East Gate Logistics Park Chicago Llc V Centerpoint Properties Trust
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813
EAST GATE-LOGISTICS PARK CHICAGO, LLC, and NORTHPOINT
DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees,
v.
CENTERPOINT PROPERTIES TRUST; CENTERPOINT JOLIET
TERMINAL RAILROAD, LLC; and HOUBOLT ROAD EXTENSION JV,
LLC,
Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 24 C 3742 — LaShonda A. Hunt, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED FEBRUARY 10, 2025 — DECIDED JULY 21, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This suit arises from compet-
ing development projects affecting terminals in Elwood and
Joliet, Illinois (the “Joliet Intermodal Zone”). In December
2016 one of the developers, CenterPoint Properties Trust, en-
tered a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the Illinois
2 Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813
Department of Transportation, Will County, and the City of
Joliet. Under this contract CenterPoint Properties Trust would
construct a bridge over the Des Plaines River, connecting the
Joliet Intermodal Zone to nearby highways. In exchange Cen-
terPoint Properties Trust would be allowed to collect a toll
from those crossing the bridge. Section XII.B(3) of the contract
provides that the County and City will “take no steps or ac-
tions to … eliminate trucking restrictions, weight limits, or
other similar regulations on roads that enter or exit [portions
of the Joliet Intermodal Zone]”.
Around the same time NorthPoint Development, LLC
(and, later, East Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC) began
work on a project for warehouse development. In December
2021 East Gate and Joliet executed their own deal, the “Annex-
ation and Development Agreement.” In it Joliet agreed to al-
low heavy tractor-trailers access to the Intermodal Zone along
a road where trucks of such weight normally were prohibited.
See Joliet Ordinance §19-21.
Believing that this would allow vehicles to bypass the toll
bridge and so violate the Memorandum of Understanding,
CenterPoint Properties Trust, CenterPoint Joliet Terminal
Railroad, LLC, and Houbolt Road Extension JV, LLC (the
“CenterPoint parties”) sued Joliet in state court and named
East Gate as an interested party. They asked the judge to en-
join the Annexation and Development Agreement. The Will
County Court initially denied relief but, on remand from the
Illinois Appellate Court, 2023 IL App (3d) 220433-U, enjoined
those parts of the Annexation and Development Agreement
that allow heavy truck access on the new roadway. See
Houbolt Road Extension JV, LLC v. City of Joliet, No. 22 MR 138
(Will County Cir. Ct. March 19, 2024). Further briefing has
Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813 3
been ordered, and discovery is ongoing. The state court has
yet to rule on the merits of the dispute. (The state judge called
the decision a temporary restraining order, but it has lasted
so long that it is effectively a preliminary injunction.)
Soon after the state court issued the preliminary injunc-
tion, East Gate and NorthPoint (the “East Gate parties”)
brought suit in federal court. They contend that the Memo-
randum of Understanding violates federal antitrust law by
granting the CenterPoint parties the ability to prevent com-
petitors from accessing warehouses in the Intermodal Zone.
The CenterPoint parties raised three arguments in opposition.
First they asserted that the district court lacks subject-maker
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The antitrust case,
they contended, functions as a federal appeal of the state
court’s injunction, which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine pre-
vents. Second they argued that, even if jurisdiction exists, the
district court ought to abstain under the Colorado River doc-
trine. See Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Third they asserted that, if the mer-
its of the argument were to be reached, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, which shields parties from antitrust liability for ad-
vocacy before government agencies, warrants a dismissal un-
der Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Eastern R.R. Presidents Confer-
ence v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
The district court rejected the Rooker-Feldman argument
and dismissed the 12(b)(6) motion without reaching the mer-
its. But it stayed the federal proceedings, ostensibly on Colo-
rado River grounds. 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171146 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
4 Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813
23, 2024). The East Gate parties appealed the stay order, while
the CenterPoint parties cross-appealed the rejection of the
Rooker-Feldman and Noerr-Pennington motions. In their initial
briefing both parties asserted that we have appellate jurisdic-
tion. After oral argument, we requested additional briefing on
jurisdiction. The East Gate parties maintain that appellate ju-
risdiction exists, while the CenterPoint parties have reversed
course, now asserting the opposite. We start and end our de-
cision with appellate jurisdiction.
The parties agree that a stay of judicial proceedings is not
normally appealable. It is not final under 28 U.S.C. §1291, and
does not fit under the exceptions in 28 U.S.C. §1292. Yet the
East Gate parties contend that we have jurisdiction because
the district judge employed the language of Colorado River.
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), holds
that a district court’s decision to abstain under the Colorado
River doctrine works like a dismissal in disguise, which makes
it appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. §1291. Cf. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983) (discussing circumstances under which stays of
judicial proceedings are effectively final). See also, e.g.,
Loughran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2 F.4th 640, 645–46 (7th Cir.
2021); R.C. Wegman Construction Co. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,
687 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 2012).
The headwater of this stream of reasoning can be found in
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962),
which first endorsed the “effectively out of court” approach
in the abstention context. There the district court refused to
empanel a three-judge court to assess the constitutionality of
a state law, instead abstaining under the doctrine established
in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813 5
Moses H. Cone and Quackenbush broadened this approach to
additional abstention orders when the stay or dismissal places
one “effectively out of federal court.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S.
at 9 n.8. The Court also limited this understanding of finality
“to cases where … the object of the stay is to require all or an
essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state fo-
rum.” Id. at 10 n.11. See also Loughran, 2 F.4th at 646; SwiQer-
land Cheese Association v. E. Horne’s Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25
(1966) (finding an order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment not appealable under 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) because it
was an order that “in no way touch[ed] on the merits” and
“only relate[d] to pretrial procedures”).
The collateral order doctrine also can provide appellate ju-
risdiction in abstention cases. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at
713–14; Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 11–13. An interlocutory or-
der is appealable under this doctrine if it “determine[s] the
disputed question, resolve[s] an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and [would] be effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Moses
H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 11–12 (cleaned up); see also Cohen v. Ben-
eficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Out of concern
that judicial expansion of this exception would swallow the
rule that appeal must wait until the district court’s resolution
of the whole case, however, the Court insists that the doctrine
be used “narrow[ly] and selective[ly]”. Mohawk Industries, Inc.
v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009).
Moses H. Cone and Quackenbush provide examples of ap-
pealable abstention orders. In Moses H. Cone the suit dealt
with the arbitrability of a contract, and the district court en-
tered a stay to allow the state court to resolve that precise
question. In Quackenbush the district court remanded, in its
6 Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813
entirety, a complex series of tort and contract claims in an in-
surance insolvency maker. The Supreme Court found that
these litigants were placed “effectively out of [federal] court”,
because the district courts “surrender[ed] jurisdiction” of the
makers to state courts. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 713–14; Moses
H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10.
By contrast, the order in this case does not put anyone “ef-
fectively out of [federal] court”. Nor did the district court
“surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court” in “all
or an essential part of the federal suit”. The federal antitrust
claims fall within exclusive federal jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4,
15(a); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470
U.S. 373, 379–80 (1985). The state court will not resolve them.
The district judge herself will do so once the state court has
resolved the contract disputes. The East Gate parties have
acknowledged throughout briefing that “the state action can-
not resolve all Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims” regardless of
the outcome. If the state court finds that section XII.B(3) of the
Memorandum of Understanding is enforceable under state
law, “none of the Plaintiffs’ [antitrust] claims will be re-
solved.” If, on the other hand, the state court refuses to en-
force section XII.B(3) or holds that it has not been violated,
some of the East Gate parties’ claims of ongoing antitrust vio-
lations might be affected but claims for damages would re-
main.
Whatever decision the state court reaches will not have a
preclusive effect because antitrust questions are not at issue
in state court. No maker what the state court decides about
the effect of section XII.B(3), the entirety of the antitrust anal-
ysis remains for the federal court to handle. See also Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11 (“We do not hold that an order
Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813 7
becomes final merely because it may have the practical effect
of allowing a state court to be the first to rule on a common
issue.”). Instead allowing the state court to go first will make
the analysis of the federal issues more accurate, for the district
court would know what parts of the Memorandum of Under-
standing are enforceable. This makes it hard to say that the
district court “surrender[ed] jurisdiction”. It also sufficiently
distinguishes the facts here from Loughran, 2 F.4th at 646,
where we found that a Colorado River abstention order was ap-
pealable even though some “residual” makers might come
back to the federal court. Here we can confidently say that the
remaining questions the district court will engage with would
not be “residual” but rather the core of the dispute.
The collateral order doctrine likewise does not provide ju-
risdiction. Cohen requires that the interlocutory order “resolve
an important issue”. The only maker resolved is one of tim-
ing—whether the district court will wait for the state court to
resolve a question of state law. Appeal therefore must wait
until the federal antitrust issue has been finally resolved. See
also Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (“the chance that the litigation at
hand might be speeded … does not provide a basis for juris-
diction”) (cleaned up); Grace v. Vannoy, 826 F.3d 813 (5th Cir.
2016).
The district court’s reference to Colorado River was unfor-
tunate (perhaps spurred by the fact that both parties invoked
that case). Colorado River arose from parallel state and federal
litigation about water rights. The United States asked a fed-
eral court to issue a declaratory judgment about its water
rights. The district court abstained in favor of a comprehen-
sive water-management proceeding under way in state court.
The Justices held that abstention can be appropriate in such a
8 Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813
zero-sum game, for conflicting decrees about disposition of
the same water would be untenable. Only the state court
could resolve the rights of all parties—and in allocating water,
as in other kinds of in rem proceedings, the ability to bind all
parties is essential. The Court drew parallels to historical
practices in property cases where the first court to exercise ju-
risdiction over the property at issue maintains jurisdiction to
the exclusion of other courts. This result avoids duplicative
litigation over a limited resource. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at
818. And that is also why a genuine Colorado River order is ap-
pealable, as it effectively ends the federal case.
The dispute between the East Gate and CenterPoint par-
ties does not entail a zero-sum game. The district court’s stay
is just a step in case management. The judge believed that it
would be helpful to know how state law handles a state-law
issue that affects the antitrust claim. While the parties might
prefer a different sequence of decision, an order affecting liti-
gation’s timing is not appealable under §1291. See also CroVy
v. City of Chicago Heights, 857 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1988). Conse-
quently, we lack appellate jurisdiction over the appeal.
R.C. Wegman supports our understanding. There the dis-
trict judge orally granted a stay in an insurance dispute be-
cause a state court suit involving the same insurance claim
(but a different defendant) was ongoing. The federal judge
likely hoped that resolution of state law issues would smooth
the path in the federal case. This court dismissed the immedi-
ate appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding the stay to be simply
a maker of timing, not a dismissal disguised as a stay. 687 F.3d
at 365. Accord Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Duree, 375 F.3d 618,
622 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that a district court’s dismissal or-
der that was based in part on waiting for state court resolution
Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813 9
of a related maker functions like a stay and was not appeala-
ble).
The fact that the judge’s stay cited Colorado River does not
maker to jurisdiction. Cases such as Quackenbush tell us that
jurisdiction depends on what the order does and not what
name the district judge applied. Because, as we have empha-
sized, the federal antitrust issues will be decided in federal
court no maker what happens in state court, nothing has been
finally resolved and an appeal is premature. See also CroVy,
857 F.2d at 1174.
The parties do not explain how the cross-appeal might
grant us jurisdiction. We nonetheless address the question
ourselves. See Buchel-Ruegsegger v. Buchel, 576 F.3d 451, 453
(7th Cir. 2009); Villa v. Barr, 924 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 2019).
The Rooker-Feldman and Noerr-Pennington motions were
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Interlocutory orders,
including denials of motions to dismiss, are not ordinarily ap-
pealable under 28 U.S.C. §1291. See Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S.
729, 733–34 (2023); Beathard v. Lyons, 129 F.4th 1027, 1032 (7th
Cir. 2025). We do not see any reason to depart from that norm,
given that all arguments can be reviewed on appeal after a
final decision (if they still maker by then).
The appeals are dismissed for want of jurisdiction.