, 22.
3 Affording Plaintiff the special solicitude ordinarily given to pro se litigants, the Court notes that
although Plaintiff's fifty-three-page objections exceed the twenty-five-page limit pursuant to
Local Rule 72.1(c), the Court will consider them. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c); see also Tracy v.
Freshwater, 623 F. 3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) ("It is well established that a court is ordinarily
obligated to afford a special solicitude to pro se litigants").
vehicle under 49 C.F.R. § 395.1(j)(1). Id. at 7, 12; see also 49 C.F.R. § 395.1(j)(1) ("When a
property-carrying commercial motor vehicle driver at the direction of the motor carrier is
traveling, but not driving or assuming any other responsibility to the carrier, such time must be
counted as on-duty time unless the driver is afforded at least 10 consecutive hours off duty when
arriving at destination, in which case he/she must be considered off duty for the entire period").
Plaintiff also argued to Defendant Schrader that the State's registration and driver's license
requirements only apply to "motor vehicles" which requires "commercial activity as an element"
and, therefore, would not implicate Plaintiff's 2005 Chevrolet Astro which he lived out of and
used as a means of travel. Id. at 7, 12; see also 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6) ("The term 'motor vehicle'
means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power
and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers
and property, or property or cargo"). Defendant Schrader told Plaintiff he witnessed Plaintiff
"behind the wheel on a public highway operating [a] vehicle," which constituted "driving." Id. at
8, 11. After receiving the citations, Plaintiff's vehicle was impounded and towed to JR's
Transmission owned by Defendant John Vandenburgh. See id. at 13. Plaintiff pleaded "not
guilty" to the citations at the Town of Cairo Municipal Court, and he "requested a supporting
deposition" and "filed a motion for dismissal, a copy of the public record that Deputy Schrader
received, . . . a notice on US attorney and an affidavit of sovereign status with the Cairo
Municipal Court clerk." Id. The municipal court case was later dismissed "for lack of a
supporting deposition." Id. at 14; see Dkt. No. 6 at 7.
In his complaint, Plaintiff raises fourteen causes of action and seeks over five million
dollars in compensatory damages along with injunctive and declaratory relief for the return of his
vehicle. See id. at 32. Additionally, Plaintiff wants the State of New York, County of Greene,
and Town of Cairo to adopt (1) the use of "motor vehicle" as Plaintiff claims it should be used
under 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6), and (2) the terms "driving" and "traveling" under 49 C.F.R. §
395.1(j)(1) into their policies, practices, and customs. See id.4
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
"[W]hen a party files 'general or conclusory objections or objections which merely recite
the same arguments [that he presented] to the magistrate judge,' the court reviews those
recommendations for clear error." Idlisan v. SUNY Upstate Med. Univ., No. 5:12-CV-1790, 2013
WL 486279, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013) (quoting O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011
WL 933846, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011)) (citations and footnote omitted). "[A] district court
will ordinarily refuse to consider argument that could have been, but was not, presented to the
magistrate judge in the first instance." Bryant v. Miller, No. 9:18-CV-0494, 2019 WL 4267376,
*2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019) (citing Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., No. 04-CV-0210, 2011 WL
3610717, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2011)).
"When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the
district court makes a 'de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.'" Idlisan, 2013 WL 486279, at *1
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). "To be 'specific,' the objection must, with particularity, 'identify
[1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection
and [2] the basis for the objection.'" Boice v. M + W U.S., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 677, 683
(N.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c)). "After the appropriate review, 'the court may
4 A more complete recitation of the factual background is contained in Magistrate Judge
Evangelista's Report-Recommendation and Order. See Dkt. No. 6 at 4-14.
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.'" Idlisan, 2013 WL 486279, at *1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).
When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, "the Court must review his complaint under a more
lenient standard." Gerken v. Gordon, No. 1:24-CV-435, 2024 WL 5001402, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec.
6, 2024) (citing Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)). Therefore, "[a]
document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' . . . and 'a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'"
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))
(internal citation omitted). "'Although the court has the duty to show liberality towards pro se
litigants, . . . there is a responsibility on the court to determine that a claim has some arguable
basis in law before permitting a plaintiff to proceed with an action in forma pauperis.'" Gerken,
2024 WL 5001402, at *1 (quoting Moreman v. Douglas, 848 F. Supp. 332, 333-34 (N.D.N.Y.
1994)). A complaint, ultimately, must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face[,]" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and assert
"more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009).
B. Sovereign Immunity
Magistrate Judge Evangelista first recommends that Plaintiff's claim for monetary
damages against the State of New York and Commissioner Mark J.F. Schroeder of the New York
State Department of Motor Vehicles, acting in his official capacity, be dismissed because of
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Dkt. No. 6 at 14; see also Dkt. No. 1 at
3-4. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista because, under the Eleventh
Amendment, "'state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their
Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" Yerdon v. Poitras, 120 F.4th 1150, 1153 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Gollomp v.
Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009)). Additionally, sovereign immunity extends to "suits
not only against the state itself but also against state officials when sued in their official
capacities." Id. (citing Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 2003)).
In Plaintiff's objections, he disputes the application of sovereign immunity, because
"[s]overeign immunity does not prevent individuals from suing government officials who attempt
to enforce laws that are unconstitutional or without constitutional constraints." Dkt. No. 7 at 50.
While a plaintiff can sue state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief,
Magistrate Judge Evangelista correctly concluded that Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages are
not permissible. See Dkt. No. 6 at 14. Therefore, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's
recommendation that the State of New York and Commissioner Schroeder are immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 5.5
5 In Plaintiff's objections, he also references Ex Parte Young. See Dkt. No. 7 at 49-50. The Ex
Parte Young doctrine provides an exception to sovereign immunity. See Brown v. New York, 975
F. Supp. 2d 209, 225 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). However, it is only triggered when there is a properly
pled claim for injunctive relief. Id. To determine if the exception applies, "'a court need only
conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'" Ford, 316 F.3d at 355
(quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Plaintiff seeks
"declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of New York, County of Greene, and Town of
Cairo enjoining policies, practices, and customs to encourage the operating of the term 'motor
vehicle' by no other definition than the definition give[n] by the United States Code[]" and wants
the State to "institute policies, procedures, and training for the law enforcement agencies of these
entities to bring them into compliance with constitutional standards." Dkt. No. 1 at 32. However,
Plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory relief, which seek to remove the state law
requirement of a driver's license and/or vehicle registration as unconstitutional, is retroactive.
Even if the requests were properly pled as prospective, they must be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
C. Monell claims against the County and Town
Generally, the "[b]ar of Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to states and
state officials . . . but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (citing Lincoln Cnty. v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)) (internal citations omitted); see also Holley v. Lavine, 605
F.2d 638, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1979) (concluding that a county employee defendant was not immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment). Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and
injunctive relief against Defendants Greene County, the Town of Cairo, and county and town
employees in their official and individual capacities—claims which Magistrate Judge Evangelista
recommends be dismissed. See Dkt. No. 6 at 14. Although sovereign immunity generally does
not bar suits against county and town defendants sued in their official capacities, these official
capacity claims against the individual town and county employees are deemed to be brought
against the municipalities themselves.
Plaintiff seeks to sue Greene County, the Town of Cairo, County Administrator Shaun
Groden, County Attorney Edward I. Kaplan, and Town Supervisor Jason Watts pursuant to
Monell for alleged deprivations of Plaintiff's substantive due process rights through "de facto
policies . . . , practices, and customs of civil rights violations and unconstitutional practices" by
"approv[ing], authoriz[ing], and acquiesc[ing] in the unlawful and unconstitutional conduct of
defining the term 'motor vehicle' by a definition other than the definition given by the United
States Code[.]" Dkt. No. 1 at 22.7 Plaintiff claims that these "policies" violated his constitutional
6 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
7 Plaintiff additionally asserts that these "policies" violate the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. Dkt. No. 1 at 16. The Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's
r ecommendation that this claim is without merit as the Administrative Procedure Act is only
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 24.
To make out a Monell claim, Plaintiff must "'plead and prove three elements: (1) an
official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right.'" Chompupong v. City Schenectady, 511 F. Supp. 3d 228, 240 (N.D.N.Y.
2020) (quoting Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)) (additional quotation
and quotation marks omitted). "Although 'official policy' often refers to formal rules or customs
that intentionally establish 'fixed plans of action' over a period of time, when a municipality
'chooses a course of action tailored to a particular situation,' this may also 'represent[ ] an act of
official government "policy[.]"'" Montero v. City of Yonkers, New York, 890 F.3d 386, 403 (2d
Cir. 2018) (quoting Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2004))
(additional quotation omitted). Additionally, "'mere allegations of a municipal custom, a practice
of tolerating official misconduct, or inadequate training and/or supervision are insufficient to
demonstrate the existence of such a custom unless supported by factual details.'" Hicks v. City of
Syracuse, No. 5:17-CV-0475, 2018 WL 6308653, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2018) (quoting Tieman v.
City of Newburgh, No. 13-CV-4178, 2015 WL 1379652, *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015)). The
Court agrees with and adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that Plaintiff's
applicable to federal agencies. See Dkt. No. 6 at 24; see also New York v. Atl. States Marine
Fisheries Comm'n, 609 F.3d 524, 534-35 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to extend theory of status as a
quasi-federal agency to a state agency for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act).
8 The Court also adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that Plaintiff's claim
under the Thirteenth Amendment be dismissed for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff's claim
is based upon the incorrect belief that state requirements for driver's licenses "amounts to 'forced
labor/involuntary servitude.'" Dkt. No. 6 at 24 (quoting Dkt. No. 1 at 21); see also Boyle v. Town
of Hammond, No. 7:08-CV-1065, 2008 WL 11416992, *5 (quoting United States v. Kozminski,
487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988)) ("The phrase 'involuntary servitude' was intended '"to cover those
forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to
p roduce like undesirable results"'") (additional citation omitted).
allegations of unconstitutional policies much be dismissed as against Defendants Greene County
and Town of Cairo because they are conclusory. See Dkt. No. 6 at 25.
As to the county and town employees, "in the absence of an official policy adopted by the
municipality itself, municipal liability attaches only where 'a deliberate choice to follow a course
of action is made . . . by the official responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the
subject matter in question.'" Flannery v. Cnty. of Niagara, 763 F. Supp. 3d 364, 396 (W.D.N.Y.
2025) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)). "Whether an alleged
official may be considered as a final policy-maker on behalf of a municipal defendant depends on
whether applicable state law confers such status on the official and whether such status includes
policy-making authority over the subject area underlying a plaintiff's § 1983 claims." Id. at 397
(citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483). "It is ultimately the plaintiff's burden to establish, as a matter
of law, 'that [an] official had final policymaking authority in the particular area involved. . . .'"
Edrei v. City of New York, 254 F. Supp. 3d 565, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd sub nom., Edrei v.
Maguire, 892 F.3d 525 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Groden, Kaplan, and Watts hold final policymaking
authority concerning Plaintiff's challenges to New York State traffic laws. See Dkt. No. 1 at 22-
24. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Groden, Kaplan, and Watts are insufficient to
support Monell liability and must be dismissed. See Flannery, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 414.
D. Malicious Prosecution
1. Claims Against County Sherriff and Officers
Next, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that Plaintiff's
claim for malicious prosecution against all Defendants for "caus[ing], instigat[ing], influenc[ing],
or participat[ing] in the decision to charge Plaintiff with New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law
violations without probable cause[]" be dismissed. Dkt. No. 1 at 19; see Dkt. No. 6 at 22.
"To prevail on a [§] 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, 'a plaintiff must show a
violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment . . . and must establish the elements of a
malicious prosecution claim under state law.'" Shabazz v. Johnson City Police Dep't, No. 3:18-
CV-570, 2019 WL 2617016, *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019) (quoting Manganiello v. City of New
York, 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010)). In New York, a plaintiff must allege "(1) the initiation
or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in
plaintiff's favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice
as a motivation for defendant's actions." Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing
Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991)). "Initiating a criminal proceeding against a
person without probable cause, coupled with a deprivation of liberty, is a Fourth Amendment
violation." Shabazz, 2019 WL 2617016, at *4 (citing Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944-45 (2d
Cir. 1997)).
The Second Circuit has held that while generally police officers do not "'commence or
continue' criminal proceedings against defendants, a claim for malicious prosecution can still be
maintained against a police officer if the officer is found to 'play[ ] an active role in the
prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act.'"
Bermudez v. City of New York, 790 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Manganiello v. City of
New York, 612 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2010)). "As one court has observed, '[n]early all cases in
which law enforcement officers were found to have initiated or continued a prosecution for
purposes of a malicious prosecution claim involve officers who provided knowingly false and/or
fabricated evidence to unwitting prosecutors.'" Besedin v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 18-CV-00819,
2024 WL 4225956, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2024) (quoting Joyner v. Cnty. of Cayuga, No. 5:20-
CV-60, 2020 WL 1904088, *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2020)); see also Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997). The Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's
recommendation that Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed because he has failed to allege
Defendants played an active role in a prosecution or provided false information to prosecutors.
See Dkt. No. 6 at 22-23.
In regard to Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants acted without probable cause, Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Dkt. No. 1 at 19-20. As stated
by Magistrate Judge Evangelista, Plaintiff concedes in his complaint that he did not have a
driver's license or valid vehicle registration but contends that he was ticketed without probable
cause because he was not required to have either. See Dkt. No. 6 at 23. "'[T]he existence of
probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution.'" Werkheiser, 655 F.
Supp. 3d at 104 (quoting Adams v. City of New York, 226 F. Supp. 3d 261, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)).
"'Probable cause, in the context of malicious prosecution, has . . . been described as such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty.'" Id.
(citing Adams, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 269).
Under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law,
[e]xcept while operating a motor vehicle during the course of a road
test conducted pursuant to the provisions of this article, no person
shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this
state or upon any sidewalk or to or from any lot adjacent to a public
garage, supermarket, shopping center or car washing establishment
or to or from or into a public garage or car washing establishment
unless he is duly licensed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 509 (emphasis added). Additionally, New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law provides that, "[n]o motor vehicle shall be operated or driven upon the public highways of
this state without first being registered in accordance with the provisions of this article, except as
otherwise expressly provided in this chapter." Id. § 401 (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff claims Defendants acted without probable cause when Defendant Schrader
ticketed Plaintiff for operating a vehicle without a driver's license or valid vehicle registration.
See Dkt. No. 1 at 19. However, Plaintiff admits in his complaint that he did not have a driver's
license or valid vehicle registration and told Defendant Schrader that he was not required to have
either. See Dkt. No. 1 at 8-9. The Court adopts the recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Evangelista that Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint establish probable cause for Plaintiff to be
ticketed in violation of N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 401 and § 509. See Dkt. No. 6 at 23. Therefore,
Plaintiff has failed to state a malicious prosecution claim against Defendants. See id.
2. Claims against Prosecutors
Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's malicious prosecution
claims against Defendants Stanzione and Sandleitner based on a lack of sufficient explanation as
to how they, as prosecutors, were personally involved in any purported malicious prosecution.
See Dkt. No. 6 at 23. "'In this Circuit[,] personal involvement of [D]efendants in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.'" Moffit v.
Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d
930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977)). Plaintiff must "allege a tangible connection between the acts of a
defendant and the injuries suffered." Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that after a "50-H hearing at the Greene County Office Building"
Defendants Stanzione and Sandleitner engaged "in a seditious conspiracy to overthrow the
Constitution and violate his God-given rights." Dkt. No. 1 at 15. Plaintiff bases his claims on
Defendants' failure to respond to his multiple attempts to contact them at their places of
employment to provide a supporting deposition. See id. Plaintiff alleges this created a "legal
problem" for Plaintiff and constituted a "continued [] deprivation of Plaintiff's rights to private
property and substantive and procedural due process." Id. The Court agrees with Magistrate
Judge Evangelista's recommendation that Plaintiff has failed to connect Defendant Stanzione or
Sandleitner's conduct to a malicious prosecution.
Magistrate Judge Evangelista also states, in a footnote, that Defendants Stanzione and
Sandleitner are likely immune from suit on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. See Dkt. No. 6 at
23 n.15. "The Second Circuit has made clear that 'prosecutors enjoy "absolute immunity from §
1983 liability for those prosecutorial activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process."'" Werkheiser v. Cnty. of Broome, 655 F. Supp. 3d 88, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 2023)
(quoting Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 864 (2d Cir. 2022)) (additional quotation omitted). "For
example, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity when determining which offenses to charge,
initiating a prosecution, presenting a case to a grand jury, and preparing for trial." Anilao, 27
F.4th at 864 (citing Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Therefore, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge
Evangelista's recommendation that even if Plaintiff sufficiently alleged Defendant Stanzione and
Sandleitner's personal involvement in a prosecution, the claims against them are barred by
prosecutorial immunity and must be dismissed. See Dkt. No. 6 at 23 n.15.
E. Private Actor Liability
The Court also adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's conclusion that John Vandenburgh,
owner of JR's Transmission, cannot be held liable for the alleged constitutional violations because
Plaintiff's complaint does not plausibly suggest that Defendant Vandenburgh was acting under the
color of state law or in concert with state actors. See Dkt. No. 6 at 21. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Vandenburgh engaged in a conspiracy with the State to violate his constitutional rights
when an unidentified employee of JR's Transmission assisted with a tow truck removal of
Plaintiff's van after Plaintiff received the traffic citations. See Dkt. No. 1 at 17. "In order to state
a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was injured by either a state actor or a private
party acting under color of state law." Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir.
2002) (citing Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1992). "'To state a claim
against a private entity on a [§] 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts
demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an
unconstitutional act.'" Id. at 324 (quoting Spear, 954 F.2d at 68)). Plaintiff must show the private
actor "'is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.'" Id. (quoting Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)). However, "[a] merely conclusory allegation that a
private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the
private entity." Id. (citing Spear, 954 F.2d at 68).
Plaintiff's complaint contends Defendant Vandenburgh was "a willing participant" and
"act[ed] under color of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law." Dkt. No. 1 at 17. However,
the complaint contains no factual basis to plausibly assert Defendant Vandenburgh conspired to
deprive the Plaintiff of his private property. Ciambrello, 292 F.3d at 324. It is not sufficient that
Plaintiff's vehicle was impounded at JR's Transmission to constitute state action as "courts have
rejected the notion that private towing companies operating pursuant to licenses, permits, or
contracts issued by the state are state actors." VW Credit Leasing LTD. v. Runway Towing Corp.,
757 F. Supp. 3d 271, 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) ("Companies that provide services to municipalities . .
. are not thereby transformed into state actors . . . where, as here, the function performed (towing
cars) has not been historically, traditionally and exclusively the prerogative of the state") (quoting
Calderon v. Burton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 480, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). For these reasons, the Court
adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation to dismiss the claims against Defendant
Vandenburgh. See Dkt. No. 6 at 21.
Additionally, the Court adopts the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Evangelista that
Defendant Vandenburgh cannot be liable for conspiracy. See Dkt. No. 6 at 21-22. "A valid claim
of conspiracy under § 1983 to violate a complainant's constitutional rights must contain
allegations of (1) a conspiracy itself, plus (2) actual deprivation of constitutional rights. A
violated constitutional right is a natural prerequisite to a claim of conspiracy to violate such
right." Romer v. Morgenthau, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Malsh v. Austin,
901 F. Supp. 757, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). "[I]f a plaintiff cannot sufficiently allege a violation of
his rights, it follows that he cannot sustain a claim of conspiracy to violate those rights." Id.
(citation omitted). Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory and lack a constitutional violation on
which to stand because, as explained later in this Memorandum-Decision and Order, no
constitutional violation has been properly alleged. See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622
(1915).
The Court also agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation to dismiss
Plaintiff's alleged §§ 1985 and 1986 claims whereby there must be "'(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal
protection of the laws, . . . ; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is . . .
deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States.'" Brown v. City of Oneonta, New York, 221
F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A] § 1986 claim must be predicated on a valid § 1985 claim").
Such claims must be motivated by "'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.'" Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 130
(1985) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). As noted by Magistrate Judge
Evangelista, Plaintiff has not alleged class-based or racial animus. See Dkt. No. 6 at 20.
Therefore, the Court adopts that portion of the Report-Recommendation and Order which
recommends the §§ 1985 and 1986 claims be dismissed. See id. at 19-20.
Next, as to Defendant Scaturro, a Greene County Public Defender, Plaintiff's claims must
also be dismissed. The Supreme Court has noted "that a public defender does not act under color
of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a
criminal proceeding." Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Tapp v.
Champagne, 164 Fed. Appx. 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant
Scaturro has acted outside his traditional functions as a public defender. See Dkt. No. 1 at 18-19.
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot bring a cause of action under § 1983 against Defendant Scaturro and
the claim must be dismissed. See id.
F. Failure to State a Claim
Magistrate Judge Evangelista concluded Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed as
frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). See Dkt. No. 6 at 28. The Second Circuit has defined "an action [as]
'frivolous' when either: (1) 'the "factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations
are the product of delusion or fantasy;' or (2) 'the claim is based on an "indisputably meritless
legal theory."'" Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990)) (additional quotation omitted).
Plaintiff's complaint and the basis of his objections turn on whether the State of New York
can constitutionally require an individual to maintain a valid driver's license and vehicle
registration. See Dkt. No. 1 at 9; see also Dkt. No. 7 at 15-16. The Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Hendrick v. Maryland, and stated as follows:
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state
may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public
safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all
motor vehicles, []those moving in interstate commerce as well as
others. And to this end it may require the registration of such
vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor
reasonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of the
engines, []a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of
control. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly
recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the
preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens; and
it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate
commerce.
Ali v. Siwek, No. 23-CV-354, 2023 WL 9184481, *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2023) (quoting
Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622) (alterations omitted). Driving a vehicle, as Plaintiff was witnessed
doing by Defendant Schrader, has never been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right;
therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right. See Dkt. No. 6 at 8; see
also Crandall v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, No. 1:10-CV-918, 2011 WL 2295742,
*2 (N.D.N.Y June 8, 2011) (quoting Haselton v. Amestoy, No. 1:03-CV-223, 2003 WL 23273581,
*2 (D. Vt. Mar. 16, 2004)).
It has been recognized that the states have the constitutional police power to regulate and
"enact laws requiring owners of motor vehicles to register those vehicles." Ali, 2023 WL 9184481
at *3 ; see also Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167
(1916) ("The power of a state to regulate the use of motor vehicles on its highways has been
recently considered by this court and broadly sustained"). The Second Circuit has acknowledged
an "undenied power of a state to impose a registration or license fee on those using motor vehicles
in the state[.]" Spector Motor Serv. Inc., v. Walsh, Tax Com'r, 139 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1943)
(citing Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622). "[T]here cannot be the slightest doubt of the validity of th[e]
requirement" for states to mandate individuals to have a valid vehicle registration. Munz v.
Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (citing Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622).
It is well established that a state may "prescribe uniform regulations covering the
ownership and operation of these vehicles" in order to minimize risks to public safety on
highways. Id.; see also Morris, 274 U.S. at 143; Kane, 242 U.S. at 167. "The enforcement and
documentation of New York's license requirements thus fall squarely within the parameters of the
state's constitutional authority and cannot form the basis of Plaintiff's constitutional deprivation
claim." Scalpi v. Town of E. Fishkill, No. 14-CV-2126, 2016 WL 831956, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29,
2016); see also Ali, 2023 WL 9184481, at *3 (concluding that the plaintiff was unable to bring a §
1983 action because he had not plausibly alleged that by being required to register his vehicle, he
was denied "a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States") (citing Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiff's belief that he is exempt from having a driver's license because he was
"traveling," is unfounded, as the statutory definition he relies on is confined to commercial drivers
during mandatory travel rest times. See 49 C.F.R. § 395.1(j)(1). Plaintiff claims he was not
"driving" without a license because he defines "driving" as "ranching parlance to drive cattle to
market, a commercial activity." Dkt. No. 1 at 7. Magistrate Judge Evangelista explained that the
1894 Supreme Court case cited by Plaintiff does not support Plaintiff's assertion that states only
have authority to regulate the use of "public roads for commercial activity." Dkt. No. 1 at 7; see
Dkt. No 6. at 19 n.13 (citing Interstate Com. Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894)). The
Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista that Plaintiff's belief is misplaced and there is no
valid legal support for the position that Plaintiff is exempt from state laws requiring a driver's
license and vehicle registration. See Dkt. No. 6 at 17.
Additionally, the term "motor vehicle" in 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6) is applicable only to the
referenced chapter of the statute regarding crimes and criminal procedures of aircraft and motor
vehicles—not to the personal use Plaintiff describes in the complaint. See 18 U.S.C. § 31(a).
Therefore, Plaintiff's argument that he was not operating a motor vehicle is meritless. See Dkt.
No. 1 at 6. This further renders Plaintiff's objection stating he was using an "automobile for
private purposes" under New Hampshire case law and not a "motor vehicle" used for commercial
purposes, frivolous. Dkt. No. 7 at 8; see American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Chaput, 95 N.H. 200,
203 (N.H. 1948).
The majority of Plaintiff's objections echo the same premise of his complaint. See Dkt.
No. 7 at 19-37. In Plaintiff's objections, he argues the "real purpose" of requiring driver's licenses
is an "insidious" scheme requiring citizens to "give up his/her Constitutional Right to travel in
order to accept and exercise a privilege under Contract" so that the legislature may execute a
"slow, meticulous, calculated encroachment upon the Citizen's Right to travel." Id. at 34, 51.
Plaintiff contends that state driver's license and vehicle registration laws are an abuse of the
Constitutional "right to travel," Congressional "taxing power," are a "conversion of a right to a
crime," and a violation of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution because driver's
licenses "are obviously[] Noble entitlements and franchises[.]" Id. at 13-19, 25-26, 39. As the
Court has explained in this Memorandum-Decision and Order, these arguments do not support a
cognizable legal claim and, therefore, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's conclusion
that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed. See Dkt. No. 6 at 15.
G. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims
because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see Dkt. No. 6 at 26. In the present case, all claims over which the Court
would have original jurisdiction have been dismissed, leaving only Plaintiff's state law claims.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), Magistrate Judge Evangelista correctly recommends that the
Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Chompupong v. City of Schenectedy, No. 1:17-CV-929, 2021 WL
1758803, *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 4, 2021). Accordingly, Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed.9
H. Dismissal and Leave to Amend
Finally, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that
Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. See Dkt. No. 6 at 27. Generally, "'[a]
pro se complaint should not be dismissed without the Court granting leave to amend at least once
when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.'"
Edwards v. Penix, 388 F. Supp. 3d 135, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d
58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014)). "However, if the problems with a complaint are 'substantive' rather than
the result of an 'inadequately or inartfully pleaded' complaint, an opportunity to re-plead would be
'futile' and 'should be denied.'" Id. at 144-45 (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d
Cir. 2000)). Due to the substantive deficiencies in Plaintiff's complaint, amendment would be
9 Additionally, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that insofar as
Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1589, Plaintiff has no private right of action to
enforce a state or federal criminal law statute. See Dkt. No. 6 at 24; see also McFadden v. Ortiz,
No. 5:12-CV-1244, 2013 WL 1789593, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2013).
futile and leave to amend will not be granted.
The Court also agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation to dismiss
Plaintiff's claims against the State of New York and Commissioner Mark J.F. Schroeder based on
sovereign immunity without prejudice because "[g]enerally, dismissals for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction must be without prejudice[.]" Mulhern Gas Co. v. Rodriguez, No. 1:23-CV-1267,
2024 WL 3992588, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024) (citing Katz v. Donna Karan Co., L.L.C., 872
F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2017)); Karupaiyan v. New York, No. 23-1257, 2024 WL 2174272, *2 (2d
Cir. May 15, 2024). Therefore, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation
to dismiss the claims against the State of New York and Commissioner Mark J.F. Schroeder
without prejudice. See Dkt. No. 6 at 28.
For the remaining portions of Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court agrees with Magistrate
Judge Evangelista's recommendation to dismiss the claims with prejudice because "[d]ismissals
for failure to state a claim . . . are generally with prejudice." Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43
F.4th 112, 126 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Donnelly v. CARRP, 37 F.4th 44, 57 (2d Cir. 2022)); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully considering Plaintiff's submissions, Magistrate Judge Evangelista's Report-
Recommendation and Order, and the applicable law, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Evangelista's Report-Recommendation and Order (Dkt.
No. 6) is ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons set forth herein; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) asserted against Defendants State of New
York and Commissioner Mark J.F. Schroeder in his official capacity is DISMISSED without
prejudice and without leave to amend; and the Court further
ORDERS that the remainder of Plaintiff's federal claims are DISMISSED with
prejudice and without leave to amend; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
state law claims, which are DISMISSED without prejudice; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants’ favor and close
this case; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and
Order on Plaintiff in accordance with the local rules.
IT ISSO ORDERED.
Dated: July 22, 2025 t .
Albany, New York Lak Dihgths
U.S. District Judge
22