Williams V Huner
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN WILLIAMS, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-0928
:
BRITTANY HUNER, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
GOLDBERG, J. JULY 22, 2025
Plaintiff John Williams, a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at SCI Phoenix, filed
a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of his
constitutional rights arising from alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Currently before the Court are Williams’s Complaint (“Compl.” (ECF No. 1)), his Motion for
Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 4), and his Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement.
(ECF No. 5.) Williams asserts claims against the following SCI Phoenix employees: Correctional
Health Care Administrator Brittany Huner, Health Care Providers Jane Does 1 and 2, Facility
Grievance Coordinator Gina Orlando, Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services Charles
Hensley, and Superintendent Joseph Terra. (Compl. at 2-4.) He also asserts claims against Chief
Grievance Officer Dorina Varner and Assistant Chief Grievance Officer Keri Moore, who are
alleged to be employees of the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances & Appeals, and Bureau of
Health Care Services employee John or Jane Doe 3. (Id. at 4.) Williams asserts his claims against
the Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 2-4.) For the following reasons,
the Court will grant Williams leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Williams’s constitutional claims
and his derivative supervisory liability claims, his claims asserted under Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (“ADA”), his claims against Defendants
Orlando, Hensley, Terra, Varner, Moore, and Doe 3 based on their participation in the grievance
process, his request for declaratory and injunctive relief, and his official capacity claims will be
dismissed with prejudice. Williams’s state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, but without leave to amend.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
The gravamen of Williams’s claim is that he requested and was denied rigid braces for his
neck and wrists to relieve pain associated with damaged cervical vertebrae and Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome, respectively, and to prevent further injury. Williams alleges that he arrived at SCI
Camp Hill on July 22, 2019. (Compl. at 12.) Upon arrival, he underwent an intake screening,
diagnostic, and classification process required of all newly committed state prisoners. (Id.) During
this process, Williams advised medical staff that in June 2017, following an examination, he was
diagnosed with damaged cervical vertebrae and spinal cord nerve impingement in his neck, and
chronic, bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and arthritis in his fingers, hands, and wrists. (Id.) He
advised medical personnel that he had been receiving treatment for these conditions, and that these
conditions rendered him disabled in that he suffered from a limited range of motion and debilitating
pain that prevented him from reclining comfortably and also impeded his ability to perform daily
1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Williams’s Complaint (ECF
No. 1). The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system. Where
appropriate, grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors in Williams’s pleading will be corrected
for clarity. Williams includes the following Exhibits with his Complaint: a completed grievance
form, an Initial Review Response, a completed Inmate Appeal to Facility Manager Grievance, a
Facility Manager’s Appeal Response, a completed Inmate Appeal to Final Review Grievance, a
Grievance Referral Notice, and a Final Appeal Decision. (Compl. at 37-44.)
functions such as hand writing notes or legal documents, gripping or holding objects, lifting or
carrying objects, handwashing his clothing, attending to his personal hygiene, using power tools,
or engaging in any repetitive use of his hands, arms, shoulders, neck and head. (Id. at 12-13.) He
further advised prison medical personnel that before his incarceration an outside physician had
prescribed an adjustable rigid composite-plastic neck brace and rigid composite-plastic wrist
guards, and instructed him to wear these devices as much as possible to immobilize and support
his injured neck and wrists. (Id. at 13.) Additionally, Williams advised the SCI Camp Hill staff
that he had been prescribed Vicodin for pain relief and Valium to help him sleep. (Id.) Despite
these prescriptions, unidentified medical personnel told Williams he would not be provided with
the neck or wrist braces or the Vicodin or Valium as long as he was a Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) inmate. (Id.)
Between October 2019 and June 2023, Williams experienced a steady increase in the
severity of his pain and physical incapacitation. (Id. at 13.) During this period, he also fell out of
his top bunk because of PTSD-related night terrors, further injuring his neck and wrists. (Id.)
Williams requested that medical staff provide him with neck and wrist braces similar to those
which had been previously prescribed to him. (Id.) He also requested medication to ease his pain.
(Id.) However, he was consistently told by unidentified personnel that he would not be provided
with rigid neck or wrist braces, and that only Ibuprofen or Naproxen would be provided for pain
relief. (Id. at 14.) On June 30, 2023, Williams filed an ADA disability accommodation request
with Defendant Huner, requesting that the DOC provide him with a rigid neck brace and wrist
braces similar to those he had been prescribed in the past, and pain medication more effective than
Ibuprofen or Naproxen. (Id.) Following Huner’s receipt of the request, Williams was interviewed
by Huner and Jane Does 1 and 2. (Id.) During the interview, Williams described his diagnoses,
the pain associated with his conditions, and the type of rigid braces that had been prescribed in the
past, and also explained that the Ibuprofen and Naproxen he had been prescribed by DOC health
care providers were completely ineffective for relieving his pain. (Id.) Williams was informed
that Huner and Jane Does 1 and 2 had obtained his treatment records and were reviewing them for
the purpose of making a decision regarding Williams’s ADA disability accommodation request.
(Id.) However, they continued to refuse to provide any pain medication other than Ibuprofen or
Naproxen. (Id. at 14-15.)
On November 20, 2023, Huner advised Williams that his ADA accommodation request
had been approved and issued him a cervical collar and wrist braces. (Id. at 15.) However, rather
than the rigid braces he requested and had been previously prescribed, Williams received a soft,
foam-like collar and fabric, Velcro-closure wrist braces from which the rigid inserts had been
removed. (Id.) Williams complained that these neck and wrist braces did not properly immobilize
his neck and wrists and therefore would not relieve pain or prevent further injury. (Id.) Huner
responded that the rigid plastic neck brace and rigid inserts for the wrist braces were not allowed
for security reasons. (Id.)
On November 25, 2023, Williams filed a grievance with Defendant Orlando asserting that
the medical devices provided to him were worthless because they did not immobilize his neck and
wrists enough to relieve his pain or prevent further injury. (Id. at 16.) He also asserted that other
inmates had been issued medical devices that included rigid plastic and metal materials. (Id.)
Finally, he asserted that Huner, the SCI Phoenix medical department, and the DOC were
circumventing the requirements of the ADA and violating his rights as a disabled person by
refusing to provide him with adequate medical devices. (Id.) On December 22, 2023, Williams
received a response to his grievance prepared by Defendants Orlando and Hensley which denied
his grievance on the ground that metal and hard plastic were not permissible in a correctional
setting, and that the devices issued to Williams provided appropriate support. (Id.) Williams
alleges that the response to his grievance was “baseless, specious, and unfair” because medical
devices including rigid plastic and metal are routinely provided to inmates at SCI Phoenix, and the
devices issued to Williams provided inadequate support, were not the same as the ones prescribed
to him before he was incarcerated, and did not provide adequate pain relief or protection from
further injury. (Id. at 17.)
On January 5, 2024, Williams appealed the initial denial of his grievance to Defendant
Terra, asserting that (1) he had specifically advised Huner and Does 1 and 2 that the rigid braces
prescribed by his outside physician were necessary to relieve his pain and prevent further injury;
(2) Huner and Does 1 and 2 had reviewed his medical records and were aware that he had been
previously prescribed rigid braces and why; and (3) failure to ensure that Williams was provided
with rigid braces would result in the worsening of his pain and possible further, irreparable injury
to his neck and wrists. (Id.) On January 24, 2024, Terra denied Williams’s appeal and approved
Orlando and Hensley’s denial of his initial grievance on the grounds that rigid braces were not
permissible, and the braces issued to Williams provided adequate support. (Id. at 18.) Williams
alleges that Terra’s response was “baseless, specious, and unfair,” because medical devices
including rigid plastic and metal are routinely provided to inmates at SCI Phoenix, and the devices
issued to Williams provided inadequate support, were not the same as the ones prescribed before
Williams was incarcerated, and did not provide adequate pain relief or protection from further
injury. (Id.)
On February 8, 2024. Williams filed a final grievance appeal of Orlando and Hensley’s
initial review response and Terra’s appeal response with the DOC Secretary’s Office of Inmate
Grievance Appeals, arguing that (1) the medical department routinely issued medical devices
constructed of rigid materials, such as wheelchairs, crutches, leg braces, walking boots, and
eyeglasses, to inmates, and the neck and wrist braces Williams requested posed much less of a
safety threat than those items; (2) Huner and Does 1 and 2 were not trained and licensed physicians
and their lay opinions as to the adequacy of the braces issued to Williams were not based on
medical science but on their unwillingness to provide Williams with adequate medical care; and
(3) Williams’s medical treatment should not be conditioned on the hypothetical risk posed by the
devices he had been previously prescribed. (Id. at 19.) On March 29, 2024, Varner and Moore
served Williams notice that his appeal had been referred to the DOC Bureau of Health Care
Services. (Id.) On June 24, 2024, Moore, Varner, and Doe 3 returned a final appeal response to
Williams that upheld Orlando and Hensley’s initial review and Terra’s denial of his appeal on the
grounds that, inter alia, the medical care provided to Williams was reasonable and appropriate,
and Huner and Does 1 and 2 had not engaged in wrongdoing. (Id. at 19-20.) Williams alleges that
the final appeal response provided by Moore, Varner, and Doe 3 contradicted the treatment
provided by his physician prior to his incarceration though that plan had not been contraindicated
based on any medical examination or diagnostic tests performed on Williams during his
incarceration, and that it ignored the fact that other inmates were issued devices with metal and
rigid plastic parts, including the identical neck brace that Williams had requested. (Id. at 20.)
Williams further alleges he has not been examined by a health care provider while in the
custody of the DOC and has not undergone any diagnostic testing. (Id.) He claims that as a result,
the decisions rendered by the Defendants with respect to the type of neck and wrist braces to be
provided to him were not based on medical science, but instead were based on the cost or
inconvenience of ordering the correct devices, or on the Defendants’ personal prejudices against
confined and indigent state prisoners, and their unwillingness to provide medical care similar to
that which was available to Williams before he became incarcerated. (Id. at 20-21.)
Williams alleges that as a result of the Defendants’ conduct, he has experienced increased
pain and disability, inability to sleep comfortably, headaches, and limited range of motion which
impacts his ability to perform day-to-day tasks. (Id. at 21-22.) He has also experienced anxiety
over the prospect of becoming permanently crippled, as well as associated psychological distress.
(Id. at 22.) Williams asserts First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims,2 a claim under Title
II of the ADA, and related state law claims. (Id. at 22-24.) As relief, Williams requests a
declaratory judgment,3 injunctive relief,4 and money damages. (Id. at 24-25.)
2 The Court understands Williams’s Fourteenth Amendment claim to be based on the Defendants’
alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (See, e.g., Compl. at 23, Claim I.)
Although the standards under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment for claims
related to a prisoner’s medical needs is essentially the same for purposes of analysis, see Parkell
v. Morgan, 682 F. App’x 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam); see also Moore v. Luffey, No. 18-
1716, 2019 WL 1766047, at *3 n.2 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2019) (declining to address whether a new
standard applies to claims raised by pretrial detainees based on issues related to medical care),
because it appears that Williams was a convicted prisoner at the time of the events in question, the
Eighth Amendment governs his claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005).
Because the Complaint includes no facts that could support a plausible Fourteenth Amendment
claim not based on alleged indifference to serious medical needs, Williams’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
3 Williams seeks a declaration that the Defendants’ conduct violated his rights. (Compl. at 24.)
However, declaratory relief is unavailable to adjudicate past conduct, so Williams’s request for
declaratory relief is improper. See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not
“meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-
3574, 2021 WL 1191628, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is
available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no
threat of continuing harm.”); Andela v. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir.
2014) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgments are meant to define the legal rights and obligations
of the parties in the anticipation of some future conduct.”). For these reasons, Williams’s request
for declaratory relief will be denied with prejudice.
4 Williams requests a mandatory injunction requiring the Defendants to provide him with rigid,
composite-plastic neck brace and wrist splints similar to those prescribed to him before he became
incarcerated, pain medication similar to Vicodin, and medical care from a physician specializing
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Williams leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that
he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.5 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether
a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the
complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v.
Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will
accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient
to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation
on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024).
Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Williams is proceeding pro se,
the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
in the treatment of the conditions with which Williams has been diagnosed. (Compl. at 25.)
Issuance of an injunction is an extraordinary remedy, granted only when a plaintiff faces
irreparable injury. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982). In keeping
with the general reluctance of any court to exercise its discretion in the absence of a compelling
need for extraordinary relief, a plaintiff must allege a real danger that the act complained of will
actually take place. An “injunction issues to prevent existing or presently threatened injuries. One
will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in
the future.” Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931). In light of the Court’s
dismissal of Williams’s constitutional, ADA, and state law claims, his request for injunctive relief,
too, will be dismissed. He may include this claim in an amended complaint if he can assert
allegations as described herein.
5 Because Williams is a prisoner, the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that he pay the full
filing fee in installments regardless of the outcome of this case.
(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). Additionally, the
Court must review the pleadings and dismiss the matter if it determines, inter alia, that the action
fails to set forth a proper basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)
(“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.”); Group Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6
(3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”).
III. DISCUSSION
Williams asserts claims based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The vehicle
by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be
liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d
366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020).
A. Official Capacity Claims
Williams seeks recovery of money damages against the Defendants in their official
capacities. All of the Defendants are identified as employees of the Pennsylvania DOC. The
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek monetary
damages. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); A.W. v.
Jersey City Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). Suits against state officials acting in
their official capacities are really suits against the employing government agency, and as such, are
also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A.W., 341 F.3d at 238; see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 25 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). As the
Commonwealth has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits filed in federal
court, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521-22, it and its departments, as well as their officials sued in
their official capacities, are immune from suits filed in federal court.
However, Williams may pursue his claims for money damages against state officials sued
in their individual capacities, because state officials sued in their individual capacities are
“persons” within the meaning of § 1983, see Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31, and the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar suits for monetary damages brought under § 1983 against state officials in their
individual capacities. Id. Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment does not generally bar
prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985)
(explaining that “official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against
the State”); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (holding that “a federal court’s
remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective
injunctive relief.”); O’Callaghan v. Hon. X, 661 F. App’x 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2016). Thus, while
Williams may pursue prospective injunctive relief on an official capacity claim against state
employees, he may not pursue money damages on those claims. Accordingly, his official capacity
claims, to the extent he seeks money damages, must be dismissed with prejudice. His official
capacity claims seeking prospective injunctive relief will also be dismissed with prejudice in light
of the dismissal of his constitutional and ADA claims, discussed below.
B. Claims Based on Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
Williams asserts Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against all of the named
Defendants, yet none of the Defendants, other than Jane Does 1 and 2, is alleged to have been a
medical professional from whom Williams sought treatment. Additionally, other than Huner, who
allegedly refused to provide Williams with the types of hard braces he desired, most of the
Defendants are alleged to have done no more than participate in the grievance process after
Williams was issued soft neck and wrist braces, but was denied the particular rigid neck and wrist
braces he had been prescribed before he was incarcerated. These circumstances provide bases for
dismissal of the claims Williams asserts against these Defendants, as discussed later. His Eighth
Amendment claims, even if they were asserted against individuals personally involved in his care,
are not plausible as pled.
A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “A medical need is serious, . . . if
it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious
that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty.
Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations
omitted). Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a
prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary
medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed
or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A
serious medical need exists where “failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and
unnecessary suffering.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).
Inadequate medical care rises to the Eighth Amendment level only when a plaintiff can
show both a serious medical need and acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, (1976). Not every complaint of
inadequate prison medical care rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Anderson v. Price, No.
22-3058, 2023 WL 5814664, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023) (per curiam). “Where a prisoner is
receiving some amount of medical treatment, [courts] presume that the treatment is adequate
absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.” Id. (affirming dismissal of
deliberate indifference claims on screening) (citing Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d
274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Hayes v. Gilmore, 802 F. App’x 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (“Where a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment, it is difficult to
establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded considerable latitude in the
diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.”); Davis v. Superintendent Somerset SCI, 597 F. App’x 42,
45 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over
the adequacy of the treatment, ‘federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical
judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.’”) (per curiam) (quoting
United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979)). Additionally,
“if a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . , a non-medical prison official will generally
be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
236 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Carter v. Smith, 483 F. App’x 705, 708 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(“Prison officials cannot be held to be deliberately indifferent merely because they did not respond
to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison medical
staff.”).
Williams alleges that prior to his incarceration, he was diagnosed with damaged cervical
vertebrae and spinal cord nerve impingement in his neck, and chronic, bilateral Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome and arthritis in his fingers, hands, and wrists, for which he was prescribed rigid neck
and wrist braces. (Compl. at 12.) Upon arriving at SCI Camp Hill, he advised personnel of his
diagnosis and treatment, but was not issued any braces. Years later, at SCI Phoenix, Williams
sought braces as an ADA accommodation. While he was successful in obtaining an
accommodation, the braces he was issued were soft, and Defendant Huner explained that the rigid
plastic neck brace and rigid inserts for the wrist braces were not allowed for security reasons.
(Compl. at 15.) Despite efforts to reverse this decision through the grievance process, Williams
was not issued rigid braces, notwithstanding his claims that the soft braces are inadequate to relieve
his pain and protect his joints. Williams’s claim, as pled, is based on the adequacy of the care he
has been receiving, not on a denial of care. As such, he has not stated a plausible claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Davis, 597 F. App’x. at 45.
Additionally, as noted, Williams was told that the braces he wanted were not permitted for
security reasons. Based on this expressed concern for institutional security, Williams has failed to
establish a claim of deliberate indifference for the refusal to provide him with rigid braces. See
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986) (holding that prison officials should be accorded
wide ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies necessary to preserve internal
order and maintain institutional security); Lerma v. Bell, 2 F. App'x 782, 784 (9th Cir.2001)
(affirming district court grant of summary judgment to defendants who confiscated the plaintiff's
elastic knee brace for legitimate safety concerns); Estien v. Showalter, No. 13-2474, 2014 WL
4916333, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss where inmate failed to
establish a claim of deliberate indifference based on medical personnel’s failure to provide him
with a thumb brace, citing safety concerns). In light of the nature of the deficiencies in Williams’s
Eighth Amendment claim, amendment would be futile, and, therefore, his Eighth Amendment
claims will be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2000).
C. Supervisory Liability Claim
Williams asserts that Defendants Orlando, Hensley, Terra, Moore, Varner, and Doe 3,
“failed to adequately supervise, and explicitly ratified” the conduct of Defendants Huner and Does
1 and 2. (See Compl.) Other than this conclusory allegation that cannot state a plausible claim,
see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, the only allegations as to these Defendants describe their participation
in the grievance process; they are not alleged to have otherwise participated in decisions regarding
Williams’s medical care and the absence of factual allegations describing their personal
involvement in the alleged denial of his constitutional rights renders these claims not plausible.
See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Moreover, to the extent Williams seeks to assert claims against these
Defendants based on the conduct of other SCI Phoenix employees, he cannot do so, because
liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis. Chavarriaga, v. New
Jersey Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022
WL 17248100, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 28, 2023) (per curiam). Generalized allegations that a
supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are insufficient to
allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F.
App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants were ‘in charge of
agencies that allowed this to happen,’ and that liability stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief’
that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be held liable ‘simply because
of his position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d
Cir. 2005)). Rather, “[s]uits against high-level government officials must satisfy the general
requirements for supervisory liability.” Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017).
There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for
unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307,
316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a
supervisor may be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id.
(quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)
(alteration in original)). “Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she
participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in
charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.”
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227. Additionally, a supervisory claim requires “a showing that there
was an actual constitutional violation at the hands of subordinates” before finding liability on the
part of the supervisory prison official. Allen v. Eckard, 804 F. App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (concluding that failure to train and supervise claims asserted against supervisor
defendants were meritless where the plaintiff failed to make a plausible showing of an underlying
constitutional violation). Because Williams has not stated a plausible underlying claim, the
derivative claims based on the Defendants’ alleged supervisory positions must also be dismissed
with prejudice.
D. Claims Based on Grievances
Williams asserts claims against Orlando, Hensley, Terra, Varner, Moore, and Doe 3 based
upon their participation in the grievance process following Huner and Does 1 and 2’s refusal to
issue him rigid neck and wrist braces in connection with his successful request for an ADA
accommodation. (See Compl., generally and Claim 2) These claims are not plausible because in
general, “[m]erely responding to or reviewing an inmate grievance does not rise to the level of
personal involvement necessary to allege an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.”
Tenon v. Dreibelbis, 606 F. App’x 681, 688 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Curtis v. Wetzel, 763 F.
App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“The District Court properly determined that
Defendants Wenerowicz, Lewis, and Shaylor – who participated only in the denial of Curtis’
grievances – lacked the requisite personal involvement [in the conduct at issue].”); Folk v. Prime
Care Med., 741 F. App’x 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Although some of these defendants
were apparently involved in responding to some of Folk's prison grievances, there are no
allegations linking them to the underlying incidents and thus no basis for liability based on those
later grievance reviews.”); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(defendants’ alleged inappropriate responses to plaintiff’s “later-filed grievances” were
insufficient to establish those defendants’ personal involvement in underlying wrongs).
Additionally, claims based on the handling of prison grievances fail because “prisoners do
not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures.” Gerholt v. Wetzel, 858 F. App’x
32, 34 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001)
and Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)). Accordingly, claims such as
those raised by Williams predicated on failures of the grievance process or improper handling of
or response to grievances do not give rise to a constitutional claim. See Woods v. First Corr. Med.
Inc., 446 F. App’x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“We agree with the District Court that
because a prisoner has no free-standing constitutional right to an effective grievance process,
Woods cannot maintain a constitutional claim against Lucas based upon his perception that
she ignored and/or failed to properly investigate his grievances.” (internal citation omitted));
Burnside v. Moser, 138 F. App’x 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (explaining that “[i]nmates
do not have a constitutionally protected right to the prison grievance process” and that “a state
grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional right upon prison inmates”
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). Accordingly, Williams’s claims against these
Defendants are not plausible and will be dismissed with prejudice.
E. Claims Based on Violation of ADA
Williams asserts claims under the ADA against all of the named Defendants. (See Compl.)
The Court understands these claims to be based on the refusal to issue Williams rigid braces for
his neck and wrists.6 To allege a plausible violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must assert
that (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability;” (2) he is being excluded from participation
in or being denied the benefits of some “services, programs, or activities,” by reason of his
disability; and (3) the entity which provides the service, program or activity is a public entity. See,
e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir.1998); Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 475 (D.N.J. 1998); Adelman v. Dunmire, No. 95-4039, 1997 WL 164240
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1997). To be considered a “qualified individual with a disability” under the
statute, a plaintiff must allege that he has a “disability” which is defined as “a physical or mental
6 Section 202 of the ADA provides:
Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12132. The United States Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA applies to
state prisons and inmates. Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-12 (1998) (noting
the phrase “services, programs, or activities” includes recreational, medical, educational, and
vocational prison programs).
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual. . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id.
at § 12102(2)(A). With the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act,
Congress declared that “[t]he definition of disability shall be construed in favor of broad coverage
of individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.” Pub. L.
No. 110–325, §§ 2(b)(1)-(6), 3(2)(a), § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555. Additionally, the ADAAA
requires a “less searching analysis” of whether a plaintiff is “substantially limited.” Kravits v.
Shinseki, No. 10–861, 2012 WL 604169, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012).
The proper defendant under a Title II claim is a public entity or an individual who controls
or directs the functioning of the public entity. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189
(3d Cir. 2002). Therefore, as an initial matter, any individual capacity ADA claims against the
Defendants must be dismissed with prejudice because they are not “public entities” within the
meaning of the ADA, nor is it alleged that any of these Defendants controls or directs the
functioning of an appropriately identified public entity. See Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of
Corr., 779 F. App’x 938, 942 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Kokinda’s claims for individual
damages liability under Title II of the ADA fail for the simple reason that there is no such
liability.”); Bowens v. Wetzel, 674 F. App’x 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“[T]he District
Court could have properly followed the holdings of those circuits which have concluded that there
is no individual damages liability under Title II of the ADA, which provides an additional basis to
affirm the dismissal of this claim.”).
Williams’s ADA claim, additionally, is not plausible as pled even if he had named an
appropriate public entity defendant. Although Williams broadly alleges that he was discriminated
against, he attributes the basis of the discrimination to cost-savings and “the Defendants’ own
personal prejudices against confined and indigent state prisoners” and not to any disability
associated with his neck or wrist conditions. (See Compl. at 21.) Additionally, he concedes that
when he requested an accommodation for his disability, it was granted, but not in the exact way
he desired since he was issued soft neck and wrist braces rather than rigid devices. (Id. at 15.)
The Defendants’ refusal to provide rigid neck and wrist braces, rather than soft braces are treatment
decisions and do not provide a basis for a plausible claim. Nunez v. Prime Care Health, Inc., No.
19-0859, 2019 WL 1400466, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2019) (“decisions about a prisoner’s
medical treatment generally do not give rise to a claim under the ADA,” citing cases); see also
Kokinda, 663 F. App’x at 159 (“The District Court was also correct to conclude . . . that Kokinda’s
ADA claims fail because the ADA prohibits disability-based discrimination, not inadequate
treatment for the disability.” (footnotes and internal quotations omitted)).
Additionally, monetary damages, such as those sought by Williams, are not available under
the ADA absent a showing of intentional discrimination. Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 181
(3d Cir. 2018)). “To prove intentional discrimination, an ADA claimant must prove at least
deliberate indifference, and to plead deliberate indifference, a claimant must allege (1) knowledge
that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be violated and (2) failure to act despite
that knowledge.” Id. (internal citation and ellipses deleted). A plaintiff can plead deliberate
indifference in two ways: “first, by alleging facts suggesting that the existing policies caused a
failure to adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiffs,’ or,
second, by alleging facts indicating that [plaintiff] could prove that the risk of cognizable harm
was so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure to respond will alone support finding
deliberate indifference.” Id. (internal quotation marks and ellipses deleted). Here, Williams has
not identified any policy that resulted in a failure to respond to situations such as that in which
Williams found himself, or, indeed, a failure to respond to any identified risk. To the contrary,
Williams successfully petitioned for an accommodation for his disability – he simply was not
satisfied with the accommodation provided.
Because amendment would not cure the deficiencies in Williams’s ADA claims, they will
be dismissed with prejudice. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108; Shane, 213 F.3d at 116.
F. State Law Claims
Williams asserts professional negligence claims against Defendants Huner and Does 1 and
2, and asserts negligence claims and claims for aiding and abetting professional malpractice
against Defendants Orlando, Hensley, Terra, Varner, Moore, Doe 3. (Compl. at 24.) Because the
Court has dismissed his federal claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any of Williams’s state law claims. Accordingly, the only independent
basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court
jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”
Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’
even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. This means that, unless there is
some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood,
592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the
state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain.
See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). “[T]he domicile of a prisoner
before his imprisonment presumptively remains his domicile during his imprisonment.” Pierro v.
Kugel, 386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish diversity of
citizenship, see Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc.
v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity cases, the
plaintiff must demonstrate complete diversity between the parties and that the amount in
controversy requirement has been met); Jackson v. Rosen, C.A. No. 20-2842, 2020 WL 3498131,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020).
Williams does not allege the citizenship of the parties. Rather, he provides only the address
of SCI Phoenix for himself, and SCI Phoenix or DOC business addresses for the Defendants.
(Compl. at 2-4.) All of the addresses are in Pennsylvania, which suggests that he and some, if not
all, of the Defendants may be Pennsylvania citizens. Accordingly, Williams has not sufficiently
alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over any of
the state law claims he intends to pursue. His state law claims will therefore be dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and without leave to amend. Instead, Williams
may pursue these claims in an appropriate state court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Williams leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Williams’s constitutional claims and his derivative supervisory liability claims, his
claims asserted under Title II of the ADA, his claims against Defendants Orlando, Hensley, Terra,
Varner, Moore, and Doe 3 based on their participation in the grievance process, his request for
declaratory and injunctive relief, and his official capacity claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
Williams’s state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, but without leave to amend.
An appropriate Order follows.