State V Coleman
[Cite as State v. Coleman, 2025-Ohio-2581.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 30939
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JOHN COLEMAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR-2018-01-0287
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: July 23, 2025
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, John Coleman, pro se, appeals the judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In 2019, Coleman was convicted of two counts of burglary in violation of R.C.
2911.12(A)(2). Coleman appealed and this Court issued a decision affirming his convictions.
State v. Coleman, 2020-Ohio-2807 (9th Dist.).
{¶3} In the years that followed, Coleman filed a number of motions attacking his
convictions that were denied by the trial court. Coleman also filed a motion for judicial release
that was denied.
{¶4} Thereafter, on October 17, 2023, Coleman filed a pro se motion for leave to file a
motion for new trial. The State filed a brief in opposition to the motion for leave, arguing that
Coleman had neither identified any new evidence, nor addressed why he was unavoidably
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prevented from filing a timely motion for new trial. Coleman filed a reply brief in support of his
motion. Coleman then filed a motion to appoint counsel as well as a separate motion for the
appointment of standby counsel. The trial court subsequently issued a journal entry denying the
motion for leave, the motion to appoint counsel, and the motion to appoint standby counsel.
{¶5} On appeal, Coleman raises one assignment of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
APPELLANT COLEMAN WAS TRIED, CONVICTED, AND SENTENCED ON
BURGLARY R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), BEHIND ILLEGAL EVIDENCE, IN
VIOLATION OF THE 4TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT[S] TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTION[,] ART. I.[,] §
14.
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Coleman argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. This Court disagrees.
{¶7} A trial court’s ruling on a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cleavenger, 2022-Ohio-1041, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.); see also State v.
Hunter, 2024-Ohio-4658, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s
attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219 (1983).
{¶8} Crim.R. 33(A)(6) provides that a new trial may be granted “when new evidence
material to the defense is discovered which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial.” Crim.R. 33(B) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Motions for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence shall be filed within
one hundred twenty days after the day upon which the verdict was rendered, or the
decision of the court where trial by jury has been waived. If it is made to appear
by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from
the discovery of the evidence upon which he must rely, such motion shall be filed
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within seven days from an order of the court finding that he was unavoidably
prevented from discovering the evidence within the one hundred twenty day period.
{¶9} Coleman filed his motion for leave to file a motion for new trial on the basis that
he had discovered new evidence. Coleman filed his motion on October 17, 2023, more than four
years after the jury rendered its verdicts in this case and well outside the 120-day window for filing
a motion for new trial set forth in Crim.R. 33(B). “A defendant who seeks to file a motion for a
new trial outside the timeframe provided by Crim.R. 33(B) must first obtain leave by filing a
motion demonstrating that he was unavoidably prevented from filing the motion for a new trial or,
in the case of a motion premised on newly discovered evidence, that he was ‘unavoidably
prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must rely.’” State v. Baskerville,
2019-Ohio-3639, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting Crim.R. 33(B). This Court has held that “[u]navoidable
delay results when the party had no knowledge of the existence of the ground supporting the
motion for a new trial and could not have learned of the existence of that ground within the required
time in the exercise of reasonable diligence.” State v. Mills, 2023-Ohio-3783, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.),
quoting State v. Covender, 2012-Ohio-6105, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.).
{¶10} Under the circumstances here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Coleman’s motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. In support of his motion, Coleman set
forth a narrative detailing how a detective from the Akron Police Department knowingly made
false statements in order to obtain the search warrant that police relied on to collect DNA samples
from Coleman. Coleman argued that the tactics used by police resulted in a deprivation of his
constitutional rights. Significantly, however, Coleman did not address how the narrative set forth
in his motion was predicated on newly discovered evidence. Coleman also failed to explain how
he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence that purportedly served as the basis
for his motion. “A defendant is not unavoidably prevented from discovering new evidence when
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he could have discovered the evidence through the exercise of due diligence and reasonable effort
in preparing for trial.” Cleavenger, 2022-Ohio-1041, at ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). As Coleman failed to
explain how he was unavoidably prevented from discovering new evidence, we cannot say that the
trial court’s order denying his motion for leave was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
{¶11} Coleman’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶12} Coleman’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
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STEVENSON, P. J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOHN COLEMAN, pro se, Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.