P V Arcila Ca24

Filed 7/21/25 P. v Arcila CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B337975

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA038696
v.

JORGE ARCILA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Peabody and Jennifer Hansen, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1999, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Jorge
Arcila of murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), and the trial court
sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison. Arcila was 17
years old at the time of the offense. In January 2024, Arcila filed
a petition for recall and resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608
(Heard).2 In May 2024, the trial court issued a written order
summarily denying Arcila’s petition. In denying Arcila relief, the
court explained that because Arcila was sentenced to 25 years to
life when he was 19 years old, he will be eligible for parole when
he is 44 years old, and consequently, he was not sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP.
Court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief identifying
no arguable issues in the trial court’s ruling and requesting
discretionary independent review of the record under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Degladillo). Arcila then filed a
supplemental brief on his own behalf.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) provides: “When a
defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole
[(LWOP)] has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the
defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall
and resentencing.” Heard held that, although subdivision
(d)(1)(A) limits eligibility for recall and resentencing to juvenile
offenders sentenced to explicitly designated LWOP terms, equal
protection principles require that the statute also extend to
juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the functional
equivalent of LWOP. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 612.)

2
If, as here, appellate counsel finds no arguable issues exist
in a postconviction appeal, this court need not independently
review the record. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) And
if, as here, the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief,
this court need evaluate only the arguments presented in that
brief. (Ibid.)
Turning to those arguments, Arcila renews his contention,
raised in the trial court, that because he was 17 years old when
he committed his offense, he is eligible for recall and resentencing
under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and Heard. He also argues
that he should have been charged in juvenile, not adult court,
and that the failure to charge him in juvenile court constituted
legal error. He lastly requests that new appellate counsel be
appointed on his behalf. As explained below, we reject these
contentions.

DISCUSSION

I. The trial court did not err in denying Arcila’s
petition

The trial court was correct in ruling that Arcila is ineligible
for recall and resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)
and Heard. As the trial court correctly explained, because
Arcila’s sentence rendered him eligible for parole in his mid-40’s,
the sentence did not constitute the functional equivalent of
LWOP. (Cf., e.g., People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268
[a juvenile defendant’s sentence of 110 years to life constitutes
the functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Contreras (2018) 4
Cal.5th 349, 360, 368–369 [juvenile offenders’ sentences of 50
years to life and 58 years to life constituted the functional
equivalent of LWOP because the sentences “ ‘[fell] short of giving

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[the juvenile offenders] the realistic chance for release . . . ’ ”].)
Because Arcila was not sentenced to LWOP or its functional
equivalent, he falls outside section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A),
and the trial court was correct in summarily denying him relief.

II. It was not legal error to try Arcila in adult court

We likewise reject Arcila’s argument that he is entitled to
relief because he was charged in adult, not juvenile court.
Although it is unclear, it appears Arcila may be arguing that he
should be granted retroactive relief under the Public Safety and
Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). The electorate
passed Proposition 57 on November 8, 2016, and it took effect the
next day. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304
(Lara).) “Proposition 57 prohibits prosecutors from charging
juveniles with crimes directly in adult court.” (Lara, at p. 303.)
“Instead, they must commence the action in juvenile court.”
(Ibid.) “If the prosecution wishes to try the juvenile as an adult,
the juvenile court must conduct . . . a ‘transfer hearing’ to
determine whether the matter should remain in juvenile court or
be transferred to adult court.” (Ibid.) “Only if the juvenile court
transfers the matter to adult court can the juvenile be tried and
sentenced as an adult. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a).)”
(Lara, at p. 303, fn. omitted.) Proposition 57 applies retroactively
to nonfinal judgments. (Lara, at pp. 303–304.)
To the extent Arcila’s letter brief suggests he is entitled to
relief under Proposition 57, we reject this contention. Because
Arcila’s 1999 judgment was final when Proposition 57 took effect
in 2016, he is not entitled to its retroactive benefit. (Lara, supra,
4 Cal.5th at pp. 303–304 [Proposition 57 applies retroactively
only to nonfinal judgments]; People v. Lizarraga (2020) 56

4
Cal.App.5th 201, 206 [a case is final once the time for petitioning
for a writ of certiorari has passed]; U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules, rule
13-1 [petition for writ of certiorari is timely if filed with the clerk
of the United States Supreme Court within 90 days after entry of
judgment of a state court of last resort].)
Relatedly, to the extent Arcila suggests that trying him in
adult and not juvenile court violated his constitutional
protections against cruel and unusual punishment, we likewise
reject this contention. In determining whether a sentence
constitutes cruel or unusual punishment, the proper inquiry
“focuses on whether the punishment is ‘grossly disproportionate’
to the offense and the offender or, stated another way, whether
the punishment is so excessive that it ‘ “shocks the conscience
and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” ’ ” (In re
Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 972.) When challenging a sentence
as being cruel and/or unusual in violation of the federal and
California Constitutions, “[a] defendant has a considerable
burden to overcome.” (People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166
Cal.App.3d 520, 529.) “The doctrine of separation of powers is
firmly entrenched in the law of California and the court should
not lightly encroach on matters which are uniquely in the domain
of the Legislature.” (Ibid.) Reviewing courts must always
remain “aware that it is the function of the legislative branch to
define crimes and prescribe punishments.” (Ibid.) Because it is
the Legislature which determines the appropriate penalty for
criminal offenses, “[f]indings of disproportionality have occurred
with exquisite rarity in the case law.” (People v. Weddle (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196.) Applying this due deference, rooted in
principles of separation of powers, we conclude that it did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment for the Legislature to

5
allow for juvenile offenders such as Arcila to be charged directly
in adult court prior to the enactment of Proposition 57. Nor was
it cruel and unusual for the Legislature to draft Proposition 57 in
a manner that would not extend the new law to offenders, such as
Arcila, whose judgments are already final.

III. Arcila is not entitled to new appointed counsel

We lastly reject Arcila’s request that we appoint new
counsel on his behalf. Nowhere under California statutory or
case law is it contemplated that in instances such as this one,
appellants such as Arcila should receive the benefit of a second
appointed appellate counsel. Nor do the circumstances before us
suggest that Arcila’s first appointed counsel represented him in
an improper manner. Rather, appellate counsel’s declaration,
contained in the Opening Brief, reflects that counsel reviewed the
record and found no arguable issues on appeal.
And to the extent that Arcila’s request for new appellate
counsel may be read as an implied contention that his appointed
counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we likewise reject this
contention. In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability of a more favorable result absent counsel’s
allegedly deficient conduct. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 694.) Here, Arcila cannot demonstrate any such
reasonable probability. Counsel could not have changed the fact
that, because Arcila received a sentence that rendered him
eligible for parole in his mid-40’s, he was not sentenced to the
functional equivalent of LWOP, and is consequently ineligible for
relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). In other words,
because there is no way Arcila could have obtained a more

6
favorable result in the trial court, Arcila was not prejudiced by
counsel’s performance.

IV. We do not discern reversible error based on an
independent review

Although we are not required to, we have also exercised our
discretion to independently review the record, and we have
discovered no additional arguable issues on appeal. (See
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)

DISPOSITION

We affirm the order denying Arcila relief under section
1170, subdivision (d)(1).

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P.J.

MORI, J.