Steshenko V Bd Of Trustees
Filed 7/23/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREGORY STESHENKO, H052324
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 21CV391490)
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
FOOTHILL-DE ANZA COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
In January 2021, in a prior civil action, plaintiff Gregory Steshenko was declared
a vexatious litigant, and he was subject to a prefiling order requiring him to obtain
permission from the presiding judge before filing any new litigation. (See Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 391, 391.7.)1 Steshenko filed an appeal in this earlier action.
In November 2021, while the appeal was pending, Steshenko filed the instant civil
action against defendants Foothill-De Anza Community College District (the College
District), its board of trustees, Patrick J. Ahrens, Laura Casas, Pearl Cheng, Peter
Landsberger, Gilbert Wong, and Shinny Duong. The College District filed a notice in the
instant action regarding the earlier prefiling order. (See § 391.7, subd. (c).) Steshenko
filed a written objection contending that the prefiling order had been stayed pending the
appeal.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
1
otherwise indicated.
The College District, its board of trustees, and Duong thereafter filed a motion in
the instant action contending that the prefiling order was still in effect notwithstanding
Steshenko’s appeal in the prior action. To the extent a new motion was required in the
instant action, they moved to have Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant again, to have
another prefiling order issued, and to require Steshenko to furnish security. Steshenko
opposed the motion. Before the trial court ruled on the motion, this court issued an
opinion in Steshenko’s appeal in the prior action. This court’s opinion left intact the
vexatious litigant finding and the prefiling order.
In the instant action, in June 2024, the trial court determined that the prefiling
order was not stayed on appeal. The trial court consequently determined that Steshenko
was required to request leave before filing the instant action, that he had failed to do so,
that he had been denied permission after the action was filed, and that therefore the action
must be dismissed. Alternatively, to the extent the prefiling order was not in effect while
on appeal, the trial court found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant, granted the request
for a new prefiling order, ordered Steshenko to furnish security, and, after observing that
Steshenko refused to furnish any security, ordered the action dismissed.
On appeal, Steshenko contends that the judgment of dismissal should be reversed
and that he should be allowed to proceed with his case on the merits.
For reasons that we will explain, we determine that the prior January 2021
prefiling order remained in effect while on appeal. The trial court in the instant action
therefore properly dismissed the action based on Steshenko’s failure to obtain permission
before filing the action, and the denial of permission after the action was filed. We will
strike the June 2024 orders filed in the instant action that again found Steshenko to be a
vexatious litigant and again required him to obtain leave before filing new litigation.
Although we are striking these orders issued in the instant case, Steshenko continues to
be designated as a vexatious litigant and continues to be subject to a prefiling order
pursuant to the January 2021 orders issued in the prior action.
2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Steshenko’s Prior Litigation Against the College District
1. The 2017 Civil Action
In 2017, Steshenko sued the College District and others. A judgment was filed in
favor of the defendants on February 1, 2022, after they prevailed on a motion for
summary judgment. Steshenko appealed, and this court affirmed. (Steshenko v. Foothill-
De Anza Community College District et al. (July 26, 2023, H049871 [nonpub. opn.].)
2. The 2019 Civil Action and the January 2021 Vexatious Litigant Finding
and Prefiling Order
In 2019, Steshenko again sued the College District and others. (Steshenko v.
Foothill-De Anza Community College District et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County,
2019, No. 19CV360490).) Some of the defendants filed a motion in 2020 to have
Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant, for a prefiling order, and to require him to furnish
security. Other defendants, including the College District, made an oral joinder to the
motion.
In January 2021, the trial court found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant. The
court also set security for each of 12 moving defendants at $10,000, with the case to be
dismissed if no security was posted. The court also granted the request for a prefiling
order. The prefiling order was filed on January 21, 2021. (§ 391.7.) The prefiling order
“prohibited” Steshenko, unless represented by an attorney, “from filing any new litigation
in the courts of California without approval of the presiding justice or presiding judge of
the court in which the action is to be filed.”
Steshenko appealed. This court ordered modification of the January 2021 order by
striking the requirement of $10,000 in security as to certain defendants, including the
College District, and affirmed the order as so modified. (Steshenko v. Foothill-De Anza
Community College District et al. (Aug. 1, 2023, H048838 [nonpub. opn.].) The
3
remainder of the order, which found Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant and which
granted the request for a prefiling order, was left intact by this court.
On November 1, 2023, the California Supreme Court denied Steshenko’s petition
for review. The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied Steshenko’s petition
for a writ of certiorari.
B. The November 2021 Complaint in the Instant Action
In the meantime, in the instant action, on November 15, 2021, Steshenko filed
another civil complaint against the College District. He also named as defendants the
College District’s board of trustees and several individuals. 2 Steshenko’s complaint
arose out of De Anza College’s alleged failure to enroll him in the courses necessary for
his graduation from its medical laboratory technician program. He alleged two causes of
action for (1) violation of his civil rights and (2) retaliation for filing an age
discrimination complaint.
C. Notice of Vexatious Litigant Prefiling Order
On December 8, 2021, the College District filed a notice regarding the prefiling
order. (See § 391.7, subd. (c).) In the notice, the College District stated that Steshenko
had previously been designated a vexatious litigant in a prior case in January 2021, and
that he was subject to a prefiling order that required him to obtain approval from the
presiding judge before filing any new litigation. The College District indicated that it
was unaware of Steshenko complying with the prefiling requirement before filing the
instant action. The College District requested that the complaint be dismissed unless
Steshenko complied with the prefiling order.
Steshenko filed a written objection. He contended that the prefiling order had
been stayed pending an appeal.
2
Defendant Duong is allegedly the program director of De Anza College’s
medical laboratory technician program. The remaining individual defendants are
allegedly trustees on the College District’s board of trustees.
4
The record does not reflect that the trial court took any action in relation to the
College District’s notice of prefiling order.
D. February 2022 Motion for New Prefiling Order and to Require Security in
the Instant Case
On February 4, 2022, the College District, its board of trustees, and Duong filed a
motion for a new prefiling order. They argued that Steshenko had previously been
declared a vexatious litigant, that he was subject to a prefiling order, and that the prefiling
order was still in effect notwithstanding his appeal in the prior action giving rise to the
order. To the extent a new motion was required in the instant action, they moved to have
Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant, to have a prefiling order issued, and to require
Steshenko to furnish security.
Steshenko filed opposition to the motion.
On May 3, 2022, the trial court stayed the instant action. The court determined
that the January 2021 orders in the prior case, in which Steshenko was declared a
vexatious litigant and subject to a prefiling requirement, “continued” at the time he filed
the complaint in the instant action. Although Steshenko had filed a notice of appeal in
that earlier action, the appeal (case No. H048838) had been stayed because Steshenko
failed to obtain leave from the presiding justice to file the appeal. The trial court
determined in the instant action that because Steshenko similarly failed to obtain leave
from the presiding judge before filing the instant action, the instant action should be
stayed. The court ordered the instant action stayed until (1) an application by Steshenko
for leave to file the instant action was granted or denied, (2) an opinion was issued in case
No. H048838, or (3) pending an order dismissing the instant action.
E. Demurrer
In the meantime, on February 4, 2022, prior to the trial court staying the instant
action, the College District, its board of trustees, and Duong filed a demurrer to
Steshenko’s complaint. On May 2, 2022, Steshenko filed a first amended complaint
5
before a hearing was held on the demurrer. 3 The amended complaint continued to allege
causes of action for violation of civil rights and retaliation for filing an age discrimination
complaint, but also included two additional causes of action for “breach[]” of
“obligations arising from operation of law” and violation of civil rights.
F. Steshenko’s Requests for Permission to File the Instant Action
In May 2022, and again in January 2024, Steshenko requested permission from the
presiding judge to file the instant action. (See § 391.7.) Although it is not clear from the
record on appeal whether the presiding judge ruled on the May 2022 request, the
presiding judge denied Steshenko’s January 2024 request.
G. Steshenko’s Motion to Lift the Stay
On February 20, 2024, Steshenko filed a motion to lift the stay. Among other
contentions, he argued that he had filed an appeal in the prior action (case
No. 19CV360490), in which he was declared a vexatious litigant and a prefiling order
was made, and that consequently those orders were not final when the instant action was
filed. Steshenko contended that because those orders were not final, he was not required
to seek permission before filing the instant action and therefore the instant action should
have not been stayed.
In opposition, the College District, its board of trustees, and Duong contended that
the vexatious litigant orders, including the prefiling order, in the prior action were now
final because Steshenko had exhausted all avenues of appeal. The College District, its
board of trustees, and Duong stated that they did not oppose the lifting of the stay for the
limited purpose of addressing the prefiling order, whether Steshenko had complied with
it, and an order regarding Steshenko furnishing security.
3
Steshenko’s amended complaint was initially rejected for filing, but the trial
court later permitted it to be filed with a “backdated” filing date of May 2, 2022.
6
In reply, Steshenko reiterated that the prior prefiling order was not final at the time
he filed the instant action and therefore he did not have to comply with its requirements
when he filed the instant action.
On April 4, 2024, the trial court ordered the stay lifted for the limited purpose of
addressing the February 4, 2022 motion by the College District, its board of trustees, and
Duong which sought to have Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant, to have a prefiling
order issued, and to require Steshenko to furnish security. The court ordered the moving
defendants to file an amended notice of motion and indicated that they could file
supplemental papers to bring their motion up to date.
H. Amended Motion for Prefiling Order and to Require Security
On April 19, 2024, the College District, its board of trustees, and Duong filed an
amended notice of motion and an amended memorandum of points and authorities in
support in support of their motion for a prefiling order and for an order requiring
Steshenko to furnish security. They continued to contend that the action should be
dismissed unless or until Steshenko complied with the January 2021 prefiling order
issued in his prior civil action. To the extent a separate motion was required, they sought
to have Steshenko declared a vexatious litigant, to have him furnish security, and to have
him subject to a prefiling order. They also filed an amended declaration from counsel
and an amended request for judicial notice of several other cases, orders, or actions taken
by courts in other cases.
On May 14, 2024, Steshenko filed opposition to the motion for a prefiling order
and security. He contended that the moving defendants failed to establish that he was a
vexatious litigant within the meaning of section 391. Steshenko also argued that the
moving defendants failed to establish the requirements for an order requiring security.
He filed a request for judicial notice of several documents.
7
I. Continued Hearing and June 2024 Orders of Dismissal
The hearing on the motion for a prefiling order and security was originally set for
May 28, 2024. The trial court continued the hearing and requested that the parties submit
additional declarations and/or objections regarding the amount of security being
requested. Defense counsel provided a supplemental declaration. Steshenko objected to
the imposition of any security requirement, contended that he was “indigent,” and stated
that “he would not post any security, even if his pecuniary status would not be so
desperate.”
The continued hearing was held in June 2024. In written orders filed in June 2024
after the hearing, 4 the trial court first granted the moving parties’ request for judicial
notice in its entirety. The court also granted Steshenko’s request for judicial notice as to
all documents except one.
Second, the trial court determined that the January 2021 order in the prior action,
in which Steshenko was declared a vexatious litigant and subject to a prefiling order, was
prohibitory in nature. The court consequently found that the prefiling order in the prior
action was not stayed by Steshenko’s appeal in that earlier action. The court in the
instant action therefore determined that Steshenko was required to request leave before
filing the instant action. The court found that Steshenko did not receive approval from
the presiding judge before filing the instant action. The court also determined that the
presiding judge in a January 2024 order denied Steshenko’s request to file new litigation.
The court thus ordered the instant action “dismissed as to all named defendants.”
Third, the trial court found that even if the January 2021 order from the prior
action was not in effect, Steshenko was a vexatious litigant under section 391,
subdivision (b)(1) and (3).
4
The record reflects that the trial court signed an order dated June 13, 2024.
Thereafter, the trial court appears to have issued a duplicative order dated June 18, 2024,
which was filed on June 28, 2024.
8
Fourth, the trial court granted the moving defendants’ request for a prefiling order.
Fifth, the trial court determined that security was warranted and fixed the amount
at $20,000 total, based on $10,000 “for both moving defendant,” which the court
identified as “Foothill” and “Duong.” Observing that Steshenko “refuses to pay any
security,” the court dismissed the case.
Steshenko filed a notice of appeal regarding the June 2024 orders dismissing the
instant action.
II. DISCUSSION
Steshenko contends that the judgment of dismissal should be reversed and that his
case should be allowed to proceed on the merits. In making this contention, we
understand Steshenko to argue: (1) the trial court did not read the complaint or first
amended complaint; (2) the instant action was properly filed notwithstanding the
January 2021 prefiling order issued in Steshenko’s prior civil action; (3) the trial court in
the instant action erred in declaring Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant under
section 391, subdivision (b)(1) and (3); (4) the trial court erroneously required Steshenko
to furnish security in this action; (5) the trial court erred in issuing a new prefiling order
in this action; and (6) the court otherwise erred in dismissing the instant action. 5
We will first address the parties’ requests for judicial notice. We will then set
forth general legal principles regarding vexatious litigants and prefiling orders. For
reasons that we will explain, we find Steshenko’s failure to comply with the
January 2021 prefiling order dispositive in this case.
5
This court previously denied by order filed August 21, 2024, a motion by
Steshenko to transfer this appeal to another court. To the extent Steshenko in his opening
brief on appeal again requests that this appeal be transferred to another appellate court,
we deny his request.
9
A. Requests for Judicial Notice
1. Steshenko’s Request for Judicial Notice
We understand Steshenko to be requesting judicial notice of the following three
documents that were filed in the trial court but not included in the record on appeal:
(1) Steshenko’s May 2, 2022 application to the presiding judge to permit the instant case
to proceed in the trial court; (2) a May 2022 “Civil Filing Rejection Letter” from the
court clerk, rejecting Steshenko’s first amended complaint for filing; and (3) Steshenko’s
May 18, 2022 objection to the clerk’s rejection letter and request to file the first amended
complaint.
We will treat Steshenko’s request for judicial notice as a motion to augment. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) [record may be augmented with a “document
filed or lodged in the case in superior court”].) We grant the motion as to the first
document (May 2, 2022 application) and the third document (May 18, 2022 objection).
The second document, the May 2022 “Civil Filing Rejection Letter,” is already contained
in the record on appeal in volume 8 of the clerk’s transcript at page 2218. Consequently,
the motion to augment the record with this document is denied.
In sum, Steshenko’s request for judicial notice is granted as to the May 2, 2022
application and the May 18, 2022 objection, and the request for judicial notice is denied
as to the May 2022 “Civil Filing Rejection Letter.”
2. College’s Request for Judicial Notice
The College District, its board of trustees, and the individually named defendants
request judicial notice of seven documents. The parties requested judicial notice of most
of the same documents in the trial court, and the trial court granted those requests. As a
result, most of the documents that the College District, its board of trustees, and the
individually named defendants now seek judicial notice of are already contained in the
record on appeal. They fail to explain why judicial notice is necessary in this court for
any of the documents already contained in the record on appeal.
10
Regarding documents not contained in the record on appeal, “ ‘[r]eviewing courts
generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court’ absent
exceptional circumstances. [Citation.]” (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th
372, 379, fn. 2.) In this case, the College District, its board of trustees, and the
individually named defendants fail to articulate exceptional circumstances warranting
judicial notice of any document not already contained in the record on appeal. (See ibid.)
Accordingly, the request for judicial notice by the College District, its board of
trustees, and the individually named defendants is denied in its entirety.
B. General Legal Principles Regarding a Vexatious Litigant
“The vexatious litigant statutes [citations] are designed to curb misuse of the court
system by those persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedly litigating the same
issues through groundless actions, waste the time and resources of the court system and
other litigants. [Citation.]” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169 (Shalant).)
The vexatious litigant statutes provide various “ ‘means to counter misuse of the system
by vexatious litigants.’ ” (Id. at p. 1170.) Those means may include an order requiring
the plaintiff to furnish security and a prefiling order.
1. Order to Furnish Security
“[I]n pending litigation, ‘the defendant may move for an order requiring the
plaintiff to furnish security on the ground the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and has no
reasonable probability of prevailing against the moving defendant.’ [Citations.] If the
court finds in the defendant’s favor on these points, it orders the plaintiff to furnish
security in an amount fixed by the court. [Citation.] Failure to provide the security is
grounds for dismissal. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 1339, 1345; see §§ 391.1-391.4.)
2. Prefiling Order
A defendant may also move for a prefiling order, which “ ‘ “operates beyond the
pending case.” ’ ” (Shalant, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) A prefiling order “prohibits
11
a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria
persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the
court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.” (§ 391.7, subd. (a).)
Subdivision (b) of section 391.7 provides that “[t]he presiding justice or presiding
judge shall permit the filing of that litigation only if it appears that the litigation has merit
and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay.”
If the vexatious litigant does not first obtain permission for filing the litigation,
then its filing is prohibited. Specifically, subdivision (c) of section 391.7 states, “The
clerk may not file any litigation presented by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling
order unless the vexatious litigant first obtains an order from the presiding justice or
presiding judge permitting the filing.”
“If the clerk mistakenly files the litigation without the order, any party may file
with the clerk and serve, or the presiding justice or presiding judge may direct the clerk
to file and serve, on the plaintiff and other parties a notice stating that the plaintiff is a
vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order . . . . The filing of the notice shall
automatically stay the litigation. The litigation shall be automatically dismissed unless
the plaintiff within 10 days of the filing of that notice obtains an order from the presiding
justice or presiding judge permitting the filing of the litigation as set forth in
subdivision (b).” (§ 391.7, subd. (c).)
3. Enforceability of a Trial Court’s Prefiling Order While on Appeal
As a general rule, “the perfecting of an appeal stays [the] proceedings in the trial
court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or
affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order . . . .” (§ 916,
subd. (a).) As a result of this automatic stay, “[t]he trial court’s power to enforce, vacate
or modify an appealed judgment or order is suspended while the appeal is pending.
[Citations.]” (Elsea v. Saberi (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 625, 629.)
12
However, there are exceptions to the automatic stay. “It is well settled that an
injunction mandatory in character is automatically stayed on appeal and that a prohibitory
injunction is not so stayed [citations] . . . .” (Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Davis (1964)
228 Cal.App.2d 827, 834 (Paramount); accord Hayworth v. City of Oakland (1982)
129 Cal.App.3d 723, 728 (Hayworth).) A “prohibitive order seeks to restrain a party
from a course of conduct or to halt a particular condition. [Citation.]” (People v. Mobile
Magic Sales, Inc. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1, 13 (Mobile Magic Sales); accord, People ex
rel. Brown v. iMergent, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333, 342.) By contrast, “an
injunction is considered to be mandatory where it requires affirmative action and changes
the status quo. [Citation.]” (Hayworth, supra, at pp. 727-728.) “[T]he prefiling order
contemplated by section 391.7, subdivision (a) [concerning vexatious litigants] is an
injunction. It is, literally, an order requiring [the vexatious litigant] to refrain from doing
a particular act—filing any new litigation without certain permission.” (Luckett v. Panos
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 85, italics omitted (Luckett).)
C. Steshenko’s Failure to Comply with the January 2021 Prefiling Order and
the Denial of Permission for Him to File the Instant Action Required
Dismissal of the Instant Action
The January 2021 prefiling order issued in Steshenko’s prior civil action expressly
“prohibited” him “from filing any new litigation in the courts of California without
approval of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court in which the action is to
be filed.” The January 2021 prefiling order is prohibitory in nature because it restrains
Steshenko from changing the status quo by filing new litigation without permission. (See
Luckett, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 85; Mobile Magic Sales, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at
p. 13.) Consequently, the automatic stay that went into effect upon his appeal in that
prior action did not operate to stay the January 2021 prefiling order. (Paramount, supra,
228 Cal.App.2d at p. 834; Hayworth, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at p. 728.)
13
Since the January 2021 prefiling order was not automatically stayed, Steshenko
was prohibited by that order from filing the instant action in November 2021 without
permission. The trial court in the instant action found that (1) Steshenko did not receive
approval from the presiding judge before filing the instant action, and (2) Steshenko’s
subsequent request to file new litigation was denied by the presiding judge on January 16,
2024. The court thus ordered the instant case “dismissed as to all named defendants.”
Having filed the instant action without permission, the instant action was subject to
dismissal. (§ 391.7, subd. (c).) We therefore determine that the court did not err in
dismissing the instant action based on the January 2021 prefiling order.
We understand Steshenko to contend that the instant action was not filed in
violation of the prefiling order. He argues that the trial court, through the court clerk,
allowed the complaint and the first amended complaint to be filed. Steshenko contends
that “[t]his would not have been done if the case was filed improperly.”
We are not persuaded by Steshenko’s argument. Section 391.7, subdivision (c)
contemplates that a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order might cause new
litigation to be filed in violation of the prefiling order by failing to obtain permission
from the presiding judge. Such “mistakenly file[d]” litigation is still subject to dismissal
if the vexatious litigant fails to thereafter obtain an order from the presiding judge
permitting the filing of the litigation as set forth in subdivision (b) of section 391.7. (Id.,
subd. (c).) In this case, the trial court found that (1) Steshenko did not obtain permission
before filing the instant action and (2) he was denied permission when he finally
requested leave pursuant to section 391.7, subdivision (b) after the action was already
filed. (See id., subds. (b) & (c).) Under these circumstances, the court did not err in
dismissing Steshenko’s action. (Id., subd. (c).)
D. June 2024 Order Requiring Steshenko to Furnish Security
As we have just explained, the instant action was properly dismissed by the trial
court based on the prior January 2021 vexatious litigant finding and prefiling order. In
14
view of this conclusion, the issue of whether the trial court’s alternative ground for
dismissing the action was proper—that is, the June 2024 order requiring Steshenko to
furnish security and his failure to furnish such security—is moot.
E. June 2024 Vexatious Litigant Finding and Prefiling Order
In June 2024, the trial court in the instant action made a new finding that
Steshenko is a vexatious litigant and issued a new prefiling order. As Steshenko was
already subject to the January 2021 prefiling order and did not obtain permission to file
the instant action, the instant action should not have been filed. (§ 391.7, subds. (a)-(c).)
After the instant action was filed (despite the January 2021 prefiling order), the action
should have been automatically stayed upon the College District filing a notice of
prefiling order on December 8, 2021. (§ 391.7, subd. (c).) Thereafter, the instant action
should have been automatically dismissed in December 2021 based on Steshenko’s
failure to obtain permission to file the litigation within 10 days of the filing of the notice.
(Ibid.)
Under these circumstances, we will strike the June 2024 orders in the instant case
(1) finding Steshenko is a vexatious litigant and (2) requiring Steshenko to obtain leave
before filing new litigation. Although we are striking these orders issued in the instant
case, Steshenko continues to be designated as a vexatious litigant and continues to be
subject to a prefiling order pursuant to the January 2021 orders issued in his prior action,
Steshenko v. Foothill-De Anza Community College District et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County, 2019, No. 19CV360490).
III. DISPOSITION
The June 2024 orders declaring Steshenko to be a vexatious litigant and requiring
him to obtain leave before filing new litigation (prefiling order) are hereby stricken. As
so modified, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs
on appeal. This disposition leaves intact and does not change the January 2021 orders
issued in Steshenko’s prior litigation, Steshenko v. Foothill-De Anza Community College
15
District et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, 2019, No. 19CV360490), in which
Steshenko was declared to be a vexatious litigant and subject to a prefiling order.
16
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Grover, J.
______________________________________
Rodriguez, J.*
H052324
Steshenko v. Board of Trustees of Foothill-De Anza Community College District et al.
_____________
* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Trial Court: Santa Clara County
Superior Court No.: 21CV391490
Trial Judges: The Honorable William J. Monahan
The Honorable Socrates Peter Manoukian
The Honorable Drew C. Takaichi
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant In pro per
GREGORY STESHENKO:
Attorneys for Defendants and Roy A. Combs
Respondents David R. Mishook
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF Alia El Radi
FOOTHILL-DE ANZA Katherine Yoshida
COMMUNITY COLLEGE Fagen Friedman and Fulfrost, LLP
DISTRICT, FOOTHILL-DE ANZA
COMMUNITY COLLEGE
DISTRICT, PATRICK J. AHRENS,
LAURA CASAS, PEARL CHENG,
PETER LANDSBERGER, GILBERT
WONG, and SHINNY DUONG:
H052324
Steshenko v. Board of Trustees of Foothill-De Anza Community College District et al.